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0.1 – General introduction 
 
Since several years the society is showing an increasing concern about the development of 
sustainable and safe production processes. The growing competitiveness of the market caused 
an important acceleration in R&D activities, introducing new opportunities for the 
implementation of sustainable criteria in the design of industrial production processes. 
Therefore, the constraints and the priorities in the goals of the research and design activities 
were forced to change from the traditional ones, in particular in the chemical sector. In fact, 
till the 90s the key factors in process design concerned the overcoming of technological 
constraints and the sole economic optimization of the industrial operations. Instead, in the last 
decade the focus of design improvement shifted to the problem of coping with external 
constraints as environmental impact and process safety. Nowadays, the increasing aversion to 
technological risks of the society requires the development of inherently safer and 
environmental friendly processes, beside assuring the economic competitiveness of the 
industrial activity. The perspective of sustainability allows encompassing all these aspects at 
once. In fact, the impacts of a production process can be classified, according to sustainability 
assessment, as environmental, economic and societal. These very different forms of impacts, 
frequently characterized by reduction strategies in mutual disagreement, must be holistically 
taken into account by a proper balanced analysis in order to identify the optimal solutions in 
process design. Thus, a reliable decision support system is required to guide design activities, 
in particular for the development of new technologies, where significant risks may be 
overlooked due to a lack of previous experience (emerging risks). 
 
With respect to the conceptual definition of sustainability and inherent safety, the literature 
reports an extensive discussion of the strategies, as well as sets of specific principles and 
guidewords. However, in the absence of quantitative assessment tools, these are not sufficient 
to develop effective strategies for the improvement of process and plant performance. As a 
matter of fact, the application of the principles or guidewords may result in contradictory 
indications on some possible hazard reduction actions. Therefore, the development and the 
introduction of a metric and of quantitative assessment tools is a necessary step in order to 
effectively introduce inherent safety and sustainability criteria in process and plant design. 
Technical quantitative tools for development of sustainable processes and for the 
implementation of inherent safety principles in the design activities still need work to be fully 
defined. Several methodologies and techniques were proposed, mostly derived from a 
reorientation of traditional tools used in process engineering. However, these are poorly 
interfaced in an integrated system. The introduction of sustainability approaches in the 
practice of design (both conceptual and basic) and of process optimization is still a problem 
because of the specific characteristics of these design activities: limits in the amount and 
detail of the available information should be considered; the parameters actually measurable 
should be identified; time factor should be accounted; resorting to subjective or expert 
judgement in the analysis should be restrained. Current literature approaches are not fully 
suitable for applications that satisfy all these constraints. For instance, traditional risk 
assessment techniques rely on historical data and experience with risks (the lagging risk 
indicators used in e.g. assessment of environmental impact, quantitative risk analysis, etc.), 
and are therefore not always applicable to analyse early stages of process design. There is, 
thus, a need for a more pro-active approach on risk management. The development of leading 
risk indicators for performance assessment, to be used instead of or in combination with the 
traditional lagging risk indictors, is a key issue in this field. Moreover, comprehensive 
integrated approaches are required to limit the possibility of risk shift: the implementation of 
actions effective in the improvement of one aspect of the risk (e.g. inherent safety) may cause 
the uncontrolled increase of other risks (e.g. the environmental risk due to the process). In 
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particular, the clustering of the different quantitative indicators to a limited number of 
integrated indices is a critical point. 
With regard to inherent safety assessment, existing methods are mainly based on empirical 
indexes. Moreover, they are concerned only with the selection of process alternatives during 
the conceptual stages of the lifecycle of process design (type of substances, selection of the 
catalyst and of solvents, etc.), while scarce attention is paid to the assessment of the possible 
options available in the other stages of project lifecycle, as in basic design or in lay-out 
definition. As a matter of fact, it has been recognized that the actions aimed to inherent safety 
improvement must focus not only on initial phases of process design, but also to all the initial 
phases of the different stages of the design lifecycle (process design, flow-sheet definition, 
P&ID definition, etc.). However, the different kind of information available in any of these 
stages requires the introduction of a modulated approach to inherent safety, that is not 
currently available. 
 
The present work is aimed at the development of supporting tools for integrated industrial 
process design, specifically dedicated to the chemical industry or to industrial processes in 
which substances dangerous for humans and environment are used or stored. 
The tools will be mainly devoted to the application in the stages of conceptual and basic 
design, for two main reasons. On one hand, the usual techniques of project management 
recognize in these stages a higher number of degrees of freedom. Thus, during conceptual and 
basic design it is still acceptable to consider and assess various and different technical 
solutions, also due to the reduced impact of the activity on the overall project costs. On the 
other hand, especially in the stage of conceptual design, the availability of a decision support 
system would be strategic to successfully address the decision process during design 
activities, that is too often only committed to unverified expert judgment. 
The ultimate goal of current work is, thus, the development of a decision support system for 
conceptual design and basic design. In particular, a portfolio of tools, devoted to the analysis 
and assessment of process inventory, of process flow diagrams, and of preliminary plant lay-
out, will be developed. The decision support system will be based on the use of a system of 
leading key performance indicators (KPIs), which will assure the assessment of economic, 
societal and environmental impacts of the process (referred to as the sustainability profile of 
the process). The integrated sustainability assessment will include both a normalization 
procedure, aimed to introduce in the analysis site-specific issues, and an aggregation 
procedure that will allow accounting for specific targets in the management policy of the site 
and of the surrounding area. 
Particular attention will be devoted to the development of reliable criteria and tools for the 
assessment of inherent safety. The implementation of inherent safety in design activity is 
worth both for itself, since it leads to systems with a reduced hazard level, and as a key 
element for sustainable process development, since it can be linked to the social dimension of 
sustainability. A set of tools suitable for quantitative assessment of inherent safety in different 
stages of the process design was developed in current work. 
 
The work was divided in 4 main sections: 
• Section 1 provides an introduction to the approaches for implementation of 
sustainability in design activity. A novel procedure developed for the definition and 
comparison of the quantitative sustainability profile for alternative process options is 
also described. The developed method is suitable for application as integrated decision 
support tool in early stages of process design. 
• Section 2 describes a portfolio of innovative tools for inherent safety quantitative 
assessment. The tools cover the specific aspects of different stages of process design 
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(material selection, process definition, plant design, layout definition). Objective 
criteria (e.g. expected possible consequence of accidents) were adopted in the 
definition of the methods. The methods provide a comprehensive support to the 
implementation of inherent safety principles in design stages previously poorly 
explored and a reliable indicator for societal aspects related to safety in the 
sustainability assessment. 
• Section 3 presents the results of an experimental survey aimed at exploring aspects 
related to the inherent safety of materials. In particular the thermal stability and the 
formation of hazardous decomposition products was studied. The activity was focused 
on the application of suitable experimental protocols for the analysis of isomers of 
chlorinated and non-chlorinated nitrobenzaldehyde. 
• Section 4 reports several case studies demonstrating the application of the developed 
methodologies. Moreover the case studies worked as validation tests for the methods, 
proving the ability to identify the expected critical issue of each case. The case studies 
concern the analysis of options for the production of chemicals (cyclohexanone, 
hydrogen), storage of materials (hydrogen), preparation and finishing of fine 
chemicals, disposal of wastes (electronic boards, exhausted solvents), hazard 
assessment of materials, layout definition for plant and storage farms. 
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§1.0 - Introduction 
 
In the last twenty years the chemical and process industry has been actively committed in 
reducing its impacts on the planet, aiming at the limitation of the environmental burdens and 
at the use of renewable resources. More recently, these actions were incorporated in a holistic 
perspective, referred to as sustainability, that promotes a common systematic approach to the 
investigation of economic, societal and environmental performances. The adoption of a 
sustainable behaviour is nowadays a core issue for process industry, representing the effective 
answer to problems like societal acceptability, pressure on the environment, efficiency, safety, 
etc. The development of specific guidelines and tools is required to effectively address 
sustainability at the different  scales of industrial activity. 
The design stages of production processes and plants strongly influence the sustainability 
profile of new installations. Process design activities are conventionally divided in several 
stages (conceptual design, basic design, detailed design, design of operative procedures). In 
particular, the early stages of the design (i.e. conceptual and basic process design) show a 
great potential for implementation of sustainability concepts, provided that adequate tools are 
available for the assessment. While several tools were introduced to support a life cycle 
approach to product and process design, the availability of widely accepted quantitative 
assessment tools providing a specific support to process design is still limited. 
 
The present section aims at the development of an assessment tool specifically addressed to 
be used as a design support system. The tool will provide a quantitative sustainability metric 
for decision-making and improvement-assessing. The developed tool will be fully applicable 
since the early stages of design and it will include all the relevant aspects for the assessment 
of sustainability profile.  
In §1.1.1 the basic principles underlying sustainability of industrial processes are reviewed. In 
§1.1.2 the existing quantitative approaches to sustainability assessment in industrial activities 
are discussed with respect to the applicability to process design support systems. In §1.2 the 
innovative procedure developed in current study is described in all its parts. Complementary 
information on the definition of normalization and weighting factors are presented in 
Appendix 1.1. The main conclusions on the section are briefly drawn in §1.3. 
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1.1 – Background 
 
1.1.1 – Introduction to Sustainability 
 
Sustainability aims to a balanced and respectful way to conduce human activities, so they can 
be maintained indefinitely. It is popular to define not the sustainability itself, but the 
collection of dynamic processes and activities that evolve in accordance to sustainability: this 
is the sustainable development. The well-known definition of this, from the Brundtland 
Commission - formally, the World Commission on Environment and Development [WCED, 
1987] - is the development that "meets the needs of the present generation without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." 
The natural resources of the Earth, in their broader sense, are limited in quantity and, once 
depleted, have their specific regeneration rates. This observation is the rationale of shifting to 
a development model that interfaces human activities with the Earth in a sustainable way, in 
order to allow long-term coexistence and prosperity. 
In the analysis of sustainability of a system three main domains or spheres are identified as to 
require comprehensive addressing (triple bottom line): environment, economy and society. 
 
As a matter of facts, human activities interest the whole crust and atmosphere of the Earth. 
Thus sustainability must account for the whole Earth system. However, in a complex system, 
the global performance deepens both on the performance of the single parts and on their 
interaction. Each part can be further divided in smaller elements and the procedure can be 
repeated. Sikdar [2003] identifies 4 system scales for the application of sustainability: 
 
1. Global concerns or problems (e.g. global warming, ozone depletion, biodiversity, 
etc.): global treaties and agreements are effective tools on this scale. 
2. Systems characterized by geographical boundaries: competencies about civil and 
environmental engineering, ecology, hydrology, urban planning, law and economics 
should act to address sustainability into this scale. 
3. Business either localized or distributed: sustainability can be practiced by creating 
material and energetic exchange networks, reducing energy intensity, adopting cleaner 
technologies, recycling by-products, creating a safe and comfortable environment for 
employees. 
4. Sustainable technologies: these are the technologies aimed at providing economic 
values and services through clean procedure/devices. 
 
Operative tools and drivers are required to implement sustainability in each one of those 
scales. In the present study, the focus will be mainly on the last two levels of scale, since they 
are the ones of relevance for process and chemical engineering. However the connection with 
larger scales (global and geographical) will be a distinctive element in making the 
sustainability of technologies effective (see §1.2.4 and §1.2.5). 
Being more specific, the focus of present study is on the design activity in the process and 
chemical industry. In fact, the design of a facility defines the sustainable performance of the 
technology, both as stand-alone (“sustainable technology” scale) and as interacting with other 
entities all across the temporal and spatial lifecycle (“business” scale and fallouts on larger 
scales). 
 
Table 1.1.1 reports a brief list of guidelines, principles and conceptual tools that are suitable 
to provide theoretical support for the application of sustainability in process industry. 
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The Natural Step principles [TNS, WP] 
The Earth Charter principles [TEC, WP] 
The Hanover principles [THP, WP] 
The CERES (Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies) principles [CERES, WP] 
Industrial Ecology [Garner & Keoleian, 1995] 
Green Chemistry [Anastas & Kirchhoff, 2002] 
Green Engineering [Abraham & Nguyen, 2003] 
Life Cycle Thinking [Allen & Shonnard, 2002] 
Design for the Environment [DfE, WP] 
 
Table 1.1.1: List of guidelines providing theoretical support for the application of 
sustainability in process industry. 
 
 
These guidelines were analysed and three common key-concept that characterize 
sustainability were identified: 
• Holism: a system must be considered as a whole. A comprehensive and balanced 
perspective must be adopted with regard to the possible different point of view. The 
interactions of the system with the surroundings and the extension over time and space 
must be accounted. Analysis addressing a single aspect of the system must be avoided. 
Examples of holism are life-cycle thinking, combination of environment, economy 
and society in a tripe bottom line, “risk-shift” avoiding, etc. 
• Inherency: the embedded proprieties of a system should be accounted, selected, 
designed and preferred. System should match their function without negatively 
affecting any other concern. Examples span from materials (safe, recyclable, bio-
degradable, etc.), to processes (atom efficient, stable, safe, waste and by-product free, 
exploit renewable sources, etc.), to design for sustainable use and recycle phase (safe 
in use, requiring limited utilities/intervention for use and maintenance, safely 
disposable/recyclable, etc.). 
• Integration: any system or element interacts with other systems. Systems must be 
designed to take advantage from such interactions, resulting in a shared and mutually 
profitable use of material energy and services and minimizing waste and inefficient 
use of resources. Industrial ecology, recycle and reuse policies, elimination of the 
concept of “waste” are example of this key-concept. 
 
For sake of reference, a brief description of some of the principles and conceptual tools cited 
is reported in the following. For further details see the cited literature. Inherent safety will be 
extensively discussed in §2. 
 
 
1.1.1.1 – Green Chemistry and Green Engineering 
 
Green chemistry aims at the design of chemicals and of synthesis routes that are safe and that 
reduce or eliminate the formation of undesired materials and by-products. The approach is of 
particular concern among chemists and industrial chemists, but quite obviously extends its 
fallouts on all the competencies in the chemical and process industry. 
Green chemistry features guidelines for the identification of chemical route and reactants. 
These are expressed through a collection of principles [Anastas & Kirchhoff, 2002]: 
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1. Prevent waste  
2. Maximize atom economy 
3. Design less hazardous chemical syntheses  
4. Design safer chemicals and products  
5. Use safer solvents and reaction conditions  
6. Increase energy efficiency 
7. Use renewable feedstock  
8. Avoid chemical derivatives  
9. Use catalysts, not stoichiometric reagents  
10. Design chemicals and products to degrade after use  
11. Analyze in real time to prevent pollution  
12. Minimize the potential for accidents 
 
Green chemistry has found a significant popularity among chemists and industrial chemists. 
To quote a few examples, outcomes of green chemistry concern the use o renewable raw 
materials [Anastas & Kirchhoff, 2002], the identification of atom efficient reactions [Trost, 
2002], the development of solvent-free synthesis [DeSimone, 2002; Allen & Shonnard, 
2002], the use of supercritical solvents [DeSimone, 2002] and the development of innovative 
synthesis routes [Allen & Shonnard, 2002; Bose et al., 2002; Trost, 2002]. 
 
Green chemistry alone is not sustainable chemistry. Though green chemistry is a good 
application of the inherency concept, the sustainability of an industrial chemical process is 
influenced also by design choices pertaining the scale-up of the laboratory chemical reaction. 
This introduces a number of further issues to be taken into account with regard to economic, 
environmental and social aspects. 
 
Green engineering is the design, commercialization, and use of processes and products, which 
are feasible and economical while minimizing the generation of pollution at the source and 
the risk to human health and the environment. The green engineering encompasses all the 
branches of engineering activity, but is particular suitable for process engineering [Abraham 
& Nguyen, 2003; Anastas & Zimmerman, 2003]. 
 
The principles of green engineering can be listed as follows [Abraham & Nguyen, 2003]: 
 
1. Engineer processes and products holistically, use systems analysis, and integrate 
environmental impact assessment tools.  
2. Conserve and improve natural ecosystems while protecting human health and well-
being.  
3. Use life-cycle thinking in all engineering activities.  
4. Ensure that all material and energy inputs and outputs are as inherently safe and 
benign as possible.  
5. Minimize depletion of natural resources.  
6. Strive to prevent waste.  
7. Develop and apply engineering solutions, while being cognizant of local geography, 
aspirations, and cultures.  
8. Create engineering solutions beyond current or dominant technologies; improve, 
innovate, and invent (technologies) to achieve sustainability.  
9. Actively engage communities and stakeholders in development of engineering 
solutions.  
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The principles are intended for engineers to use as a guidance in the design or redesign of 
products and processes within the constraints dictated by business, government and society 
such as cost, safety, performance and environmental impact. The vision provided by the 
principles is broad, outlining a similar perspective in addressing problems of different nature. 
 
 
1.1.1.2 – Industrial ecology 
 
Industrial processes are not stand-alone entities, but are connected one-another by material 
and energetic exchanges. The idea of industrial ecology is to optimize those exchanges 
making them efficient both from the ecological and economic sides [Garner & Keoleian, 
1995; Stanley & Manahan, 1999]. It is essentially a system approach to the problem. Clearly 
enough the issues identified on the whole system scale should be reported to specific action in 
the design of the facilities (“Think globally, act locally” [Garner & Keoleian, 1995]). 
 
Industrial ecology is named after the science of ecology, that studies the dynamic links among 
single organisms and their environment, accounting for physiologic feedbacks, population 
structure and dynamics, material and energy exchanges in the system, interaction and 
organization. Similarly industrial ecology studies the interactions among industrial facilities 
in the industrial systems and between the system and the surrounding environment. 
Ecological systems are closed and fully-integrated systems, where a dynamic equilibrium 
exists. Materials and energy are continuously recycled and reused by the units of the system: 
wastes of an organism are the substrate for another. The only external contribution is a 
renewable source of energy, typically the sun. Feedback control systems exist to maintain the 
dynamic equilibrium of the system. 
Industrial ecology strive to obtain the same for industrial systems, in order to reach the same 
proprieties of sustainability of the natural ecosystems. Closed material and energy cycles 
should be created. The fluxes among the components of the industrial system (industrial 
metabolism) should be completely integrated. A key element in industrial ecology is the 
elimination of the concept of “waste”. Waste is something that is not useful in any way and 
has to be disposed in order to be eliminated. According to industrial ecology wastes should 
not exist (or be largely reduced), since the unused streams of a process will be profitably 
exploited by some other system. 
Of course integration of industrial processes poses problems with respect to the market issues, 
since links together industries with different demand of goods. Thus flexibility and 
redundancy of possible sources and sinks should be designed in order to let the system 
survive the single units. Moreover a continuous management and innovation/upgrade is 
required to maintain the dynamic equilibrium. 
 
Some examples of real application of an industrial symbiosis already exist in the word. The 
most famous is Kalundborg, Denmark, where a network of connections and shared utilities 
links a power plant, a refinery, a plasterboard producer, a biotechnological industry, the 
nearby municipality, the farming activities, a cement industry, a sulphuric acid producer, fish 
farms and greenhouses. Another example can be found in the Gulf Coast of USA where a 
network exists between industries processing chlorine compounds [Allen & Shonnard, 2002]. 
Further examples can be found in some European countries [Green & Randles, 2006; Garner 
& Keoleian, 1995]. 
The industrial symbiosis, in the general meaning, should involve different types of industrial 
activities. However, material and energy integration is in the culture of chemical industry 
since the oils crises. Heat and Material Exchange Networks (HEN and MEN) have been 
object of study and optimization, especially in oil-downstream and base chemical industry. 
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The creation of chemical and petrochemical industrial areas is another example of the natural 
tendency of integration in this industrial sector. Despite integration has always been pursuit in 
chemical industry, the present goal is to optimize the integrated system not only from the 
economic point of view, but including the environmental and the general sustainability 
perspective. 
 
 
1.1.1.3 – Life-Cycle Thinking 
 
The idea of lifecycle originates from comparing the “story” of a human-made object to the 
cycle of live beings: birth (creation/production), life (operation/use) and death 
(decommissioning/disposal). Any of the phases of the lifecycle involves interaction with the 
surrounding environment (exchange of materials, energy, release of emissions, generation of 
wastes, etc.). In particular they may involve the use of other goods (e.g. components for the 
production, energy for the use phase, means for transportation, etc.). Thus the analysis of the 
life-cycle of the base object may be extended to consider the lifecycle these goods as well. 
Eventually a complete lifecycle may extend from the extraction of the very raw materials (the 
“cradle”) to the final disposal of non recyclable wastes (the “grave”). 
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Figure 1.1.1: Product and process lifecycles. 
 
 
Lifecycle concept is usually applied to a product, e.g. manufacturing, but also processes have 
their own lifecycle (Figure 1.1.1). The two are interrelated, since the impacts of the 
production of the product and of all the upstream phases of product lifecycle are defined by 
the production process. On the other hand, the product design influence the production 
procedure to fabricate it. Process design is thus a key stage in defining the impacts of 
production as well as of plant erection and decommissioning. The designer should be able to 
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account all the phases of the lifecycle. In particular, this involve the responsibility of designer 
on impacts deriving from the operations that are outside of his direct control on the project. In 
fact, design activities should optimize the whole lifecycle and not only the current project 
[Allen & Shonnard, 2002]. 
 
The operational counterpart of the life-cycle concept is the Life Cycle Analysis (LCA), a 
comprehensive and detailed study of the life-cycle. The procedure is defined in ISO 14040 to 
14047. The first step of an LCA is the identification of the scope of the analysis; this defines 
the quality of the data required and, thus, the information and time necessary to accomplish it. 
The choice of the functional unit is an immediate consequence of the scope. The functional 
unit is the reference basis of the assessment. It is named after the idea that it should represent 
the function rather than the object itself: this allow easy comparison among LCA for items 
that are different, but fulfill the same ultimate function (e.g. plastic and paper shop-bags have 
different carrying capacities, number of reuses, weights, etc. so they can be compared 
effectively only with respect to absolving a certain function, e.g. carrying once a week a 
certain amount of shop-purchases). 
The next step of LCA is the most time consuming, the compilation of the Life-Cycle Inventory 
(LCI): this is the list of all the material and energy fluxes entering or leaving the borders 
identified for the analysis. The values identified in this phase depend on the assumptions 
made in the definition of the scope and boundaries. The LCI may include a large number of 
items,  in relation to the size of the lifecycle studied and of the classification that is made of 
the single  fluxes. LCI are affected by availability and quality of the data reported. In 
particular when auxiliary processes or processes far away from the direct control of the 
analyst are studied, the gathering of information may rely on estimation and generic data 
reported by databases. As a consequence not all the studies have the same level of detail, 
extension of the boundaries or requirement of data quality. These elements are instead tailor-
made according to the scope of the analysis and the availability of data. 
Allocation is used when co-products are originated beside the one corresponding to the 
functional unit of interest. Allocation strategies may vary in function of the scope of the 
analysis: allocation of the items of the LCI for a mix of products can be done according to the 
commercial values, the mass or other criteria. Another option, used mainly for co-products 
have alternative ways of production, is the calculation of avoided fluxes, that corresponds at 
subtracting in the LCI the fluxes of the alternative production, which were “avoided” in by the 
adoption of the analysed lifecycle. 
The information contained in the LCI is elaborated in the step of Life-Cycle Impact 
Assessment, where indicators and indices are usually calculated in order to summarize the 
quantitative information required by the scope of the analysis (e.g. assessment of greenhouse 
gases emissions, analysis of energy consumption, analysis of overall environmental impact). 
Many different approach were proposed for the life-cycle impact assessment; some of them 
are detailed and discussed in §1.1.2. However these indices usually refer to environmental 
impacts, though proposals for the inclusion of economic and societal aspects can be found in 
the literature [Dhillon, 1989; LCWE, WSa]. 
The last step of an LCI is the improvement analysis or interpretation step. The results of the 
study are analysed and used to propose improvement of the lifecycle, in accordance to the 
initial scopes. 
 
 
1.1.2 – Quantitative Assessment of Process Sustainability 
 
The theoretical principles of sustainability reported in §1.1.1 point out the role of the design 
phase in defining the sustainability of the process. In particular early design stages of process 
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show a great potential for the implementation of sustainability, since they define some core 
elements for the impact of production all over the lifecycle. 
 
The principles of sustainability provide theoretical support and inspiration, but do not help an 
effective implementation of sustainability in the design activities. The practice of design 
requires the availability of adequate support tools for the quantitative assessment of the 
sustainability performance. These tools should be swift in application and able to cope the 
quality of available/estimable data during the design activity (in particular in early stages of 
design). 
 
Although many significant efforts were made in this direction, the availability of widely 
accepted quantitative assessment tools suitable for supporting process design activities is still 
limited. 
In the following a brief literature review of the principal quantitative tools that share elements 
applicable in supporting process design for sustainability is presented. 
 
 
Environmental 
aspects
Societal 
aspects
Economic 
aspects
Socio-economic 
indicators
Eco-efficiency 
indicators
Socio-ecological 
indicators
Sustainability 
indicators
 
 
Figure 1.1.2: Sustainability as combination of three spheres. 
 
 
Some Authors [Gonzales & Smith, 2003; Sikdar, 2003b] identified sustainability indicators in 
the evaluation of a set of critical parameters directly related to the process (non-renewable 
energy consumption, consumption of non-renewable raw materials, waste production, water 
use, CO2 emission, yield, value creation, etc.). Though these parameters are the ones that 
define the sustainability profile of the process, the connection between their value and the 
impact of the process is not straightforward. Thus the size of positive effects on sustainability 
of marginal improvements on some of those parameters is difficult to recognize.  
 
The indicators for the assessment of the impacts are usually calculated elaborating the raw 
process data. Several approaches were proposed in the literature to assess process 
sustainability by specific metrics or by a set of representative indicators [IChemE, 2002b]. 
However, most of these methodologies specifically address a single aspect of the problem 
(e.g. material and energy flow analysis [Sikdar, 2003], exergy flows [Heui-seok et al., 2004; 
Jorge & Bhavik, 2004], specific potential impacts through midpoint environmental indicators 
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[Allen & Shonnard, 2002; IPPC, 2006], endpoint environmental indicators derived from Life-
Cycle Analysis [Allen & Shonnard, 2002; Chen et al., 2002; Goedkoop & Spriensma, 2001; 
ISO 14040-43; Pennington et al., 2000]), not featuring a complete and comprehensive 
assessment of the system. 
 
Although a set of metrics for single aspects can be used to show the fingerprint of a system, 
comprehensive indexes are preferred for several applications, like optimization or decision-
making. Numerical aggregation is usually proposed to obtain a single quantitative indicator of 
process performance that includes the different issues relevant to sustainability [Chen et al., 
2002; Goedkoop & Spriensma, 2001; ISO, 14040-43; Saling et al., 2002]. However, the need 
to compare indicators of different nature, the completeness of their set and the subjective 
judgment in the aggregation process are critical and still need to be thoroughly investigated 
[Sikdar, 2003]. 
Nevertheless various methods have been proposed to support the aggregation, as reported by 
Chen [Chen & Shonnard, 2004] (e.g. analytic hierarchy process [Satty, 1980], multi-attribute 
utility theory [Keeney & Raiffa, 1976], etc.). The problems relevant to the aggregation of 
indicators of different nature are only formally avoided in other approaches which use a 
common metric for all the elements involved (e.g. economic measures, exergy, emergy, etc. 
[Figge & Hahn, 2004; Heui-seok et al., 2004; Jorge & Bhavik, 2004]), since a criteria must 
be stated to measure the different issues through the common unit of measurement. 
 
The concept of life cycle is central in sustainability assessment. However the conventional 
tools devoted to life cycle assessment (LCA) [ISO 14040] are not practically applicable to 
support process design. In fact a wide amount of data on the entire lifecycle (well apart from 
the process section to be designed) is required and the procedure can became significantly 
time consuming. The conventional applications of LCA is limited to the assessment of 
environmental impacts and no site-specific considerations are usually included, since the life 
cycle involves sources which are usually spatially spread. More recently, approaches 
accounting for lifecycle costs and societal impacts were proposed [Dhillon, 1989; LCWE, 
WSa]. Nevertheless, the indicators used in an LCA are not directly suitable for the analysis of 
the very specific features of process design assessment, that needs a dedicated approach. 
 
 BASF developed an eco-efficiency analysis tool that accounts for several categories of 
environmental and economic impact and that is based on the aggregation of the indices in a 
modular scheme that allows the comparison of alternatives [Landsiedel & Saling, 2002; 
Saling et al., 2002; Shonnard et al., 2003]. The methodology was later extended to consider 
societal impacts (SEEBalance). However the societal upgrade considers indicators mainly 
linked to the facility management (e.g. working conditions, local community) and to issues 
related to the entire lifecycle (e.g. child labour), fairly related to process design choices. 
Moreover, the use of internal normalization in the procedure may introduce biases in the 
assessment that somehow limit the suitability of the results for decision making. 
 
A further approach was proposed by Narodoslawsky [Krotscheck & Narodoslawsky, 1996; 
Narodoslawsky & Krotscheck, 2000], that suggested to base sustainability assessment on the 
estimation of the required area for process operability under sustainable conditions. This 
method is widely applicable and apparently avoids the issues related to normalization and 
weighting, although also in this case societal and economic aspects may not be easily 
integrated in the procedure. 
 
Several assessment tools were promoted by EPA for supporting the development of greener 
processes. The Tool for the Reduction and Assessment of Chemical and Other Environmental 
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Impacts (TRACI) [Bare et al., 2003], presents a wide set of environmental indicators for the 
analysis of industrial processes. However the assessment is limited to environmental aspects 
and aggregation is avoided. The Waste Reduction Algorithm (WAR) [Mallick et al., 1996; 
Young et al., 2000] proposes an aggregation strategy of the environmental indicators. 
However, a broad and organic coverage of all the sustainability domains is still missing.  
 
Shonnard and co-workers [Chen et al., 2002, 2003; Chen & Shonnard, 2004] proposed and 
discussed the optimization of chemical processes for as concern economic and environmental 
performance. Their approach resort to a multi-criteria aggregation approach similar to the one 
discussed in the following. However no site-specific values are defined in the normalization 
of the indicators. The final aggregation of the economic and environmental indexes (no 
societal aspects are considered) is based on internal normalization and weight factors are 
evaluated there by AHP. These practices may introduce biases in the results, especially 
considering highly result-sensitive applications as design optimization. 
 
Summarizing, the review of the literature evidenced the following features: 
 
i) a dedicated approach is required for sustainability assessment in process design; 
ii) specific indicators are necessary to match the information detail of early design 
stages; 
iii) no specific methods encompassing all the sustainability aspects exist; 
iv) combination and comparison of different indicators are critical element due to the 
possible introduction of biases and is not included in all the literature methods. 
 
The methods proposed in the current work of thesis aims at filling these gaps. Elements from 
previous widely-accepted literature approaches (e.g. the general framework and some of the 
impact indices) will be included in the developed methods whenever possible, in order to 
make them consistent to the established practice. However, several new elements will be 
specifically developed, as discussed in the following of present text. 
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1.2 Proposed Assessment Method 
 
1.2.1 Overview of the method 
 
In this chapter a new sustainability assessment method is described. The developed procedure 
is specifically aimed at the quantitative assessment in the comparison of the impact on 
sustainability of process and plant options. The method is intended to be a tool within a 
design support system, accordingly to the general goals of the current work. As a 
consequence, the procedure is especially developed to be applicable with the limited amount 
of data available in early stages of process design (i.e. conceptual and basic design). 
Moreover, it is focused on assessing the aspects of sustainability that are influenced by design 
decisions in these stages of the process lifecycle. 
The proposed methodology is aimed at identifying the best design alternative among a set of 
given options and to provide information on critical sustainability issues of the proposed 
options. The procedure is based on a classical multi-criteria analysis, but encompasses several 
innovative elements. 
In particular, a comprehensive set of sustainability impact indicators addressing individual 
process performances in all the spheres of sustainability was defined. The indicators were 
chosen in order to match the data usually available in the early stages of process design. The 
indicators were either selected from widely accepted literature approaches, if suitable, or were 
developed within the present study. In particular, a specific method was developed to include 
inherent safety issues among the relevant sustainability parameters. Inherent safety, despite 
being a key element in sustainability, is seldom explicitly considered by other assessment 
approaches. 
Innovative reference criteria were developed to compare and aggregate the impact indicators 
on the basis of the actual site-specific impact burden and sustainability policy. On the one 
hand this links the assessment of the process to the general sustainability management of the 
site and, on the other hand, it allows a straightforward comparison and aggregation of aspects 
belonging to economic, societal and environmental spheres. The proposed procedure resulted 
in a simple and flexible tool, that allows a straightforward application to practical situations. 
 
The methodology consist of four main steps (Figure 1.2.1): 
1. the selection of a common reference basis for the definition of compared options 
2. the definition of a system of quantitative indicators 
3. the development of a specific procedure for the normalization of the indicators 
4. the aggregation of the indicators to define a final set of sustainability indices suitable 
for a comparative assessment of design options 
 
In the following, the detail of each step of the procedure is described. The procedure is 
demonstrated by the application to several case-studies in Section 4. Some of the case-studies, 
as explained in Section 4, were also preliminary used to validate the method, checking the 
applicability and the ability to identify expected results. 
 
 
1.2.2 Definition of the process alternatives 
 
The starting point of the procedure is the definition, the characterization and the collection of 
the quantitative data necessary for the analysis of the possible process or plant option. 
The effective comparison of different alternatives requires the specification of criteria to 
define common reference basis and common boundaries to be considered in the analysis. 
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Figure 1.2.1: Flow diagram of the procedure developed for sustainability assessment. 
 
 
A common reference basis may be easily introduced considering the same production 
potentiality for the different process alternatives. In the present framework, production 
potentiality may be defined as: i) the production rate of the main product of the process (e.g. 
the tons/year of ammonia for an ammonia production process); or ii) if the process is not 
aimed to obtain a product of interest but to the treatment of a raw material (e.g. the disposal of 
a waste), the amount of raw material processed. In case of multiple valuable products, the 
problem of allocation is generally avoided in current procedure by proper choices in the 
material flow assessment (see 1.2.3). If that is not possible, typical allocation rules used in 
LCA studies [Allen & Shonnard, 2002] can be followed. 
The reference basis is the analogous to the functional unit of an LCA [ISO 14040]. However, 
for the current goals, the identification of the reference basis is generally more straightforward 
than in the typical life cycle analysis, since in the chemical and process industry it may be 
easily identified in the flow-rate of a key stream leaving (i.e. final product) or entering (i.e. 
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stream to be treated) the process. Thus, in order to have the same reference basis for all 
process alternatives, the flow rate and the composition of the key stream (i.e. the potential of 
the process) must be the same for all the alternatives. 
The boundaries of the alternatives must be defined consistently among the options. The goal 
of the assessment is to analyze different design option for a process facility in a given site. 
Thus the boundaries of the analysis should be limited to installations present in the site. As a 
consequence, they should include the main process (i.e. the core process that is the central 
focus of the design activity and, consequently, of the analysis) as well as the on-site utilities 
that are necessary for the main process to operate (e.g. boilers for steam production, nitrogen 
separation facilities, wastewater treatments, etc.). The utilities must be accounted even if 
outside process design limits (e.g. utilities may be already in place, or may be designed 
independently since not dedicated only to a single process). However, in the analysis of the 
utilities, only the impacts allocable to the main process should be considered. For instance, an 
utility producing a material stream used by several facilities/section of a plant (e.g. steam), 
should be accounted only for the fraction of the stream employed by the process of interest. 
The boundaries of the alternatives do not include the analysis the upstream and/or 
downstream operations not realized in the site under analysis. This correspond to a “gate to 
gate” analysis, in the LCA nomenclature [ISO 14040]. However the effect of the upstream 
and downstream operations is not fully neglected, but it is accounted through the assessment 
of input and output streams (indexes in the group resource consumption). This allows limiting 
to a practical and acceptable level the information input required in the analysis (see next 
section), while retaining the central value that belongs to life cycle perspective in the 
sustainability assessment. 
 
Category Data 
Process Simplified process flow diagram (list of units and characterization of process streams) 
 Energy input/output data 
 Raw materials flow rate, composition, temperature and pressure 
 Products, Co-products and by-products flow rate, composition, temperature and pressure 
 Waste streams / effluents flow rate, composition, temperature and pressure 
 Fugitive emissions estimated rates and composition 
 Hazardous proprieties of substances (flammability, instability, reactivity, toxicity) 
 Operating conditions of equipment units (pressure and temperature) 
 Preliminary definition of equipment types and geometry (taxonomy) 
 Preliminary estimation of equipment inventories (quantity and average composition) 
Economic Preliminary estimate of capital cost 
 Cost of raw materials 
 Value of products 
 Value or cost of disposal of co-products and by-products 
 Number of employees 
 Labour cost 
 
Table 1.2.1: List of Data required for the application of the sustainability assessment 
procedure. 
 
 
The data required to analyze each process alternative are summarized in Table 1.2.1. The 
method was specifically developed in order to allow the assessment in the early stages of 
process design (conceptual and basic design) that are notoriously critical with respect to this 
aspect. In the following a brief description of each data group of the table and suggestions on 
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the tools to support data definition/estimation in the early stages of process design are 
provided. 
 
i) Simplified process flow diagram (PFD). A diagram reporting the process equipment and 
the general flow patterns of the streams in the alternative. It is a core part of the definition and 
design of the alternative itself. The required information for the definition of the PFD may be 
obtained in early stages of design integrating the engineering practice/experience of the 
designer by the analysis of process literature and patents. 
ii) Input/output material data. These are quantitative data on the flow rate, composition, 
temperature and pressure of the streams entering and leaving the boundaries of the process. 
The streams of raw materials, co-products and by-products, waste streams/effluents and 
fugitive emissions have to be accounted. Data on these streams, if not implicit in the process 
design, can be easily evaluated by material and energy balances or resorting to emission 
factors (in particular for micro-pollutants or fugitive emissions) from specific emission 
databases or reported in the literature. Several tools may be interfaced with the discussed 
methodology in order to support the collection of input/output material data. These include 
process simulation software (e.g. HYSYS) and tools for the evaluation of process emissions 
(e.g. FIRE [EPA,WPa], fugitive emission estimation methods [Allen & Shonnard, 2002], 
ChemSTEER [EPA,WPb], etc.). Besides the material flows across the boundaries defined for 
the analysis, a preliminary evaluation of the main streams among the process units is required 
for inherent safety assessment. 
iii) Input/output energy flow data. These data concern the useful energy flows entering or 
leaving the process boundaries. Thus, for instance, thermal energy dispersed in the 
environment is not accounted. As a matter of fact, these data include the evaluation of electric 
power and of thermal power exchanged with other users/suppliers (e.g. use of waste heat from 
another plant) outside of process boundaries. These data may be typically obtained in the 
early design stages of process design by material and energy balances; process simulation 
software may be used to support the evaluation. 
iv) Operating conditions of equipment units. The definition of pressure and temperature in 
each equipment units is deeply related to the definition of the process alternative itself. Data 
can be obtained from the process literature and patents, as well as by material and energy 
balances. 
v) Preliminary equipment taxonomy. It consists in a preliminary definition of the type of 
equipment used for each unit operation in the process. In particular, the definition of the 
geometry (shape and volume) of each unit is important for the identification of the inherent 
safety profile of the unit, characterizing both unit robustness (failure modes and their 
likelihood) and release potential. Furthermore, the definition of the equipment present 
supports the evaluation of capital costs. This kind of information is a key part of the basic 
design definition. In conceptual design, however, preliminary assumption may be done 
considering the type of equipment typically used for similar processes. 
vi) Estimation of equipment inventories. This is an information strongly related to the 
equipment taxonomy (v). It consists in an evaluation of the quantity and average composition 
of the material contained in each unit. Although a precise definition of these data require a 
detailed design of each unit, generally a rough evaluation based on simple rules of thumb, 
well known in the chemical engineering practice, is sufficient in the current analysis. The data 
are used in the assessment of the inherent safety of the process units and typical index 
methods (generally based on scoring) can easily cope with low precision data. 
vii) Hazardous proprieties of materials. These parameters quantify the hazard related to 
the proprieties of the substances in the process (flammability, instability, reactivity, toxicity). 
These data are required for the inherent safety assessment and in general are needed only for 
the substances present or that may be accidentally formed in relevant quantities. This limits 
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the actual number of substances to be considered. Information on these proprieties are usually 
found in the literature, and in particular are reported in the safety data sheets. Information on 
the toxic proprieties can also be found in dedicated databases (e.g. see [EPA, WPb,WPc; 
CDC, WP]). 
viii) Economic data. This information is required to define the economic profile of the 
alternative. Data are required to define the operative costs, as for instance the input/output 
flow economics (cost of the streams crossing process boundaries) and labor cost. On the other 
side, a preliminary estimation of the capital costs should be done, according to the PFD of the 
alternative. Cost databases may be used to support the assessment (e.g. Matches' [Matche, 
WP], Chemicals Cost Guide [IChemE, 2002], Aspen Icarus Process Evaluator). 
 
As showed in the earlier discussion of the data sources, several tools and software may be 
interfaced with the proposed methodology in order to support the collection of input data. 
However, the proposed method is of general applicability and the procedure does not pose 
restrictions in the approach used to obtain the required input data. 
 
 
1.2.3 Definition of a system of quantitative indicators 
 
The input data allow the quantification of the potential impacts of each process. A specific set 
of indicators must be defined to address the impact categories of process activities with 
respect to the three main issues of sustainability: environmental, societal and economic 
impacts. 
A general set of indicators, suitable for the assessment of early stages of process design, is 
identified and listed in Table 1.2.2. As pointed out previously the set of indicators and, 
moreover, the evaluation rules have to cope with data availability. The approach proposed in 
current procedure is to identify a few critical parameters that can be related easily to the 
process or plant design of the assessed option. These parameters must be the core issues in 
affecting the sustainability performance of the future operation of the facility. Thus, 
considering the project lifecycle, the identified indicators are leading indicators. The name is 
borrowed from economic science, where it identifies indicators which tend to change before 
the general economy has changed (e.g. stock prices, building permits, unemployment 
insurance, etc.). 
It must be remarked that the set of indicators reported in Table 1.2.2 was the result of an 
optimization aimed to define a set of quantitative indices useful in a generic application. 
Clearly enough, the set is open to the addition of further indicators in the context of a specific 
assessments.  
 
As shown in the table, well-known and widely used potential impact indicators derived from 
the literature [Allen & Shonnard, 2002; Azapagic, 2003; Bare, 2000; Chen et al. 2002; IPPC, 
2006; ISO 14040-43; Pennington et al., 2000; Saling et al., 2002] were selected for the 
assessment of environmental impact. The adoption of potential impact indicators is 
particularly useful in this context, since the selected indicators present a direct correlation 
among flows and impacts. Thus, their assessment is possible even in the initial stages of 
process or plant design, since it does not require the use of complex models of environmental 
fate, affected by a relevant uncertainty [Bare, 2000]. Moreover, potential impact indicators 
yield conservative impact values, thus reflecting a precautionary approach. 
Standard procedures are available in the literature for the quantitative assessment of mid-point 
indicators, usually based on the reference to a benchmark substance [Allen & Shonnard, 
2002; Pennington et al., 2000]. Thus, all the environmental indicators considered in Table 
1.2.2 are assessed following the general equation: 
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∑= j kjjiki mPIFI ,,,         (1.2.1) 
 
where Ii,k is a generic indicator, PIFi,j is the potential impact factor for the i-th impact 
category for j-th material and mj,k the mass of j-th material crossing the boundaries of k-th 
alternative. The potential impact factor represents the ability of a material to cause a specific 
damage related to the reference material. 
As previously mentioned, consolidated values of the potential impact factors for many 
emitted substances can be found in the technical literature with respect to several impact 
categories, such as global warming, ozone depletion, acidification, smog formation, 
eutrophication, organic load and ecotoxicity (e.g. Allen & Shonnard [2002], IPPC [2006]). 
For a few indicators (toxic and carcinogenic releases, soil emissions and resource 
consumption), an “ad-hoc” definition of the benchmark rule was required, since poorly 
standardized approaches suitable for the current procedure were found in the literature.  
 
Thus, the development of assessment of toxic and carcinogenic emissions required particular 
attention. These impact categories are poorly standardized due to the complexity of the 
phenomena involved (e.g. different exposure pathways, lack of strong dose-response 
relations, non-linear effects). Several valuable proposal can be found in the literature (e.g. 
Human Toxicity Factors [IPPC, 2006], DALY [Goedkoop & Spriensma, 2001], etc.), but 
data are available only for limited groups of substances and are complex to estimate. 
However, easy and flexible impact indices on human health are required in early stages of 
design. 
 
Thus, adopting a common approach in the definition of PIFs for midpoint indicators 
[Pennington et al., 2000], in the present assessment the toxicity impact potential was assumed 
as the ratio of the toxicity parameters for the substance of concern and a benchmark substance 
(toluene). A similar definition of the PIF for toxicity, although corrected by environmental 
repartition coefficients, can be found in the literature [Shonnard et al., 2003]. Coherently, the 
carcinogenic potential was assumed as the ratio between the cancer potency slope factor for 
the substance of concern and that of benzene. The chosen approach ignores the fate of the 
compound in the environment (difficult and uncertain to estimate in many cases), but reflects 
the idea of the impact potential. Both carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic effects are separately 
assessed for releases in specific environmental media: inhalation data are employed for air 
release, ingestion data for water release. The toxicity parameters chosen in the present study 
are the inverse of 50% lethal doses and 50% lethal concentrations for rats: 
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The parameters selected for toxicity and carcinogenicity of the substances of concern are 
among the most available and may be collected for a wide number of substances from suitable 
databases [EPA, WPb,WPc; CDC, WP]. If the LC50 of the substance of interest is not 
reported, empirical correlation rules may be used for its estimation (e.g. see the diagram 
proposed in [Koller et al., 2000]). 
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The solid waste disposals are the material streams that leave the process boundaries in order 
to be disposed. The standard destination considered for these waste streams is landfill, since 
landfill is assumed to be the worst disposal option. As a working hypothesis, the ratio of the 
average disposal cost of the waste of concern to that of municipal waste is used as potential 
impact factor. The disposal cost is in general representative of the hazard due to the different 
standards necessary for landfilling a type of waste [Saling et al., 2002]. 
 
The impact category of resource consumption is related to the valuable material and energy 
flows crossing process boundaries. Resource flows can both enter (raw materials) or leave 
(co-products) the system boundaries. The sign of the flow is defined respectively positive and 
negative. Material streams are generally divided in renewable and non-renewable, since this 
distinction will be useful in the weighting step in order to address the environmental policies 
(see § A1.1.3). 
In order to compare in a single indices material fluxes of different nature, a potential impact 
factor is required. A good parameter to use in the definition of the PIF is the market value of 
the stream [Krotscheck & Narodoslawsky, 1996]; credit factor should be applied to consider 
the externalities. For renewable materials, the land-occupation for the crop grow can be used 
in alternative. 
The consumption of electrical power is straightforward evaluated as an energy consumption 
rate. This is usually considered a distinct impact category for ease of data normalization and 
aggregation. 
The land use indicator is related to the occupation of land. In particular, in the present case 
study, the impact is assessed for process alternative D, where the landfill facility occupies a 
significant land area for a long time span (virtually infinite). In that case, the area “consumed” 
per unit of disposed waste is evaluated by data of similar facilities. 
 
 
With respect to economic indicators, a specific and simplified approach was developed to 
obtain an appropriate economic indicator to be used in the framework of the comparison of 
process sustainability issues. A “net potential economic impact” index (NPEI) was defined. 
Since the net present value (NPV) is typically adopted in the economic comparison of 
alternatives, NPEI was calculated as the NPV multiplied by –1. The change of sign was 
introduced since impact indices, used in the present approach, must have a higher value in the 
worst case. Thus: 
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where Ct is the cash flow at time t, r the discount rate and n the expected life of the plant. 
 
The identification of quantitative indices for the societal impacts relevant to the process 
sustainability is more difficult, as they involve subjective aspects that are not directly related 
to the process or that are not easy to quantify. In the following, as a working assumption, only 
two societal indices were considered, since they were identified as more directly related to the 
choices in process design: an inherent safety index and an occupational index. 
 
The impact of process activities on population safety was evaluated using an inherent safety 
metric, since the inherent safety approach is described as a core issue in sustainability 
[Abraham & Nguyen, 2003; Anastas & Zimmerman, 2003]. Moreover inherent safety is 
particularly suitable to yield a numerical value representative of process safety performances 
in the analysis of early design stages. As a matter of facts, the hazards, that pertain to inherent 
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safety analysis, are almost completely defined since the early stages, while actual risk level 
requires an higher level of detail for to be assessed.  
The definition of a specific consequence-based inherent safety index suitable for the 
framework of current procedure is extensively discussed in Section 2. 
 
An occupational index was based on the assessment of the equivalent number of workers 
necessary for the specific process activity. If no specific data are available, the value of the 
equivalent number of workers may be derived from that of similar industrial processes. The 
occupational index used in the present study was defined as the specific equivalent number of 
persons necessary for process activities multiplied by –1. As in the case of NPEI, the change 
of sign was necessary since impact indices must have a higher value in the worst case. 
 
 
1.2.4) Normalization of the indicators 
 
The indicators listed in Table 1.2.2 yield important information on process performances and 
may allow the comparison of process alternatives with respect to specific aspects. However, 
they are not suitable for a direct comparison among the different categories of impact, since a 
normalization is required. Normalization is thus a necessary step both for the successive 
aggregation of indexes and the interpretation of the indicators. Normalization usually 
represents the comparison between the impact value and a reference value (or normalization 
factor) [ISO 14040-43; Chen et al., 2002; Saling et al., 2002; Bare, 2006]:  
i
ki
ki NF
I
NI ,, =           (1.2.7) 
where NIi,k is the i-th normalized index for the k-th alternative, Ii,k is the indicator value for 
the i-th impact category of the k-th alternative, and NFi is the normalization factor for the i-th 
impact category. However, the selection of significant reference values, NFi, is still an open  
 
 
 
Aspects  Impact categories Indicator Scale 
Global warming IGW National 
Ozone depletion IOD National 
Rain acidification IRA 1500 km 
Smog formation ISF 100 km 
Toxicity in air ITA 100 km 
Air 
emissions 
Carcinogenicity in air  ICA 100 km 
Eutrophication IEU Hydrographical basin 
Organic load IOL Hydrographical basin 
Toxicity in water ITW Hydrographical basin 
Carcinogenicity in water ICW Hydrographical basin 
Water emissions 
Ecotoxicity IET Hydrographical basin 
Soil emissions Solid waste disposal IWD Regional 
Non renewable materials INR National 
Renewable materials IRM National 
Electrical power IEL National 
Environmental 
Resource 
consumption 
Land use ILU Regional 
Economic  NPEI INEPI National 
Inherent safety index IIS Regional Societal  Occupational index IOC Regional 
 
Table 1.2.2: Indicators used for the assessment of process impacts and characteristic scales 
used in the external normalization procedure. 
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 problem. As a matter of fact, the choice of inadequate reference values in the normalization 
may introduce a relevant bias in the procedure, in particular if different processes are 
compared or if aggregated indices are calculated. 
 
Usual normalization procedures heavily rely on internal normalization, that consists in the 
use of one of the Ii,k index values calculated for an alternative option (in general the maximum 
or the more consolidated value) as the normalization factor NFi (e.g. [Saling et al. 2002]). 
However this approach  should be avoided, since it is likely to introduce biases in the 
calculations and requires, in the aggregation stage, the definition of weight factors specific for 
each set of considered options. On the other hand, when external normalization is used, it is 
commonly based on generic reference values that are not site specific. In the present study, a 
novel approach was developed, introducing a site-specific external normalization. Where 
possible, a target area was defined for each impact indicator. The target area was defined as 
the area which properly accounts for the range of the impact of concern. A reference 
‘external’ normalization factor was thus calculated accounting for the impacts of the industrial 
facilities within that area. The reference values may be collected from several available 
databases reporting widely accepted environmental data (see Appendix 1.1). Also in the case 
of the economic index it was possible to define an external normalization factor. The 
identified normalization factor is the gross domestic product in the area interested by the 
economic impact of the process considered. The target area generally corresponds to an 
administrative division of the territory (e.g. a province, a state, etc.) or even the entire national 
territory, depending on the economic impact of the installation with respect to its location. 
Data on gross domestic product on the impact area of concern are usually available by 
national statistics and conventional procedures exist to extrapolate, if necessary, future values 
according to the expected grow rate. With respect to societal indicators, the inherent safety 
and occupational metrics considered in this study allowed the definition of an external 
normalization value based respectively on potential life loss for technological risks and on the 
employment statistics in the area of concern. 
 
The effects of process impacts occur on different spatial scales, thus a significant 
characteristic scale should be assumed for each category of impact. Table 1.2.2 reports the 
characteristic scales identified for the external normalization of each impact category. The 
target areas are defined in accordance to the spatial dimension that are affected by the 
impacts. These are evaluated for each impact category by suitable approaches (e.g. 
characteristic distances calculated by models for pollutant dispersion, administrative division 
of the land, etc.). Some impact categories concern phenomena having effects on a global scale 
(global warming, stratospheric ozone depletion, etc.). However the use of a national reference 
was preferred in these cases. As a matter of facts reliable national emission balances and 
reduction plans exist as a consequence of shared international agreements (e.g. Kyoto 
Protocol, etc.). Data from national references are generally easier to collect and closely reflect 
the emission policy in the chosen site, supporting the aggregation step. 
All the facilities considered within the pertinent target area contribute to the normalization 
value for a given impact category. The normalization factors are straightforwardly calculated 
from the area data by the same rules used in the assessment of the corresponding indicator 
(see §1.2.3). Thus consistency of the indices for the assessed alternatives and normalization 
factor is warranted with respect to approximations possibly present. Since the impact scales 
are different for the different impact categories, normalization values are expressed per unit of 
area. The normalization factors for a specific site can be calculated by the simplified formula 
in Equation (1.2.8). The formula is valid under the assumption of background emission 
sources uniformly distributed in the target area: 
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where Es,i is the impact index for the i-th impact category from the s-th source belonging to 
the target area (At) and Ati is the size of the target area for the i-th impact category. The 
impact index Es,i is calculated from the data about the source, following the same rules 
defined for Level 1 indicators. 
 
The normalized indices resulting from the use of these external reference values are a direct 
measure of the relevance of the additional impact from the process to the local conditions. 
This allows comparing the single indicators to a reference that is independent of the process 
alternatives assessed, but is dependent on the specific site. This reference represents the 
impact burden on the site generated by the other industrial activities. Thus the normalized 
indicators measure the relative contribution of the alternatives to the local impact loads. 
 
 
1.2.5) Aggregation of the indicators and definition of overall sustainability indices 
 
As shown in Table 1.2.2, a relevant number of different indicators may be necessary to 
correctly describe all the possible impacts of different process alternatives. However, in order 
to effectively compare the impacts of alternatives, the availability of a limited number of 
aggregated indicators would be important. In the present procedure a two stage multi-criteria 
weighted summation was adopted to generate a hierarchy of indices, as shown in Figure 1.2.2. 
The general structure of each aggregation stage is represented by the following expression: 
 
∑= i kiikaggr NIWI ,,          (1.2.9) 
 
where Iaggr,k is the aggregated index for the k-th alternative, and Wi is the weight factor for the 
i-th impact category. Weight factors, summing up to 1, were chosen to represent the relative 
importance of the impact categories. 
 
The normalized indexes resulting from the use of external reference values are a direct 
measure of the importance of the additional impact to the local conditions. Weight factor must 
be related to the background state accordingly: weight factors represent the relative 
importance of load reduction among the impact categories. This requires to refer to a 
sustainability policy for the site of concern, where the weights represent the result of long-
term management perspectives that strive to reduce the critical effects in the area of concern. 
The sustainability policy belongs to a macro-scale level that is different than the technical 
domain of process design (§1.1.1). Weight factors must be defined within the macro-scale 
policy level, eventually creating a link between the general suitability policy and the process 
design. An important consequence of these assumptions is that weight factors should be 
independent from the assessed alternatives, but may depend on local conditions. 
 
As shown in Figure 1.2.2, the developed procedure allows the calculation of a hierarchy of 
indices related to sustainability assessment. Level 1 indices are impact indicators, that may be 
used to compare a single impact of different process alternatives. Level 2 indices are a set of 
three normalized indices that represent the impacts of the process on the three main elements 
related to sustainability: environmental impact, societal impact and economic impact. Level 3 
index is an overall value, obtained as the result of the above described aggregation procedure, 
suitable for a general comparison among alternatives. 
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Normalization  
factors
Environmental index
Level 1
Level 3
Level 2
Normalized 
environmental indicators
Societal index
Normalized
societal indicators
Weighting  
factors
Economic index
Weighting  
factors
Overall index
Normalized
economic indicator
 
 
Figure 1.2.2:  Set of indices selected for the representation of the impacts on sustainability of 
an assessed option. 
 
 
 
1.2.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The results obtained for the overall (level 3) and level 2 indices are obviously influenced by 
the weight factors used in the procedure. Since these parameters refer to policy considerations 
that are inevitably affected by significant uncertainties, their value should be considered as 
less reliable than other parameters evaluated in the assessment. Thus, a sensitivity analysis is 
worth to check the influence of variation in the values of weight factors on the final values. 
Of course, because of the mathematical structure of the procedure, a variation in the values of 
weight factors will change the numerical value of the aggregated indices. However in many 
practical applications it is not the absolute values of the aggregated indices that is of interest, 
but the relative performance of the indexes for the options or, more simply, the rank of the 
compared options. 
 
The first step toward a sensitivity analysis is to identify a confidence interval for each weight 
factor. This will derive by an evaluation of the uncertainty of the data sources used in the 
definition of the weight factor. As a consequence it is generally possible  to identify a 
maximum and minimum likely value for each weigh factors. 
A sensitivity analysis would require to repeat several time the aggregation stage of the 
procedure with a variation of each single weight factor within the identified range and to 
assess the influence on the results. However this approach may result impractical and time-
consuming in many cases. Thus, a possible option is the use of a software-aided Monte Carlo 
approach. The technique allow to automatically vary several parameters influencing the 
weight factors, obtaining a general feedback on the index results in a limited amount of time. 
Neither weight factor nor the parameters for their calculation are statistic variables and, thus, 
a distribution of probabilities of the weight values can not be strictly defined. However, in 
order to allow the application of the Monte Carlo method, it is possible to attribute to each 
parameter a conventional distribution of likelihood of the value within the identified 
confidence interval (e.g. uniform distribution, beta distribution, etc.). Monte Carlo runs of 
these distributions yield straightforward a distribution for of the aggregated indices. 
 §1.2 - 12 
As a matter of facts, if large variation of many weight factors are studied the aggregated 
indices of different options will likely result in spread distributions, that may partially 
overlap, making the interpretation of the results harder. In these cases the analysis of index 
differences can be applied, adapting the approach followed by Goedkoop & Spriensma 
[2001]. First the options are ranked according to the index of interest with the base set of 
weight factors. Then, by the Monte Carlo runs, the distribution of the difference among each 
couple of options with consecutive ranks is calculated. The analysis of these distributions 
yield important information on the inversions in the impact ranking of the options, since a 
change in the rank result in a change of sign in the index difference. Moreover, an information 
on the relative importance of the single weight factors on the aggregated values can be 
obtained by the analysis of the contribution of the different weight factors to the variance of 
the results. This can be easily expressed as a percentage contribution to the variance from the 
Monte Carlo analysis. 
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1.3 – Conclusions 
 
In this section a sustainability assessment tool for design support for was presented and 
discussed. 
The existing literature approaches were analysed in order to identify the elements useful for 
the development of the tool. The analysis evidenced that no existing method is suitable per se 
for the intended goal. In particular, limitations are related to the application in early stages of 
design (presence of uncertain data, specific impact categories to be addressed, etc.) and to the 
ability to encompass all the aspects required by a sustainability analysis. 
Therefore, a dedicated quantitative assessment procedure was developed for the identification 
and comparison of the sustainability impact profile in early design stages. The aim of the 
proposed methodology is to identify the best alternative among a set of options and to provide 
information on critical sustainability issues of the proposed process options. The procedure 
will provide support for a sustainability oriented decision making in the design of industrial 
processes. A particular effort was devoted to develop a methodology based on a set of input 
data that may be easily evaluated in the early stages of process design (i.e. conceptual and 
basic design), since it is well known that the resulting impacts on sustainability are mostly 
influenced by decisions in these process design stages. 
The developed procedure is based on a classical multi-criteria analysis, but encompasses 
several innovative elements. A comprehensive set of sustainability impact indicators 
addressing individual process performances in all the spheres of sustainability was defined. 
The indicators were chosen in order to match the data usually available in the early stages of 
process design. The indicators were either selected from widely accepted literature 
approaches, if suitable, or were developed within the present study. In particular, a specific 
method was developed to include inherent safety issues among the relevant sustainability 
parameters (see also §2). In fact, inherent safety, despite being a key element in sustainability, 
is seldom explicitly considered by other assessment approaches. 
Innovative reference criteria were developed to compare and aggregate the impact indicators 
on the basis of the actual site-specific impact burden and sustainability policy. On the one 
hand this links the assessment of the process to the general sustainability management of the 
site and, on the other hand, it allows a straightforward comparison and aggregation of aspects 
belonging to economic, societal and environmental spheres. 
The proposed procedure resulted in a simple and flexible tool, that allows a straightforward 
application to practical situations. 
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Appendix 1.1 - Approach to normalization and weighting 
 
A1.1.1 – The normalization approach 
 
As discussed in §1.2.4, normalization is a necessary step both for the aggregation of indexes 
and the interpretation of Level 1 indicators. In the proposed method the internal 
normalization (i.e. using one of the alternatives as normalization reference) is avoided, since 
it is likely to introduce biases in the calculations and requires a definition of weight factors 
specific for each set of the considered alternatives. Hence a site-specific external 
normalization is adopted. This allows comparing the single indicators to a reference that is 
independent of the process alternatives assessed, but is dependent on the specific site. This 
reference represents the impact burden on the site generated by the other industrial activities. 
Thus the normalized indicators measure the relative contribution of the alternatives to the 
local impact loads. 
 
The definition of the normalization factors for a specific site requires to assess all the impacts 
on sustainability already present that are of pertinence for that site. The assessment is done 
independently for each category of impact. Once calculated, the normalization factors for a 
site are the same, no matter the process alternative assessed. 
Assessing a normalization factor of a certain category of impact require three main steps: 
 
1) Identify the characteristic target area for that impact; 
2) Collect relevant impact data on that area; 
3) Calculate the value of the normalization factor. 
 
 
A1.1.1.1 – Identification of the characteristic target area 
 
The characteristic target area must be identified for each impact category. The target areas 
are defined in accordance to the spatial dimension that are influenced by the impacts. The 
characteristic dimensions considered in the case studies of §4 are reported in Table 1.2.2. 
The characteristic target areas are evaluated for each impact category by suitable approaches 
(e.g. characteristic distances calculated by models for pollutant dispersion, administrative 
division of the land, etc.). For instance, occupational impact acts on a local/regional area, 
since the creation of workplaces interest the job market in the area nearby. On the other side, 
rain acidification may interest target at considerable distance, since airborne transportation of 
acidic substances can interest a large meteorological phenomena (e.g. the characteristic 
dimension cloud systems over Europe is adopted in  Table 1.2.2). In the case of some global 
issues, like global warming from greenhouse gases, alternative assumptions on the scale may 
be anyway adopted: in these cases the use of a national reference is preferred since national 
emission balances and reduction plans exist as a consequence of shared international 
agreements (e.g. Kyoto Protocol, etc.). Data from national references are generally easier to 
collect, more precise and closely reflecting the emission policy in the chosen site. Thus the 
assumption supports the weight definition in aggregation step. 
 
 
A1.1.1.2 – Collection of  relevant impact data 
 
All the activities considered within the pertinent target area contribute to the normalization 
value for a given impact category. However it is practical (also in function of the decisions 
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ion the assignment of the weights) to refer to the sole impacts from industrial facilities. This is 
because impacts from other activities (e.g. agriculture, financial business, transportation, etc.) 
have a completely different profile of sustainability impact to be considered, difficult to 
compare with industrial processes. 
 
The impact data can be practically collected from the elaboration of databases. Several 
reliable databases may be used for gathering data on the emissions, consumptions, economics 
and social issues within the pertinent target area. The proper selection of data from databases 
is fundamental to obtain significant results. In particular the considered data must refer to 
homogeneous groups of activities in order to avoid biases (e.g. industrial facilities, power 
plants and waste treatment plants are considered in the discussed case studies of §4). 
 
Some examples of available international and national database used as source for 
environmental normalization data are listed in the following: 
 
♦ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Greenhouse 
Gases Database, http://ghg.unfccc.int/ 
♦ UNECE/EMEP, Activity data and emission database, WebDab2005,  
http://webdab.emep.int/  
♦ European Environment Agency dataservice, http://dataservice.eea.eu.int/dataservice/ 
♦ European Pollutant Emission Register (EPER), http://eper.cec.eu.int/eper/ 
♦ U.S. EPA, National Emissions Inventory Data & Documentation, 2002, 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/net/2002inventory.html 
♦ U.S. EPA, Toxic Release Inventory: Public Data Release, 2005,  
http://www.epa.gov/triexplorer/ 
♦ U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
♦ Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio, Relazione sullo stato 
dell’ambiente 2001, http://www.minambiente.it/Sito/pubblicazioni/ 
♦ Ministero delle Attività Produttive, https://dgerm.attivitaproduttive.gov.it/dgerm/ 
♦ Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas, http://www.autorita.energia.it 
 
Similar sources report economic and societal data of concern (e.g. the cases studies used data 
from some Italian statistical databases: Istituto nazionale di statistica (ISTAT), 
http://www.istat.it/ ; Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro, 
http://www.inail.it/). 
 
As it can be easily observed, most of the proposed sources of references offer public and free 
access to the data, that may be easily available through the world wide web. 
 
 
A1.1.1.3 – Calculation of the value of the normalization factor 
 
The normalization factors are straightforwardly calculated from the data available for the area 
of interest by the same rules used in the assessment of Level 1 indices (see §1.2.3). Thus, the 
consistency of the indices for the assessed alternatives and of the normalization factor is 
warranted with respect to approximations possibly present in impact evaluation. 
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Since the impact scales are different for the different impact categories, normalization values 
are expressed per unit of area. In the hypothesis of background emission sources uniformly 
distributed in the target area the following equation is valid for the calculation of the impact 
factors: 
 
i
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where Es,i is the impact index for the i-th impact category from the s-th source belonging to 
the target area (At) and Ati is the size of the target area for the i-th impact category. The 
impact index Es,i is calculated for each source according to the rules for Level 1 indicators. 
 
 
A1.1.2 – Example of Set of Normalization Factors 
 
In the following an example of set of normalization factor is presented. It is actually the set used in 
most of the sustainability analysis of the examples in §4. 
The set refers to a site localized in Northern Italy, in the in proximity of Bologna. 
 
The characteristic target area were defined in function of the specific impact categories. Table 1.2.2 
summarizes the dimensions considered. 
 
Reference data for normalization were collected for the pertinent characteristic target areas 
surrounding the site. The emissions of the industrial plants located in the respective reference areas 
were obtained from the following databases: 
♦ Global warming: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
Greenhouse Gases Database, http://ghg.unfccc.int/ 
♦ Rain acidification: UNECE/EMEP, Activity data and emission database, WebDab2005,  
http://webdab.emep.int/ 
♦ Smog Formation: European Pollutant Emission Register (EPER), http://eper.cec.eu.int/eper/ 
♦ Air toxicity: European Pollutant Emission Register (EPER), http://eper.cec.eu.int/eper/ 
♦ Air carcinogenicity: European Pollutant Emission Register (EPER), 
http://eper.cec.eu.int/eper/ 
♦ Solid waste disposal: Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio, Relazione sullo 
stato dell’ambiente 2001, http://www.minambiente.it/Sito/pubblicazioni/ 
 
The emissions for single substances of the different plants in the area were summed together. Then 
they were converted in equivalent emission for each category of impact by the same procedure 
described for the level 1 indicators (§1.2.4). Finally the total equivalent emission was divided by the 
spatial dimension (i.e. area) of the reference area, to yield the normalization factors reported in Table 
A1.1.2. 
An example is provided in Table A1.1.1 for greenhouse gases responsible of global warming. The 
table reports the value of emission in equivalent unit of CO2 for single substances over the time for a 
selected group of emission sources from UNFCCC database (emissions from industrial activities and 
energy production). The databases usually report recorded data till a certain year (e.g. 2002 in this 
case). Data for the successive years can be easily estimated by extrapolation of the trend in previous 
years. It is apparent the importance of all the reference data correspond to a standard reference year 
(i.e. 2005 in the example of the Table). The total equivalent of emissions for the reference year were 
divided by the reference area (the national area for this impact category) according to (A1.1.1).  
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 CO2 CH4 N2O HFCs PFCs SF6 CO NMVOC Total 
1990 2.52E+11 3.61E+10 3.30E+10 3.51E+08 1.81E+09 3.33E+08 7.62E+08 8.60E+08 3.28E+11 
1991 2.44E+11 3.66E+10 3.43E+10 3.55E+08 1.42E+09 3.56E+08 8.50E+08 8.63E+08 3.21E+11 
1992 2.42E+11 3.48E+10 3.38E+10 3.59E+08 7.99E+08 3.58E+08 7.74E+08 8.38E+08 3.15E+11 
1993 2.34E+11 3.45E+10 3.40E+10 3.55E+08 6.31E+08 3.70E+08 9.20E+08 8.02E+08 3.08E+11 
1994 2.36E+11 3.49E+10 3.36E+10 4.82E+08 3.55E+08 4.16E+08 8.85E+08 7.82E+08 3.09E+11 
1995 2.57E+11 3.53E+10 3.43E+10 6.71E+08 3.37E+08 6.01E+08 8.37E+08 7.72E+08 3.32E+11 
1996 2.48E+11 3.51E+10 3.37E+10 6.05E+08 2.43E+08 6.83E+08 7.37E+08 7.50E+08 3.21E+11 
1997 2.53E+11 3.52E+10 3.49E+10 1.22E+09 2.52E+08 7.29E+08 8.33E+08 7.40E+08 3.28E+11 
1998 2.58E+11 3.47E+10 3.44E+10 2.35E+09 2.70E+08 6.05E+08 7.91E+08 7.12E+08 3.33E+11 
1999 2.53E+11 3.52E+10 3.49E+10 1.22E+09 2.52E+08 7.29E+08 8.33E+08 7.40E+08 3.28E+11 
2000 2.63E+11 3.42E+10 3.50E+10 4.10E+09 3.46E+08 4.93E+08 8.05E+08 6.83E+08 3.39E+11 
2001 2.65E+11 3.41E+10 3.60E+10 5.56E+09 4.52E+08 7.95E+08 7.98E+08 6.53E+08 3.45E+11 
2002 2.66E+11 3.32E+10 3.54E+10 7.11E+09 4.14E+08 7.60E+08 7.53E+08 6.49E+08 3.45E+11 
          
2003 2.67E+11 3.29E+10 3.55E+10 9.95E+09 4.26E+08 7.86E+08 7.41E+08 6.33E+08 3.47E+11 
2004 2.68E+11 3.26E+10 3.57E+10 1.39E+10 4.39E+08 8.13E+08 7.30E+08 6.18E+08 3.49E+11 
2005 2.70E+11 3.23E+10 3.58E+10 1.95E+10 4.52E+08 8.41E+08 7.19E+08 6.02E+08 3.51E+11 
 
Table A1.1.1: Emission in equivalent unit of CO2 (kg/y) for single substances from industrial 
activities and energy production (data from UNFCCC database); reference area: Italy. 
 
 
A similar procedure was followed for the impact categories of use of resources. The data sources used 
in the definition of the reference values were, in this case: 
♦ Land use: Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio, Relazione sullo stato 
dell’ambiente 2001, http://www.minambiente.it/Sito/pubblicazioni/ 
♦ Natural Gas: Ministero delle Attività Produttive, https://dgerm.attivitaproduttive.gov.it/dgerm/ 
♦ Electric Power: Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas, http://www.autorita.energia.it 
With respect to economic normalization reference, data on the gross domestic product can be found in 
general statistics data (e.g. Istituto nazionale di statistica (ISTAT), http://www.istat.it/ ). Also in this 
case the data is expressed per unit of area, dividing for the pertinent area. 
 
 
 Impact category Normalization Factor Unit 
Global warming 1.16 · 106 kgeq / (y · km2) 
Rain Acidification 4.83 · 103 kgeq / (y · km2) 
Smog Formation 5.63 · 103 kgeq / (y · km2) 
Air toxicity 3.79 · 105 kgeq / (y · km2) 
Air carcinogenicity 2.06 · 101 kgeq / (y · km2) 
Solid waste disposal 2.32 · 105 kgeq / (y · km2) 
Land use 2.34 · 10-5 y -1 
Natural Gas 1.19 · 10 5 kgeq / (y · km2) 
Environment 
Electric Power 1.10 · 106 kWh / (y · km2) 
Economy NPEI 2.83 · 106 €05 / km2 
Occupational index 7.92 · 101 people/ km2 
Society 
Inherent Safety 6.00 · 10 -6 y -1 
 
Table A1.1.2: Example of set of normalization factors for a site in northern Italy (near 
Bologna). The data will be used in the case studies (§4). 
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The normalization reference for inherent safety depend on the index used in the assessment. In the 
case of the Hazard Index (HI) proposed in §2.3 the normalization factor must represent the average 
probability of death from industrial accident of people in the area surrounding the plant. This value is 
assumed as an  average value of Potential Life Loss (PLL) from the analysis of social risk curves 
available in the literature [Lees, 1996] and national fatality statistics (Istituto nazionale per 
l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro, http://www.inail.it/). 
The data on the occupation were got from “Istituto nazionale di statistica (ISTAT)” (http://www.istat.it/) 
and divided by the area of concern to obtain the desired normalization value. 
Table A1.1.2 summarizes an example of set of normalization factors used in the case studies of §4. 
 
 
A1.1.3 – Evaluation of the weight factors 
 
As discussed in §1.2.4 and §1.2.5, normalization represents the first step towards aggregation. 
The normalized indexes resulting from the use of external reference values are a direct 
measure of the importance of the additional impact to the local conditions. On the other hand, 
weight factors represent the relative importance of load reduction among the impact 
categories. This requires to refer to a sustainability policy for the site of concern. The 
sustainability policy belongs to a macro-scale level that is different than the technical domain 
of process design. Weight factors must be defined within the macro-scale policy level, 
eventually creating a link between the general suitability policy and the process design. 
 
Weight factors are defined in current method according to the hierarchy of the indexes 
described in §1.2.5 and pictured in Figure 1.2.2. Thus weights referring to each group to be 
aggregated (e.g. Level 1 environmental indicators) are assessed independently and sum up to 
1. Since weight factors represent the sustainability policy, they are independent from the 
alternative assessed and should be defined also for those impacts that are not of interest for 
the specific process options considered in the analysis (e.g. also for water emissions, even no 
process has relevant emissions to water media). Thus in some case studies of §4 the weight 
factors used in some aggregation steps may not sum up to 1. This is intended to reward the 
processes that have not that do not address some categories of impact of potential impact. 
 
A possible approach for the numerical determination of weight factors is based on the 
distance of present impacts from future target values. Weight factor can be evaluated as: 
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where Wi is the weight factor of the i-th impact category, ri is the reduction rate and α is an 
aversion factor (generally assumed equal to 1). The function f describe the way impact loads 
are planned to be reduced from the present IMi(t=0) to the future value IMi(t=n) in the span of 
n years. The same structure for function f must be adopted for all the impact categories, in 
order to yield consistent rates. A simple example of function f is the linear reduction: 
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In any case weight factors are limited to be greater or equal to zero. 
 
 §A1.1 - 6 
Reliable values for the impact targets may come from large scale (i.e. regional/national) eco-
system modeling of sustainability. Targets and trends are fixed for many categories by 
national policies or international agreements (e.g. Kyoto Protocol, Goteborg Protocol, etc.). 
Table A1.1.3 reports an example of reduction rate values at the Italian national level 
calculated by equation A1.1.4. The target data are derived from the Italian environment 
ministry [MinAmb, 2001]. 
 
 
Media Impact Category 
Reduction target 
over the time span
(%) 
Time span, n
( y ) 
Reduction Rate, r 
( y -1 ) 
Air Global Warming 1A1.1 12 0.0094 
 Rain Acidification 66.7 13 0.0513 
 Smog Formation 44.8 13 0.0345 
Water Eutrophication 10.0 20 0.0050 
 
Table A1.1.3: Example of reduction rates from internationally agreed targets; values from 
[MinAmb, 2001]. 
 
 
An alternative approach for weight estimation may be based on the judgment by a panel of 
experts. Resorting to an expert panel for weighting estimation is an approach common to 
several other assessment methods in the literature (e.g. BASF method [Saling et al., 2002], 
the AHP procedure [Chen et al., 2002, 2004], etc.). The panel should be composed by experts 
having different backgrounds and, preferably, include experts who are responsible of the 
definition of the local sustainability policy. Proper consistency checks must be made in order 
to limit the subjectivity introduced by the decisions of the expert panel. Table A1.1.4, reports 
an example of a set of weight factors decided by expert judgement that was derived from 
publications from BASF. 
 
 
Group of categories % Media % Impact category % Weight factors 
Emissions 20 Air 50 Global Warming 50 0.056 
   Ozone Depletion 20 0.022 
   Rain Acidification 10 0.011 
   Smog Formation 20 0.022 
  Water 35 Eutrophication 100 0.078 
  Soil 15 Waste to disposal 100 0.033 
Toxicity 20     0.222 
Raw material consumption 25     0.278 
Energy and Fuels 25     0.278 
Other (non environmental) 10     - 
 
Table A1.1.4: Example of weight factors for Level 1 environmental impacts from expert 
judgement; adapted values from [Saling et al., 2002]. 
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If the analysis has to account different criteria or point of view  in the definition of weight 
factors (e.g. reduction targets, impact perception of the civil society, company policy etc.) a 
combination rule for different sets should be defined (see e.g. Saling et al. [2002]). 
An example of combination rule is the arithmetic mean: 
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where Wj,k is the weight factor for the j-th impact category in the k-th set out of n to be 
combined and pk is the relative importance of the sets. 
Another option is the use of the geometric mean, equation (A1.1.7) plus (A1.1.6). However 
arithmetic mean is advised, since effectively applicable also when some impact categories are 
not defined for certain weight sets. 
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Impact index  Weight Factor 
Level 1 (normalized)   
Air Global warming 0.051 
 Ozone depletion 0.013 
 Rain Acidification 0.066 
 Smog Formation 0.049 
 Air toxicity 0.095 
 Air carcinogenicity 0.168 
Water Eutrophication 0.041 
 Organic Load 0.020 
 Water toxicity 0.095 
 Water carcinogenicity 0.168 
 Eco-toxicity 0.033 
Soil Solid waste disposal 0.030 
Resources Land use 0.081 
 Natural Gas 0.044 
Environment 
 Electric Power 0.064 
Economy  NPEI 1.000 
 Occupational index 0.200 
Society 
 Inherent Safety 0.800 
Level 2    
Environment  0.300 
Economy  0.300 
Society  0.400 
 
Table A1.1.5: Example of set of weight factors used in the application of the proposed 
sustainability assessment procedure (§1.2 and §4). 
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No matter the approach chosen for the weights definition, a level of uncertainty always affect 
these values. As a consequence, a sensitivity analysis of the results is suggested §1.2.6. 
 
Table A1.1.5 reports and example of set of weight factors used in the case studies of §4. The values 
were primarily derived from target data available from the site of the Ministry of the Environment, 
referring to international agreement and current impact reduction trends [MinAmb, 2001; MinAttProd, 
WP]. When the shortage of quantitative information about future targets did not allowed the full 
application of the procedure, expert judgement was followed for data integration on the basis of the 
available qualitative information on the national and local sustainability policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 2: Inherent Safety 
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2.0 – Introduction 
 
 
Pursuing inherent safety is a key factor in the development of innovative chemical processes. 
Inherent safety promotes the elimination or the extensive reduction of process hazards by 
proper design choices. Moreover, it is broadly recognized that an integrated approach to the 
development of sustainable technologies requires the minimization of risk by the reduction of 
the causes and possible consequences of accidental events (§1.1). 
 
The idea of limiting process hazards rather than controlling the risk was introduced in mid-
70s by Tevor Kletz [Kletz 1978]. A well known schematization is based on five guidewords: 
minimization, substitution, simplification, moderation, and limitation. 
The main advantage of a process design based on inherent safety is that the safety 
performance of the system is not influenced by active safety or mitigation devices (that may 
fail or have an ineffective action), or by safety procedures (subject to operational errors). 
Further relevant economic benefits may derive from the introduction of risk reduction 
strategies based on inherent safety, due the reduction of operational costs and of capital costs 
[Lawrence & Edwards, 1993].  
 
In spite of the relevant contributions dedicated to the subject of inherent safety in recent years, 
a well-accepted and detailed methodology for the assessment of the actions aimed to improve 
the inherent safety of a process is still missing. The absence of inherent safety among the 
approaches indicated for the control and the reduction of industrial risk in the European and 
Italian legislation is, at least in part, caused by the lack of tools for the quantitative assessment 
of inherent safety. A modulated inherent safety assessment methodology able to take into 
account the stage of process development and the detail of available information is still 
missing. It is also recognized that the available methodologies for inherent safety assessment 
are not able to identify some potential hazards (formation of undesired compounds in “out of 
control” conditions, specific modes of release from the equipment, domino hazard, etc.). 
 
This section presents the approaches and the quantitative tools developed for supporting 
process design activities with regard to inherent safety aspects. Moreover, the tools introduced 
are a key element in the broader framework of sustainability assessment for design support, 
described in Section 1. 
In §2.1 the theoretical background of inherent safety is reviewed and the tools proposed in the 
literature are analysed with respect to the goals of the current application. In the following 
chapters, the set of consequence-based quantitative tools developed for the inherent safety 
analysis in process and plant design is presented. The tools encompass three key features of 
the plant design: inherent safety of material (§2.2), inherent safety of process and plant 
schemes (§2.3) and inherent safety of plant layout (§2.4). In §2.5 the framework of a 
generalized approach for implementation of inherent safety in further stages of project 
lifecycle is presented. 
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2.1 – Background 
 
2.1.1 - Definition 
 
The CCPS [CCPS, 1996] defined a detailed scheme that classifies the different strategies for 
the reduction of risk in the industrial processes. Four different strategy levels were identified: 
? Truly inherent: actions aimed to achieve process safety by a reduction of the hazard, e.g. 
by the use of less hazardous substances or of less hazardous reactions 
? Passive: actions aimed to the reduction of risk by design procedures able to minimize the 
expected frequencies and the consequences of accidents without the introduction of any 
active device 
? Active: actions aimed to achieve process safety by the introduction of active safety devices 
able to identify and correct process deviations from standard operating conditions, e.g. 
control and alarm systems, emergency shutdown systems, emergency cooling systems, 
etc. 
? Procedural: actions aimed to control the risk by the introduction of procedures and 
management systems able to reduce the expected frequencies and the consequences of 
accidents 
The concept of "inherent safety" was introduced for the first time by Kletz in 1976 [Kletz, 
1976]. Inherent safety is an approach to industrial risk control and mitigation aimed at the 
elimination, or the ‘reasonably practicable’ reduction, of the hazards in a system [Kletz, 
1978]. Thus, an inherent safety approach is considered to be based on the first category of 
actions (inherent) and, at least in part, on the second category (passive). The key idea of the 
inherent safety approach is the intuitive concept that a truly inherently safe system cannot 
possibly fail. This nullifies the requirement for safety devices to reduce the risk of accidents 
(likelihood and/or consequences) to acceptable levels. In principle, an approach to process 
safety based on "inherent safety" is more effective than the approaches based on active or 
procedural safety, since active devices may fail and procedures may be violated as a 
consequence of operational errors. 
Although hazards cannot be completely eliminated in the process industries, a wide range of 
opportunities and improvements which lead to inherently safer systems are possible. Thus, 
inherent safety is usually considered in relative terms. Moreover, inherently safer systems can 
reduce the high costs usually associated with the full plant lifecycle – both operational (more 
simple procedures, reduced safety system maintenance, etc.) and capital costs (reduced 
investment in safety devices, easier hazard management and compliance to regulatory 
liabilities [Edwards & Lawrence, 1993; Gupta et al., 2003; Khan & Amyotte, 2005; Kletz, 
1984, 1991, 1998]. 
For all these reasons, the theme of inherent safety has received an increasing attention in 
recent years, as a possible alternative approach to process and plant safety [Ashford, 1993; 
Bollinger et al., 1996; Carrithers, et. al., 1996; CCPS, 1993; Hendershot, 2002; IChemE & 
IPSG, 1995; Khan & Amyotte, 2003; Kletz, 1998], that presently still relies mainly on active 
and procedural actions. 
 
It is well known that the inherent safety of a process and/or of a plant is related to the 
properties of the substances, to the process conditions, and to the unit operations performed 
[Ashford, 1993; Hendershot, 2002; Khan & Amyotte, 2003; Kletz, 1991]. The actions aimed 
to the improvement of inherent safety should thus be addressed to the reduction of the hazards 
coming from these factors. Although similar in concept, the different possible actions toward 
inherent safety, the so called “principles” or “guide-words”, may be formally classified or 
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“labelled” in different ways depending on the various authors/practitioners (e.g.  CCPS, 
[1996]; Kletz, [1991]; Khan & Amyotte, [2004]). 
Since the terminology of inherent safety varies somewhat throughout the process safety 
community, the choice is made in current work to refer to the following guidewords: 
minimization, substitution, attenuation, simplification, and limitation of effects. The meaning 
of the five guidewords can be summed up as follows, according to their hierarchy: 
1. Intensification: identifies the actions aimed to the minimization of plant and equipment 
inventory , thus reducing the hazard coming from the possible loss of containment 
2. Moderation: consists in the promotion of actions aimed to the reduction of the hazards due 
to operating conditions (e.g. by the use of lower temperatures or pressures), that result in 
an inherently safer process due to the minimization of the energies involved and in a lower 
hazard associated to the substances present 
3. Substitution: identifies the actions aimed to the development of substances, process 
schemes and equipment different from those conventionally used, but characterized by a 
higher inherent safety 
4. Simplification: identifies the design actions aimed to reduce the complexity of the process 
and/or of the plant, thus reducing the possibility of errors and the probability of loss of 
containment 
5. Limitation of effects: consists in actions aimed to the design of a process and/or of a plant 
in which the consequences of the possible loss of containment are effectively reduced and 
the possibility of escalation is minimized 
The identified guidewords represent a roadmap of basic rules to improve the inherent safety 
of a system. They provide, for every stage of the design lifecycle, guidelines that help to 
categorize the possible actions for hazard reduction. However, in the absence of quantitative 
assessment tools, these are not sufficient to develop effective strategies for the improvement 
of process and plant inherent safety. As a matter of fact, the application of the keywords may 
result in contradictory indications on some possible hazard reduction actions [Kletz, 1991]. 
An example is given by the choice of less severe reaction conditions: this action is suggested 
by the moderation keyword, but may be in contrast with the intensification keyword, since the 
use of mild reaction conditions usually results in higher residence times and thus in a higher 
hold-up of process equipment. Therefore, the development and the introduction of a metric 
and of quantitative assessment tools is a necessary step in order to introduce inherent safety 
criteria in the process and plant design. 
Furthermore quantitative indices for inherent safety are required to integrate the assessment in 
the general system of sustainability analysis of a project, as detailed in Section 1. 
 
 
2.1.2 – Existing assessment tools: review of the literature 
 
2.1.2.1 – Generalities on the methods for the quantitative assessment of inherent safety 
 
It is widely recognized that the actions aimed to the improvement of inherent safety should be 
mainly concentrated during the initial steps of process development, since in the initial design 
phase changes and modifications are more easily introduced [Kletz, 1976, 1991]. Most of the 
available techniques for quantitative risk assessment are rather complex and require detailed 
information on the plant analyzed [Khan et al., 2003]. Thus, their application in the initial 
steps of process or of plant design is not possible, and the assessment of a high number of 
different solutions is extremely time consuming. A possible alternative is the use of simplified 
methods based on the estimation of risk indexes, that allow a quantitative assessment based 
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on a limited amount of information. For this reason all the available methods for the 
quantitative assessment of inherent safety are based on the assessment of risk indexes [Khan 
& Amyotte, 2003; Khan et al., 2003; Koller et al., 2001]. Many contributions dedicated to the 
development of tools for inherent safety assessment focused on the modification of existing 
methods for the assessment of risk indexes or on the development of improved or original 
procedures for the assessment of inherent safety indexes. 
An important problem that emerged in the use of inherent safety assessment tools during 
process design is related to the possible "risk shift" [Koller et al., 2000; Shah et al., 2003]: the 
implementation of actions aimed to improve inherent safety may reduce the risk of major 
accidents, but may cause the increase of other risks, e.g. of the environmental risk due to the 
process. Several publications evidenced the need of a comprehensive approach, that should 
take into account inherent safety jointly to the environmental and human health risk caused by 
the process [INSIDE Project, 1997; Koller et al., 2000; Shah et al., 2003; Mansfield, 1994]. 
However, the integrated tools proposed for the comprehensive assessment of all the different 
process impacts still need to overcome the problem posed by the clustering of the different 
indexes to a limited number of integrated indicators [Gupta & Edwards, 2003]. The 
development of specific aggregation tools, based on fuzzy sets or on hierarchical matrixes 
[Gentile et al., 2003; Shah et al., 2003], seems to represent a promising perspective in order 
to achieve integrated methods for quantitative assessment. 
 
Data Required PIIS ISI i-safe Index 
INSET
(I , J) ESH I2SI SWeHI
Dow 
F&EI 
Dow 
CEI 
Mond 
F,E&T
KPI 
(this 
study) 
Chemicals and 
their proprieties ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Reactions and 
interactions ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
Operative 
conditions ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Process Flow 
Diagram  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Equipment 
inventory    ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Material 
balances      ? ? ? ? ? ? 
P&ID       ? ? ?  ?  
Layout definition       ? ? ?  ?  
Equipment 
design data        ? ? ?  
 
Table 2.1.1: Data required for the calculation of some quantitative indexes proposed for 
inherent safety assessment. 
 
 
Most of the existing methods for the assessment of inherent safety are thus highly concerned 
with the selection of process alternatives during the initial steps of process development (type 
of substances, selection of the catalyst and of solvents, etc.), while often scarce attention is 
paid to the assessment of the possible alternatives available in the other steps of process 
development, as in flow-sheet or in lay-out definition. However, the analysis of the possible 
actions for hazard reduction deriving from the application of the inherent safety guidewords 
points out that many of these are related to flow-sheet optimization or to lay-out definition. As 
a matter of fact, has not been recognized that the actions aimed to inherent safety 
improvement should not be concentrated only in the initial step of process design (i.e. early 
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stages of process lifecycle), but should be extended to all the initial steps of the different 
stages of project development (i.e. early phases of each stage of the process lifecycle: early 
process design, early flow-sheet definition, early P&ID definition, etc.) [Carrithers et al., 
1996]. The different detail of information available in the different stages of project 
development requires a modulated approach to inherent safety, with a set of different tools for 
the quantitative assessment that may be integrated with the conventional tools used in process 
and plant design. 
The existing tools for inherent safety assessment can be classified in function of the amount 
system of detail they require for the application. Table 2.1.1 depicts a summary this 
information level required by several inherent safety indexes proposed in the literature. In the 
following a quick review of the existing inherent safety tools and of their principal advantages 
and drawbacks in application is provided. 
 
2.1.2.2 – Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) and Dow Chemical Exposure Index (CEI) 
 
Commonly referred to as the Dow Index, the Dow Fire and Explosion Index is a well known 
and widely used hazard index [Dow Chemical Company, 1994]. It is primarily designed for 
operations in which a flammable, combustible, or reactive material is stored, handled or 
processed. The original procedure for the assessment of the index aims to take into account 
fire protection measures in combination with a damage factor to derive the maximum 
probable property damage (MPPD). 
This method is not originally intended as a method for inherent safety assessment: in fact it is 
a simplified method for risk assessment. However it has been proposed as suitable for the 
assessment of inherent safety, provided that the assessment of loss control credit factors is 
skipped [Etowa et al., 2002; Koller et al., 2001]. 
The assessment of F&EI includes a first step of calculation of a material factor (MF), which is 
a measure of the potential energy released from the material. It is determined by scoring the 
flammability and reactivity of the material. Then two penalty factors (F1 and F2), respectively 
accounting for general process hazards (penalties due to the type of reaction/process, type of 
chemical handled in the process unit, and spill control factors of the chemical) and special 
process hazards (penalties due to operation under hazardous conditions, quantity of chemical 
handled in the unit, and characteristics of the chemical) are calculated. These are combined to 
yield a process unit hazards factor (F3). The Dow Index is obtained as the product of the MF 
and the process unit hazards factor. 
The Dow Chemical Exposure Index (CEI) is an index originally developed at Dow Chemical 
Company to measure relative acute toxicity risks [Dow Chemical Company, 1993]. It may be 
used for initial process hazard analysis, for health hazard ranking of units and for emergency 
response planning. Also in this case, the extension of the use to inherent safety assessment 
was proposed [Etowa et al., 2002; Heikkilä, 1999; Koller et al., 2001]. 
The information needed for the calculation of the Dow CEI includes: a) physical and chemical 
properties of the material, b) a simplified process flow sheet, c) individual units showing 
vessels and major pipework with inventories, and d) an accurate plot plan of the industrial site 
and its surroundings. The CEI computation involves two key factors: the first is the Airborne 
Quantity (AQ) and second is the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPG) value. 
AQ is the rate at which the material can become airborne under process conditions. The 
ERPG represent the parameter assessing the toxic proprieties of released materials; in 
particular the index uses a threshold regarding to serious or irreversible health effects (ERPG-
2). 
Although both F&EI and CEI are widely accepted and validated methods for quick risk 
analysis, they suffer drawbacks for the use in inherent safety assessment. The complete 
calculation of the indices require the knowledge of several details on the plant (e.g. layout, 
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material corrosion, indoor/outdoor, etc.) for the assignment of parameter values (Table 2.1.1). 
Since these characteristics are usually defined in late design stages, the method is applicable 
in earlier stages only in a simplified version that overrides the unknown aspects. Moreover the 
two indices assess separately the hazard of  flammability/explosiveness and of acute toxicity. 
Thus a problem arises on the comparison of the two indexes results. No rules are defined for 
combining the values for single units in order to assess a plant/process. 
 
2.1.2.3 – Mond Fire, Explosion, and Toxicity Index 
 
The Mond Fire, Explosion, and Toxicity Index (referred to as the Mond Index) was developed 
by the Mond division of ICI [ICI Mond Division, 1985; Tyler, 1985]. The Mond Index makes 
an initial hazard assessment in a manner similar to that used in the Dow Index, but 
incorporates additional hazard considerations (wider range of applicability, processing of 
explosive chemicals, improved hazard consideration of hydrogen, inclusion of toxicity 
assessment, consideration of control and safety instrumentation). The potential hazard is 
expressed in terms of the initial value of a set of indices for fire, explosion, and toxicity. The 
material factor is determined as in the Dow method, but additional special material hazard 
factors are introduced. Again as in the Dow method, use is made of factors for general and 
special process hazards although some other necessary factors are different. A quantity factor, 
based on the inventory of material, and layout hazard factor are also introduced, as are 
toxicity hazards. The toxicity index is calculated using a health factor, the quantity of 
chemical in use, and the toxicological properties of the chemical. As in the Dow F&EI, also 
Mond Index allow to account for risk control measures by a system of offsetting factors; these 
ones should not be considered for the use in inherent safety assessment. 
The Mond Fire, Explosion and Toxicity Index is a possible alternative to Dow Indexes, but it 
still retains some of the same limitations for the application in early stages, because of the 
required detail. On the other hand the improved factors considered in this index constitutes an 
advantage compared to Dow indices. 
 
2.1.2.4 – Safety Weighted Hazard Index 
 
SWeHI is the revised version of the hazard identification and ranking analysis proposed 
earlier by Khan and Abbasi [Khan & Abbasi, 1998b]. It aims at providing a “single frame” 
view of a desired process unit. The SWeHI represents the radius of the area under hazard 
(50% probability of fatality/damage) due to the given unit [Khan et al., 2001]. The SWeHI is 
the ratio of two factors: a quantitative measure of the damage that may be caused by a 
unit/plant, measured in terms of area under 50% probability of damage (B) and a factor 
representing the credits due to control measures and safety arrangements made to counter the 
undesirable situations (A). For inherent safety application this second factor can be ignored 
(i.e. considering it equal to 1). 
The factor B is chosen as the maximum between the factor for damage due to fire and 
explosion (B1) and the factor for damage due to toxic release and dispersion (B2). The 
quantification of B1 is based on a few steps. First of all, the various units are classified in pre-
defined groups (storage units; units involving physical operations; units involving chemical 
reactions; transportation units; other hazardous units (e.g. furnaces, boilers, direct-fired heat 
exchangers, etc.)). For each unit, within the rules specific for each group, a few energy factors 
(quantification of the potential of the system to release energy) are calculated. Then penalties 
are assigned for the operating conditions, material proprieties and unit/plant location. Finally 
B1 is calculated by group specific equations. 
On the other hand, B2 is using the outcomes of the elaboration of derived using transport 
phenomena and empirical models based on the quantity of chemical(s) involved in the unit, 
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the physical state of the chemical(s), the toxicity of the chemical(s), the operating conditions, 
and the site characteristics. The dispersion is assumed to occur under slightly stable 
atmospheric conditions, representing a median of high instability and high stability. The 
estimation of B2 is done for every unit by the combination of a core factor and several 
penalties. The core factor takes into account the condition for release (gas, liquid, two-phase, 
pyrophilic solids) by a proper factor. 
Similarly to Dow and Mond Indices, SWeHI was initially developed for an evaluation of 
process safety requiring more detailed data. The index structure is equally based on the 
combination of factors by built-in rules. However the scoring rules were frequently calculated 
on the basis of physical phenomena concerning potential accidents. As in Dow F&EI, a 
relationship is claimed between the final result and a distance of damage, but, as pointed out, 
the physical relationship remains mostly embedded into the parameter scoring procedure. No 
combining rules are defined for whole plant/process assessment. 
 
2.1.2.5 – Prototype Index of Inherent Safety 
 
Edwards and Lawrence [Edwards & Lawrence, 1993] have proposed a Prototype Index of 
Inherent Safety (PIIS) to analyse, by a quick scoring, inherent safety potential of different 
process routes for the same product. The index attributes scores to 7 parameters related to the 
process and chemicals in use, that were select as key factors for the hazard potential of a 
process. The ISI computation procedure divides the complete process into various sub-steps 
based on the chemical route. A chemical score is calculated for inventory, flammability, 
explosiveness, and toxicity of each chemical used in the sub-steps. The highest score is 
considered the representative value for this sub-step. As well, the process score is computed 
for pressure, temperature, and yield of each sub-step. Chemical and process scores are 
combined to give a single value for each sub-step, and subsequently combined to produce a 
single index for a given process route. Finally, a ranking of process routes is done, implying 
that the higher the value of a process route, the less inherently safe is that route. 
This index is a milestone in the field of inherent safety assessment, since it represents the first 
example of a quantification tool dedicated to inherent safety. Resorting to a scoring method 
allows an easily application even having limited details on the process. Nevertheless, this 
particular scoring approach has been criticized for including built-in judgments of the 
developers of the index on the relative importance of the terms [Gupta & Edwards, 2003]. All 
these assumptions may hardly retain their value when further information on the process 
become available in the further design steps. Another limit of index is that it is very reaction 
oriented and does not consider properly the other parts of the process even they usually 
represent the majority of equipment. 
 
2.1.2.6 – Inherent Safety Index 
 
Heikkilä [Heikkilä, 1999; Heikkilä & Hurme, 1998] has developed an Inherent Safety Index 
(ISI) to classify process alternatives during the preliminary process design. It is based on a 
scoring approach similar to the PIIS, as it can be considered an upgrade of the latter index. It 
consists of chemical and process inherent safety indices. Both contain revised sub indices 
with respect to both number of considered hazards and scoring rules. Noticeably enough, 
“chemical interaction” and “corrosiveness” are included in the chemical inherent safety index 
and “equipment safety” (i.e. possibility that a piece of equipment is unsafe) and “safe process 
structure” (i.e. inherent safety of the process configurations) are included in the process 
inherent safety index. The resulting tool can be easily applied within a very basic knowledge 
of the process. However it retains all the limits on subjective judgement and built-in 
assumptions typical of the simple scoring rules adopted. 
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2.1.2.7 – Inherent Safety Index based on fuzzy approach 
 
According to Gentile and co-workers [Gentile et al., 2003] indices like the ISI and the PIIS 
are based on Boolean mathematics. Therefore each sub-range is like a set with sharp 
boundaries. So an element can belong only to one set at a time. This may bring a practical 
problem as regards sensitivity: an excessive sensitivity of the score is experienced when the 
value of a parameter is close to the limits of a range (the value of the parameter can have a big 
shift to former or later range even for a small change of the parameter) and, by converse, an 
insufficient sensitivity within the range (despite the reduction of the parameter within a range, 
no shift on the score is yield). In order to fix these limits, Gentile and co-workers proposed to 
improve the ISI method by using fuzzy set theory, where transition from one interval to the 
next is smooth. In fact, in a Boolean set, an element can only be inside or outside the set, but 
in a Fuzzy set, the element can be partially or totally inside or outside depending on the shape 
of membership function. In this method each factor is assessed by a Linguistic Variable. This 
variable is divided into sub-ranges, or fuzzy sets. The fuzzy sets for inputs are related to the 
output fuzzy sets through if-then rules, which describe the heuristic knowledge about the 
behaviour of the system. The final result can be defuzzyfied to yield a quantitative score. 
 
2.1.2.8 – i-Safe Index 
 
Palaniappan and co-workers have proposed the i-Safe index [Palaniappan et al., 2002, 
2002b]. This index is part of a software-aided methodology for process chemical route 
selection and flow-sheet improvement; the approach includes a system of expert rules for 
inherent safety improvement in PFD design. For as regard the inherent safety index, it is 
practically an expansion of the approach from Heikkila [Heikkilä, 1999], including further 
parameters. However the structure is similarly based on scoring of the proprieties for the 
chemical and the process. Thus the practical advantages, as well as the drawbacks, are similar 
to the ones discussed for ISI and PIIS. 
 
2.1.2.9 –INSET Toolkit 
 
The INSET toolkit [INSIDE Project, 1997] is the result of an European government/industry 
project aimed to promote inherently safer chemical process and plants (the INSIDE Project). 
The project has developed a set of tools to identify inherently safer design options through the 
life cycle of a process and to evaluate the options. Among these tools, indices aimed at the 
quantitative assessment of the safety health and environment (SHE) performance are defined. 
In particular tools I (ISHE performance indices) and J (multi-attribute ISHE comparative 
evaluation) concern aspects related to hazard assessment. The calculation of the indices relays 
on factors scored from the proprieties of substances (easily obtainable from material data 
sheets) and on an evaluation of inventories. However no particular rules are defined for the 
latter one. Tool J suggests a multi-attribute approach for combination of the indices calculated 
for single hazard aspects (e.g. fire and explosion, acute toxic hazard, reaction hazard, etc.), 
even if do not define strict rules for that, relying on case-specific expert judgement. No rules 
are provided for whole plant quantitative assessment. This method, along with the EHS Index, 
require an higher level of detail compared to the simper scoring methods like PIIS and ISI 
(Table 2.1.1). However the assessment procedure is still based on the evaluation of inherent 
safety scores, resulting in the same kind of limitations of the simpler approaches. 
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2.1.2.10 – EHS Index 
 
Koller and co-workers proposed the EHS index for environment health and safety assessment 
of chemical processes, with particular attention to batch processes (e.g. fine chemistry) 
[Koller et al., 2000]. However the narrow application to inherent safety assessment is 
possible. The idea of the index is conceptually similar to the INSET tools, but the EHS Index 
has improved, but swift, assessment rules that account for a larger number of parameters 
influencing the hazard (the “dangerous proprieties”). Noticeably the rules for the scoring of 
dangerous proprieties are flexible in order to allow the use of different data sources. Also in 
this case the final index for each hazard aspect (the “potential of danger”) scores from the 
material proprieties are combined with an estimation of the inventory. No general rules are 
defined for the quantification of the inventory for units of continuous processes. The approach 
allow to account, by proper factors, for technological and organizational measures for risk 
mitigation, but this is not the case for inherent safety assessment. 
Also in this index the assignment of hazardous parameters is a scoring procedure, even if 
more refined then other scoring approaches, yielding the same practical limits discussed 
earlier. Moreover this method do not define a procedure for the aggregation or combination of 
the various sub-indices addressing specific hazard issues. Furthermore no combination of unit 
scores to a plant one is provided. 
 
2.1.2.11 – Integrated Inherent Safety Index 
 
Khan and Amyotte [Khan & Amyotte, 2004, 2005] have developed a tool for inherent safety 
evaluation, named Integrated Inherent Safety Index (I2SI). It consists of a comprehensive 
framework intended join hazard potential identification and assessment of hazard control 
measures with an economic evaluation of safety. I2SI is a function of Hazard Index (HI) and 
inherent safety potential index (ISPI). HI is a measure of the damage potential considering 
process and hazard control measures. The damage potential is based on scoring of expected 
damage distances for fire and explosion, acute toxicity, chronic toxicity and environmental 
damage. ISPI is a measure of the applicability of inherent safety’s principles to the base 
process. 
An I2SI value greater than unity, presents a positive response to inherent safety guideword 
application. The higher the value of the I2SI, the more pronounced the inherent safety impact. 
Thus, despite all the previous indices, that aimed at hazard evaluation, in this case the lower 
the value of the index, the less inherently safer is the option (i.e. it is more hazardous). 
According to the Authors, this indexing procedure required subjective judgment for certain 
aspects, and for this problem and other uncertainties they have suggested the use of fuzzy 
mathematics. 
The methodology requires the calculation of damage distance, for some parameters, that may 
be obtained by a preliminary application of other approaches, like for instance SWeHI. 
Moreover the same Authors recognize that the procedure implies some extent of subjective 
judgement and some expertise on the processes should be suggested for a proper application. 
However it constitute the most comprehensive approach till now developed for inherent safety 
assessment. 
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2.1.3 – Limits of the existing methods 
 
The analysis reported above identified several approaches that have been proposed in the 
literature for the assessment of the inherent safety performance in design activities. As 
discussed, despite the valuable research effort, some limitations exists in the effective 
applicability of the methodologies as support tool for process design. Hence, current work 
makes an effort to propose innovative tools for filling the gap. The principal limitations 
hindering conventional methodologies can be generalized as follows: 
• Current assessment tools mainly focus on a single phase of the design lifecycle, 
generally the process selection. Though this is a key phase in the definition of the 
safety profile of a plant, the implementation of inherent safety should be generalized 
all over the design lifecycle. 
• The simpler methodologies (i.e. requiring less process information) are heavily based 
on simplifications and built-in assumptions that strongly rely on the specific 
experience of the developers and may hardly retain their value when further 
information on the process become available. 
• On the other side, some approaches resorts to scoring based on expert judgment of the 
analyst, thus introducing some subjective elements in the comparison of the 
alternatives. 
• Only standard units are usually accounted. The rigid and sometimes unclear 
assessment structure of some index methods may lead to difficulties in the application 
to some specific cases (new technologies, minor and auxiliary equipment, etc.). In 
particular, some indexes were designed only for rather specific process applications, 
and their evaluation in other types of processes/units is not straightforward. 
• Some methods yield unaggregated indexes for specific types of hazard. Moreover 
clear rules for the aggregation of the single unit indices to an overall plant profile are 
usually not defined. 
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2.2 – Proposed Method for the Inherent Safety Assessment of Materials 
 
2.2.1 – Overview of the problem 
 
Inherent safety principles recognize that an important part of the hazard involved in handling 
and processing of chemical substances is directly related to the substance characteristics and 
proprieties (toxicity, flammability, stability, etc.). Less attention is usually devoted to the 
potential dangers that may arise from the products that may be formed as a result of thermal 
decomposition or unwanted reactions of the primary material. Thermal decomposition can be 
triggered in anomalous conditions, as overheating or process runaway, or as a consequence of 
accidental scenarios. The unforeseen conditions may lead to the formation and to the release 
of extremely hazardous compounds, different from the normal reactants and products of the 
process. 
It is well known that the loss of control of a chemical process may result in the formation of 
extremely hazardous compounds due to the unwanted conditions caused by the accidental 
event. Historical analysis results confirm that severe accidents in the manufacture of fine 
chemicals and pharmaceutical products, as well as, production and storage of commodities 
(plastics, fertilizers, etc.) were caused by the release of hazardous products formed as a 
consequence of the deviation of a process from the normal operating conditions [Cozzani, et 
al., 1997a, 1997b]. The dangerous substances “which it is believed may be generated during 
the loss of control of an industrial chemical process” must be considered by law in the 
analysis of industrial installations subject to the Directive (96/82/EC), named after the Seveso 
accident. 
 
The particular aspect of hazardous substances that may be formed by unforeseen reactions is 
not considered in the currently available methods for the assessment of inherent safety. 
Accounting for the hazard from undesired decompositions is not a simple task, in particular if 
a comparative analysis among the hazards of different "primary" substances and the 
“secondary” products is pursued. As a matter of fact, a number of different products may be 
formed from a single "primary" substance, each having a different hazard. 
Nevertheless the selection of less hazardous substances is a key issue for an inherent safety 
assessment method aimed at supporting the development of new chemical processes. Thus a 
specific tool for the assessment of the hazard profile of the decomposition products for a 
substance was developed in the current study. 
 
The development of such a tool required to focus on two aspects: the first one concerns the 
identification of the expected “secondary” substances originated in anomalous condition and 
the second one concerns the definition of a comprehensive procedure for hazard assessment 
and comparison. 
The problem of identification of the secondary substances requires dedicated experimental 
surveys. Experimental protocols may be adopted in order to reproduce the accidental 
conditions and to identify the products. A separated section (§3) of the current work will be 
specifically dedicated to this purpose. 
In the following, the procedure specifically developed for the assessment of the hazard profile 
of “primary” and “secondary” materials is described. The procedure allows the comparison of 
the hazard profiles of the initial substances and the decomposition products, allowing the 
identification of potentially dangerous condition. This completes the outcomes of 
experimental surveys providing the elaboration and the interpretation of the results. 
 
 §2.2 - 2 
2.2.2 – Selection of hazardous proprieties 
 
The first step in the development of the procedure for inherent safety of materials was the 
definition of a the hazard vector. This is a vector that contains the hazardous proprieties 
considered for a given material. The hazard vector represents the hazard related to the release 
of any identified substance into different environmental compartments. In particular the four 
targets of the hazard were considered: 
i. acute effects on human health; 
ii. long-term effects on human health; 
iii. damages of  ecosystems (both global balance and single species); 
iv. environmental media contamination. 
Physical and chemical hazards, as flammability or explosion, were not considered since the 
main concern of the present study was the possible formation and release in the environment 
of extremely toxic decomposition products. This choice is justified by the analysis of past 
accidental scenarios, that highlighted that the more critical aspects connected to the 
decomposition of substances are toxicity and environmental contamination. 
 
The actual capability of a substance to reach a damage target was considered. A 
comprehensive study of the methodologies used to assess the risk for the human health, and 
for ecological and environmental media vulnerability, led to the identification of four 
categories of hazardous properties (Table 2.2.1). 
 
The first category is represented by toxicological and eco-toxicological parameters, that 
express dose-response relationships, as acute toxicity and chronic reference doses (inhalation, 
oral and dermal), and cancer slope factors (inhalation, oral and dermal). In addition toxic 
effects on fish, daphnia and birds are taken into account in order to define the eco-
toxicological behaviour. 
 
 
Categories Proprieties Symbol 
 Acute toxicity on humans PAT 
Toxicological and Acute eco-toxicity on fauna and flora PET 
eco-toxicological properties Chronic toxicity on humans PChT 
 Carcinogenicity PC 
 Molecular weight PMW 
Dispersion and Henry’s law constant PH 
environmental fate Boiling point PBp 
 Water solubility PS 
Uptake by humans and 
animals Octanol-water partition coefficient PKow 
Persistence in the 
environment Overall persistence time Pto 
 
Table 2.2.1: Potential impact categories and selected hazardous proprieties for the 
characterization of substances released into the environment. 
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The second category contains parameters influencing the dispersion and the environmental 
fate of substances (i.e. chemical and physical properties that describe the partition of 
chemicals between solid, liquid and gas phases). Molecular weight, melting point, boiling 
point, relative density (liquid, air), vapour pressure, Henry’s law constant, water solubility, 
lipophilicity, air and water diffusivity belong to this group. 
 
The third category is represented by the parameters influencing the uptake by humans and 
living organisms: octanol-water partition coefficient (Kow), organic carbon partition 
coefficient, bioconcentration and bioaccumulation factors, soil-water partition coefficient, 
suspended solids-surface water partition coefficient, sediments-pores water partition 
coefficient. However, it must be remarked that reliable methodologies are available to derive 
all these parameters from the Kow coefficient. 
 
The fourth and last category consists of properties influencing the persistence in the 
environment: degradation coefficients or half-life times in air, soil and water. 
 
Although many parameters can fit in these four categories, a selection of a small number of 
properties was possible (Table 2.2.1). The criteria for selection were based on the role they 
play in the risk modeling and the existence of predictive relations among the parameters 
belonging to the same category [Allen & Shonnard, 2002; EPA, 2005]. 
 
 
2.2.3 – Definition and comparison of the hazard profiles 
 
The parameters in Table 2.2.1 are the basis of the evaluation of the hazard profile. Thus the 
collection of the values for all these parameters is required for the application of the present 
methodology. The values of the proprieties will be converted in scores, the quantities actually 
used in the hazard vector. Table 2.2.2 reports the possible typology of data for assigning 
values at the parameters. 
 
Two practical sources exist to obtain the values of the parameters: available databases 
reporting results from experimental data (suggested) or estimation on the basis of the structure 
of the chemical of concern. 
 
 
Group of properties # Parameter Data 
PAT Acute toxicity  LC50, LD50, Risk Phrases 
PET Ecotoxicity LC50, LD50, EC50 
PChT Chronic toxicity  RfD, RfC 
1) Toxicological and  
eco-toxicological 
properties 
PC Carcinogenicity  CSF 
PMW Molecular weight M 
PH Henry’s law constant H 
PBp Boiling point Tb 
2) Dispersion and fate 
PS Water solubility S 
3) Uptake by organisms PKow Octanol-water partition c. Kow 
4) Persistence  Pto Overall persistence time To 
 
Table 2.2.2: Hazardous parameters and typology of data for the definition. 
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Examples of databases that can be used in the assessment are: 
 
• CHEMEXPER, http://www.chemexper.com 
• EPI SUITE, http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/exposure/pubs/episuite.htm 
• SIRI, http://www2.siri.org/msds/index.php 
• TOXNET (HSDB, IRIS, ITER), http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov 
• Lewis, R.J., Sax’s Dangerous Proprieties of Industrial Materials, 1992, 8th Ed., Van 
Nostrand Reinhold, New York. 
 
The predictive methods are generally described as group contribution methods, structure 
activity methods (SARs) or quantitative structure activity relationships (QSARs) [Allen & 
Shonnard, 2002; EPA WPd; Perry 1997]. As well, specific toxicological and eco-
toxicological  tests can be done where necessary. 
 
In order to evaluate and compare the different hazards associated to a substance of concern, 
an arbitrary hazard ranking was derived from the substance parameters listed in Table 2.2.2. A 
score, integer between 0 and 3, was assigned to each property, on the basis of the value of the 
reference parameters. The 0 value (i.e. negligible effect) is assigned only for the first group 
parameters, that are related to toxicity, carcinogenicity and ecotoxicity, while for all the other 
parameters the lowest score is 1. Table 2.2.3 shows an example of this assignation procedure 
for the acute eco-toxicity for fauna and flora (PET). Scoring procedures similar to those 
described in figure were defined for all the other parameters, and are reported in Appendix 
2.1. The scores assigned to each range of the parameters were defined on the basis of criteria 
depending on the specific parameter, considering typical values for a large number of 
substances as well as normative references (e.g. for the acute toxicity, the criteria were based 
on the classification given by Directive 67/548/EEC). Where more parameters contribute to 
the assignation of a single parameter score [Koller et al.,2000; Allen & Shonnard, 2002], as 
in the example of Table 2.2.3, the overall score is conservatively assumed on the basis of the 
highest parameter. 
 
All the parameter scores of a substance are listed in the “hazard vector” of the substance, that 
may be also represented using a radial graph, to give the “hazard footprint” of the substance, 
as shown in the examples of §4.5. 
 
The scores of the hazard vector may be combined and aggregated in a limited number of 
hazard indexes, each expressing the potential impact towards a specific target, in order to 
allow a more identification of the hazards of a substance. The four impact indexes used to 
define the impact profile of each substance were defined in order to share the same 
generalized equation: 
 
I = HF·AF·CPF                  (2.2.1) 
 
where: 
• HF (Hazard Factor) represents the ability of a substance to damage the target; 
• AF (Availability Factor) represents the availability and the intensity with which the 
substance may actually reach the target; 
• CPF (Contact Probability Factor) quantifies the likelihood of a target to come in contact 
with the substance. 
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 Fish 
LC5096h 
(g/m3) 
Daphnia 
LC5048 h 
(g/m3) 
Birds 
LD50oral 
(mg/kg) 
Algae 
LC5072h 
(g/m3) 
 
Score 
Very toxic < 1 < 1 < 10 < 1 3 
Toxic 1 – 10 1 – 10 10 – 100 1 – 10 2 
Harmful 10 – 100 10 – 100 100 – 1000 10 – 100 1 
Negligible 
toxicity 
> 100 > 100 > 1000 > 100 0 
 
Table 2.2.3: Example of hazard ranking: acute eco-toxicity for flora and fauna (PET) 
 
 
Table 2.2.4 lists all the indexes considered by the method. The values of the specific impact 
indexes are between 0 and 27. 
 
The first index, the Acute Toxicity Index (IAT), assesses the hazards for the humans due to 
acute toxicity for the inhalation of a volatile compound. In this index, the HF is linked to the 
acute toxicity parameter (PAT), but it refers to the specific acute toxicity for inhalation. The AF 
is represented by the tendency of the compound to be present in air. Thus, the AF was 
calculated as the mean of the scores for the boiling point and the Henry’s law constant (H), 
expressed in atm·m3/mol. Finally, the CPF is related to the molecular weight, since diffusivity 
in air, which affects the dilution of a toxic cloud, is correlated to molecular weight by a 
decreasing function. 
 
The second index (Ecotoxicity Index, IET) concerns the hazards for the ecosystem. Two sub-
indexes were defined for the calculation: one for aquatic species (IETaq) and the other for avian 
ones (IETav). IETaq is obtained multiplying the scores of the following parameters: toxicity for 
algae, daphnia, and fishes (HF), solubility (AF) and persistence time (CPF). Toxicity for birds 
(HF), Henry’s law constant (AF) and persistence time (CPF) are instead considered for IETav 
calculation. The higher value between the two indexes is chosen as IET.  
 
The third index (Chronic Toxicity Index, ICT), expresses the chronic toxic effects of a released 
substance on human targets. The three factors for the estimation of the Chronic Toxicity Index 
are the scores for chronic toxicity, the Kow and the persistence. 
 
 
Index Formula 
Acute Toxicity (IAT) Iat = PAT · ((PH+PBp)/2) · PMW 
Ecotoxicity (IET) Iet = max( (PETwater · PS · Pto) ; (PETair · PH · Pto) ) 
Chronic Toxicity (ICT) Icht = PChT · PKow · Pto 
Carcinogenicity (IC) Ic = PC · PKow · Pto 
Overall Index Io = Iat + Iet + Icht + Ic 
 
Table 2.2.4: Hazard indexes defined to describe the hazard profile of a substance. 
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The fourth index (Carcinogenicity Index, IC), is similar to the previous, but the aspect of 
concern is the carcinogenicity. Therefore, the hazard factor is represented by the score for 
carcinogenicity (evaluated through slope factors or qualitative information), while the other 
two factors are the same of the ICT. 
 
The four indexes are added to calculate the Overall Hazard Index (IO). Although this is useful 
for quick hazard comparison of different substances, its intrinsic limit due to the loss of detail 
in the information has to be recognized. 
 
The loss of control of a chemical process may cause the contemporary release of many 
substances; therefore the development of an approach for the comparison of the hazard 
profiles of primary and secondary substances becomes a fundamental element for the 
comprehension of the consequences of an accidental scenario. The identification, possibly 
quantitative, of the substances released rely on the application of suitable experimental 
protocols, as described in Section 3. 
When several substances are present in a mixture, the single hazard vectors, featuring the 
impact profile of the decomposition products, can be arranged in an hazard matrix. 
 
The comparison of the hazard profile between the primary substance and the decomposition 
products is a starting point for the assessment of scenarios involving decomposition reactions 
following the loss control of the chemical system. The use of the hazard matrix allow a quick 
comparison among single substances (e.g. Table 2.2.5). Furthermore a graphical 
representation (radial diagrams and histograms, as in Figure 2.2.1) shows the new hazards that 
may arise in “loss of control” conditions. 
 
 
 
 
2 1 2122113 1 TBPB 
Pto PKPSPBPHPMPCPCPEPACompound name 
2 1 3123110 1 2-methyl-2-propanol 
1 1 3122001 0 1-phenyl-2-propanone 
1 1 2222112 1 Ethyl benzene 
1 2 2122123 0 Biphenyl 
2 1 3223020 0 Butanone 
2 1 3223122 1 Benzene 
1 1 2223122 1 Toluene 
3 1 2333011 0 Methane 
3 1 3223110 0 Propanone 
3 1 3333000 0 Carbon Dioxide 
 
 
Table 2.2.5: Example of hazard matrix: the thermal decomposition of 
 tert-butylperoxybenzoate (TBPB), (raw data from CCPS, [1995]) 
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In the case of mixtures, general rules can be defined for the identification of the hazard profile 
of the mixture. When quantitative data on the expected distribution of the weight fractions of 
the decomposition products are available, a significant information may be added up in the 
comparison of the hazard profiles, estimating the weighed average of the hazard profiles. 
Otherwise the range of variation of the values can be represented graphically, allowing a 
screening of the possibility of formation of more hazardous compounds and, through the 
analysis of the indexes, of the prevalent types of new hazard arising. 
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Decomposition
products 
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Figure 2.2.1: Example of hazard footprint: thermal decomposition of  
tert-butylperoxybenzoate (TBPB), (raw data from CCPS, [1995]) 
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2.3 – Proposed Method for the Inherent Safety Assessment of a Process 
 
2.3.1 –Overview of the method 
 
In the present chapter, a specific effort is made to develop an innovative method for 
quantitative inherent safety assessment in early process design. A few key performance 
indicators (KPIs) for inherent safety are defined and a procedure for their quantitative 
assessment is developed. These KPIs are particularly suitable for the use within the 
sustainability assessment introduced in §1.2. 
In order to overcome the dependence of the scores on the experience and on expert judgement 
typical of other methods (see §2.1.2), the proposed procedure is strongly based on 
consequence assessment of potential accidents. A specific equipment classification and the 
related failure modes are identified, in order to define the potential accidental scenarios 
associated to each process unit. Rules for the calculation, by physical model runs, of reference
 
 
Step 1
Identification of
process units
Step 2
Identification of failure 
modes and LOCs
Step 6
Identification of
credit factors
Step 3
Identification of 
material proprieties
Step 4
Event trees definition 
and scenario selection
Step 5
Calculation of
damage distances
Step 7
Unit index
calculation
Step 8
Overall index 
calculation
All the units
assessed?
No
Yes
 
 
Figure 2.3.1: Flow diagram of the method. 
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 damage distances are also defined. Credit factors to account for the safety score of the 
different equipment classes are introduced. The methodology is applied to a case study in 
order to demonstrate its suitability for the identification of safety critical units and for the 
assessment of the inherent safety of alternative processes. 
 
The aim of the method is to compare the inherent safety of alternative process schemes by the 
calculation of quantitative hazard and risk indexes for single units and for the overall process. 
This is a purpose absolutely similar to the one of the sustainability assessment procedure 
(§1.2). Clearly enough, the inherent safety assessment for processes can be used both for 
providing societal indicators in sustainability assessment and for the category-specific 
assessment of the only inherent safety of process options. 
 
The conceptual flow diagram of the inherent safety assessment method is reported in Figure 
2.3.1. As most of the methods requiring the assessment of safety indexes, the procedure starts 
from the identification of the equipment units of each process, based on a specific equipment 
classification. KPIs are then calculated for each unit, based on the consequence analysis of 
credible scenarios. The single unit indexes may be further added in order to provide an overall 
hazard index. 
The estimation of the KPIs of the single units is directly based on the assessment of the 
expected consequences of credible scenarios, whose straightforward calculation is presently 
possible with the aid of commercial software codes for consequence analysis. The use of a 
procedure based on consequence assessment contributes to limit the problems of built-in 
judgement on the relative importance of some parameters, that resulted a critical point in the 
application of score-based indexes (e.g. PIIS and ISI [Gentile et al., 2003; Gupta & Edwards, 
2003]). Moreover, the rigid and sometimes unclear assessment structure of some index 
methods may lead to difficulties in their application. In particular, some indexes were 
designed only for specific process applications [Khan et al., 2003; Koller et al., 2000], and 
their evaluation in other types of processes is not straightforward. In the methodology 
proposed, the approach introduced and the use of consequence analysis allow a more general 
application of the procedure. 
 
The input data required for the application of the method to the process options of concern are 
preliminary data on process equipment and the data contained in a simplified process flow 
diagram (PFD): 
• substances and operating conditions (pressure, temperature, phase) in each unit of the 
process; 
• material flows in process lines; 
• general technical specifications of the equipment units; 
• a preliminary estimation of substance inventories in each process unit. 
 
Thus they represent a subset of the data required for sustainability assessment of processes 
(§1.2.2). 
 
 
2.3.2 – Identification of process units 
 
As shown in Figure 2.3.1, the starting point for the application of the procedure is the 
identification of relevant equipment units to which the method should be applied. The units 
identified at this stage represent the basic elements of the assessment. Equipment units to be 
considered were sorted by a specifically defined classification, that was based on the 
geometrical structure of the units. Table 2.3.1 reports the main general unit categories defined 
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for process equipment. For each unit category, sub-categories featuring the specific 
characteristics of the units related to their function/operative condition were also defined. 
Specific codes are given to each sub-category. 
 
 
General Categories Sub-categories Code 
Vessel-like equipment Atmospheric vessel (storage, process, etc.) EQ1.1 
 Pressurized vessel (storage, column, reactor, etc.) EQ1.2 
 Mobile vessel (tank wagon, road tanker) EQ1.3 
Tube bundle equipment S&T heat exchanger, reactor, etc. EQ2.1 
Plate and frame equipment Filter, plate heat exchanger, etc. EQ3.1 
Pipe Pipeline, manifold, etc. EQ4.1 
Pumping equipment Pump (centrifuge, alternative, etc.) EQ5.1 
 Compressor (centrifuge, alternative, etc.) EQ5.2 
Warehouse Packed materials (bags, barrels, etc.) EQ6.1 
 Spare materials (piles, etc.) EQ6.2 
Special equipment Solid handling (conveyors, crushers, etc.) EQ7.1 
 Other EQ7.2 
 
Table 2.3.1: Main general categories proposed for the classification of process units. 
 
 
2.3.3 - Definition of the failure modes and of the events leading to the loss of containment 
 
The following step of the method consists in the identification of reference failure modes 
which lead to a loss of containment (LOC). Reference LOCs were associated to the more 
common classes of pieces of equipment, following the classification reported in Table 2.3.1, 
on the basis of approaches suggested in the technical literature [Delvosalle et al., 2006; Lees, 
1996; Uijt de Haag & Ale, 1999]. Table 2.3.2 reports an example of the LOC events 
associated to different equipment categories on the basis of the approach suggested by the 
TNO “purple book” [Uijt de Haag & Ale, 1999]. When non-standard equipment needs to be 
considered in the analysis, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) may be applied to 
identify the credible events leading to loss of containment. 
 
Several LOC events are possible for each piece of equipment. “Credit factors” may be 
determined in order to assess the credibility of the LOCs identified. In the present approach, 
the likelihood of the reference LOCs was estimated from statistical data. Reference failure 
frequency data may be easily used to evaluate the hazard linked to each class of equipment 
[Heikkilä,  1999], and to represent the susceptibility to particular failure modes of the 
equipment class. Equipment frequency failure data are reported in several publications (e.g. 
API, [2000]; Delvosalle et al., [2006]; MVG, [2004]; OREDA, [2002]; Uijt de Haag & Ale, 
[1999]). The reference frequencies reported for a given equipment failure mode by the purple 
book [Uijt de Haag & Ale, 1999] or, if not available, by API publications [API, 2000] were 
used in the present approach as “credit factors” for standard technologies. Specific failure 
frequency data, e.g. derived from available statistical data or from conventional fault-tree 
analysis [Delvosalle et al., 2006], were introduced to account for the credit factors derived 
from the adoption of technologies with higher safety standards. This approach allows the 
estimation of “standard” credit vectors for each reference class of equipment. The elements of 
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the credit vector are the above defined credit factors for each LOC considered for the unit. 
Table 2.3.2 gives an example of credit vectors defined for some common pieces of equipment. 
Clearly enough, the standard credit vectors reported in Table 2.3.2 may be modified to 
account for improved safety standards of specific pieces of equipment. 
 
 
LOC 
Horizontal 
gas storage 
(EQ1.2) 
Floating roof 
tank 
(EQ1.1) 
Centrifugal 
pump 
(EQ5.1) 
Centrifugal 
compressor 
(EQ5.2) 
Shell and 
tube heat 
exchanger 
(EQ2.1) 
R1: small leak, continuous 
release from a 10 mm 
equivalent diameter hole 
1x10-5 1x10-4 n.a. n.a. 1x10-3 
R2: catastrophic rupture, 
release of the entire inventory 
in 600 s 
5x10-7 5x10-6 n.a. n.a. 5x10-5 
R3: catastrophic rupture, 
instantaneous release of the 
entire inventory and release 
from the full-bore feed pipe 
5x10-7 5x10-6 n.a. n.a. 5x10-5 
R4: pipe leak, continuous 
release from a hole having  
10% of pipe diameter 
n.c. n.c. 5x10-4 1x10-3 n.c. 
R5: pipe rupture, continuous 
release from the full-bore pipe n.c. n.c. 1x10
-4 1x10-4 n.c. 
 
Table 2.3.2: LOCs and related “credit factors” for different categories of process equipment 
(data for credit factors derived from the literature [API, 2000; Uijt de Haag & Ale, 1999]). 
n.a.: not applicable; n.c.: not considered. 
 
 
 
 
  FB JF VE FF TD PF BV
Continuous releases        
 Gas or vapor  ? ? ? ?   
 Pressurized liquefied gas  ? ? ? ?   
 Cryogenic / Boiling liquid 
  ? ? ? ?  
 Non-boiling liquid     ? ?  
Instantaneous releases        
 Gas or vapor   ? ? ?   
 Pressurized liquefied gas ?  ? ? ?  ? 
 Boiling liquid   ? ? ? ?  
 Cryogenic liquid ?  ? ? ?   
 Non-boiling liquid     ? ?  
 
Table 2.3.3: Summary of conventional scenarios considered by the reference set of event 
trees for the more common LOC events involving flammable or toxic fluids, listed as a 
function of release conditions. Fireball (FB), jet fire (JF), vapor cloud explosion (VE), flash 
fire (FF), toxic dispersion (TD), pool fire (PF), BLEVE (BV). 
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2.3.4 - Event tree definition and scenario selection 
 
As discussed above, the present methodology is based on the calculation of equipment hazard 
indexes derived from the consequences of the accidental scenarios that may be associated to 
each unit. Thus, a necessary step in the application of the procedure is the identification of the 
accidental scenarios that may be associated with each unit. A set of reference event trees, 
derived from conventional approaches proposed in the technical literature [Delvosalle et al., 
2006; Lees, 1996; Uijt de Haag & Ale, 1999], were defined to identify the expected incidental 
scenarios associated with each LOC. An example of standard reference event tree is reported 
in Figure 2.3.2. The selection of the proper event tree follows the criteria used in conventional 
risk analysis, that are based on the characteristics of the LOC event, and on the hazard, the 
physical state, the physical properties, the temperature and pressure of the stream released. 
Further details on the criteria for event tree definition and selection are reported in the 
literature [CCPS, 2000; Lees, 1996]. Table 2.3.3 summarizes the scenarios associated with 
the different release categories considered for flammable/toxic substances. 
 
 
YES
NO
VE - VCE
FF - FLASH FIRE
TD - DISPERSION
EARLY IGNITION LATE IGNITION EXPLOSION
JF - JET FIRE
Ac1 CONTINUOS RELEASE OF GAS
 
 
Figure 2.3.2: Example of reference event tree for the continuous release of a flammable gas. 
 
 
2.3.5 - Calculation of damage distances 
 
The calculation of the equipment hazard indexes requires the estimation of a parameter 
representing the severity of each scenario that may be triggered by the identified LOC events. 
Different types of physical effects (thermal radiation, overpressure or toxic concentration), are 
taken into account and compared in the analysis. Thus, in order to obtain a homogeneous 
severity parameter of each scenario, the damage distances corresponding to a given effect 
threshold were calculated. The effects on humans were taken into consideration to define 
threshold values for each physical effect. Table 2.3.4 shows an example of homogenous-effect 
threshold values, that are suggested in technical documents as representing the 1% mortality 
level of exposed population [Christou et al., 1999; Lees, FP.; 1996; Planas et al., 2006; 
TNO, 1992]. Damage distances are thus defined as the maximum distance where at a fixed 
height (1m in the present study) the physical effect of the scenario (thermal radiation, 
overpressure or concentration) reaches the threshold value. Damage distances may thus be 
calculated for each scenario using consequence analysis models, on the basis of the LOC 
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characterization performed in the previous steps. Several models and commercial software 
tools are available in the literature for consequence analysis, and may be used for the purpose. 
The only limitation is that the same model should be used in the comparative assessment of 
different LOC events to obtain coherent results and to avoid at least the possible “bias” in the 
comparison derived from model differences. In the case study discussed in the following, the 
set of consequence analysis models reported by the TNO “yellow book” [Van Den Bosh & 
Weterings, 1997] were used. 
 
 
Physical effect Threshold Value 
Flash Fire ½ LFL 
Fireball 7 kW/m2 
Jet Fire 7 kW/m2 
Pool Fire 7 kW/m2 
Vapor cloud explosion 14 kPa 
Physical/mechanical explosion 14 kPa 
BLEVE 14 kPa 
Toxic exposure IDLH 
 
Table 2.3.4: Threshold values assumed for damage distance evaluation (LFL: lower 
flammability limit; IDLH: toxic concentration immediately dangerous to life and health). 
 
 
Thus, for each unit it is possible to calculate an impact matrix, having a number of rows equal 
to all the credible LOC events and a number of columns equal to the maximum number of 
accidental scenarios related to each LOC event. Each element of the impact matrix for the k-
th unit, mi,j,k, is related to the expected damage distance calculated for the j-th scenario of the 
i-th LOC event by the following expression: 
 
),(max ,,,, cdm kjikji =         (2.3.1) 
 
where di,j,k is the calculated damage distance and c is a constant. The use of the constant c in 
Equation (2.3.1) allows the definition of a “near field” zone, in which the consequences of the 
event are neglected. This takes into account the unreliability of conventional consequence 
assessment models in describing correctly the consequences of the events in the “near field”, 
thus avoiding biases in the analysis due to these uncertainties. 
 
Starting from the impact matrix, a unit hazard vector h may be defined, whose elements are 
the maximum damage distances calculated for each LOC event considered in the analysis: 
 
)(max ,,, kjijki mh =          (2.3.2) 
 
where hi,k is the maximum damage distance of the i-th LOC event considered for k-th unit. 
 
 
2.3.6 - Calculation of hazard indexes 
 
The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are obtained starting from the hazard and credit 
vectors calculated for each unit. A unit potential hazard index may be defined as follows: 
 
2
, )(max kiik hUPI =          (2.3.3) 
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where UPIk is the unit potential hazard index of the k-th unit and hi,k is the corresponding 
hazard vector. The unit hazard index is thus representative of the maximum impact area that 
may derive from the worst case scenario considered for the unit. 
 
Credit factors may be introduced in the analysis in order to take into account the safety scores 
of the equipment, and to consider differences in inherent safety performance deriving from 
equipment technology: 
 
∑
=
⋅= k
n
i
kikik hcfUHI
1
2
,,          (2.3.4) 
 
where UHIk is the unit inherent hazard index of the k-th unit, nk is the number of LOC events 
considered for the k-th unit, cfi,k and hi,k are respectively the credit factor and the maximum 
damage distance calculated for the i-th LOC event. The value of the index is higher for units 
having higher potential hazards or a higher record of LOC events. 
 
The overall indexes of a group of N units (e.g. the entire plant) are calculated as follows 
starting from the unit indexes: 
 
∑
=
=
N
k
kUPIPI
1
          (2.3.5) 
 
and: 
 
∑
=
=
N
k
kUHIHI
1
         (2.3.6) 
 
Thus, the methodology developed allows the calculation of indexes representing the inherent 
safety performance of the plant, based either on a direct assessment of potential worst-case 
scenarios (PI) or of likely safety performance and release scenarios of process units (HI). 
Both indexes represent a quantification of the inherent safety of a process, having lower 
values as the inherent safety of the process is increased. 
 
 
2.3.7 – Notes on the main features of the method 
 
The proposed method for inherent safety assessment presents several advantages, compared to 
existing literature approaches. The case studies will help to underline these features (see §4). 
 
♦ The method is based on the consequence assessment of reference accidental scenarios, 
taking advantage of the progress in the availability of user-friendly commercial 
software, that significantly reduced the time requirements for consequence analysis. 
The use of consequence modelling of reference accidental scenarios and of credit 
factors derived from statistical data limit the requirements for built-in expert 
judgement and for the introduction of subjective elements within the analysis. The 
final result is expected to be a more realistic and sound representation of the inherent 
safety performance. 
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♦ Through the use of credit factors, the method considers the inherent safety 
performance of the single pieces of equipment (i.e. the credibility of the LOCs). This 
feature is not present in most of the other methods in the literature. 
♦ The method is extremely flexible allowing the application of the more appropriate 
model for the analysis of each specific scenario. As a consequence, built-in 
assumptions and generalizations typical of other tools are avoided, yielding a more 
specific assessment of the expected accident severity. On the other hand, the method 
has no limitations in considering specific and non-standard pieces of equipment, since 
LOCs and credit factors may be determined by the application of well-known specific 
methods (e.g. FMEA). This possibility is not present in most of literature tools, due to 
built-in assumptions that may not be easily modified by the user. 
♦ The method yields quantitative indexes that allow an easy interpretation and 
communication of the results. Transparent rules are defined for the combination of the 
KPIs of the single units to give overall indexes for the process. Moreover, the results 
are obtained on a fixed scale. Therefore, it is possible to compare the inherent safety 
indexes obtained even for very different units or processes. This is an important 
feature in order to address the absolute ranking of the inherent hazard, and the 
requirements for add-on safety devices or other risk control and risk management 
measures. 
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2.4 – Proposed Method for the Inherent Safety of Layout 
 
2.4.1 – Overview of the problem 
 
In this chapter the implementation of inherent safety in the design of plant layout plots is 
discussed and specific decision support tools for layout design are proposed. 
 
The plant layout plays an important role in defining the safety of a facility. The spatial 
arrangement of process units influences the ability of an accidental event to propagate from 
one unit to another (domino effect), resulting in escalation of the magnitude of the accident 
consequences [Cozzani et al., 2005,2007; Khan & Abbasi, 1999]. As well, the position of 
populated targets (e.g. buildings) with respect to possible sources of hazard is of major 
concern due to the possibility of exposure and fatalities. Moreover, layout design affects the 
accessibility of the different areas in a plant, which is a critical element for both accident risk 
(e.g. easy, regular operations and maintenance) and accident management (e.g. fire-fighting 
operations and evacuation). 
 
Plant layout design involves several different issues that have to be considered at the same 
time: constraints on process requirements, cost, safety, services and utilities availability, plant 
construction, regulations, etc. Layout design is usually performed in successive steps of 
increasing detail. Design strategies and computer aided-tools have been developed to assist in 
the various steps (see, for example, [Mecklenburgh, 1985; Lees, 1996] and the references 
cited therein). Current research worldwide on design analysis tools is focused primarily on 
optimization of the economic aspects of the facility plot (see, for example, Barbosa-Pòvoa et 
al., [2002]; Deb & Bhattacharyya, [2005]; Georgiadis et al., [1999]; Papageorgiou & 
Rotstein, [1998]). From the safety point of view, early layout design is mainly based on 
industrial practice and simple guidelines or empirical rules. Tables of conventional 
segregation distances for various equipment units are traditionally used in this framework 
[Mecklenburgh, 1985; Lees, 1996]. Some attempts to include safety aspects in layout 
optimization have been made [Nolan & Bradley, 1987 Penteado & Ciric, 1996 Patsiatzis, 
D.I.; Knight, G.; Papageorgiou, L.G.; 2004]; these are aimed mainly at economic 
optimization of layout design, including the assessment of safety aspects (e.g. cost of safety 
devices and of losses). A more detailed safety analysis, involving evaluation of possible 
accidental scenarios and consequence analysis, is generally confined to the final stages of the 
design lifecycle when the risk performance of the whole plant is verified. There are, however, 
limited margins for layout improvement left at this final stage. Hence, there exists a need for 
an engineering tool that is applicable in the early stages of each step of the process design 
lifecycle. 
 
Inherent safety can be effectively implemented in the layout structure beginning with the early 
stages of layout design. However no comprehensive inherent safety assessment tool 
specifically addressing the assessment of early layout design is currently available: the 
analysis of the literature reported in §2.1.2 evidences that the attention in developing tools 
was manly focused on the phases of chemical route selection and conceptual process design. 
 
This chapter is divided in two main sections: in the first is specifically aimed at the analysis of 
domino hazard, including the discussion of the possible design actions to limit the escalation 
potential and the proposed methods for the quantitative assessment of this hazard during 
design activities; the second deals with the overall problem of inherent safety in layout and 
with the method developed for the safety assessment in the design of layout plans. 
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2.4.2 – Domino Hazard reduction in layout design 
 
2.4.2.1 – The domino hazard and the risk reduction strategies: introducing an inherent 
approach 
 
A domino accident (also known in the literature as escalation or knock-on event) may be 
defined as an accident in which a primary event propagates to nearby equipment, triggering 
one or more secondary events. Four elements characterize this phenomenon: 
• a primary accidental scenario, which triggers the domino event; 
• the propagation effect following the primary event, due to the physical effects (escalation 
vectors) caused by the primary event on secondary targets; 
• one or more secondary accidental scenarios, involving the same or different plant units 
• an “escalation” effect, that is an increase of the overall severity of the domino event with 
respect to that of the primary accidental scenario 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4.1: The domino escalation accident. 
 
 
Escalation sequences for atmospheric and pressurised equipment are only possible when 
highly energetic primary scenarios occur. Table 2.4.1 shows the primary scenarios that are 
likely to trigger escalation effects, and the escalation vectors identified for each scenario. The 
list of primary scenarios included in Table 2.4.1 derived for the analysis of more than 100 
domino case-histories performed in a previous study [Cozzani et al., 2006], and was extended 
to comprehend all the categories of accidental scenarios that were responsible of at least an 
escalation event. Definition, modelling details and physics of the scenarios listed in Table 
2.4.1 are widely described elsewhere [Baker et al., 1983; CCPS, 1994; Lees, 1996]. Table 
2.4.1 reports also the physical effects responsible of escalation identified for each scenario, 
which may be defined as the escalation vectors of the scenario. 
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Primary scenario Escalation vector 
Fireball Heat radiation 
Jet fire Heat radiation 
Pool fire Heat radiation 
Vapour cloud explosion 
(VCE) Overpressure 
BLEVE Overpressure 
 Fragment projection 
Mechanical Explosion Overpressure 
 Fragment projection 
 
Table 2.4.1: Escalation vectors for the primary scenarios identified as potential initiator of 
domino escalations. 
 
 
Accidents in which a domino effect takes place are among the more severe events that may 
affect industrial processes and storage sites. Hence, strong efforts should be addressed by the 
safety management to the prevention of domino accidental scenarios, which is currently 
mainly pursued by active and passive safety strategies. 
 
The passive safety approach to domino limitation consists in the proper design of physical 
barriers and protection systems (e.g. thermal insulation of process equipment) whose effect, 
when needed, is available without any external intervention. This strategy is widely used for 
the reduction of accident consequence, although the cost of passive protection systems may be 
relevant [Hendershot, 1997]. Active strategies to prevent escalation events are usually 
considered less reliable in the hierarchy of safety but, at least for some primary scenarios as 
pool or jet fires, these approaches may be effective (e.g. sprinklers protecting pressurized 
storages), and are often compulsory in the national legislation of several countries as well as 
in international design standards. 
 
Although the two approaches cited above are of great relevance, it is of fundamental 
importance to explore the possibility of an inherent safety approach to the prevention of 
domino accidental events. 
An inherent approach to domino prevention may be easily applied in early plant design, 
taking into account the possibility of domino events during lay-out definition. In this case, 
escalation events may be avoided simply by introducing appropriate safety distances between 
the more hazardous process units (those having large inventories of flammable or toxic 
substances) and other process installations. However, distances between process units are 
usually defined on the basis of industrial practice and simple guidelines or rule of thumbs, 
without specific reference to the prevention of domino events [Mecklenburgh, 1985]. 
Thus, the possibility of an inherent approach to escalation prevention, based on lay-out 
definition during early design, is seldom taken into account, and no well accepted procedure 
or guideline is available. Moreover, the possibility of an inherent approach to escalation 
prevention in existing plants, where lay-out modifications are usually not possible and only 
limited changes may be introduced, has never been explored. 
 
The assessment of escalation requires, in the case of domino effect prevention, the analysis of 
the possible primary scenarios and of the possible domino targets, and thus may not be carried 
out in detail before the preliminary design of equipment. On the other hand, at this stage, 
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limited changes may be introduced in the process, although the lay-out definition still leaves 
some degrees of freedom. Even less modifications are possible on existing plants. The 
feasibility of inherent safety actions addressed to the prevention of domino effect and 
classified by the inherent safety guidewords should thus be carefully evaluated. 
 
The guide word intensification is mainly referred to the reduction of the inventory in single 
equipment items or of the number of equipment items. Since the inventory involved is often a 
significant parameter in determining the escalation of a primary scenario (e.g. for BLEVEs or 
VCEs), the minimization of quantities stored or processed is an effective measure for the 
reduction of hazard, though the revision of equipment design is needed. Also actions related 
to moderation would lead to important reduction in escalation possibilities. The use of less 
hazardous conditions, as the shift to safer storage technologies (as, in general, the use of 
cryogenic instead of pressurized storages), is effective in reducing on one hand the hazard of 
the primary event, on the other the vulnerability of equipment to escalation as well as the 
severity of the possible secondary scenarios. 
However, also in this case the revision of equipment design and mainly of storage strategies is 
required. Thus, actions falling under the intensification and moderation guidewords, when 
introduced specifically for escalation prevention issues, may be considered mainly for 
equipment items having relevant inventories, as storage tanks (e.g. reducing storage capacity 
or changing storage conditions). Their applications will actually lead to complex design 
modifications that are hardly acceptable in the final stages of plant design. Similarly, 
substitution of substances with others having less hazardous proprieties, and simplification of 
processes, although effective in reducing the possibilities of escalation, would require relevant 
modification in process design, that are scarcely applicable in the stage of lay-out definition 
during plant design or in existing plants. Indeed, the actions identified by these guidewords 
require, in general, important process modifications or changes in plant design, usually not 
affordable in the stage of lay-out definition during plant design or in existing plants. Thus, 
actions related to the moderation, intensification, substitution and simplification guidewords 
are usually hardly applicable to the prevention of escalation, and should be considered in 
other steps of process development. 
Limitation of effects is sometimes considered as a "minor" guideword, as it accepts that a 
negative effect will somehow take place. However, in the perspective of escalation, this 
guideword should assure that no secondary event will be caused by domino effects, thus 
pursuing the prevention of domino accidents by an effectively inherent approach. 
 
It may be concluded that the application of an inherent safety approach to the prevention of 
escalation events will mainly lead to identify actions that fall under the limitation of effects 
guideword, specific to the prevention of damage and of escalation. 
 
 
2.4.2.2 – KPI for domino hazard assessment: proposed method based on models for 
consequence analysis 
 
As previously reported in several points of this work, the implementation of inherent safety 
strategies in layout design requires quantitative key performance indicators to support design 
activity. Several methods were proposed for the assessment and the comparison of inherent 
safety of alternative processes, as showed in §2.1. However, most of these methods do not 
include the assessment of possible domino events. Moreover, none of the literature methods 
for inherent safety assessment includes consequence-based criteria to consider the actual 
hazard posed by escalation [Khan et al., 2003]. 
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In the following, such an approach, based on the modeling of expected consequence, will be 
presented. The method conceptually mirrors the approach proposed in chapter §2.3 for the 
analysis of inherent safety of processes. The flow diagram of the method is shown in Figure 
2.4.2. The typical inputs required by the method are: 
1) Definition of substances and operative conditions in each unit of the process 
2) Quantification of flows in process lines and piping 
3) General technical specifications of the equipment units 
4) Evaluation of inventories in the equipment units of each process alternative 
 
As shown in Figure 2.4.2, the first step of the methodology is the identification of process 
units to be considered in each alternative scheme, which are classified on the basis of their 
structural and geometrical features. Different failure modes related to loss of containment 
(LOC) are thus associated to each unit on the basis of literature data analysis [API, 2000; Uijt 
de Haag & Ale, 1999] (step 2). A simplified Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is 
used to obtain data for non-standard equipment [Tugnoli et al., 2007]. 
In steps from 3 to 5 of the procedure, the consequence analysis of each possible scenario 
following the LOC is performed. Standard event trees are used to identify the scenarios, while 
loss intensities and consequences are calculated by conventional literature models [Lees, 
1996; Van Den Bosh & Weterings, 1997]. The threshold values for damage to equipment 
units (escalation thresholds) are derived from previous studies [Cozzani et al., 2006, 2007]. 
These data are used to calculate the conventional escalation distances for each LOC and 
scenario. The escalation vector (i.e. array of the escalation distances for the possible 
scenarios) is used in the following step to provide specific Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
(step 7). Some KPIs require a credibility factor to be assessed for each LOC, on the basis of 
the expected release and failure frequency data reported for standard technologies in several 
publications [Delvosalle et al., 2006; Uijt de Haag & Ale, 1999] (step 6). 
 
Step 1
Identification of
process units
Step 2
Identification of failure 
modes and LOCs
Step 6
Identification of
credit factors
Step 3
Identification of 
material proprieties
Step 4
Event trees definition 
and scenario selection
Step 5
Calculation of
escalation distances
Step 7
Calculation of layout 
KPIs
 
 
Figure 2.4.2: Flow diagram of the method used for the calculation of the inherent safety key 
performance indicators. 
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The key step of the method is the definition of a physical parameter quantifying the intensity 
of each escalation vector. This parameter is identified as the escalation distance, that is the 
maximum distance form the primary unit at which escalation effects may be considered 
credible. Escalation distance coincides, as well, with the inherent safety distance, since no 
escalation event is expected for target units located at distances larger than this one. The 
escalation distance (i.e. intensity of escalation vector) for each possible escalation scenario 
triggered by a given primary unit, depends on the total amount of energy (or substance) which 
is possibly released from the primary system of containment (reactor, storage tank, etc.). 
Table 2.4.2 reports the definition of the escalation distance for each primary scenario likely to 
result in escalation. 
Further details about the definition of the intensities of the escalation vectors (escalation 
distances) and about the possible inherent strategies to reduce domino hazard can be found in 
Appendix 2.2. 
 
 
Primary 
scenario Escalation vector 
Escalation distance Equipment 
category Safety criterion 
atmospheric Fireball radius Fireball Heat radiation Fireball Radius 
pressurized 0 
atmospheric Flame length + 50m 
Jet fire Heat radiation 
Distance at which 
heat radiation equals 
threshold value pressurized Flame length + 25m 
atmospheric Pool border + 50m 
Pool fire Heat radiation 
Distance at which 
heat radiation equals 
threshold value pressurized Pool border + 15m 
atmospheric R = 1.75  Vapour cloud 
explosion (VCE) 
Overpressure 
(F ≥ 5; Mf ≥ 0.35) 
Distance at which 
peak pressure equals 
threshold value pressurized  R = 2.10 
atmospheric R = 1.80  
BLEVE Overpressure 
Distance at which 
peak pressure equals 
threshold value pressurized  R = 2.00  
 Fragment projection Maximum projection distance Any undefined 
atmospheric R = 1.80  Mechanical 
Explosion Overpressure 
Distance at which 
peak pressure equals 
threshold value pressurized  R = 2.00  
 Fragment projection Maximum projection distance Any undefined 
Note: R, is the Sachs energy-scaled distance (R = r·(E/P°)1/3, where r is the effective distance, P° is 
the ambient pressure and E is explosion energy calculated by means of the total combustion 
heat of the flammable cloud), F is the strength factor as in the Multi-Energy Method [Van den 
Berg, 1985] and  Mf is the flame Mach number in the Baker-Sthrelow-Tang methodology [Tang 
& Baker, 1999]. 
 
Table 2.4.2: Escalation vectors and definition of escalation distances for domino 
propagation.  
 
 
The escalation distance is determined on the basis of the threshold values for escalation (step 
5). Table 2.4.3 reports escalation threshold values identified for various types of target 
equipment [Cozzani et al., 2005, 2006; Cozzani & Salzano, 2004; Salzano & Cozzani, 2004, 
2006]. A generalized value of escalation distance, independent from the target unit can be 
obtained conservatively assuming thresholds for the more vulnerable categories of process 
equipment (i.e. the escalation criterion); these values are reported in Table 2.4.3 (i.e. the 
escalation criterion). 
  §2.4 - 7
Appendix 2.2 also reports a simplified approach, based on generalized graphs, for a quick 
estimation of the escalation distances in early screening. An example is reported in Figure 
2.4.3, for jet fires of pressurized hydrocarbons. In more precise assessments, it is however 
suggested the use of suitable consequence modes for the calculation of escalation  distances. 
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Figure 2.4.3: Example of generalized graph for evaluation of escalation distances: escalation 
distances (a) and critical primary vessel inventory (b) for different release diameters in the 
case of jet fires from hydrocarbon gases at ambient temperature. See Appendix 2.2 for further 
details. 
  §2.4 - 8 
Table 2.4.2 shows the safety distances identified for different categories of target equipment 
on the basis of the specific escalation thresholds listed in the Table 2.4.3, as derived by the 
quick generalized approach [Cozzani et al., 2005, 2006, 2007]. The safety distances and the 
threshold values reported in the table are specific to escalation assessment, thus they are 
derived also taking into account the severity of the secondary scenarios that are likely to 
follow the damage of the primary equipment [Cozzani et al., 2006; Salzano & Cozzani, 
2006]. It is also important to evidence that Tables 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 report general conservative 
results that are not affected by substance-dependent parameters. 
 
Primary 
scenario Escalation vector 
Equipment 
category 
Threshold 
Value 
Escalation 
criterion 
atmospheric 15 kW/m2 Fireball Heat radiation 
pressurized 50 kW/m2 
Engulfment 
atmospheric 15 kW/m2 
Jet fire Heat radiation pressurized 50 kW/m2 15 kW/m
2 
atmospheric 15 kW/m2 
Pool fire Heat radiation pressurized 50 kW/m2 15 kW/m
2 
atmospheric 22 kPa Vapour cloud 
explosion (VCE) 
Overpressure 
(F ≥ 5; Mf ≥ 0.35) pressurized  16 kPa 
16 kPa 
atmospheric 22 kPa BLEVE Overpressure pressurized  16 kPa 16 kPa 
 Fragment projection Any undefined Fragment impact 
atmospheric 22 kPa Mechanical 
Explosion Overpressure pressurized  16 kPa 16 kPa 
 Fragment projection Any undefined Fragment impact 
 
Table 2.4.3: Escalation threshold for the definition of escalation distance for different 
primary scenarios. 
 
 
The above defined escalation distances may be used for a preliminary evaluation of the 
inherent domino hazard in a lay-out. Since several specific issues are of interest in the layout 
design an extensive set of key performance indicators may be defined for this purpose: 
 
• a Unit Potential Domino index, UPD, that may be used for a preliminary ranking of the 
worst-case hazard of the primary units independently of the definition of a layout 
• a Unit Hazard Domino index, UHD, that may be used for a preliminary ranking of the 
expected hazard of the primary units independently of the definition of a layout 
• a Domino Chain Actual hazard index, DCA, that may be used to assess the hazard of a 
specific escalation between a primary and a secondary unit 
• a Unit Domino actual hazard Index, UDI, that expresses the hazard due to escalation 
scenarios triggered by a given primary unit 
• a Target Domino actual hazard Index, TDI, that expresses the hazard for a given target 
unit due to escalation scenarios triggered by other primary units 
 
The unit potential domino index, UPD, was defined as the area potentially affected by worst-
case escalation effects, estimated on the basis of the intensity of the escalation vector. 
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where UPDi is the unit potential domino index for the i-th primary unit and DIS h,i,j the 
escalation distance (or inherent safety distance) for the h-th scenario with respect to a generic 
j-th target. In equation (2.4.1) the maximum inherent safety distance is selected among the pi 
possible scenarios and the ti possible typologies of generic targets which the i-th unit can 
potentially trigger. The index represents a leading indicator of the domino hazard potential of 
the unit generating the escalation vector. It allows a preliminary screening of domino hazard 
and the identification of critical potential sources of escalation events, independently on the 
actual lay-out configuration. 
 
The unit hazard domino index, UHD was defined similarly to UPD; however in this case the 
credibility of the LOC is taken into account, similarly to the approach described in §2.3.6. The 
UPD index was defined as the sum of the squares of the maximum escalation distance 
calculated for each LOC multiplied by the respective credit factor: 
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where UHDi is the unit hazard domino index for the i-th primary unit, DIS k.h,i,j is the escalation 
distance for the h-th scenario of the k-th LOC with respect to a generic j-th target and cfk,i the 
credit factor for the k-th LOC of the possible ni LOC events considered the i-th unit. 
The index represents a leading indicator of the domino hazard of the unit that accounts for the 
credibility of the loss and, thus, the inherent safety of the containing equipment. The index 
value is a reference independent on the actual lay-out configuration. 
 
In order to evaluate the specific escalation hazard between two units in a given layout, the 
domino chain actual hazard index, DCA, was defined as the ratio of the inherent safety 
distance to the actual distance among the two units considered: 
ji
jihIS
jih D
D
DCA
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,,
,, =          (2.4.3) 
where DCAh,i,j is the hazard index for the h-th primary scenario of the i-th unit, considered as 
a domino trigger towards the j-th unit. 
The actual equipment distance (Di,j) is available only if a layout plan, either in a preliminary 
form, is defined. If separation distances and plant lay-out are not available (e.g. in the early 
steps of plant design), conventional safety distances may be used to provide at least a 
preliminary estimation of the expected chain propagation hazard. As a matter of facts, these 
distances reflect the current practice in layout design and are those more likely are adopted in 
a standard layout design. Such distances are reported in several technical publications and 
standards [Lees, 1996; Mecklenburg, 1973; and references cited therein]. 
 
The chain escalation index, DCA, concerns specific escalation scenarios and target units. In 
order to obtain a synthetic representation of the critical primary units with respect to domino 
hazards in a given lay-out, a unit domino actual hazard index, UDI, may be defined: 
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where ui is the total number of units considered for possible escalation caused by the i-th unit, 
mi is the total number of primary escalation scenarios of the i-th unit that may trigger 
escalation and αh,i is an inventory parameter. The inventory parameter takes into account that 
the escalation hazard may depend on the inventory of the primary unit, in particular for 
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escalations triggered by stationary radiation. As a matter of fact, in these scenarios a higher 
duration of the fire may be a consequence of a higher inventory in the primary unit. Thus, the 
inventory parameter, αh,i, was defined as follows: 
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where η is a parameter proportional to the maximum time of interest for the accidental 
scenario, that identifies the time for effective emergency actions to be enforced (a suggested 
value for η is 10, corresponding to a time of interest of 2.5h), and DCFh,i, the domino 
inventory factor, is the ratio among unit inventory Ii and the critical inventory for the h-th 
escalation scenario CIh,i: 
ih
i
ih CI
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The target domino actual hazard index, TDI, was defined similarly to UDI but, in this case, 
the focus is on the hazard is on the target: 
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where TDIj is the target domino hazard index for j-th target unit, qj is the total number of units 
considered for possible escalation scenarios having j-th unit as a target and the other 
parameters are defined as in Equations (2.4.6) to (2.4.7). The index is aimed at the definition 
of the actual risk for a target unit within the assessed layout. Clearly enough it may be 
calculated as well for external units, in order to assess the escalation hazard toward other 
facilities. 
 
 
2.4.2.3 – Proposed scoring system for domino hazard: the Domino Hazard Index 
 
In the following a scoring system for domino hazard, the Domino Hazard Index (DHI), 
assessment is presented. This indexing system is useful for a swift quantification of domino 
hazard to be used in the more general framework of the proposed layout safety assessment 
described in §2.4.3. In fact, that approach requires a single indexing parameter based on a 
scoring scale, in order to keep the method quick and simple. 
The Domino Hazard Index (DHI) is specifically aimed at assessing the domino effect hazards 
caused by a unit in a specific layout. For each unit of the layout, the DHI considers the actual 
consequences of possible escalation scenarios and scores or ranks the accident propagation 
potential. The index is able to consider the effects of both inherent and passive measures on 
the domino escalation potential, as required by the framework of I2SI for layout assessment 
(§2.4.2). The specific use of the index as a reference within I2SI for layout assessment 
decides whether to account for the effects of passive measures in the DHI calculation. 
 
Figure 2.4.4 illustrates the assessment procedure for the Domino Hazard Index. The starting 
point is the plant layout plan, from which the relative distances of the geometric centres of 
each possible pair of units are evaluated. The distances can be arranged for ease of use in a 
matrix form (Di,k). In subsequent steps of the procedure, each single unit is analyzed, with the 
ultimate goal being to evaluate the DHIi for a particular unit. 
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Plant layout plan Matrix of relative unit distances ( Di,k )
Take i-th
primary unit
Take k-th
secondary unit
Assess DHSi,k,h
considering each
h-th event and Di,k
All “k” 
assessed ?
DHIi = Σk DHSi,k
Identify possible 
primary events (“h”)
for i-th unit
DHSi,k = maxh(DHSi,k,h)
Stop
Yes
Yes
No
All “i” 
assessed ?
No
Escalation test:
DIk > min(DIi , ζ )
Yes
No
 
 
Figure 2.4.4  Conceptual flow diagram of DHI assessment. 
 
 
 
The primary accidental events that may result in domino effects arising from the assessed unit 
(i-th unit) must be identified. These events, as previously outlined, depend on the chemical 
characteristics, inventory and operating conditions relevant to the primary unit. Methods for 
primary event identification are widely available in the literature (e.g. [Delvosalle et al., 
2006; Lees, 1996]). Table 2.4.4 provides an overview of the possible primary events which 
can trigger domino effects. Table 2.4.5 classifies the accidental events according to the 
involved escalation vector (i.e. the physical phenomenon that causes the escalation from one 
unit to another). 
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 Material Classification 
 Flammable Explosive/reactive Stable & non-flammable 
Physical State    
Liquid Pool fire, Flash fire, VCE 
Condensed phase/ 
confined explosion - 
Liquefied gas 
Pool fire, Jet fire, VCE, 
Flash fire, Fireball, 
BLEVE, Physical 
explosion 
Condensed phase/ 
confined explosion, 
Physical explosion, 
BLEVE 
Physical explosion, 
BLEVE 
Gas 
Jet Fire, Flash fire, 
VCE, Physical 
explosion 
Condensed phase/ 
confined explosion, 
Physical explosion 
Physical explosion 
Solid/dust/mist Fire, Dust explosion, Confined explosion 
Condensed phase/ 
confined explosion - 
 
Table 2.4.4: Possible primary events likely to give domino escalation as a function of 
material hazardous proprieties and operative conditions. 
 
 
Escalation Vector Accidental Event 
Flame impingement/heat 
radiation Pool fire, Jet fire, Flash fire, Fireball, VCE 
Blast wave Condensed phase explosion, Confined explosion, Physical explosion, BLEVE, VCE 
Fragment projection Condensed phase explosion, Confined explosion, Physical explosion, BLEVE 
 
Table 2.4.5: Accidental events likely to give rise to domino escalation (classified according 
to the escalation vector involved) [Cozzani et al., 2007]. 
 
 
Each possible pair of units (‘i’ being the assessed primary unit and ‘k’ the secondary unit) that 
can potentially result in a domino escalation scenario is analyzed. A selection criterion is 
defined in order to account only for the units that have significant potential for an increase in 
accidental adverse consequences, or that are considered highly hazardous ‘per se’. The 
Damage Index (DI) of the original I2SI approach [Khan & Amyotte, 2004] is used as the 
hazard indicator for the units in this procedure (Equation (2.4.8)): 
If  DIk > ( min( DIi ; ζ  ) ) then  k-th unit is assessed as a secondary unit (2.4.8) 
    else k-th unit is skipped (i.e. minor consequences) 
where ζ is an arbitrary threshold value that defines the lower limit of DI for units considered 
highly hazardous ‘per se’; in the section 3 case study, ζ is taken as having a value of 25. 
 
For each identified primary accidental event (h-th event) of the assessed unit (i-th unit), a 
Domino Hazard Score (DHSi,k,h) is evaluated for each of the secondary targets (k-th unit).  
DHSi,k,h is therefore a ranking that represents the score given to the hazard in terms of an 
escalation from unit ‘i’ to unit ‘k’ by event ‘h’. The maximum value for DHS is 10, meaning 
that escalation is highly probable; the minimum value, 0, represents the inherently ‘safest’ 
level for domino escalation (i.e. elimination of the escalation hazard). The value of DHSi,k,h 
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for each possible event is derived by comparison of the physical effect distances associated 
with that particular event to the actual distance between units on the layout plan. The rules for 
assigning DHSi,k,h values are summarized in Table 2.4.6 and are discussed in detail in 
Appendix 2.2. 
 
 
Escalation 
Vector  Secondary Unit 
Inherent 
DHS Protective Device 
Passive 
DHS 
Flame 
impingement
/radiation 
Flash fire, 
thermal 
effect VCE 
Free flammable 
vapors 10 -  
  Other cases 0   
 Fireball Impinged 
atmospheric vessel 10 Fire insulation 5 
  Other cases 0   
 Pool fire Impinged equipment 10 Fire resistance wall 1 
    Bund + 1 
  Thermal radiation as 
distant source 
Fig. 
A2.2.9 Fire insulation 
Fig. 
A2.2.9 
 Jet fire Impinged equipment 10 Fire resistance wall / mounding 1 
  Thermal radiation as 
distant source 
Fig. 
A2.2.10 Fire insulation 
Fig. 
A2.2.10 
Blast wave  Unprotected 
equipment 
Fig. 
A2.2.11 Barricade 1 
Fragment 
projection 
 Unprotected 
equipment 
Fig. 
A2.2.12 Barricade 1 
 
Table 2.4.6: Summary of rules for assignation of Domino Hazard Score (DHS) as a function 
of the escalation vector. Inherent DHS and passive DHS refer to the possibility of accounting 
for passive protection devices in DHS evaluation. The figures cited in the Table are reported 
in Appendix 2.2. 
 
 
Once the DHSi,k,h values have been assessed, the worst possible scenario is selected as a 
reference among all the possible scenarios, yielding DHSi,k for every pair of considered units 
(Equation (2.4.9)): 
DHSi,k = maxh ( DHSi,k,h )        (2.4.9) 
where subscript h identifies the scenario. 
 
The final index (DHIi) for the i-th primary unit is the sum of the scores (DHSi,k ) for all 
possible secondary target units (Equation (2.4.10)): 
DHIi = ∑k DHSi,k         (2.4.10) 
An upper limiting value of 100 is imposed on DHIi for practical applications. 
 
  §2.4 - 14 
2.4.3 – The proposed layout assessment method 
 
The goal of layout design for safety is to bring inherent safety concepts into the early stages of 
layout design by means of an easy-to-use approach. This requires consideration of the role of 
both strictly inherent as well as passive safety measures in achieving layout safety. An index-
based assessment tool specifically aimed at the comparison of preliminary alternative layout 
options was developed to support layout design for safety. Although the potential of domino 
effect is a key issue in the design for layout safety, as discussed in §2.4.2, further aspects 
should be taken into account in this index. Thus, the evaluation of the index is based on an 
integrated analysis of the different aspects concerning hazard of process units, applicability of 
inherent safety guidewords, requirement for safety devices and safety economics. A scoring 
method was adopted because it is suitable for quickly considering at once such a different 
array of issues and because it is particularly suitable for the early stages of design when a 
limited amount of information is available. 
The framework of the Integrated Inherent Safety Index (I2SI) proposed by Khan and Amyotte 
[Khan & Amyotte, 2004, 2005] was chosen for the newly proposed layout assessment tool. 
This is in keeping with an overall objective of providing a portfolio of tools with a common 
structure for the assessment of inherent safety aspects in both process design (previous 
applications of I2SI as described in Khan & Amyotte, [2004, 2005]) and layout design 
(present contribution). Furthermore, such an approach shows other features matching the 
needs of the layout assessment: 
• I2SI is an indexing approach structured to assess in a comprehensive manner various 
aspects of inherent safety, with particular reference to applicability of inherent safety 
guidewords. 
• It can be easily adapted to the specific design issues of different phases of the design 
lifecycle, such as layout design in this case, while maintaining the same general 
structure. 
• The application is simple and quick, requiring details that are ready available or 
estimable. 
• I2SI employs inherent safety guidewords in a manner similar to the well-accepted and 
practiced HAZOP methodology. 
• Quantitative scores are provided to help with the interpretation of results and design 
decision-making. 
 
 
• Inherent Safety Index (ISI) is reviewed to consider the specific issues of layout design. 
• A new ISI for attenuation is defined to account for domino hazards. 
• ISI for simplification is extended to account for increase of complexity. 
• Three new sub-indices are defined for ISI for limitation of effects. 
• Reference indices are provided to reduce subjectivity in the evaluation of the extent of 
applicability of inherent safety guidewords. 
• The index PHCI in ISPI is limited to the hazard control measures (HCI). 
• Explicit accounting of costs of domino effect escalation is implemented in cost indices. 
• LSI is introduced for a better evaluation of costs of losses. 
 
Table 2.4.5: Modifications of the former I2SI methodology introduced for the analysis of 
layout safety. 
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The sub-indices of the original I2SI have been revised in the current work to match the unique 
issues of layout safety assessment. Table 2.4.5 provides a summary of the main modifications 
introduced to the original I2SI.  
 
The framework of the Integrated Inherent Safety Index (I2SI) relies on the assessment of the 
applicability of inherent safety guideword. Thus a preliminary analysis of the guideword 
applicability in layout design was essential for the index development. The principal 
outcomes of that analysis are presented in the following. Then, a brief illustration of I2SI and 
a more detailed description of the specific features developed for layout assessment are 
presented in the following chapters. 
 
 
2.4.3.1 - Inherent Safety Guidewords for layout plans 
 
The basic principles of inherent safety can be expressed by a few guidewords, as discussed in 
§2.1.1. However terminology of inherent safety varies somewhat throughout the process 
safety community, resulting in the same conceptual principles being expressed with alternate 
labels. In the framework of I2SI the key guidewords employed are: minimization, substitution, 
attenuation, simplification, and limitation of effects. The guidewords can be applied at the 
different levels of the hierarchy of inherent safety strategies (§2.1.1), for example leading to 
add-on measures that are more reliable, effective and thus – in a broad sense – inherently 
safer. In the developed layout assessment index both strictly inherent measures as well as 
passive measures have been investigated for their ability to improve the safety performance of 
the layout plot. The perspective of layout design considered here, therefore, is one in which 
the entire set of items placed in the facility (no matter if they are pieces of equipment or blast 
walls) contributes in defining the global hazard of the plant as a system (e.g. the potential for 
maximum domino effect escalation). This shift in perspective justifies the choice to consider 
both safety strategy levels (inherent and passive) in the current analysis. Active and 
procedural safety strategies are not considered here because, by their definition, they do not 
generally belong to the first stages of layout design. 
 
As earlier mentioned (§2.4.1), constraints related to previous design steps (e.g. chemical route 
choice, process design, equipment selection, etc.) exist in layout design. These constraints 
limit the applicability of measures aimed at enhancing inherent safety in the layout options. 
The inherent safety principles are reviewed below with respect to their applicability in layout 
design: 
 
• The minimization guideword is generally not applicable because equipment 
characteristics and material inventories have already been selected in previous design 
phases. If options of changing inventories are still open, they are likely to principally 
affect storage sections. In the design of equipment layout, the application of this 
guideword is fairly impractical. 
 
• The substitution guideword in layout design, both for equipment and materials, is 
affected by limitations similar to minimization. Thus, substitution applicability is 
generally limited. 
 
• The attenuation guideword, in its usual reference to changes in unit operating 
conditions, has limited applicability as these conditions will have been fixed in 
previous design steps. However, this guideword may be applied to changes in the 
arrangement of units. Changing unit arrangement and/or increasing unit segregation 
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reduces, if not eliminates, the potential of domino effects and thus the hazard within 
the system. This is a key point because accident escalation by domino effect has been 
identified as the most important hazard source related to process layout design 
[Cozzani et al., 2007] (§2.4.2). The effectiveness of layout in reducing this hazard is 
thus the application of the guideword attenuation for the plant considered as a system 
(i.e. from the perspective of layout analysis). Further justification for this viewpoint 
can be found in the work of Kletz [Kletz, 1998]. His original definition of attenuation 
in process design (processing hazardous materials under less hazardous conditions – 
e.g. low pressure and temperature) can be revised in the case of layout design as ‘using 
hazardous units in the least hazardous form’ (i.e. the layout which limits the domino 
potential). The present approach is proposing that as the materials being processed are 
the building blocks of process design, the process units may be considered the 
building blocks of layout design. 
 
• The simplification guideword is readily applicable to layout design. The choice of unit 
spatial organization has great potential to affect the simplicity of a plant. Complexity 
can easily arise as the disposition of units diverts from the logical process flow order, 
or as further items (e.g. walls, equipment of other production lines, and buildings) are 
added to the plan. Therefore, it is quite likely that layout design choices, even if 
oriented to satisfy the other inherent safety guidewords, eventually result in a negative 
feedback with respect to simplification. 
 
• Limitation of effects is a guideword that deals with the reduction of the extent of 
negative consequences arising from accidental events. Accepting that a negative effect 
may somehow occur, this guideword implies a consideration of the measures aimed to 
limit consequences. In early layout design both inherent and passive strategies can be 
implemented to pursue this goal. Thus, the limitation of effects guideword has been 
considered in the safety analysis of both inherent and passive measures. Three main 
applications of limitation of… in layout design were identified: 
i) limitation of the effects of domino escalation: reduction of the effects and 
consequences of domino escalation events, considering the integrated action of 
inherent and passive strategies. Note that this is a different aspect than the one 
considered for the applicability of the attenuation guideword. With attenuation, 
the focus was on reduction of the embedded hazard, such reduction being attained 
only by inherent measures. With limitation of effects, the focus is on the effects 
themselves that can be controlled by both inherent and passive strategies. 
ii) limitation of the damage potential to target buildings: appropriate location of 
buildings (workshops, administrative buildings, trailers, etc.) and control or 
emergency structures (control room, medical centre, etc.) in the layout plan so as 
to limit harm to people and impairment of accident response. 
iii) limitation of the affected area: limitation (generally by passive measures) of 
the spatial area affected by the consequences of an accidental event, regardless of 
the effects on other units, buildings, etc. 
 
The conclusion from the above examination is that out of the five guidewords, three 
(attenuation, simplification and limitation of effects) are of particular interest for the safety 
assessment of layout plans. 
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2.4.3.2 - The I2SI for Layout Safety 
 
The conceptual framework of the Integrated Inherent Safety Index (I2SI) is given in Figure 
2.4.5, according to [Khan & Amyotte, 2004, 2005]. The first step of I2SI assessment for 
safety in layout is the identification of the units in a given option. For each unit, the I2SI is 
comprised of two main sub-indices: a Hazard Index (HI) and an Inherent Safety Potential 
Index (ISPI). The Hazard Index is a measure of the damage potential of a single unit after 
taking into account the process and hazard control measures. The Inherent Safety Potential 
Index, on the other hand, accounts for the applicability of the inherent safety principles (or 
guidewords) to the unit. The HI is calculated for the units of an arbitrary reference layout 
option – called the base case –  and the values remain the same for the corresponding units in 
all other possible options. The HI and ISPI are combined to yield a value of the Integrated 
Inherent Safety Index (I2SI) as shown in Equation (2.4.11). 
 
Inherent safety potential index
Hazard index
Select unit
Identify
. chemicals in use
. operating conditions
. inventories
Estimate damage radii and 
damage index (DI)
Estimate process and hazard 
control index (PHCI)
Evaluate potential of 
applicability of inherent safety 
principles to the process unit
Estimate inherent safety index 
(ISI)
Estimate process and hazard 
control index (PHCI) after 
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principles
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safety index (I2SI)
Estimate cost associated 
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Figure 2.4.5: Conceptual flow diagram of the I2SI assessment method. 
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HI
ISPII2SI =            (2.4.11) 
As evident, an I2SI value greater than unity denotes a positive response of the inherent safety 
guideword application (i.e. an inherently safer option). The higher the value of I2SI, the more 
pronounced the inherent safety impact. 
 
To evaluate alternative layout options for the same plant, the I2SI values for all the N 
considered single units are combined according to Equation (2.4.12): 
2/1
1
⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛= ∏
=
N
i
isystem I2SII2SI         (2.4.12) 
 
The Hazard Index (HI) for layout assessment is evaluated for each unit following the same 
procedure as for process assessment [Khan & Amyotte, 2004]. The HI is comprised of two 
sub-indices: a Damage Index (DI) and a Process and Hazard Control Index (PHCI). The 
numerical value of HI for the unit being considered is calculated by dividing the DI by the 
PHCI, as shown in Equation (2.4.13): 
PHCI
DIHI =           (2.4.13) 
 
The Damage Index (DI) is a function of four hazard parameters, namely: fire and explosion, 
acute toxicity, chronic toxicity, and environmental damage. These are estimated as a function 
of the expected damage radii for each scenario and have values ranging up to 100. Damage 
radii may be calculated using simple, validated approaches such as the Safety Weighted 
Hazard Index, or SWeHI, methodology developed by Khan et al. [Khan et al., 2001]. 
 
The Process and Hazard Control Index (PHCI) is calculated for various add-on process and 
hazard control measures that are required or are present in the system. This index is quantified 
on a scale mutually agreed upon by process safety experts. The index ranges from 1 to 10 for 
any control arrangement and is quantified based on the necessity of this control arrangement 
in maintaining safe operation for the unit. 
 
The Inherent Safety Potential Index (ISPI) is comprised, similarly to the Hazard Index (HI), 
of two sub-indices: an Inherent Safety Index (ISI) and a Hazard Control Index (HCI). The 
ISPI for single units is computed as shown in Equation (2.4.14): 
HCI
ISIISPI =           (2.4.14) 
 
The ISI is calculated by using scores based on the applicability of the inherent safety 
guidewords. A detailed description of the procedure for ISI computation in layout assessment 
is reported in the next section. 
 
The original version of ISPI [Khan & Amyotte, 2004] used PHCI after the implementation of 
safety measures as the denominator in Equation (2.4.14). For layout considerations, the 
denominator in Equation (2.4.14) is redefined as HCI (Hazard Control Index) after the 
implementation of safety measures. In the assessment of HCI, the requirement to install 
further add-on hazard control measures after the previous analysis and implementation of 
safety measures in the layout option is assessed. Process controls are not considered here, 
since they are not effective in layout safety. The scores of HCI are evaluated by the same 
rules as PHCI [Khan & Amyotte, 2004]. 
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2.4.3.3 - The ISI index 
 
The ISI calculation follows the same procedure as a HAZOP study in which guidewords (in 
the present case, the identified inherent safety guidewords) are applied to the assessed system. 
Based on the extent of applicability and the ability to reduce the hazard, an index value is 
computed for each guideword. Attenuation, simplification and limitation of effects were earlier 
identified as the relevant guidewords for layout design. For each guideword a specific value 
of ISI is estimated. For attenuation and limitation of effects these values are estimated by 
conversion monograph (Figures 2.4.6 and 2.4.7) that relate the quantification of the extent of 
applicability of the guideword in the assessment option to an ISI score. The extent of 
applicability was evaluated, in the original I2SI, on a linguistic variable scale resulting from 
the agreement of a panel of experts [Khan & Amyotte, 2004]. Since the evaluation of the 
extent of applicability is admittedly subjective, specific guidelines are proposed here to 
facilitate the quantification of this parameter. These guidelines are discussed in the following 
paragraphs with respect to each guideword. For the guideword simplification, where the 
current authors experienced objective difficulty in quantifying this subjective parameter, an 
arbitrary reference table is proposed for the direct assessment of the index value by linguistic 
guidelines (Table 2.4.6). 
 
The specific values of ISI for the single guidewords are combined together to yield the final 
ISI for the assessed unit, according to Equation (2.4.15): 
ISI = [ Max( η2 , ISIa2 + ISIsi*||ISIsi|| + ISIl2 ) ]1/2       (2.4.15) 
where the subscripts refer to the considered guidewords (a for attenuation, si for 
simplification and l for limitation of effects). Equation (2.4.15) allows negative values for the 
simplification parameter, although limiting to η ≥ 0 the lowest value of the final ISI. In the 
subsequent analysis, η is set equal to the minimum of the corresponding HCI in ISPI 
calculation (η = 5); hence ISPI is equal to 1 for base case units (i.e. ISI = 5) that do not require 
any hazard protection device (i.e. HCI = 5). 
 
 
2.4.3.3.1 - Attenuation 
 
Figure 2.4.6 reports the monograph proposed to convert the extent of applicability of the 
guideword attenuation into an ISI value. This is in accordance with the monograph approach 
used in the original version of I2SI [Khan & Amyotte, 2004]. The extent of applicability of 
this guideword is assessed mainly as the ability of the layout option to reduce the hazard 
potential from domino effects. 
 
To overcome the subjectivity in assessment of the extent of applicability, an approach based 
on the Domino Hazard Index (DHI) is used. The DHI is specifically aimed at assessing the 
domino effect hazards caused by a unit in a specific layout. The DHI values for a unit range 
from 0 to 100. The maximum value means that the unit can affect multiple other units, 
triggering severe domino consequences; the  zero-value indicates no domino possibility from 
the unit (i.e. the highest degree of inherent safety). Detailed discussion of the index and its 
development is reported in §2.4.2.3. The DHI of each unit of the layout being assessed is 
compared with the base option. In this case, the protection provided by passive devices is not 
accounted  for in DHI as the focus is on the domino escalation potential (i.e. hazard) that can 
be reduced only by inherent measures. The estimation of extent of applicability by DHI may 
be done using Equation (2.4.16): 
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This proposal is in line with that suggested in the original I2SI formulation for the assessment 
of toxicity within the moderation guideword (i.e. use of reduction in LC50 values as 
LC50intial/ LC50changed) [Khan & Amyotte, 2004]. 
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Figure 2.4.6: Inherent Safety Index for the attenuation guideword. 
 
 
2.4.3.3.2 - Simplification 
 
As previously discussed, layout options aiming at safer performance with respect to 
attenuation and limitation of effects usually cause an increase in layout complexity. Some 
important factors that may result in an increased complexity are: 
• Complication of pipe connection among units – the displacing of units from the 
logical process-flow arrangement makes the piping network, pumping and control 
more complicated. 
• Complication of pipe connection among units – the need for longer pipelines to 
connect units provides additional sources of release that are not strictly related to the 
units themselves. This situation may create additional units (transportation units) that 
may undergo failure. 
• Increase in the number of items in a plant – in addition to the process units, other 
elements (e.g. blast walls, fire walls, etc.) contribute to the number of items present on 
the site. As the number of items increases, the requirements for management and 
maintenance increase, thus complicating procedures and increasing the probability of 
errors. Moreover, a non-linear disposition of a high number of units and the presence 
of obstacles (blast walls, dikes, etc.) limit the ease of access to the units. The access 
limitation further complicates regular operations (e.g. maintenance) as well as 
emergency response operations (e.g. fire-fighting). 
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To assess the complexity introduced by both inherent and passive measures, the former ISI of 
simplification was extended to account for negative values (Table 2.4.6). This is based on the 
idea that complexity can be defined as negation of simplicity. Pursuing simplification indeed 
limits the increase in complexity up to values that are overbalanced by the positive effects 
from the application of other guidewords. 
 
It is worth remembering that simplification is a matter of interrelation among process units. It 
must be judged not by focusing only on a single unit, but with respect to the whole plant (or 
occasionally a plant section). The extent of this guideword applicability should be assigned 
with respect to groups of units. 
 
Description ISI 
Process simplified to large extent and hazard eliminated 100 
Process simplified to large extent and most significant hazard reduced 90 
Process simplified to large extent and hazard reduced 80 
Process simplified to large extent and hazard reduced moderately 70 
Process simplified and hazard eliminated 60 
Process simplified and hazard reduced 50 
Process simplified moderately and hazard reduced 40 
Process simplified moderately and hazard reduced moderately 30 
No significant process simplification and hazard reduced moderately 20 
No significant process simplification and no substantial hazard reduction 10 
Non-applicable 0 
No significant process complication and no substantial hazard increase - 10 
No significant process complication and hazard increased moderately - 20 
Process complicated moderately and hazard moderately increased - 30 
Process complicated moderately and hazard increased - 40 
Process complicated and hazard increased - 50 
Process complicated and new hazards introduced - 60 
Process complicated to large extent and hazard moderately increased - 70 
Process complicated to large extent and hazard increased - 80 
Process complicated to large extent and hazard significantly increased - 90 
Process complicated to large extent and hazard highly increased - 100 
 
Table 2.4.6: Extended guidelines to decide on the ISI value for the guideword 
simplification. 
 
 
2.4.3.3.3 - Limitation of effects 
 
Analysis of the applicability of limitation of effects to layout design involves three different 
elements that must be considered in the assessment: i) limitation of the effects of domino 
escalation (ISIle), ii) limitation of the damage potential to target buildings (ISIlb), and iii) 
limitation of the affected area (ISIla). Monographs for converting the extent of applicability of 
each parameter to an ISI value are defined in Figure 2.4.7, again by an approach in 
accordance with [Khan & Amyotte, 2004]. These parameters are combined by Equation 
(2.4.17): 
ISIl = Min{ 100 , [(ISIle)3 + (ISIlb)3 + (ISIla)3 ]1/3 }     (2.4.17) 
Also in this case, suggestions are provided for guidance in the evaluation of extent of 
applicability, striving to reduce the degree of subjectivity in the analysis: 
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i) Limitation of the effects of domino escalation can be estimated by resorting to the Domino 
Hazard Index (DHI) as a reference. The approach is similar to that followed for attenuation, 
but the focus, as discussed earlier, is different in this case. In limitation of the effects of 
domino escalation, the DHI is calculated considering the synergistic effect of passive and 
inherent measure protection on domino consequence limitation. The extent of applicability of 
limitation of the effects of domino escalation may be evaluated using Equation (2.4.18): 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
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⎡
×⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛ −= 101,0
optionbase
option
le DHI
DHI
MaxE       (2.4.18) 
 
ii) Limitation of the damage potential to target buildings aims to assess the location of the 
facility’s populated buildings (control rooms, laboratories, workshops, offices, etc.) in relation 
to the hazardous units of the process. A proposal for this assessment is based on the grouping 
of the buildings into hazard-susceptible areas (i.e. areas affected by fire, explosion and acute 
toxic effects). The assessment has to take into account the combined effect of different 
primary units on the same building, since they may change from one layout option to another. 
Thus a reference index (Aj) is calculated for each target building (j) according to Equations 
(2.4.19) and (2.4.20): 
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where Di,j is the distance between the i-th unit and the j-th building, and Bi is the maximum 
damage distance of the i-th unit for fire, explosion and acute toxic effects. The estimation of 
the extent of applicability of ISIlb is defined by Equation (2.4.21): 
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
>>⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
×⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −
= ∑
∑
otherwise
aoraif
A
A
Max
E
optionbasejioptionji
j optionbasej
j optionj
ilb
0
00101,0 ,,,,
,
,
, (2.4.21) 
 
iii) Limitation of the affected area accounts for the effects of passive measures to decrease the 
area susceptible to dangerous consequences, no matter if particular structures are located there 
(e.g. units or buildings), but simply because final targets (e.g. people, environment) can 
potentially be present. The suggested guideline for quantitative assessment of this aspect is 
based on the percentage decrease of damage area compared to the same unit in the base 
option: 
⎥⎥⎦
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⎡
×⎟⎟⎠
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⎛ −= 101,0
optionbase
opion
la AA
AA
MaxE      (2.4.22) 
where AA is the affected area exposed to the consequence from the considered unit (e.g. if no 
protective devices exist, this is the area encompassed by the damage radius; if protective 
devices exist, the upwind protected areas are subtracted). 
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Figure 2.4.7: Inherent safety index for the limitation of effects guideword: limitation of 
effects of domino escalation (thin solid line), limitation of the potential to target buildings 
(thick solid line), limitation of the affected area (dashed line). 
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Figure 2.4.8: Credit factor for domino escalation as a function of DHSi,k. 
 
 
2.4.3.4 - Cost indexing 
 
The cost indexing procedure of I2SI accounts for and evaluates the economic aspects of 
inherent safety. The costing system (right-hand side of Figure 2.4.5) is comprised of two sub-
indices: a conventional safety cost index (CSCI) and an inherent safety cost index (ISCI). A 
further index specific to layout analysis, the Loss Saving Index (LSI), is introduced to account 
for the savings on potential losses due to a reduction of domino escalation possibility. 
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2.4.3.4.1 - Conventional Safety Cost Index (CSCI) 
 
The conventional safety cost index (CSCI) is computed as shown in Equation (2.4.23): 
LossC
ConvSafetyCCSCI =        (2.4.23) 
 
The numerator in Equation (2.4.23), CConvSafety, is the sum of the costs of process control 
measures and add-on (end-of-pipe) safety measures (i.e. CConvSafety = CControl + CAdd-on). It can 
be estimated by the number of measures required and their representative reference costs (see 
e.g. Khan and Amyotte [Khan & Amyotte, 2005]). 
 
The denominator in Equation (2.4.23), CLoss, represents the dollar value of expected losses 
caused by accidental events in a unit. It is comprised of five components, as shown in 
Equation (2.4.24): 
DECCECCCHHLCALCPLCLossC ++++=      (2.4.24) 
 
Production Loss (PL) is the economic consequence of production shutdown (i.e. business 
interruption). Direct Asset Loss (AL) represents the value of the physical unit itself which is 
depleted by the accidental event (e.g. fire or explosion). Human Health Loss (HHL) is 
calculated in terms of the cost of fatalities/injuries directly caused by the accident at the unit. 
However there can be a high degree of  subjectivity and discomfort associated with assigning 
a dollar value to fatality and/or injury. While the value of a human life is immeasurable, it is 
still possible to employ indicators such as insurance costs, rehabilitation costs, worker 
compensation rates, etc. Environmental Cleanup Cost (ECC) is associated with the mass or 
volume of soil, water and air that were contaminated by the accidental event. Reference costs 
for the estimation of this parameter are adapted from [Khan & Amyotte, 2005; Khan et al., 
2004b]. Domino Escalation Cost (DEC) is a cost term explicitly introduced in the present 
approach to account for the loss consequences of the possible chain of accidents. It represents 
the sum of the loss related to the secondary units involved, weighted by a parameter that 
features the probability of being involved, as expressed by Equation (2.4.25): 
CDEC = ∑k sk (CAL,k + CHHL,k + CECC,k)      (2.4.25) 
where CAL,k , CHHL,k and CECC,k are respectively the additional direct asset loss, human health 
loss and environmental cleanup costs for the failure of each k-th secondary unit, as a result of 
escalation from the primary unit under assessment. The production loss cost is not accounted 
for a second time in CDEC because the target units are considered to be in the same production 
line as the primary unit. The factor sk accounts for the credibility that the failure of the 
considered unit affects the k-th secondary unit. It can be evaluated as a function of the 
maximum Domino Hazard Score (DHSi,k), an intermediate index in the DHI calculation (see 
§A2.2.4 in Appendix 2.2). The correlation between sk and DHSi,k is reported in Figure 2.4.8. 
 
 
2.4.3.4.2 - Inherent Safety Cost Index (ISCI) 
 
The inherent safety cost index (ISCI) is computed by Equation (2.4.26): 
LossC
InhSafetyCISCI =          (2.4.26) 
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The denominator in Equation (2.4.26), CLoss, is the same as in Equation (2.4.23) for the CSCI. 
However, the numerator, CInhSafety, is the sum of the costs of inherent safety implementation, 
of process control measures, and of add-on (end-of-pipe) safety measures required in the 
inherently safer layout option (i.e. CInhSafety = CInherent + CControl + CAdd-on). The costs of process 
control and of add-on safety measures are calculated following the same procedure as for 
CSCI. 
 
The costs for inherent safety implementation are estimated considering the extent of 
application of the inherent safety guidewords and the costs associated with their application. 
A cost value is calculated for the application of each guideword. For example, the cost of 
extra space required for increased unit segregation is estimated and referred to as the cost of 
implementing the guideword attenuation, as earlier discussed. This cost is divided by a factor 
called the extent of applicability, which denotes the extent to which the guideword will 
eliminate/reduce the hazards. Hence, the total cost of inherent safety implementation is 
represented by Equation (2.4.27): 
LELCSiESiCAEACInherentC /// ++=      (2.4.27) 
where the C variables are the costs and E the extents of applicability of, respectively, 
attenuation (A), simplification (Si), and limitation of effects (L). 
 
 
2.4.3.4.3 - Loss Saving Index (LSI) 
 
The possibility of escalation by domino effects, assessed by CDEC, is frequently a prevailing 
term within the cost of loss. This value can have a significant variation for different layout 
options because of the choices specifically aimed at inherent safety improvement. A new 
index is proposed to map out the economic effect of escalation reduction deriving from 
inherently safer layout design: 
optionbaseloss
optionbaselossoptionLossoptionInhSafety
option C
CCC
LSI
,
,,, )( −+=      (2.4.28) 
 
This index compares inherent safety costs with a parameter that represents the savings from 
avoided loss by domino escalation, since it considers loss variations between the base case 
and assessed options. 
 
 
 
2.3.4 - Conclusions 
 
This chapter presents several support tools for the implementation of inherent safety in the 
design of layout. The tools are integral part of a research effort aimed at the implementation 
of inherent safety practice throughout the whole design life-cycle of a project. 
A common element of the proposed tools is the definition of escalation distances. Escalation 
distances are identified as an objective parameter for the assessment of the escalation potential 
of a unit within a layout. The distances are calculated by mathematical models for the 
simulation of the consequences. Generalized rules are provided for swift application. Several 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are calculated combining the escalation distances with the 
layout distances and credit factors of equipment failure. These KPIs provide a quantitative 
information on specific safety aspects for escalation hazard (e.g. ranking of the escalation 
potential of a unit; identification of critical units in a given layout, both as an escalation 
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initiator and as a vulnerable target; etc.), which may be used to support a detailed design of 
the process. Examples of application for identification of the critical units and analysis of the 
configurations in the definition of plant layout plot are provided in §4.4.5, §4.7.3 and §4.7.4. 
In a second step, a comprehensive screening tool for the assessment of the safety performance 
in layout plans is proposed. The tool is suitable for the comparison of alternative options for 
layout plan, especially in preliminary stages of the design. Process unit hazards, domino 
hazard, inherent safety guideword applicability, requirement of safety devices and safety 
economics are the principal features accounted by the tool. The information in the output 
indices of the method allows a comprehensive analysis and comparison of the alternative 
options and provides suggestions for the improvement of the single layout options. 
Demonstration of the application is reported in §4.7.1 and 
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2.5 – Proposed Approach for Inherent Safety through the Project Lifecycle 
 
2.5.1 - Introduction 
 
The application of inherent safety principles throughout the lifecycle of process design and 
management is not yet a current practice. Several reasons may be attributed to this lack, the 
main being a limited awareness of the potential benefits of the inherent safety strategy within 
each level of engineering activities, and the shortage of suitable tools to support the 
implementation. In particular, there is a general tendency to focus inherent safety efforts only 
on the early stages of the process design lifecycle. It is well-understood and agreed by 
practitioners that inherent safety can make significant contributions in the early design stages. 
However, the systematic application of inherent safety concepts at other stages of the process 
design and risk control-measure selection lifecycle has yet to be fully explored. 
 
In the following a conceptual framework for supporting the application inherent safety 
throughout the project lifecycle is presented. The procedure is named design assistance 
method for inherent safety implementation. The work described herein is largely conceptual at 
present, but outlines the general structure where the tools described in chapters from §2.2 to 
§2.4 should be located. 
 
The research endeavours to incorporate three key ideas: (i) the process design lifecycle, (ii) 
the hierarchy of risk control strategies, and (iii) inherent safety. Although some of these 
concepts have been already introduced in §1.1.1 and §2.1.1, they are refreshed and detailed in 
the following. 
 
i) Process Design Lifecycle 
 
The process design lifecycle represents the evolution of a design over time. The lifecycle can 
be divided into stages, with more detailed and specific elements being designed at each 
successive stage. The lifecycle stage terminology used in the present work is shown in Table 
2.5.1 along with the stage classifications proposed by other workers. Phases such as 
upgrading, management of change and decommissioning were not explicitly considered at 
this stage of the work. However this does not affect the concepts proposed, nor does it limit 
the applicability of the suggested method to design guidance. 
 
Activities involved in the design stages include selection and determination of: 
Process Research & Development: process technology, raw materials, intermediate products, 
byproducts and wastes, chemical synthesis route (after Mannan, [2005]). 
Conceptual Design: specific unit operations, types of reactors and other units, operating 
conditions, recycle, product purification, waste treatment (after Mannan, [2005]). 
Basic Design: size and number of production lines, general material and energy balances, size 
of storage facilities, specific equipment types, process control philosophy, location of the 
facility. 
Detailed Design: design of all equipment, pressure rating of all equipment and piping, 
inventory in process equipment, location of equipment in the plant, size and routing of piping, 
utilities, layout, control system, plant/operator interface. 
Procedure Design: procedures and codes of rules for normal operation, emergencies, 
inspections and maintenance. 
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Present Work Mannan, 2005 CCPS, 1996 BSI 7000:4 
Process research & 
development 
Conceptual process 
research & 
development 
Research Inception 
   Feasibility 
Conceptual design Process research & development Process development Conceptual design 
Basic design Preliminary plant design  Scheme design 
Detailed design Detailed plant design Design and construction Detail design 
   Production information 
Procedure design 
(operation & 
emergency) 
   
 Operation 
Operation, 
maintenance, 
modification 
 
  Decommissioning  
 
Table 2.5.1: Equivalence Among Various Lifecycle Stage Classifications 
 
 
ii) Hierarchy of Risk Control Strategies 
 
The hierarchy of risk control strategies (or simply hierarchy of controls [Hopkins, 2005]) is a 
classification of measures that can be taken to accomplish loss prevention and mitigation. As 
one progresses downward through the hierarchy, the reliability of the strategy decreases and 
possible failure modes increase in number. From most to least effective, the hierarchy of 
controls consists of safety measures that are: (i) inherent, (ii) passive (engineered), (iii) active 
(engineered), and (iv) procedural in nature. As described by Amyotte et al., [2007] engineered 
or add-on safety involves the addition of safety devices typically at the end of the design. 
These safety devices do not perform any fundamental operation, but are designed to act when 
a process upset occurs. The division of engineered safety into passive and active measures 
indicates that the devices accomplish their intended aim either without active functioning 
(passive – e.g. a machine guard), or only upon detection and initiation of action (active – e.g. 
emergency shutdown systems). Procedural safety measures, or administrative controls, use 
safe work practices and procedures to reduce risk. On the other hand, inherent safety uses the 
properties of a material or process to eliminate or reduce the hazard. The fundamental 
difference between inherent safety and the engineered and procedural categories is that 
inherent safety seeks to remove the hazard at the source as opposed to accepting the hazard 
and aiming at mitigation of the effects. 
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iii) Inherent Safety Guidewords 
 
Inherent safety is clearly a distinct category in the hierarchy of risk control strategies. Inherent 
safety can also be thought of as an enabling measure and as being applicable to the other 
hierarchy levels, so that it works to enhance the effectiveness of passive, active and 
procedural strategies. This is the broader view of inherent safety that the current work seeks to 
advance. 
As discussed extensively in previous sections, inherent safety involves consideration of a 
number of principles, of which the four most general and widely applicable are given in Table 
2.5.1 as a set of guidewords. The principle/guideword descriptions are purposely brief and are 
focused on materials, process routes, equipment and procedures. 
 
 
Guideword Description 
Minimize Use smaller quantities of hazardous materials when the use of such 
materials cannot be avoided. Perform a hazardous procedure as few 
times as possible when the procedure is unavoidable. 
Substitute Replace a substance with a less hazardous material or processing route 
with one that does not involve hazardous material. Replace a hazardous 
procedure with one that is less hazardous. 
Moderate Use hazardous materials in their least hazardous forms or identify 
processing options that involve less severe processing conditions.  
Simplify Design processes, processing equipment, and procedures to eliminate 
opportunities for errors by eliminating excessive use of add-on 
(engineered) safety features and protective devices. 
 
Table 2.5.2: Inherent Safety Principles [CCPS, 1996]. 
 
 
The guidewords and descriptions shown in Table 2.5.2 are usually invoked by designers 
familiar with these concepts at the inherent safety level in the hierarchy of controls and at the 
early lifecycle stages of process research & development and conceptual design. This is where 
there is general agreement that major changes can be undertaken with the greatest 
opportunities for cost-effective risk reduction. Extension of the applicability of inherent safety 
throughout the complete design lifecycle may require a more general expression of the 
guidewords in Table 2.5.2; suggestions in this regard are: 
 
• Minimize (Minimization): reduce the size of the hazard and therefore its potential to 
cause harm. 
• Substitute (Substitution): reduce the hazard by changing the type of hazardous 
elements. 
• Moderate (Moderation): reduce the ability of the (present) hazard to result in negative 
impacts. 
• Simplify (Simplification): eliminate unnecessary complexity, make operating errors 
less likely, improve error tolerance. 
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2.5.2 - Design Assistance Method for Inherent Safety Implementation 
 
The following discussion presents a method for guiding the introduction of inherent safety at 
any level or stage of process design. The method is based on the systematic implementation of 
the concepts of inherent safety in each point of the design space. 
 
The design space is a rational representation of the safety choices in design, according to their 
position with respect to several hierarchies of elements. Figure 2.5.1 gives one possible 
depiction of the design space as an oriented space that illustrates the applicability of inherent 
safety in process design. A design choice within a given project is represented by a unique 
point in the space. With this representation, it is clear that inherent safety can be successfully 
implemented at any single point in the space. As previously mentioned, it is universally 
recognized that some zones of the design space may yield better effects (e.g. early design 
stages coupled with use of inherent control strategies). Any point in the space, however, is 
available for safety measure implementations that contribute positively to the overall inherent 
safety performance of the project. 
 
As previously mentioned, the basic idea of the design assistance method is the rigorous 
exploration of inherent safety applicability within the design space. The framework of the 
methodology is shown in Figure 2.5.2. By means of nested cycles, the analysis proceeds 
systematically through the design lifecycle stages, risk control levels and inherent safety 
guidewords. Application of this methodology will eventually result in an inherent safety-
optimized design for each stage of the lifecycle. 
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Figure 2.5.1: The Design Space – A Representation 
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Figure 2.5.3 is a graphical representation of the design space (Figure 2.5.1) and how it is 
systematically filled, point-by-point through application of the methodology given in Figure 
2.5.2. On the other hand, Figure 2.5.4 provides an example of an incomplete filling of the 
design space, as would be obtained in the traditional design approach claiming to apply 
inherent safety. The application of inherent safety guidewords is non-systematic and occurs 
only at the early design stages with little consideration given to other risk control strategies. 
The more detailed (i.e. more advanced) stages of design rely on higher control levels with no 
application of the inherent safety guidewords (as represented by the shape A, which has no 
dimension on the inherent safety axis). 
 
Key blocks in the methodology shown in Figure 2.5.2 are described below: 
Hazard identification: The first step to design for safety is to identify the hazards present. 
This identification is based on checklists, brainstorming activities (e.g. What-If? analysis), 
analyst experience, and is supported by the information recorded in the knowledge bank. 
Generate a base option: As the proposed methodology is intended to lead to incremental 
design improvements, a base option is necessary to initiate the procedure. The base option can 
be generated from information in the knowledge bank, is pertinent to a given lifecycle stage, 
and may include several levels of risk control strategies. It is in the successive Analysis phases 
of Assessment, Interpretation and Improvement that the control strategies are considered level 
by level and inherent safety guideword by inherent safety guideword. 
Assessment: In this phase, a safety index is developed for the considered point of the design 
space. One possible safety index is the KPI approach described in §2.3 and §2.4. The input to 
the assessment phase is a design option for the given lifecycle stage, including the cumulative 
safety measures up to the given control level. In each application of the overall Analysis block 
(i.e. Assessment, Interpretation and Improvement), the credit and consequence calculations 
are updated as required by the subsequent modifications in safety measures. 
Interpretation: As suggested by its name, this step is aimed at recognition of the main 
elements defining the safety index or measure of risk assessed in the previous phase. A 
weighting analysis of fault tree elements, for example, can help determine the most important 
features that characterize the risk profile of the analyzed option. 
Improvement: Once the role of each of the safety measures introduced is identified in the 
previous step, actions can be taken to improve the inherent safety of the system. These actions 
should involve the elements identified as critical and should be driven by the inherent safety 
guidewords, which are systematically applied. Suggestions for system improvements can be 
provided by the knowledge bank that should contain information on possible safety measures 
as well as hazards. 
Knowledge Bank: This element represent an extensive database listing expected hazards, 
process technologies and safety measures for the analyzed kind of process (i.e. specific 
industrial sector). It is an advisory element in the method that provide information and 
checklists to the analysis. It is compiled resorting to the knowledge of several expert and 
practitioners (e.g. brainstorming activities, What-If? Analysis, etc.). It is intended as a live-
database, as it can be enriched by the outcomes of the method itself. The basic form of this 
database contains the information of hazard and barriers classification. 
As shown in Figure 2.5.2, the design assistance method moves forward along the axes of the 
design space with no explicit feedback routes to previous phases. This is reflective of the 
usual approach to design (especially within the lifecycle stages) in which, although design is 
clearly an iterative process, backward steps are generally infeasible due to practical, time and 
economic constraints. A comprehensive knowledge bank is a key requirement, therefore, to 
ensure that the impact on later stages of decisions made at a given stage on are well-
understood (e.g. a reduction in number of flanges, which is an inherent measure in detailed 
design, will have implications for procedure design with respect to inspections). 
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Figure 2.5.2: Flow Diagram of the Design Assistance Method 
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Figure 2.5.3: The Design Space – Systematically Filled by the Design Assistance Method 
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Figure 2.5.4: The Design Space – Non-Systematic Application of Inherent Safety 
Considerations 
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2.6 - Conclusions 
 
The implementation of inherent safety within a design support system was pursued through 
the development of a portfolio of dedicated tools. 
 
The review of the scientific literature on inherent safety assessment evidenced the limitations 
of tools currently available: applicability restrained to specific cases, presence of non-
transparent build-in assumptions, large use of arbitrary parameters based on expert judgement, 
etc.. 
 
A portfolio of quantitative assessment tools was proposed to overcome these limitations: 
• A procedure for the definition of the hazard profile of the decomposition products of a 
material was developed. The approach, joined with experimental protocols for the 
identification of expected decomposition products, allows the screening of the 
accidental scenarios may follow the emission in the environment of the decomposition 
products released in the loss of control of a chemical process. These scenarios should 
be assessed in the next step of evaluation of process safety. 
• A consequence-based method for the quantitative assessment of the inherent safety of 
processes was developed. The method is based on the evaluation of two KPIs, related 
to the severity of potential accidents and to the recorded safety scores of process 
equipment. In the framework of a comparative assessment of the inherent safety of 
alternative processes, the developed method overrides several problems of literature 
methods. Introducing a direct relation among hazard factors and consequence analysis 
of potential scenarios, the proposed method avoids the use of arbitrary indexes. 
• A consequence-based method, derived from the previous one, for the assessment of 
the hazard of chain effects leading to catastrophic consequences by escalation (domino 
effect). The index allow identification of the critical units and configurations in the 
definition of plant layout plot. 
• A screening tool for the comprehensive assessment of the inherent safety in early 
phases of plant layout design. The proposed tool is based on the framework of former 
literature methods, in order to produce a common approach for both process and 
layout assessment. However the application within the constraints and specific 
characteristics of layout design required a throughout update of the indexing system. 
The assessment is based on the integrated analysis of the various aspects: process unit 
hazards, domino hazard, inherent safety guideword applicability, requirement of safety 
devices and safety economics. 
 
The developed approaches listed above are integral part of a research effort aimed at 
implementation of inherent safety practice throughout the whole design life-cycle of a project. 
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Appendix 2.1 – Tables for the scoring of hazardous proprieties of materials 
 
In the following, the correlation tables for the scoring of the hazardous proprieties of 
substances required by the procedure described in §2.2 are reported. 
 
 
A2.1.1 – Toxicological and eco-toxicological properties 
 
Score 0 1 2 3 
 Negligible toxicity Harmful Toxic Very toxic 
LC50 (4h) inhalation rat (mg/l) > 20 2 ÷ 20 0,5 ÷ 2 < 0,5 Inhalation 
gas o vapour Risk phrase - R20 R23 R26 
LC50 (4h) inhalation rat (mg/l) > 5 1 ÷ 5 0,25 ÷ 1 < 0,25 Inhalation 
aerosol o 
particles Risk phrase - R20 R23 R26 
LD50 dermal rabbit (mg/kg) > 2000 400 ÷ 2000 50 ÷ 400 < 50 
Dermal contact 
Risk phrase - R21 R24 R27 
LD50 ingestion rat (mg/kg) > 2000 200 ÷ 2000 25 ÷ 200 < 25 
Ingestion 
Risk phrase - R22 R25 R28 
 
Table A2.1.1: Score ranking for acute toxicity 
 
 
Score 0 1 2 3 
 Negligible toxicity Harmful Toxic Very toxic 
LC50 (96 h) fish (mg/l) > 100 10 – 100 1 – 10 < 1 
LC50 (48 h) daphnia (mg/l) > 100 10 – 100 1 – 10 < 1 
LC50 (72 h) algae (mg/l) > 100 10 – 100 1 – 10 < 1 
LD50 oral birds (mg/kg) > 1000 100 – 1000 10 – 100 < 10 
 
Table A2.1.2: Score ranking for eco-toxicity 
 
 
RfD - reference dose 
(mg/kg·d) 
RfC - reference concentration 
(mg/m3) 
Chronic 
toxicity Score 
- - None 0 
> 0,1 > 0,35 Low 1 
0,001 – 0,1 0,0035 – 0,35 Medium 2 
< 0,001 < 0,0035 High 3 
 
Table A2.1.3: Score ranking for chronic toxicity. 
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CSF - Cancer Slope 
Factors 
(mg/kg·d)-1 
Carcinogenicity Score 
> 103 High 3 
1 – 103 Medium 2 
< 1 Low 1 
- None 0 
 
Table A2.1.4: Score ranking for carcinogenicity. 
 
 
 
A2.1.2 – Dispersion and fate 
 
Score 1 2 3 
Molecular weight (kg/kmol) > 300 100 – 300 < 100 
Henry’s law constant (atm·m3/mol) < 10-6 10-6 – 10-2 > 10-2 
Boiling point (°C) > 150 50 – 150 < 50 
Water Solubility (mg/l) < 1 1 – 103  > 103 
 
Table A2.1.5: Score ranking for dispersion and fate parameters. 
 
 
 
A2.1.3 – Uptake by organisms 
 
Octanol-water partition 
coefficient 
Bio-accumulation 
potential Score 
4.3 < Log Kow < 8.0 Alto 3 
3.5 < Log Kow < 4.3 Moderato 2 
Log Kow < 3.5 Basso 1 
 
Table A2.1.6: Score ranking for bio-accumulation factor. 
 
 
A2.1.4 – Persistence 
 
Overall persistence time (h) Score 
> 1000 3 
100 - 1000 2 
< 100 1 
 
Table A2.1.7: Score ranking for persistence. 
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Appendix 2.2 – Escalation vectors in domino scenarios 
 
A2.2.1 – Overview 
 
In this Appendix the accidental scenarios that can result in domino escalation are discussed. 
According to the main text, the scenario will be classified on the basis of the escalation vector 
(i.e. the physical effects causing the propagation) as in Table 2.4.1. The possible inherent 
strategies to reduce domino will be discussed, starting from the definition of the escalation 
vector and of the escalation radii of each accidental scenario. The assessment of the intensity 
of the escalation vector yields, as discussed in §2.4.2, the definition of inherent safety 
distances and of critical inventories. In the following discussion, the rule of thumbs developed 
for the quantification of reference values for these parameters are presented. Finally the 
developed rules for the assessment of the Domino Hazard Scores (DHS) required for the 
calculation of the Domino Hazard Index (DHI, §2.4.2.3) are presented. 
 
 
A2.2.2 – Escalation scenarios caused by fire 
 
In the chemical and process industry, fires are the more frequent accidental event. It is well 
known that escalation may be caused by fire scenarios due to: 
i)   damage of the secondary unit caused by radiation; 
ii) ignition of flammable vapours at the secondary unit due to direct flame impingement 
or to the heat of the primary fire. 
Consequently, relevant efforts are usually addressed to the reduction of fire hazards, mainly 
by avoiding the presence of ignition sources and installing mitigation devices. A number of 
well-known active and passive systems for fire prevention are typically installed in process 
plants. The strategies and the details of fire prevention and fire fighting measures are widely 
discussed in the literature (e.g. see [Lees, 1996; NFPA, 2003; Nolan, 1996] and references 
cited therein) and are not reported here for the sake of brevity. However, it is important to 
remark that several alternative actions may be considered in order to apply an inherent safety 
approach to the prevention of escalation events caused by fires. The more effective are related 
to the substitution, intensification and moderation guidewords: using non flammable 
substances, reducing stored quantities, and shifting to less hazardous storage conditions (in 
general, lower pressure and lower temperature) are well known measures aimed to the 
reduction of fire hazard. If these are not applicable or, more frequently, if after the application 
of these measures an escalation vector is still present, inherent safety may be obtained by 
limitation of effects. The limitation of the effects of the escalation vector should be related to 
the vulnerability of the possible target equipment. This principle suggests two categories of 
actions: i) the proper design of the possible targets of escalation events (e.g. buried or 
mounded tanks are not exposed to external fire radiation), and ii) the adoption of appropriate 
safety distances. A specific study dedicated to the analysis of the behaviour and to the 
assessment of the time to failure of atmospheric and pressurized vessels exposed to fires 
[Cozzani et al. 2005, 2006; Salzano et al., 2003] evidenced that safety distances are strongly 
dependent on target vulnerability and on the primary fire scenario. Nevertheless, conservative 
envelope correlations were obtained for the time to failure of different categories of 
unprotected vessels with respect to the radiation intensity and the radiation mode. 
 
In these cases, the escalation distance is dependent on the fire intensity, that may be related to 
the type of fire scenario, to geometrical parameters (release diameter, pool radius, etc.), and to 
the inventory involved in the fire. The latter is in turn related to the equipment item at which 
the fire takes place and to the fire prevention measures introduced in equipment design. The 
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estimation of fire intensity starting from the previous parameters is a standard procedure in 
the consequence assessment of fire scenarios within conventional QRA studies [Uijt de Haag 
& Ale, 1999]. Thus, the intensity of the escalation vector of each fire scenario may be 
calculated estimating the distance at which the radiation thresholds reported in Table 2.4.1 are 
obtained. Inherent safety may be achieved reducing the escalation distance and/or limiting the 
possible escalation effects of fires. 
 The primary fire scenario is therefore the key element both in the evaluation of the escalation 
vector and in the assessment of the safety distances for limitation of effects. Thus, the inherent 
safety actions applicable to the fire scenarios listed in Table 2.4.1 will be separately discussed 
in the following. 
 
A2.2.2.1 – Fireballs 
 
A fireball is a diffusive combustion of a gas cloud originated by the sudden release of relevant 
amounts of pressurized and/or liquefied gases, followed by ignition. Several models are 
available for the calculation of the maximum flame diameter, of the duration of the fire and of 
radiation intensities [CCPS, 1994; Van Den Bosh & Weterings, 1997]. The fireball diameter 
and duration mainly depend on the mass released after the vessel rupture, which is usually 
(and conservatively) assumed to be equal to the whole vessel content. 
The fireball duration is usually limited (in general of the order of 5 s to 20 s), and this should 
be taken into account in order to define the possibility of escalation. However, it must be 
recalled that the limited duration of the fireball scenario excludes the possibility of active 
protection systems in the prevention of escalation. 
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Figure A2.2.1: Escalation distance for fireballs with respect to inventory (= mass 
released) and volume of propane vessel, fill level = 80%. 
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It is well known that the fireball scenario is typical of flammable liquefied pressurized gases, 
although it is also possible for any flammable pressurized gases. Thus, an inherently safer 
condition with respect to escalation would be obtained by eliminating this scenario, by 
changing operating conditions (e.g. introducing low pressure cryogenic storage), or by 
reducing the escalation distance by limiting vessel inventory. 
 
The results of a study concerning the behaviour of unprotected atmospheric and pressurized 
vessels exposed to fireball radiation evidenced that the possibility of escalation due to 
radiation may be reasonably excluded for pressurized vessels, even in the absence of passive 
protections [Cozzani et al., 2005, 2006]. With respect to atmospheric equipment, escalation 
resulted as well unlikely, unless a direct engulfment in the flame takes place. 
 
Figure A2.2.1 reports the escalation distance with respect to inventory and mass released from 
a pressurized vessel containing propane. The plot was obtained using the simple approach 
recommended by CCPS [CCPS, 1994] for fireball radius calculation. In Figure A2.2.1, the 
separation distances necessary to prevent escalation involving atmospheric equipment are 
given. Indeed, the upper region is the inherently safer zone, where escalation may reasonably 
be excluded. On the other hand, the lower region corresponds to the zone where passive 
protection measures may be required to prevent escalation due to fireball radiation. The figure 
also evidences the influence of actions towards process intensification (thus leading to lower 
process inventories) on safety distances. 
 
A2.2.2.2 – Jet fires 
 
A jet fire is a turbulent flame that may have a relevant length in the direction of the release. It 
is well known that escalation is always possible when any fire engulfs or impinges target 
equipment. Indeed, recent experimental studies confirmed that even in the presence of active 
mitigation systems (e.g. water deluges) and passive protections (e.g. thermal insulation), hot 
spots may cause the failure of vessels exposed to jet fires [Roberts, 2004a,b; Shirvill, 2004]. 
As a consequence, the escalation distance depends mainly on the maximum flame length, i.e. 
the maximum distance from the flame source at which the damage of the more vulnerable 
category of unprotected vessels results credible. As shown in Figure 2.4.2, the escalation 
vector may be obtained adding a constant distance to the jet flame length, below which the 
radiation intensities are unlikely to cause an escalation due to vessel damage. Horizontal 
directions of the flame should be conservatively assumed. 
Figures A2.2.2 to A2.2.4 may be used for a preliminary conservative assessment of flame 
length for the three more common types of jet fires that are likely to take place in industrial 
installations: i) jet fires from compressed flammable gases at high pressure and ambient 
temperature; ii) jet fires from liquefied gases at ambient temperature (e.g. propane and butane 
in storage conditions); and iii) jet fires from hot saturated liquids (e.g. butane or higher 
molecular weight hydrocarbons in process conditions, as in distillation columns or in 
pressurized batch reactors). The plots were obtained applying the Shell jet fire model 
[Chamberlain, 1987], extensively described in the TNO “yellow book” and by Lees [Lees, 
1996; Van Den Bosh & Weterings, 1997]. The model was applied to different hydrocarbons 
and considering different wind velocities, selecting the worst case results. 
 
An inherently safer condition with respect to escalation may be obtained eliminating or 
reducing the escalation distance, and/or limiting the possible effects of the event. Pressure is 
the main operating variable that influences the flame length and thus the escalation possibility 
of a jet fire. As shown in Figures A.2.2.2 to A.2.2.4, the flame length is highly dependent on 
the internal pressure. Temperature may also be an important factor in the case of saturated 
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liquids, since it influences the vapour pressure and thus the severity of the jet fire. However, if 
the application of the moderation guideword to these process variables is not possible or not 
sufficient to eliminate the hazard, the limitation of effects guideword may lead to an effective 
reduction of the escalation hazard. 
 
Escalation due to jet fire heat radiation only (i.e. target equipment is not directly impinged) is 
dependent both on radiative heat load and on the duration of the flame exposure. Several 
criteria were proposed to identify critical heat radiation values for jet fires. In a recent study, 
the minimum heat loads leading to vessel failure in a critical time (15 minutes) were estimated 
for several vessel categories [Cozzani et al., 2005, 2006]. Figures A.2.2.2-(b), A.2.2.3-(b), 
and A.2.2.4-(b) report the value of the inventory of the primary vessel above which the jet fire 
duration is at least equal to the critical time assumed for secondary vessel failure. Thus, the 
plots in Figures A.2.2.2 to A.2.2.4 allow on one hand the identification of the range of release 
diameters that may lead to escalation given the inventory of the primary vessel and the 
distance of the secondary target. On the other hand, given the maximum credible release 
equivalent diameter, the data reported allow the identification of the safety distances for the
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Figure A2.2.2: Jet-fire flame length (a) and critical vessel inventory for a 15 minutes 
release (b) with respect to the equivalent release diameter for hydrocarbon gases at ambient 
temperature and high pressure. To obtain safety distances, 50 m for atmospheric vessels and 
25 m for pressurized vessels should be added to the flame length. 
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Figure A2.2.3: Jet-fire flame length (a) and critical vessel inventory for a 15 minutes 
release (b) with respect to the equivalent release diameter for propane releases at ambient 
temperature. To obtain safety distances, 50 m for atmospheric vessels and 25 m for 
pressurized vessels should be added to the flame length. 
 
 
 limitation of effects with respect to different categories of secondary vessels (Figures 
A.2.2.2-(a), A.2.2.3-(a) and A.2.2.4-(a)), and the critical inventory of the primary vessel, 
above which the duration of the jet fire may be sufficient to cause the failure of the secondary 
target (Figures A.2.2.2-(b), A.2.2.3-(b), A.2.2.4-(b)). 
 
Thus, the upper sections of Figures A.2.2.2-(a), A.2.2.3-(a) and A.2.2.4-(a) identify the 
inherently safe regions of secondary targets with respect to escalation caused by jet fires: 
escalation involving a secondary target falling in this region may be considered unlikely. On 
the other hand, the lower region of the figures identifies the region where passive and active 
protection systems are required. Targets having a distance from the primary event that falls 
inside this region are not inherently safe, and require the installation of protections to prevent 
domino accidents, in particular in existing plants. Similarly, Figures A.2.2.2-(b), A.2.2.3-(b), 
and A.2.2.4-(b) point out that an inherently safer region may be identified for vessel inventory 
with respect to the possibility of generating primary jet fires resulting in escalation. 
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Figure A2.2.4: Jet-fire flame length (a) and critical vessel inventory for a 15 minutes 
release (b) with respect to the equivalent release diameter for hot saturated hydrocarbons at 
high temperature and pressure. To obtain safety distances, 50 m for atmospheric vessels and 
25 m for pressurized vessels should be added to the flame length. 
 
 
Finally, it must be recalled that the safety distances obtained from the data in Figures A.2.2.2 
to A.2.2.4 and in Figure 2.4.2 refer to unprotected vessels, thus may be considered as 
conservative values. The use of active (fire sprinklers, water curtains) and, preferably, of 
passive (thermal insulation, fire walls) protection systems may greatly improve the resistance 
of the secondary targets, thus lowering the probability of escalation. 
 
A2.2.2.3 –Pool fires 
 
A pool fire is formed by the combustion of the vapour from a pool of a flammable liquid 
[CCPS, 2000; Van Den Bosh & Weterings, 1997]. Escalation caused by pool fires is mainly 
due to the full engulfment of a vessel in the flames, although the stationary radiation caused 
by the fire may as well cause the failure of a secondary vessel. Therefore, the escalation 
distance depends on the area of the pool fire and on the distance from the border of the pool 
fire. As in the case of jet-fires, the escalation distance was assumed as the maximum distance 
from the flame at which the damage of the more vulnerable category of unprotected vessels 
(atmospheric storage tanks) is credible. The parameters that mainly influence the escalation 
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distance are two: i) the surface emissive power of the flame, that in turn depends by the 
characteristics of the flammable substance that forms the pool, and ii) the pool dimension or 
equivalent diameter. Pool fires in fixed installations are most likely to take place inside the 
catch basin of the primary vessel at which a loss of containment takes place. Thus, in the case 
of severe pool fires, the pool extension may be often coincident with that of the catch basin, if 
present. In the case of unconfined pool fires, the maximum pool diameter should be 
considered. A number of literature models are available for the calculation of pool fire 
radiation and of pool fire radius (e.g. see [CCPS, 1994; Lees 1996; Van Den Bosh & 
Weterings, 1997] and references cited therein), and may be used for the assessment of the 
escalation distance. The results reported in the present study were obtained using the models 
reported in the TNO “yellow book” [Van Den Bosh & Weterings, 1997]. As shown in Figure 
2.4.2, the escalation distance may be estimated as the maximum radius of the liquid pool 
added of a constant distance over which the radiation intensity falls below the threshold 
values discussed above. 
Inherently safer conditions with respect to escalation are obtained also in this case eliminating 
the escalation vector or reducing the escalation distance, and/or limiting the possible effects of 
the event. Also in this case, provided that the substitution guideword is not applicable, the 
moderation guideword applied to temperature and pressure would be effective at least in the 
reduction of the ignition probability. However, quite often the liquid forming a pool fire is 
above the flash point even at ambient conditions. Thus, the limitation of effects guideword 
seems to identify the only effective actions that may lead to the reduction of the escalation 
hazard. 
As for jet-fires, escalation possibility depends on the radiation intensity and on the fire 
duration. Figure 2.4.2 shows the safety distances from flame border for pool fire damage of 
atmospheric and pressurized vessels derived from a previous study [Cozzani et al., 2005, 
2006]. In the case of pool fires, the safety distances may be expressed as the distance from the 
pool border. The presence and a proper design of the catch basins are thus important elements 
towards inherent safety. Individual catch basins having a high height/surface ratio lead to an 
inherently safer layout with respect to escalation. This is evidenced in Figure A2.2.5, where 
the critical inventory for escalation is reported.  
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Figure A2.2.5: Critical inventory (black lines) for pool fire scenarios with respect to 
catch basin surface area. Grey line relates pool area with an equivalent radius. To obtain 
safety distances, 50 m for atmospheric vessels and 15 m for pressurized vessels should be 
added to catch basin equivalent radius. 
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The figure shows the inventory involved in the pool fire required to obtain a pool fire duration 
equal to the critical time for escalation (15 minutes) as a function of the pool surface and of 
the burning rate of the liquid. The critical inventory was calculated on the basis of literature 
data for the burning rate [Van Den Bosh & Weterings, 1997], assuming a constant area of the 
pool. 
The plot shows conservative results for two categories of flammable liquids: "heavy liquids", 
having a burning rate lower than 0.055 kg/m2s (e.g. kerosene, fuel oil, etc.), and "light 
liquids", having a burning rate higher than 0.055 kg/m2s (e.g. gasoline, n-heptane, etc.). Pool 
fires involving liquefied gases are characterized by higher burning rates (typically higher than 
0,078 kg/m2s), thus the results obtained for "light" liquids are sufficiently conservative to be 
extended also to these compounds.  
As in the case of jet fires, also in Figure A2.2.5 the section below the solid lines may be 
considered an inherently safer region for the inventory of the primary vessel as a function of 
separation distances. On the other hand, the upper region of the plot is that where passive or 
active protection of possible targets is required. Thus, in particular in the case of existing 
plants, the installation of passive (e.g. thermal insulation, fire walls) or active systems (e.g. 
sprinklers, fire curtains) are required to protect the possible target vessels that fall in these 
zones with respect to primary pool fire scenarios. 
 
 
A2.2.3 – Escalation scenarios caused by overpressure 
 
It is well known that escalation may be triggered by pressure waves as a consequence of the 
damage of secondary vessels containing hazardous substances. The interaction of pressure 
waves with process equipment is rather complex, involving pressure wave reflection, flow 
separation, drag forces, and being influenced by the mechanical characteristic of equipment. 
However, in industrial explosions (thus excluding the explosions due to condensed high 
explosives or nuclear weapons), damages to equipment in the far-field are mainly related to 
the incident peak overpressure and to the positive impulse, while the effects of the drag forces 
(the explosion wind) may be neglected. Furthermore, many literature approaches relate the 
damage intensity to the maximum peak static overpressure only [Baker et al., 1983; Cozzani 
et al., 2005, 2006]. As a matter of fact, pressure-impulse data related to equipment damage 
are lacking and theoretical difficulties arise in the description of the interaction unless ideal 
and unrealistic blast waves are considered. Thus, a conservative assumption often used in the 
design criteria is to assume that the equipment damage is mainly related to the peak 
overpressure. Following this approach, the escalation vector due to overpressure is related to 
overpressure thresholds above which the damage of the more vulnerable equipment items 
may be expected. Figure 2.4.3 shows the threshold values derived from a previous study 
[Cozzani et al., 2005, 2006] for different overpressure scenarios. Blast waves from confined 
explosions, i.e. gas, vapour and dust explosions or runaway reactions within equipment, 
producing blast wave propagating in the external atmosphere through vents and openings 
(even formed for the partial failure of shell) were not included in the discussion due to low 
distances run by low-energy blast waves (see Forcier and Zalosh analysis [Forcier & Zalosh, 
2000] and [Cozzani et al., 2006] for further details) and considering the usually associated 
damages due to fragment projection and jet fires. 
The escalation distance for each overpressure scenario may be calculated estimating the 
distance at which the specific threshold reported in Figure 2.4.3 is obtained by the use of 
standard literature models [CCPS, 1994; Uijt de Haag & Ale 1999; Van Den Bosh & 
Weterings, 1997]. Inherent safety may be obtained reducing the escalation distance and 
limiting the possible escalation effects that may be triggered by the blast wave. 
 §A2.2 - 9
A number of active safety devices (alarms, safety interlock system, automatic remote safety 
valves, water curtains, foam sprinklers) and passive systems (pressure release valves, vents, 
etc.) are used to prevent the different explosion scenarios possible in the process industry (e.g. 
see [Baker et al., 1983; Lees 1996; Nolan, 1996] and references cited therein). An inherent 
approach may however suggest several possible actions, related to the substitution, 
intensification and moderation guidewords: using non-flammable or non-volatile substances, 
reducing stored quantities, and shifting to less hazardous operating conditions (in general, 
lower pressure and lower temperature that may limit the explosion energy and/or the amount 
of substance forming a vapour cloud). As in the case of fires, if after possible actions 
compatible with the process under examination an escalation vector is still present, the 
limitation of effects guideword may suggest further actions leading to an inherently safer plant 
lay-out with respect to escalation. However, the features of the primary scenario generating 
the blast wave are of fundamental importance in the identification of the more effective 
actions. These will be thus separately discussed in the following for the explosion scenarios 
listed in Figure 2.4.3. 
 
 
A2.2.3.1 - Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) 
 
When partially confined or unconfined gas or vapour cloud explosions (VCE) occur as a 
primary scenario, large destruction is usually expected in the surroundings due to the heat 
effects and the blast wave which characterize this scenario. Provided that heat radiation is 
unlikely to produce damage to equipment, escalation effects are usually caused by the 
mechanical damage followed by loss of containment of target equipment. The escalation 
distance is thus related to the distance at which the blast wave peak overpressure equals the 
threshold value in Figure 2.4.3. This may be calculated by the standard approach used in QRA 
[CCPS, 1994; Uijt de Haag & Ale, 1999], estimating the explosion energy and evaluating the 
“strength” of explosion on the basis of plant lay-out and fuel reactivity, i.e. the “strength 
factor F” for the Multi-Energy method (MEM, see [Eggen, 1998; Van den Berg, 1985]), or 
the flame Mach number, Mf, in the Baker-Sthrelow methodology (BS, see [Tang & Baker, 
1999] for details). 
Figure A2.2.6 shows the escalation distance with respect to the estimated explosion energy, 
and the correspondent fuel air mass and volume, for two categories of target equipment 
(atmospheric vessels and pressurised equipment). The escalation distance was defined as the 
threshold distance with respect to the fuel-air cloud border at which damage is expected for 
the category of process equipment more likely to trigger escalation events (pressurised 
vessels). The plot was obtained using the threshold values for escalation given in Figure 2.4.3, 
starting from the following assumptions: i) the cloud was considered hemispherical (release at 
ground level), homogeneous and at stoichiometric concentration; ii) a mean combustion 
energy typical of air/hydrocarbon mixtures was assumed (3.6 MJ/m3 of mixture); and iii) the 
strength factor and the flame Mach number for the VCE were assumed as for intense 
deflagration (F > 7 and Mf > 3.5). The latter assumption is justified comparing the energy-
scaled plots for the propagation of blast waves in the region where escalation effects are of 
concern: either by the MEM or by the BS approaches, no differences may be observed for 
more intense explosion (i.e. the peak pressures are superimposed whatever is the initial 
pressure). The mass-volume-energy conversion was obtained considering the total 
combustion of fuel to water and carbon dioxide. 
Quite obviously, several actions may be identified to improve inherent safety by the 
minimization of the escalation distance. This may be obtained decreasing the explosion 
energy and the explosion strength. Explosion energy may be reduced by the substitution of 
process substances with less volatile compounds or by the moderation of operating conditions 
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(e.g. using lower pressure and temperature), thus minimizing the total fuel available for the 
explosion. On the other hand, the explosion strength may be reduced again by the substitution 
of substances with less reactive compounds, e.g. gases or vapours with minor specific 
combustion energy, and/or minor laminar burning velocity. However, also the limitation of 
effects may also be effective in reducing the explosion strength, by a proper lay-out design, 
aimed to the reduction of the geometrical congestion and confinement, which strongly affect 
the violence of explosions. 
If an escalation vector is still present after the application of the above discussed actions that 
resulted compatible with the process under examination, the limitation of effects guideword 
indicates the necessity of adopting appropriate safety distances in lay-out design. As in the 
case of fires, in Figure A2.2.6 the section above the solid lines may be considered as the zone 
of inherent safety separation distances with respect to the flammable cloud border. On the 
other hand, the lower region is that where passive protections, as barricades and/or blast wall, 
should be considered for application. 
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Figure A2.2.6: Escalation distance and inherent safety distances for escalation effects 
on equipment loaded by VCEs generated by the more common hydrocarbons. (W = molecular 
weight; S =  stoichiometric concentration expressed in volume percent of fuel air mixture 
combustion). Distances should be calculated from the flammable cloud border. For more 
reactive fuels a factor 1.2 should be used to correct energy values based on cloud volume. 
Target vessel: i) Solid line: pressurised; ii) Dashed line: atmospheric. 
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A2.2.3.2 - Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) 
 
The catastrophic failure of a vessel containing a pressurized liquefied gas, due to the external 
heating of vessel wall or to other causes of overpressure, may result in a sudden evaporation 
of the vessel content and in the formation of a blast wave. The conditions necessary for the 
blast wave formation, usually related to a superheat temperature, as well as the procedure for 
the evaluation of the explosion energy are widely discussed in the literature [CCPS, 1994; 
Salzano et al., 2003]. In the present section, escalation effects triggered by the blast wave 
originated from the sudden expansion of the vessel content are only considered. 
As for Vapour Cloud Explosion, the escalation distance may be defined as the distance from 
the explosion centre at which damage is expected for pressurised equipment and vessels (see 
Figure 2.4.2). A preliminary estimate of the escalation distance may be obtained from Figure 
A2.2.7, which reports the inherent safety radii for either atmospheric or pressurised target 
equipment vessels with respect to the explosion energy, starting from the explosion of typical 
propane vessel with failure pressure of 20 bar, and 80% filling level, as conservative choice. 
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Figure A2.2.7:  Escalation distance and inherent safety distances for escalation caused 
by blast wave produced by BLEVE with respect to the total explosion energy and to the 
corresponding volume and mass of a propane vessel having an 80% filling level. Distances 
must be calculated from the vessel border. Target equipment/vessel: i) Solid line: pressurised; 
ii) Dashed line: atmospheric. 
 
 
The explosion effects have been calculated from the assumption that the expanding boiling 
liquid is at the superheat temperature (about 237 K for pure propane) at the moment of failure 
of vessel shell. Keeping constant the filling level and the initial and final thermodynamic 
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states (corresponding to the expansion from 20 bar to the atmospheric pressure), the 
correlation of the escalation distance with respect to vessel volume and inventory is also 
obtained, as the boiling liquid and the vapour specific energies can be scaled to any amount or 
vessel volume. Eventually, as the pressure threshold values for target equipment and the total 
available energy for the explosion of both expanding liquid and vapour are known, the 
effective safety distances are easily obtained (see the methodology given in [CCPS, 1994], 
where specific energy-scaled plot for the evaluation of peak overpressure are also given). To 
this regard, it’s worth considering that the results obtained for propane are conservative with 
respect to butane and LPG, as detailed in [Salzano et al., 2003].  
 
Several actions may be considered in order to eliminate or reduce the escalation distance. The 
intensification and moderation guidewords suggest to reduce the vessel volume or to shift to 
less hazardous storage conditions (e.g. use of lower storage pressure and temperature). If 
these actions are not applicable to the process of interest, inherent safety may be obtained by 
the limitation of effects guideword. The analysis of Figure A2.2.7 evidences that also in this 
case the upper region of the plot identifies the zone of inherent safety, where no damage to 
secondary equipment is expected to be caused by the blast wave. The lower zone of the plot is 
the region where protection measures are required. As in the case of VCE, the more effective 
protections are blast walls or barricades, or vessel mounding. However, since the BLEVE is 
likely to take place after a few minutes of heat loading, active systems as vessel dumping may 
be effective in the prevention of escalation following the damage of secondary equipment. 
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Figure A2.2.8: Escalation distance and inherent safety distances for escalation caused 
by mechanical explosion of high strength and low strength equipment/enclosure with respect 
to total explosion energy. Distances must be calculated from the vessel border. Target vessel: 
i) Solid line: pressurised; ii) Dashed line: atmospheric.  
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A2.2.3.3 - Mechanical Explosion 
 
Mechanical failure of an equipment item, followed by the sudden expansion of the 
compressed gas phase may result in the generation of a blast wave, which may trigger 
escalation events. The explosion energy may be estimated by standard literature approaches 
on the basis of vessel volume and of conservative assumptions for energy calculation, e.g. by 
using the Brode equation [CCPS, 1994; Lees 1996]. In particular, following conventional 
approaches, two categories may be introduced for vessel failure pressure [NFPA 68, 2002; 
NFPA 69; 1997]: low strength equipment behaviour (failure pressure of 0.03 bar g) and high 
strength equipment behaviour (failure pressure higher than 1 bar g). Also in this case, the 
escalation vector may be defined as the distance from the explosion centre at which damage is 
expected for the more vulnerable target category (see Figure 2.4.2). This is plotted in Figure 
A2.2.8 with respect to the total explosion energy. The escalation distance may be reduced 
following the moderation guideword, thus considering the adoption of lower operating 
pressures. Figure A2.2.8 also reports the inherent safety threshold distances for pressurized 
and atmospheric equipment, whose application is suggested by the limitation of effects 
guideword. Also in this case, the lower region of the plot identifies the zone where passive 
protection systems, as blast walls or barricades, are required to prevent escalation. 
 
 
A2.2.4 – Escalation scenario caused by fragments 
 
Fragment projection is among the more frequent causes of domino effect in industrial 
accidents. The primary scenarios that are likely to generate this escalation vector are 
BLEVEs, mechanical and more generally confined explosions. The escalation distance may 
be defined as the maximum fragment projection distance for the primary scenario of interest. 
Several approaches were proposed in the literature for the assessment of fragment projection 
distances and of damage to process equipment following fragment impact [Baker et al., 1983; 
Baum, 1984; Gubinelli et al., 2004]. In all these approaches, the fragment projection distances 
are dependent on the initial explosion energy. In many scenarios involving the burst of 
pressurized vessel, the projection distances may be higher than 500 m. This is in accordance 
with the experience from past accidents, in which fragment projection up to 800 m was 
reported [Holden & Reeves, 1985; Westin, 1971]. Therefore, in the framework of the 
identification of actions towards inherent safety with respect to escalation events caused by 
fragment projection, the limitation of effects guideword has a limited utility.  
As discussed above, no safety distance of practical use in lay-out design may be identified for 
fragment projection on a deterministic basis. Actions towards inherent safety should be 
oriented to the elimination of the escalation vector or to the reduction of its intensity. The 
substitution, intensification and moderation guidewords may lead to the identification of the 
more appropriate actions. Among these are: the introduction of vessel having lower volumes 
and the use of lower operating pressures, that contribute to the reduction of the available 
explosion energy; the substitution of vessel technology (e.g. the shift from fixed roof to 
floating roof tanks), that may reduce the possibility of confined explosions leading to 
fragment projection). However, in most applications, the above listed actions towards inherent 
safety are effective in the reduction of the escalation distance, but often not sufficient for the 
complete elimination of the possibility of fragment projection. Thus, conventional actions 
based on passive protection either of the primary vessel (venting devices, thermal insulation) 
or of the critical targets (blast walls, mounding, etc.) should be also applied to prevent the 
escalation due to the projection of fragments. 
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A2.2.4 – Assessment of Domino Hazard Scores 
 
The assessment of Domino Hazard Scores (DHSi,k,h) of each single primary accidental 
scenario is required in the calculation of Domino Hazard Index (DHI, §2.4.2.3). DHSi,k,h is a 
ranking that represents the score given to the hazard in terms of an escalation from unit ‘i’ to 
unit ‘k’ by event ‘h’. The maximum value for DHS is 10, meaning that escalation is highly 
probable; the minimum value, 0, represents the inherently ‘safest’ level for domino escalation 
(i.e. elimination of the escalation hazard). The value of DHSi,k,h for each possible event is 
derived by comparison of the physical effect distances associated with that particular event to 
the actual distance between units on the layout plan. 
 
The rules for assigning values for Domino Hazard Scores (DHSi,k,h) of each single primary 
accidental scenario are presented in the following according to the classification of escalation 
vectors given in Figure 2.4.1 and used in the previous discussion of escalation scenarios. 
Table 2.4.6 reports a summary of these scoring rules. 
 
A2.2.4.1 - Flame Impingement/Heat Radiation 
 
Fire could cause escalation due to equipment overheating (by direct flame impingement or by 
far-field heat radiation effects from the flame surface), or due to direct ignition of flammable 
vapors. Different fire scenarios therefore need to be analyzed in detail, as each scenario would 
have different flame properties and heat loads – thus influencing the escalation mechanism. 
 
A2.2.4.1.1  - Short duration scenarios 
 
In short duration scenarios (i.e. flash fire and the thermal effects associated with vapor cloud 
explosions, VCEs), escalation is likely to occur only by direct ignition of flammable vapors 
([Cozzani et al., 2006, 2007] and references cited therein). Thus, only secondary units likely 
to release vapors (e.g. a floating-roof tank) are considered in the analysis. Affected secondary 
units within a distance (Di,k) that can possibly be reached by the flame, receive a score of 
DHSi,k,h = 10; otherwise DHSi,k,h = 0. In usual industrial practice, passive measures are not 
considered to be effective in limiting this mode of escalation. 
 
Fireballs involve high thermal radiation levels in the area occupied by the flames, even if the 
duration of the event is short. Previous work concerning escalation likelihood has shown that 
escalation is reasonably possible only for impinged atmospheric vessels, while pressurized 
vessels are generally unaffected. Moreover, escalation phenomena are unlikely to occur for 
radiation from a distant source without impingement ([Cozzani et al., 2005, 2006, 2007] and 
references cited therein). The fireball radius (df) is the key dimension for evaluation of 
escalation possibility. Thus, the presence of an atmospheric unit within the fireball area (Di,k < 
df) means a score of DHSi,k,h = 10; otherwise DHSi,k,h = 0. 
 
Fire insulation is a passive measure that is effective in protecting vessels from fireball effects. 
It should be noted, however, that in general practice fire insulation protects only the lower 10 
m of a vessel [Lees, 1996], and fireballs can reach significant heights because of the lift 
forces involved. Similar considerations apply when protection is provided by fire resistant 
walls. Nevertheless, if the insulation is complete, some degree of protection is afforded to 
atmospheric vessels and the appropriate value is DHSi,k,h = 5. 
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A2.2.4.1.2  - Pool fires and jet fires 
 
Escalation scenarios triggered by pool fires or jet fires involve both flame impingement and 
continuous heat radiation from a distant source. Impinged unprotected vessels are reported to 
undergo failure in a relatively short time [Cozzani et al., 2005, 2006], and the distances 
occupied by the flame envelope (df) encompass an area where escalation is highly possible 
(DHSi,k,h = 10). The flame dimension (df) can be roughly considered equivalent to the pool 
radius for a non-tilted pool fire. For jet fires, the worst case of horizontal-axis release directed 
toward the secondary equipment is considered. Thus, the distance enveloped by flames (df) is 
the sum of the characteristic dimension of the primary unit on the layout plan (i.e. the distance 
of the leaking boundary from the geometric centre) and the maximum flame length. Diagrams 
are available for a quick estimation of flame length (§A2.2.2). 
 
Concerning the effects of heat radiation, a correlation can be identified between the distance 
from the flame boundary and the expected time to failure of exposed units [Cozzani et al., 
2006]. Elaboration of these data results in the DHS values reported in Figures A2.2.9 and 
A2.2.10. The distance from the flame envelope, or radiation-impacted distance (dr), can be 
calculated as: 
dr = Di,k - df - ds         (A2.2.1) 
where ds is the characteristic dimension of the secondary unit on the layout plan (i.e. the 
distance of the failing unit boundary from the secondary unit geometric centre). DHSi,k,h can 
be evaluated by entering dr from Equation (A2.2.1) in the graphs on Figures A2.2.9 and 
A2.2.10, according to the scenario and the secondary unit characteristics. 
 
Fire insulation is a passive measure that is suitable for protecting equipment from these types 
of escalation events. In the case of flame impingement, however, even small defects in 
insulation continuity nullify the protective behavior [Birk et al., 2006; VanderSteen & Birk, 
2003]. Defects can easily originate from damage or ripping, but also from incorrect operations 
(e.g. removal for inspection and missed replacement). Thus, even for protected targets, no 
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Figure A2.2.9: DHS as a function of the distance from the flame envelope for pool fire 
scenarios. Solid line: unprotected vessels; dashed line: fire-insulated vessels; atmospheric 
equipment (a); pressurized equipment (b). 
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Figure A2.2.10: DHS as a function of the distance from the flame envelope for jet fire 
scenarios. Solid line: unprotected vessels; dashed line: fire-insulated vessels; atmospheric 
equipment (a); pressurized equipment (b). 
 
 
 reduction of DHS is accounted for in the case of fire impingement (i.e. DHSi,k,h = 10). On the 
other hand, in the zone of radiation from a distant source, fire insulation is considered to 
effectively decrease the risk of escalation by heat load and the values of DHS can be derived 
from Figures A2.2.9 and A2.2.10. 
 
Fire resistant walls provide effective protection from both flame impingement and radiation, 
and the DHS value is reduced to DHSi,k,h = 1 for equipment in the protected area. The hazard 
is not completely eliminated because passive devices have an intrinsic probability of failure 
on demand [AIChE, 2001]. Mounded equipment is considered in the present analysis to have 
a protection value equivalent to fire resistant walls. 
For pool fires, a bund limits the area subjected to flame engulfment. However, as with any 
passive protection measure, bunds are not fully reliable and a one-point increase of DHS (a 
penalty of +1 to the DHS value in the radiation zone) is assigned if units can be reached by 
flames in the event of bund failure. 
 
 
A2.2.4.2 - Blast Waves 
 
Blast wave consequences are affected by numerous parameters including the explosion 
characteristics, blast wave characteristics and reflection phenomena. When far-field 
interaction between the explosion source and the target equipment is of concern, or when low 
pressures are considered (static peak overpressure less than 50 kPa), the static peak 
overpressure can be effectively used to assess the damage caused by the overpressure wave. 
Hence, it is possible to identify overpressure threshold values for different levels of damage 
for typical classes of equipment [Cozzani et al., 2006; Salzano & Cozzani 2006]. DHS scores 
have been defined using  these thresholds for different magnitudes of loss-of-containment in 
target vessels, and are reported in Figure A2.2.11. Using a suitable blast wave model (e.g. 
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Multi-energy or Baker-Strehlow), the static peak overpressure can be related to the distance 
(db) from the explosion source once the energy released by the explosion is estimated. The 
distance (db) is defined as: 
db = Di,k - de - ds         (A2.2.2) 
where de is the distance of the explosion source from the centre of the primary unit, ds is the 
characteristic dimension of the secondary unit (as previously defined), and Di,k is the relative 
distance between the two units. The distance of the explosion from the primary unit (de) can 
be considered as the geometric position on the layout plan of a failing boundary (e.g. a wall) 
or a vent in the case of confined explosions, physical explosions and BLEVEs.  In the case of 
VCEs, since weather conditions play a direct role in cloud dispersion, conservative 
assumptions may be adopted; e.g. considering a hemispheric stoichiometric cloud centered on 
the unit and assuming the flammable cloud radius to be the explosion source distance (de). 
 
Passive measures for limitation of escalation due to overpressure waves mainly consist of 
barricades such as blast walls or cubicles. These passive devices, within the extent of their 
feasibility and reliability [AIChE, 2001], are considered effective in limiting overpressures in 
the desired propagation direction (i.e. DHSi,k,h = 1 in the protected zone). 
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Figure A2.2.11: DHS as a function of the static peak overpressure for blast wave 
scenarios for different classes of equipment (T: handling toxic material; F: handling 
flammable material). 
 
 
A2.2.4.3 - Fragment Projection 
 
The projection of fragments is considered an important cause of domino effects in industrial 
accidents [CCPS, 2000; Gubinelli et al., 2004; Khan & Abbasi, 1998; Lees, 1996; Pula et al., 
2007]. Detailed analysis of the cinematic records of missile projection has enabled the 
identification of probabilities of hitting targets of a given size as a function of distance 
[Cozzani et al., 2007; Gubinelli et al., 2004]. From these data, values for DHS as a function 
of distance and vessel size were derived and are reported in Figure A2.2.12. These cited 
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studies on missile projection, as well as reports from industrial accidents [Holden & Reeves, 
1985; Westin, 1971], show that fragments are capable of generating secondary accidents at 
large distances from the primary source. Thus, no practical action in layout design (e.g. 
segregation) can result in a complete negation of escalation possibility. This is recognized in 
the DHI assessment by a lower limit of unity for the DHS score (see Figure A2.2.12). 
 
The same passive protection measures used for limiting blast wave effects (e.g. blast walls) 
can also be designed to be effective in blocking missiles. Thus, in the protected area, the 
appropriate value is DHSi,k,h = 1. 
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Figure A2.2.12: DHS as a function of the secondary unit distance for fragment 
projection; curves for different geometrical size of target unit are presented (very large storage 
vessel (a), large storage vessel (b), medium storage vessel (c), process vessel or small storage 
vessel (d)). 
 
 
 
A2.2.4.4 - Toxic Release 
 
In the present study, only primary events that result in physical effects likely to cause direct 
escalation were considered. Toxic releases may exert an escalation influence because of 
indirect effects on emergency procedures and crisis management [Khan & Abbasi, 1998]. 
Such considerations are, however, beyond the scope of the present analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 3: Experimental Results 
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3.0 Introduction 
 
Handling and processing of chemical substances may directly cause important hazards due to 
the substance characteristics (toxicity, flammability, stability, etc.). However, the formation of 
dangerous compounds by unwanted or unforeseen reactions in the deviation of a process from 
the normal operating conditions is reported to be an important cause of severe accidents 
[Cozzani & Zanelli, 1997b; Cozzani et al., 1997, 1998], as in the case of the Seveso accident 
(1976). These events are usually associated to loss of containment, thus resulting in a toxic 
release. 
The dangerous substances “which it is believed may be generated during the loss of control of 
an industrial chemical process” must be considered by law in the analysis of industrial 
installations subject to the Directive (96/82/EC), actually named after Seveso. However the 
section of Material Safety Data Sheets dedicated to this information usually reports only scant 
and vague data. This is probably a consequence of the complexity of the problem. The 
chemical effects of “out of control” conditions are difficult to foresee, since a wide number of 
chemical substances and of chemical systems are involved in industrial operations. 
 
The intuitive analysis of historic databases reporting past accidents (e.g. [Cozzani et al., 1997; 
Cozzani & Zanelli, 1997b]) is limited to long-experience applications involving well-known 
substances and can not be used proactively. 
A few approaches were proposed for the prediction of hazardous substances that may be 
formed in the loss of control of a chemical were proposed in the literature, based on lumping 
schemes [Cozzani & Zanelli, 1997, 1999b; Cozzani et al., 1997] and on stochastic approaches 
[Nomen et al., 2003; Gigante et al., 2004]. 
However the presently more reliable routes for the analysis of the hazardous substances that 
may be formed in a chemical system of interest require experimental surveys. These kind of 
studies are required also for the validation and the improvement of predictive approaches. 
Therefore, adequate and specific reference experimental techniques are needed to define the 
more likely products formed during an accident, if no specific data are available in the 
literature. Moreover, these techniques should also allow an estimation of the expected 
quantities of substances that may be formed in “out of control” conditions. 
 
The development of laboratory-scale experimental techniques to allow the identification of 
degradation and/or combustion products called for a relevant technological and scientific 
effort since the ‘70s. Several experimental techniques are now available to simulate the 
operating conditions during the loss of control of a chemical system, and several 
methodologies were proposed to identify the decomposition products formed. The 
applications in the field of process safety are summarized and revised in several 
comprehensive publications [CCPS, 1995; Molag et al., 1992]. 
The results obtained in the application of the proposed techniques to chemical systems of 
industrial interest pointed out that operating conditions such as pressure and heating rate may 
become critical factors if a quantitative characterization of products formed is required. Thus, 
beside the development of calorimetric devices, attention is required on the development of 
specific experimental techniques for the sampling, the identification and the production of 
quantitative data on products formed in the simulation of the accidental scenarios [Gigante et 
al., 2004; Marsanich et al., 2004].  
 
The current section of the thesis describes some results of experimental tests on the behaviour 
of materials in “loss of control conditions”. The goal of the presented tests is to illustrate a 
typical application of experimental techniques in the collection of data for sustainability and 
inherent safety assessment. In fact, the assessment methods proposed in Sections 1 and 2 
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require data on the thermal stability of substances (§2.3) and on the formation of undesired 
products in deviations from the normal process conditions (§2.2). 
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3.1 – Experimental Techniques and Procedures 
 
3.1.0 – Overview 
 
This paragraph describes the techniques used and the procedures followed in the experimental 
activity. This activity has been aimed at the demonstration of the collection of the information 
about the behaviour of materials in a chemical system undergoing “out of control” conditions. 
This information is necessary for the application of the assessment procedures described in 
Sections 1 and 2. In particular data on the thermal stability (useful for process inherent safety 
assessment §2.3) and on decomposition products (useful for material inherent safety 
assessment §2.2) are discussed here. 
 
In the following, the experimental protocols proposed for the identification of products 
formed in the loss of control of chemical systems are discussed (§3.1.1). Then the 
experimental configurations and devices used in the experiments are introduced (§3.1.2). 
 
 
3.1.1 – Experimental Protocols 
 
The definition of specific protocols is required because of the poor standardization of the 
procedures, as previously discussed. A set of reference experimental techniques is defined to 
approach the problem of hazardous substances formed in "out of control" conditions. 
Calorimetric techniques, as thermogravimetry (TG), differential scanning calorimetry (DSC), 
differential thermal analysis, and adiabatic calorimetry were explored for the simulation of 
operating conditions taking place during accidental scenarios. Complementary and integrated 
experimental techniques were used for the achievement of experimental data on the products 
formed in the loss of control of a chemical system. The potential application of specific 
couplings between techniques for the simulation of operating conditions taking place during 
industrial accidents and analytical methodologies for the identification and the analysis of the 
products of interest are explored. The main analytic techniques considered are Fourier 
transform infrared spectrometry (FTIR), gas chromatography (GC) and mass spectrometry  
(MS). 
The experimental protocols proposed were applied and validated on several chemical systems 
of industrial interest [Andreozzi et al, 1997; Barontini et al., 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2008; 
Lunghi et al, 2002; Marsanich et al., 2004]. 
Table 3.1.1 summarizes the main features of the experimental protocols defined in the present 
study.  
 
 
3.1.1.1 – Thermogravimetry-Differential Scanning Calorimetry (TG-DSC) and Fourier 
Transform Infrared spectrometry (FTIR) 
 
A first protocol based on the use of thermal analysis coupled with Fourier Transform infrared 
analysis of evolved gases (TG-DSC-FTIR technique) was defined for the analysis of gaseous 
products formed in the simulation of thermal degradation or combustion scenarios. 
Thermal analysis coupled with Fourier Transform infrared analysis of evolved gases may be 
advantageously used for the characterization of gaseous products formed in thermal 
degradation processes, i.e. combustion or pyrolysis [Bhandare et al., 1997; Materazzi & 
Curini, 2001; Pitkanen et al., 1999; Wilkie & Mittleman, 1993; Zanier, 1999]. Several 
coupling devices are commercially available. Low-volume gas cells have been specifically 
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 TG-DSC-FTIR DTA Adiabatic calorimeter 
Scenario simulation 
Thermal 
degradation, 
combustion (fire) 
Thermal 
degradation Runaway 
Operating mode Isotherm, constant heating rate 
Isotherm, constant 
heating rate 
“heat-wait-
search”, “open 
cell”, “closed cell” 
Max. heating rate 100°C/min 2°C/min - 
Temperature range 25-1600°C 25-400°C 25-400°C 
Pressure range 1 bar 0-200 bar 0-140 bar 
Sample size 1-50 mg 0.5-5g 0,5-50 g 
Gas 
phase  
Quail/quantitative 
data from on-line 
FTIR 
Quail/quantitative 
data from off-line 
FTIR 
Quail/quantitative 
data from off-line 
FTIR Data on products 
formed high MW 
products Non suitable 
Quail/quantitative 
data from off-line 
GC analysis 
Quail/quantitative 
data from off-line 
GC analysis 
 
Table 3.1.1: Main features of the experimental protocols developed for the identification of 
products formed in the loss of control of chemical systems 
 
 
developed for these applications. The main use of TG-DSC-FTIR data is the qualitative 
identification of decomposition or reaction products formed during the TG run [Bhandare et 
al., 1997; Cai & Shen, 1999; Fisher & Dunn, 1999; Pitkanen et al., 1999]. However, several 
authors proposed the use of the TG-DSC-FTIR system for quantitative determinations of the 
compounds evolved in the TG experiments [Bassilakis et al., 2001; Charpenay et al., 1996; 
Liau et al., 1997; Seebauer et al., 1997]. This requires the use of a calibration procedure to 
obtain quantitative data from FTIR on-line gas-phase measurements. 
 
Experimental protocols based on these techniques start from the definition of the accidental 
scenario to be reproduced, which implies the definition of temperature range, temperature-
time profile and reaction environment of experimental run, the latter one being controlled by 
the use of a specific purge gas. Preliminary thermogravimetric (TG) and/or differential 
scanning calorimetry (DSC) runs may be performed on the material to be tested in order to 
obtain indicative values on sample decomposition temperatures and on the extent of volatile 
loss. On the basis of the preliminary information obtained, it is possible to define specific 
conditions to carry out the TG-DSC-FTIR experimental runs. The analysis of the 
experimental data should yield specific results on sample thermal stability and decomposition 
kinetics (TG data), thermal effects related to the decomposition process (DSC data), and 
evolved gas composition (FTIR data). FTIR spectra analysis affords a qualitative 
identification of gaseous products evolved, and the use of calibration data [Marsanich et al., 
2002] allows the achievement of quantitative results. The application of FTIR spectra 
deconvolution methods may further improve the FTIR results [Bassilakis et al., 2001]. Data 
are commonly obtained at atmospheric pressure, though high pressure devices have been 
specifically developed [Seebauer et al., 1997]. 
The limited amounts of sample needed for experiments (of the order of milligrams), which 
turns out in a reduction in costs, safety and disposal problems, joined to the relatively short 
times required by the procedure, are very attractive features of the protocol. However, the 
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concurrent formation of a wide number of volatile compounds may complicate the 
interpretation of FTIR data. On the other hand, it should be reminded that homodinuclear 
molecules (e.g. hydrogen and chlorine) are transparent to infrared radiation, thus they cannot 
be detected. Moreover, it should be recalled that TG devices are mainly oriented to the study 
of primary decomposition reactions, and not of gas-phase secondary reactions processes. A 
further limitation of the technique is that the data are commonly obtained at atmospheric 
pressure, and, though high pressure devices have been specifically developed, it is not 
possible to simulate a specific time-pressure profile. 
 
A spin-off of the current protocol is the coupling of DSC with off-line Gas Chromatography 
(GC). In fact, the study of the apparent kinetic of a decomposition reaction requires 
information on the conversion of the initial substance over time and temperature. These can 
be combined with calorimetric data in order to identify the thermal parameters of the reaction 
(i.e. the heat of reaction as a function of a key compound). For this purpose, an experimental 
technique was specifically developed. It is based on the interruption of DSC tests by rapid 
 
 
Calorimetric (DSC) 
data
Sample 
decomposition
FTIR on-line 
quantitative analysis 
of gaseous products
Weight loss and 
weight loss rate data
Sample heat-up to 
decomposition 
temperature
Specific 
temperature-time 
profile
Calibration 
data
Method: Thermogravimetry/Differential Scanning Calorimetry 
coupled to FTIR Spectrometry
Sample quantity : 1-50 mg
Operating mode : isothermal, constant heating rate
Scenario simulation : pyrolysis, combustion (fire)
 
 
Figure 3.1.1: Main features of the TG-DSC-FTIR experimental protocol. 
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quenching of the samples. The partially-converted samples are then recovered and a solution 
is prepared with a fixed amount of solvent. This solution is then analysed by gas-
chromatography. 
The DSC allows monitoring the thermal behaviour of the sample: the thermal profile of the 
reaction and the heating rate will be used to characterize the temperature and the heat of 
reaction since test interruption. The chromatographic test on the sample, will provide the 
corresponding information on the quantity of unconverted initial substance and, thus, on the 
conversion. This requires, of course, a calibration by solutions of known concentration in the 
initial substance. 
The use of a DSC for conversion tests, compared to other similar laboratory tests (e.g. 
[Andreozzi et al. 1999]), allows the use of minimum quantities samples in the tests (in the 
order of milligrams), still maintaining a precise control of the reaction behaviour. This turns 
out in a reduction in costs, safety and disposal problems, that, joined to the relatively small 
times required by the procedure, are very attractive features. However limits due to transport 
phenomena may affect the results, in particular at high conversions. 
 
 
Sample quantity : 0.5-5 g
Operating mode : heat-wait-search, closed cell, open cell
Scenario simulation : runaway
Chromatographic      
off-line quantitative 
analysis of                     
liquid products
Sample 
decomposition
FTIR off-line 
quantitative analysis 
of gaseous products
Sample heat-up to 
decomposition 
temperature
Specific 
temperature-time 
profile
Calibration 
data
Calibration 
data
Sample temperature 
and pressure rise 
data
Method: Differential Thermal Analysis
 
 
Figure 3.1.2: Main features of the TGA experimental protocol. 
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3.1.1.2 – Differential Thermal Analysis (DTA) 
 
Thermal analysis of materials by DSC and TG is limited to atmospheric pressure and small 
samples. A scanning differential thermal analysis (DTA) in closed vessel, with continuous 
pressure recording is proposed as a test method to integrate or confirm DSC data [Andreozzi 
et al., 1997; Syvret, 1999]. This allows to monitor the pressure profile and its influence on the 
decomposition, since both rates of pressure generation and temperature increase are recorded 
as a function of temperature during the thermal decomposition event. The analysis of data 
yields the identification of the decomposition thermal steps, of the onset temperatures and of 
the decomposition pressure profile. If a reference calibration is available, the heat flux can be 
measured in the form of temperature difference between sample and inert reference. 
The decomposition products formed can be sampled and weighted at the end of the test. In 
this case the analysis is suitable for both the gaseous and the high molar weight phases. Off-
line FTIR and GC-MS techniques are used for the qualitative and quantitative identification of 
these phases. 
 
 
Sample quantity : 0.5-50 g
Operating mode : heat-wait-search, closed cell, open cell
Scenario simulation : runaway
Chromatographic      
off-line quantitative 
analysis of                     
liquid products
Sample 
decomposition
FTIR off-line 
quantitative analysis 
of gaseous products
Sample heat-up to 
decomposition 
temperature
Specific 
temperature-time 
profile
Calibration 
data
Calibration 
data
Maximum 
temperature and 
pressure rise data
Method: Adiabatic Calorimetry
 
 
Figure 3.1.3: Main features of the Adiabatic Calorimetry experimental protocol. 
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3.1.1.3 – Adiabatic Calorimetry 
 
Adiabatic calorimetry is a standard technique used for the simulation of runaway scenarios 
[Benuzzi & Zaldivar, 1991; Cardillo, 1998]. Low phi-factor calorimeters are among the 
devices currently used to assess the thermal stability and the expected severity of exothermic 
runaway reactions. This allows an efficient simulation of runaway conditions in full-scale 
chemical reactors. Thus, an experimental protocol was defined for the analysis of gaseous and 
high molecular weight products formed during the simulation of runaway scenarios by 
adiabatic calorimetry. 
Preliminary data are needed with respect to the onset reaction temperatures and the expected 
adiabatic temperature rises, and may be obtained by DSC runs (§3.1.1.1). Conventional data 
obtained by adiabatic calorimetry in the simulation of a runaway scenario are the maximum 
temperature and pressure rise, the maximum temperature and pressure rise rate, the reaction 
heat and the apparent reaction kinetics. The use of a specifically developed sampling strategy 
joined to FTIR calibration data allows for a qualitative and quantitative determination of 
gaseous products generated in the experimental run by off-line FTIR analysis [Marsanich et 
al., 2004]. Off-line chromatographic analysis of the high molecular weight products which are 
recovered from the test cell at the end of experimental run affords a qualitative and 
quantitative characterization of this product fraction. A significant highlight of the technique 
is the efficient simulation of the expected operating conditions, as temperature and pressure, 
present during the runaway of an industrial chemical reactor. 
 
 
 
3.1.2 - Experimental configurations and devices 
 
Some different scale experimental devices were used to study an exothermic thermal 
decomposition process, according to the defined protocols (§3.1.1): thermogravimetry (TG), 
RADEX oven and low phi-factor adiabatic calorimetry. The products formed in the 
experimental runs were identified and quantified by analytical techniques as FTIR 
spectrometry and Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry (GC/MS). Quantitative analysis 
of decomposition products required the development of calibration methods and of specific 
couplings between the analytical devices and the facilities used to simulate “out of control” 
conditions. 
 
3.1.2.1 – Thermogravimetry-Differential Scanning Calorimetry (TG-DSC) and Fourier 
Transform Infrared spectrometry (FTIR) 
 
Simultaneous data on the thermal degradation behaviour and on the products formed in the 
thermal degradation of chemical systems of interest were obtained using a Netzsch STA 
409/C thermoanalyzer coupled to a Bruker Equinox 55 spectrometer. The FTIR spectrometer 
was linked to the thermal analyzer using a transfer line with a 2mm internal diameter teflon 
tube, heated at a constant temperature of 230°C to limit the condensation of volatile 
decomposition products. FTIR measurements were carried out with a MCT detector in a 
specifically developed low volume gas cell (8.7ml) with a 123mm pathlength, heated at a 
constant temperature of 250°C. These temperatures were chosen in order to limit the 
condensation of volatile decomposition products and to avoid the further degradation of 
volatile compounds in the transfer line. 
 
Constant heating rates between 1 and 50°C/min were used in experimental runs. Tests were 
carried out using a purge gas flow (60ml/min at 25°C) of pure nitrogen or air. A residence 
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time of 30s in the transfer line could be evaluated for the evolved gases. This value was 
assumed as the time delay correction to be used for the comparison of TG and IR results. 
Typical sample weights of 2 to 50 mg were employed.  Experimental runs were performed 
using open or closed low-pressure aluminium crucibles, open alumina crucibles or open 
platinum crucibles. Closed crucibles were used to limit evaporation phenomena at low 
temperatures. In these runs, the crucible lid opened due to the internal pressure at the 
beginning of the decomposition process. 
 
Evolved products were identified by the analysis of recorded FTIR spectra. During TG-FTIR 
runs, spectra were collected at 4cm-1 resolution, co-adding 16 scans per spectrum. This 
resulted in a temporal resolution of 9.5s, more than sufficient to follow the gas evolution rates 
characteristic of TG runs at the heating rates used in the present study. A residence time of 
30s in the transfer line could be evaluated for the evolved gases. This value was assumed as 
the time delay correction to be used for the comparison of TG and IR results. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1.4: Configurations of the transfer line used in TG-DSC-FTIR experiments. 
 
The quantitative use of FTIR analysis requires a calibration. A few techniques were actually 
applicable for the setups of interest (concentration-based calibration, gas-pulse calibration, 
vaporization-based calibration). The equivalence of the various approaches and the typical 
measurement error were discussed and demonstrated by Marsanich et al., [2002]. In the 
present study, gas-pulse calibration, vaporization-based calibration were used. 
 
a) Gas-pulse Calibration 
 
This is a pulse calibration technique [Lopez-Anreus et al., 1998; Maciejewsky et al., 1997; 
Perez-Ponce et al., 1998a,b,c]. In pulse methods a known quantity of the gaseous compound 
of interest is sent to the IR measurement cell using the gas injection device and the system 
configuration shown in Figure 3.1.5-(a). The gas injection system used is directly derived 
from that used in gas chromatography to supply known volumes of gas samples [Skoog & 
Leary, 1992]. It consists in a rotary sample valve allowing a carrier gas to purge a known-
volume loop, previously filled with a calibration gas of known composition. Thus the system 
allows a known quantity of gas to be carried to the measurement cell by the carrier gas flow. 
Volumes of available loops were: 1.15, 3, 12, 50, and 200ml. A 100% nitrogen carrier gas 
flowrate of 60ml/min (25°C) was used. 
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Clearly enough, this method is limited to substances that are in gas or vapour state at ambient 
temperature. It is not applicable in present form to liquids. 
 
b) Vaporization-based Calibration 
 
This is a pulse calibration technique, thus similar to the previous one, but complementary 
since it is suitable for liquids or liquid solutions (including water solution of soluble gases, 
like HCl). 
TG-FTIR measurements is performed vaporizing water solutions of the compound of interest 
in the TG analyzer (see Figure 3.1.5-(c)). At the beginning of each calibration run, a quantity 
of solution in the range of 15-45µl is inserted in an alumina crucible using a chromatographic 
syringe. A pierced lid is positioned on the crucible, to limit evaporation caused by gas-phase 
diffusion at the beginning of the TG run. The initial weight of the sample and the composition 
of the solution allow the calculation of the quantity of the compound of interest vaporized in 
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Figure 3.1.5: Configurations of the TG-DSC-FTIR coupling used for: (a) concentration-
based calibration, (b) gas-pulse calibration and (c) vaporization-based 
calibration. 
(a) 
(b) 
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 the TG run. The use of solutions of different concentration and of samples of different weight 
allows the vaporization of different quantities of the compound of interest, that are carried to 
the IR measurement cell by the carrier gas flow. A constant heating rate of 5°C/min from 
25°C to 200°C is generally used for experimental runs. The carrier gas is 100% nitrogen, and 
a gas flowrate of 60ml/min is used. 
 
3.1.2.2 – DSC-GC conversion tests 
 
In the DSC-GC coupled conversion tests a Mettler DSC-25 calorimeter was used. Constant 
heating rates between 1 and 50°C/min were used in experimental runs. Tests were carried out 
using a purge gas flow (300 ml/min at 25°C) of pure nitrogen. Typical sample weights of 2 to 
10 mg were employed.  Experimental runs were performed using closed low-pressure 
aluminium crucibles, in order to limit sample evaporation. The use of small samples usually 
prevented crucible opening by pressure development. 
 
After quenching the crucibles were opened and the partially-converted samples are recovered 
preparing a solution with a fixed amount of solvent. The solution was then analysed by the 
ThermoQuest Trace GC 2000 gas chromatograph, as described in §3.1.2.5. 
 
3.1.2.3 – Differential Thermal Analysis (RADEX) 
 
A PC-Combilab (by Systag) equipped with a RADEX-Solo oven [Syvret, 1999] is used for 
scanning runs. In all the runs, the RADEX oven is equipped with a closed high pressure (up to 
100 bar) stainless steel (316 SS) reactor (V = 0.004 dm3). Basically, the Radex is similar to a 
system described in ASTM E476-87; “Thermal Instability of Confined Condensed Phase 
systems (Confinement Test)”, but has a greater ease of use and flexibility in test parameters. 
The Radex test cell is connected to a transducer to measure the internal pressure, thus 
providing the gas generation data which is not available from DSC. Information on gas 
generation during decomposition is crucial in assessing the overall hazard associated with a 
given material. Radex uses larger sample sizes than DSC (0.1 to 5g). 
 
(a)   (b)  
 
Figure 3.1.6: RADEX-Solo oven by Systag. (a) oven case; (b)  closed high pressure stainless 
steel reactor. 
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In scanning mode, Radex is typically operated at a constant heating rate (0.5 to 2°C/min), and 
it can measure heat flux, in the form of temperature difference between sample and inert 
reference. Since Radex has a single measurement thermocouple, the reference data must 
actually be obtained in a separate run. The subtraction of this “baseline” is done via software. 
However, if thermal data are not of interest, the analysis of data from a single run with no 
calibration on the reference, allow identifying the behaviour of the decomposition (i.e. single 
or multiple steps), the onset temperatures of the different decomposition steps and the 
decomposition pressure profile. 
 
The material can be scanned over the whole temperature range encompassed by the device 
(25-400°C) or the scanning can be stopped at any temperature of interest by reactor extraction 
from the oven and rapid quenching. At the end of the test, or after the cool down of the 
system, gaseous compounds can be sampled for off-line FTIR analysis and condensable 
fraction may be recovered from the reactor for chromatographic analysis (§3.1.2.4). 
 
3.1.2.4 – Adiabatic Calorimetry (PHI –TECH II) 
 
A Phi-Tec II adiabatic calorimeter developed by Hazard Evaluation Laboratory was used to 
obtain data on products formed during adiabatic decomposition runs. Samples within the 
range of 0.5-50g can be used in experimental runs. Tests were performed in stainless steel 
cells magnetically agitated, with a thermal mass of 15.23J/K. Runs were performed in a heat-
wait-search mode. A threshold of 0.02°C/min was arbitrarily chosen as the start of the 
exothermic activity. 
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Figure 3.1.7: Scheme of the Phi-Tec II gaseous products sampling system. 
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In order to allow the sampling and the analysis of the gaseous products formed during the 
experimental runs, a specifically developed sampling line was connected to the Phi-Tec 
device. Figure 3.1.7 shows a scheme of the equipment assembly. The sampling line was 
equipped with a manual pressure reduction valve and a removable cell for FTIR gas analysis. 
This system allows gas-phase sampling both during or at the end of the exothermic 
decomposition. 
 
Quantitative data on gaseous decomposition products could be obtained using a specifically 
developed sampling strategy. At the end of the exothermic decomposition, the test cell was 
cooled to ambient temperature, in order to limit the solvent concentration in the vapour phase. 
The residual pressure, due to the presence of gaseous decomposition products, was used to 
force the gas phase through the sampling line. The FTIR analysis of the gas inside the 
sampling cell was performed by a Bruker Equinox 55 spectrometer. Calibration curves, may 
be obtained using known concentration gas mixtures of the compounds of interest [Marsanich 
et al., 2002], allowed the determination of the molar concentration in the gas cell of each 
gaseous species identified. The total number of moles discharged during each sampling 
interval could be roughly estimated from the pressure decrease in the test cell by ideal gases 
volumetric correlation: 
TR
V)P(PN fi1-ii ⋅⋅−=         (3.1.1) 
where ni are the total moles discharged from the test cell during the i-th sampling, Pi-1 and Pi 
are the pressure of the Phi-Tec test cell respectively at the beginning and at the end of the i-th 
sampling, Vf is the free volume of the test cell and T the cell temperature during the sampling. 
Thus, an approximate estimation of the total number of moles of the compound of interest 
discharged from the test cell during the sampling interval could be performed, assuming a 
plug-flow in the sampling line: 
s
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⎛ += − ijij CC        (3.1.2) 
where mj,i are the total moles of compound j discharged during the i-th sampling, Cj,i-1 and Cj,i 
are the concentrations of compound j measured by FTIR analysis respectively at the 
beginning and at the end of the i-th sampling, Ts and Ps are respectively the temperature and 
the pressure of the sampling cell. Obviously this method yields only a rough estimate of the 
quantities of products formed in the thermal decomposition. However, validation runs 
performed using gaseous mixtures of known composition showed that a mean relative error of 
less than 5% should be expected, in spite of the assumptions performed in the analysis 
[Calvani, 2002]. 
 
Decomposition products present in the residue inside the cell at the end of experimental runs 
were quantified by the differential weight of the cell before and after the test. The soluble part 
was recovered by washing with acetone. The solution is suitable for qualitative and 
quantitative identification by a chromatographic analysis, as described in §3.1.2.5. 
 
In the current study, a non conventional use of the PHI-Tech device was explored. This was 
suggested by some experimental results emerged in the study activity (§3.5). In this sub-
protocol, small sample quantities (lower side of the range, 0.5-0.7 g) are tested in small stirred 
cells (15.9 J/K), so to deliberately obtain high pi-factors (10-15). This will limit the final 
temperature of the system after decomposition. Intermediate decomposition products, that will 
further convert to other substances at higher temperatures, can thus be sampled. These 
compounds can be measured and analysed by the same procedure described above for regular 
runs. The pressure increase rate and temperature increase rate are, as well, recorded during the 
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test. However it should be considered that both are affected by larger errors than in usual tests 
due to the smaller sample size and the larger phi-factors.  
 
 
3.1.2.5  – Gas Chromatography (GC) and Mass Spectrometry (MS) 
 
The analysis of high molecular weight decomposition products collected from calorimetric 
tests (e.g. Adiabatic Calorimetry (§3.1.2.4), Differential Thermal Analysis (§3.1.2.3)) was 
performed with chromatographic techniques. 
 
A Fisons MD 800 quadrupole mass spectrometer interfaced to a Fisons GC 8060 gas 
chromatograph was used for gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) analysis. A 
Mega SE30 fused silica capillary column (25m length, 0.32mm internal diameter, cross-
bonded, 0.25µm film thickness) was employed for the chromatographic separation, with 
helium as carrier gas. The column temperature programme was the following: 5min 
isothermal at 40°C, heating to 250°C (6°C/min), then 20min isothermal. Splitless injection 
with the injector at 220°C was used. 
Mass spectrometric detection was performed in full scan conditions (scan range, m/z 10-819) 
in electron impact ionization mode. 
 
Quantitative gas chromatographic analysis (GC) was carried out using a ThermoQuest Trace 
GC 2000 gas chromatograph equipped with a Flame Ionization Detector. The capillary 
column and the experimental conditions were identical to those used for GC/MS analysis, 
detector temperature was fixed at 280°C. Thus data obtained from both chromatographic 
systems are comparable. 
 
More details on GC quantitative determinations are reported elsewhere [Barontini et al., 
2004a,b]. 
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3.2 – Chemical Systems Analyzed 
 
3.2.1 – Overview 
 
This chapter presents the materials and the chemical system analysed in the experimental 
survey. 
 
 
3.2.1 – Chemical Systems 
 
The thermal decomposition and formation of decomposition product was investigated on 6 
chemical systems: 
a) 2-nitrobenzaldehyde (o-nitrobenzaldehyde) 
b) 3-nitrobenzaldehyde (m-nitrobenzaldehyde) 
c) 4-nitrobenzaldehyde (p-nitrobenzaldehyde) 
d) 2-Chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde 
e) 2-Chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde 
f) 4-Chloro-3-nitrobenzaldehyde 
 
The chemical structure of the substances analysed is quite similar, since they are two groups 
of the three isomers of the nitrobenzaldehyde and of a chorine-substituted nitrobenzaldehyde 
(Figure 3.2.1). Proprieties derived from the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) or estimated 
by predictive methods (e.g [EPA, WPd]) are reported in Table 3.2.1. 
 
These compounds are the intermediates of organic synthesis for the production of dyes and 
biologically active products (pharmaceuticals, agrochemicals, etc.). In particular, 2-
nitrobenzaldheyde is a feedstock for the synthetic production of indigo. 
 
 
Name CAS Molar mass 
Melting 
point 
Predicted
boiling 
point 
Vapour 
pressure 
Predicted 
vapour 
pressure 
at 25°C 
   (°C) (°C) (kPa) (Pa) 
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde 552-89-6 151.1 42-43 270 3.1 (at 152°C) 0.8 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde 99-61-6 151.1 55-58 270 3.1 (at 164°C) 0.60 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde 555-16-8 151.1 103-106 270 n. a. 0.19 
2-Chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde 6361-22-4 185.57 69-71 295.6 n. a. 0.12 
2-Chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde 6361-21-3 185.57 72-77 295.6 n. a. 0.11 
4-Chloro-3-nitrobenzaldehyde 16588-34-4 185.57 61-65 295.6 n. a. 0.15 
 
Table 3.2.1: Selected physical proprieties of the materials used in the experimental activity 
as reported in the Material Safety Data Sheets; the predicted values were obtained by the 
tested by EPI Suite [EPA, WPd]; n.a.:  not available. 
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Figure 3.2.1: Chemical structure of the 6 substances analysed in the experimental studies. 
(a) 2-nitrobenzaldehyde; (b) 3-nitrobenzaldehyde; (c) 4-nitrobenzaldehyde; (d) 2-Chloro-6-
nitrobenzaldehyde; (e) 2-Chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde; (f) 4-Chloro-3-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
 
 
3.2.2 – Information Available on the Chemical Systems 
 
The data on the thermal stability and decomposition product formation of the materials of 
interest are extremely scant. 
A survey of the Material Data Sheets available by different producers and suppliers is 
summarized in Table 3.2.2. As shown in the table, the information are quite scant, both on the 
stability and the product formation. Some sources report the materials as “stable” or more 
prudently “stable under normal temperatures and pressures”. The decomposition products, 
when reported, are intuitively expected from the structure of the chemicals (i.e. carbon 
dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides and,  for chlorinated isomers, hydrogen chloride). 
 
Ando and co-workers [Ando et al., 1991] report the three isomers of nitrobenzaldehyde to be 
thermally instable if heated. They provide thermal data on the decomposition, obtained by a 
differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) (Table 3.2.3). 
The data show relatively high onset temperatures (> 200°C) for all the isomers, but with the 
2-nitrobenzaldehyde decomposing at lower temperatures than the other two. The heat of 
decomposition are quite high, as well as he steepest increase rate. 
 
Cardillo [Cardillo, 1998] reports the results for self-heating curves of the isomers of 
nitrobenzaldehyde (Figure 3.2.2). 
For 2-nitrobenzaldehyde, a 2 stage decompositions, at 176°C and 194°C was identified. 
For 3-nitrobenzaldehyde also 2 stages were identified at 166 and 210°C. 
Finally 4-nitrobenzaldehyde is reported to decompose in a single stage at 226°C. 
The decomposition takes place for all the materials jointly to the generation of high quantities 
of gases and high thermal effect (above 1500 J/g). 
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Name Stability Hazardous decomposition products 
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde 
“Stability: The product is stable. 
 Instability Temperature: Not available. 
 Conditions of Instability: Not available” 
--- 
 
“Stable at room temperature in closed 
containers under normal storage and 
handling conditions. 
Conditions to Avoid: Incompatible 
materials, excess heat, strong oxidants.” 
Nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, irritating 
and toxic fumes and gases, carbon dioxide, 
nitrogen. 
 “Stable” Carbon monoxide, Carbon dioxide, Nitrogen oxides. 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde 
“Stability: The product is stable. 
Instability Temperature: Not available. 
Conditions of Instability: Not available” 
--- 
 “Stable under normal temperatures and pressures.” 
Nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, carbon 
dioxide, nitrogen. 
 --- Carbon monoxide, Carbon dioxide, Nitrogen oxides. 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde 
“Stability: The product is stable. 
Instability Temperature: Not available. 
Conditions of Instability: Not available.” 
--- 
 “Stable under normal temperatures and pressures” 
Nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, carbon 
dioxide, nitrogen gas. 
2-Chloro-6-
nitrobenzaldehyde 
 
--- 
Carbon monoxide, Carbon dioxide, 
Nitrogen oxides, Hydrogen chloride gas. 
2-Chloro-5-
nitrobenzaldehyde --- 
Carbon monoxide, Carbon dioxide, 
Nitrogen oxides, Hydrogen chloride gas. 
 
“Stable under normal temperatures and 
pressures. 
Conditions to Avoid: Incompatible 
materials, dust generation, excess heat, 
strong oxidants.” 
Hydrogen chloride, nitrogen oxides, carbon 
monoxide, irritating and toxic fumes and gases, 
carbon dioxide, nitrogen. 
4-Chloro-3-
nitrobenzaldehyde 
“Stable under normal temperatures and 
pressures.  
Conditions to Avoid: Incompatible 
materials, dust generation, excess heat, 
strong oxidants.” 
Hydrogen chloride, nitrogen oxides, carbon 
monoxide, irritating and toxic fumes and gases, 
carbon dioxide, nitrogen gas. 
 “Decomposition” 
Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, hydrogen 
chloride (hydrochloric acid), oxides 
of nitrogen, nitric acid, hydrogen cyanide. 
 “Stable” Carbon monoxide, Carbon dioxide, Nitrogen oxides, Hydrogen chloride gas. 
 
Table 3.2.2: Summary of outcomes the survey of the “stability and reactivity” section in 
Material Safety Data Sheets of the substances of interest. 
 
 
Nome Onset temperature
Heat of 
decomposition
Power 
increase rate 
 (°C) (cal/g) (cal/(min2 g)) 
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde 223 506 141.0 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde 262 594 ∞ 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde 285 670 ∞ 
 
Table 3.2.3: Data from Ando et al., [1991] on the thermal stability of nitrobenzaldehyde 
isomers. 
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Figure 3.2.2: Self-heating curves for the isomers of nitrobenzaldehyde. I: 2-
nitrobenzaldehyde, II: 3-nitrobenzaldehyde, III: 4-nitrobenzaldehyde. Heating rate on the y-
axis and Temperature on the x-axis. From Cardillo, [1998]. 
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3.2.3 – Materials Used 
 
The experimental studies were performed on the material listed in Table 3.1.4. The 
compounds were supplied by Sigma-Aldrich (Milan, Italy). The table reports also the purity 
declared and tested by the supplier. 
 
Name CAS Purity 
2-nitrobenzaldehyde 
(o-nitrobenzaldehyde) 552-89-6 98% (99.1%) 
3-nitrobenzaldehyde 
(m-nitrobenzaldehyde) 99-61-6 99% (99.3%) 
4-nitrobenzaldehyde 
(p-nitrobenzaldehyde) 555-16-8 98% (n.a) 
2-Chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde 6361-22-4 97% (n.a) 
2-Chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde 6361-21-3 97% (97.8%) 
4-Chloro-3-nitrobenzaldehyde 16588-34-4 98% (99.1%) 
 
Table 3.1.4: Materials used in the experimental activity; the purities, as declared and the 
tested by the Supplier (in brackets), are reported; n.a.:  not available. 
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3.3 – Results from experimental studies: TG – DSC – FTIR 
 
3.3.0 – Overview 
 
In the following some of the results of the experimental survey on the group of materials 
identified in §3.2 are presented. In particular the current section deals with the results 
obtained within the TG-DSC-IR experimental protocol (Figure 3.1.1). 
As evidenced in §3.2.2 scant data are available on the thermal stability and decomposition 
products of the materials of interest. This protocol is particularly suitable for a first screening 
of the thermal stability of the materials whose decomposition behaviour is unknown, since it 
is applicable to small quantities (order of few milligrams) at ambient pressure (no high 
pressure build-up is possible). The information obtained will allow to better design further 
experiments within this or others protocols. 
 
 
3.3.1 – Thermogravimetric (TG) tests  
 
Simple thermogravimetric tests were performed for a first characterization of the materials. 
As shown in Figure 3.3.1 for 3-nitrobenzaldehyde, the use of open crucibles, even in inert 
atmosphere (pure nitrogen) results in the evaporation of the sample, not allowing to 
investigate the decomposition phenomena. Thus, to limit evaporative losses, a closed crucible 
was used. Evaporation is not allowed due to the presence of the sample in a closed cell. When 
decomposition occurs, pressure will build-up inside the cell, causing the opening of the lid. 
From that instant on, the crucible behaves more or less as an open cell. 
Thus the experimental setup will allow to test: 
i. The thermal stability of the materials 
ii. The presence of decomposition steps occurring at different temperatures 
iii. The formation of a non-volatile residue (char) after decomposition 
 
The typical quantity of material used in the tests was between 5 and 10 mg. 
All the materials resulted to be thermally instable in the interval 25 - 500 °C. Table 3.1.1 
reports the average temperature of lid-opening in the different tests. The temperature is not 
expected to be a precise indicator of the decomposition range, since there is no control on the 
opening pressure of the cell. However it appears to be reproducible (typical scattering of few 
°C) among different tests on the same material. 
The decomposition appears to be limited to one stage. The typical behaviour of the mass loss 
with respect to temperature is similar to the one showed in Figure 3.3.1 for all the materials. 
After lid opening a progressive weight loss is experienced, that shows a low steep trend at the 
higher temperatures (400-500°C). 
This leads to the formation of a stable char as a result of the decomposition process. Average 
values for the char formation are reported in Table 3.1.1. The visual inspection of the char 
reveals it as a black porous solid. 
 
The main conclusions that can be draw from the preliminary TG tests are: 
• All the materials studied are thermally unstable at temperatures higher than 200°C. 
Expected onset temperature for the decomposition, estimated through the temperature 
of lid opening, are relatively similar among the two groups of nitrobenzaldehyde 
isomers and chloro-nitrobenzaldehyde isomers. Chlorinated isomers have slightly 
higher decomposition temperatures. 
• The decomposition yields the formation of a char. The fraction of the final char is 
around 35 – 40% of the initial weight of the sample for many of the analysed 
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materials. The 2-nitrobenzaldehyde appears to be an exception, yielding a lover 
residue. This hints a different decomposition behaviour of this isomer, with an higher 
expected formation of volatile compounds. 
• Evaporative phenomena occur in open cell tests, since decomposition temperatures are 
high (above 200°C). This represents a constraint for the design of the experimental 
tests on these materials. 
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Figure 3.3.1 Weight loss in TG tests with open and closed crucibles for
 3-nitrobenzhaldehyde. 
 
 
Name CAS 
T 
lid-opening 
°C 
Residue 
at 500°C 
% 
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde 552-89-6 241 23.3 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde 99-61-6 237 39.4 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde 555-16-8 236 38.2 
2-Chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde 6361-22-4 249 37.5 
2-Chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde 6361-21-3 266 38.5 
4-Chloro-3-nitrobenzaldehyde 16588-34-4 233 42.1 
 
Table 3.3.1 Experimental results of the TG tests. 
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3.3.2 – Differential Scanning Calorimetric (DSC) tests  
 
The six materials object of the study were analysed by Differential Scanning Calorimetry 
(DSC) in order to quantify the thermal effects related to the decomposition. More in detail, 
this experimental setup will allow obtain new information on : 
• The onset temperature of the materials 
• The presence of decomposition steps occurring at different temperatures 
• The quantification of the thermal effects related to the decomposition steps 
• The formation of a non-volatile residue (char) after decomposition 
 
As shown by the TG data, open cells are not suitable for the analysis of these substances, 
since the evaporative phenomena are not negligible at the decomposition temperatures. Thus 
closed aluminium crucibles were used. Similarly to what described for TG, the closed 
crucibles used are not suitable for holding the built-up of pressure, so they will eventually 
open when decomposition occurs. 
The temperature profile used in the tests was a ramp having a constant slope of 10°C/min. 
Average sample size was between 5 and 2.5 mg. 
 
Several tests were performed for each of the substances of interest.  
Reproducibility resulted good for all the investigated materials. Data on heat fluxes were 
integrated to yield the decomposition effects of the thermal phenomena. The average among 
the different test runs was considered in further data analysis. 
 
Table 3.3.2 reports a summary of the principal results of DSC analysis. Table 3.3.3 compares 
the results with the available literature data. Figures 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 show the profiles of the 
heat fluxes with respect to temperature as obtained in one of the runs for each substance. 
 
 
 
Heat of 
melting 
Melting 
temp. 
Onset 
temp. 
Heat of 
decomposition 
Residue 
at 500°C 
 (J/g) (°C) (°C) (J/g) (%) 
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde -82 42 236 1106 23% 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde -126 53 242 699 40% 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde -164 101 239 630 38% 
2-Chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde -74 65 223 936 36% 
2-Chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde -93 66 265 541 33% 
4-Chloro-3-nitrobenzaldehyde -113 60 203 839 43% 
 
Table 3.3.2 Summary of the experimental results of DSC tests. 
 
 
The results in Table 3.3.2 confirm the outcomes of the TG runs. In particular the fraction of 
the residue is frequently in line with TG results. This was expected, due to the similar 
conditions of the two tests in terms of heating rate, material quantity and cell structure. 
However it should be remembered that after lid opening, uncontrolled evaporative phenomena 
occur and the residue fraction varies in the different tests. 
The temperature of lid opening introduced in the discussion of TG runs is confirmed to be an 
estimator of the decomposition temperature, even if a strong correlation does not exist, 
because thermal and gas generation effects can not be contemporary. 
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The 2-nitrobenzaldehyde shows two main stages of decomposition (Figure 3.3.2). The first 
one at 236°C and the second one around 246°C. The two main peaks partially overlap. The 
second peak is relatively broad and slightly exothermic phenomena can be identified around 
281°C. However it is expected that the test cell has already opened at that temperature and, 
thus, the peak is not clearly identificable in all the tests, due to material losses. The char 
formed from decomposition appears to be thermally stable up to 500°C. 
The 3-nitrobenzaldehyde shows a single decomposition stage, quite sharp (Figure 3.3.2). The 
average onset temperature is 242°C, thus higher than the first peak of 2-nitrobenzaldehyde, 
but very similar to the second peak. The chemical structure of 2- nitrobenzaldehyde (Figure 
3.2.1) suggested an higher reactivity of the molecule, that may be responsible of the first stage 
of decomposition for the ortho-isomer. In 3-nitrobenzaldehyde the char formed from the first 
decomposition does not appear to be fully stable, since modest exothermic effects occur 
between 275 and 355 °C. However these effects are quite low, although they appear 
reproducible in the tests. 
The 4-nitrobenzaldehyde has a behaviour very similar to 3-nitrobenzaldehyde, with respect 
the onset temperature, profile of heat fluxes, heat of decomposition and final residue. This 
seems to suggest similar decomposition mechanism for the two isomers. The similarity with 
the second stage of 2-nitrobenzaldehyde is interesting too. 
 
With respect to the chlorinated isomers, the behaviour appears quite different among the 
different materials (Figure 3.3.3).  In all the cases decomposition occurs in a single stage, but 
onset temperatures are rather different. 
The 2-chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde starts decomposition at 223°C, thus lower than the 
correspondent non-chlorinated nitrobenzaldehyde. The peak is however centered on the same 
temperatures as the non-chlorinated nitrobenzaldehyde isomers. The char formed does not 
yield other detectable thermal effects. 
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Figure 3.3.2: Profile of the heat fluxes as to temperature at DSC for the isomers of 
nitrobenzaldehyde. 
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For 2-chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde the detected onset is at 265°C, higher than that of any other 
isomer. The char shows a slightly exothermic flux between 290 and 355°C. This is an 
interesting similarity with the non chlorinated isomers, 3-nitrobenzaldehyde and 4-
nitrobenzaldehyde. The other chlorinated isomer with meta-oriented nitro-group shares this 
peak too. However the behaviour of 4-chloro-3-nitobenzaldhyde is peculiar with respect to the 
other exothermic effects: the main decomposition peak has a very sharp and steep heat flux 
rise at a relatively low onset temperature (203°C) and a second low peak is observed for char 
decomposition between 340 and 390°C. While the secondary peak is reproducible among the 
tests, the primary peak was occasionally found at lower onset temperatures (in one test was as 
low as 158°C). The geometric shape and the heat release of the drifted peak however is 
similar independently on the temperature. This, together with the sharp steepness of the peak 
suggest that specific issues (e.g. catalytic effects of impurities, etc.) influence the activation of 
the decomposition of this compound. 
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Figure 3.3.3: Profile of the heat fluxes as to temperature at DSC for the considered isomers 
of chloro-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
 
 
The comparison of the decomposition behaviour of nitrobenzaldehyde isomers with the few 
literature data available (Table 3.3.3) is difficult due to the different experimental techniques 
used by the different authors. 
With respect to the onset temperature, all the sources agree in identifying the ortho-isomer as 
the less stable. However both the literature sources describe the meta- and para-isomers as 
largerly different than they appear in the current survey. 
The onset temperature determined by DSC test is, as well known, influenced by the 
temperature profile of the test. For the sake of clarity, Figure 3.3.4 reports the curves of 3 tests 
on 3-nitrobenzadheyde. 
 
In the comparison of the heats of decomposition with literature data (Table 3.3.3), the results 
of the current study appear to be systematically lower than the values reported from other 
 §3.3 - 6 
sources. This can be partially interpreted as a consequence of the uncontrolled loss of material 
after lid opening in the DSC tests. This aspect is expected to be common also to chlorinated 
materials. A properly designed test will be discussed in order to provide more accurate 
estimation of the heat of reaction (§3.3.6). 
 
 
 
 
Onset temperature 
(°C) 
Heat of decomposition 
(J/g) 
 c. s. Ando Cardillo c. s. Ando Cardillo
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde 236 (~246) 223 
176 
(194) 1106 2119 > 1500 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde 242 262 166 (210) 699 2487 > 1500 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde 239 285 226 630 2805 > 1500 
2-Chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde 223   936   
2-Chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde 265   541   
4-Chloro-3-nitrobenzaldehyde 203   839   
 
Table 3.3.3 Comparison of the experimental results of DSC tests with literature data. c.s.: 
current study; Ando: Ando et al. 1991; Cardillo: Cardillo 1998. 
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Figure 3.3.4: Heat fluxes as to temperature at DSC for 4-nitrobenzaldehyde. The curves were 
obtained by tests with different temperature profiles. 
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3.3.2 – TG and DSC combined tests  
 
The developed experimental protocols (§3.1.1.1) and the equipment used (§3.1.2.1) allow the 
coupling of TG with DSC results (NETZSCH STA 409 C). In the case study of interest, these 
tests do not yield new results compared to what discussed earlier. However, for sake of 
completeness, the data obtained for only two materials out of six are presented in the 
following. 
The test used a closed cell as described in the previous DSC test; the lid of the cell will open 
when pressure is built-up from decomposition. The use of larger crucibles allowed to test 
material quantities around 10 mg. The heating rate is the same as previous tests (10°C/min) 
and the instrument head is flushed by a 60 ml/min flow of nitrogen. 
 
Figure 3.3.5 reports a typical result for a TG-DSC test on 2-nitrobenzaldehyde. The 
conclusions that can be drawn from the graph are similar to those discussed for single TG and 
DSC experiments. From the graph it is evident that, after lid opening, decomposition and 
evaporation phenomena are concomitant, as shown by the trend of the DSC curve at lid 
opening temperature. Another interesting effect is showed among 300 and 400°C, where a 
weight loss is experienced with negligible thermal effects: this is due to the volatilization of 
the char. This justifies expressing the data as a char fraction at a fixed temperature (500°C in 
Tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). 
Similar comments can be done on Figure 3.3.8, later in the text, featuring a TG-DSC test on 
the 2-chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3.5: Heat fluxes as to temperature in a DSC-TG test on 2-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
 
 
3.3.4 – TG-DSC-FTIR combined tests  
 
The experimental protocol (§3.1.1.1) and the equipment used (§3.1.2.1) allow to integrate TG, 
DSC and FTIR tests at once (NETZSCH STA 409 C + transfer line + Bruker Equinox 55). 
This allow the identification of some the gaseous products formed in the decomposition. The 
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technique has obvious limits related to the IR detection (i.e. minimum detectable 
concentrations and IR transparent molecules). 
Results are presented here for the 2-nitrobenzaldehyde and the 2-chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
The TG-DSC part of the test for these substances was actually discussed in §3.3.3. 
Figure 3.3.6 reports a typical IR spectrum obtained for 2-chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde. The 
bands of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and hydrogen chloride can be can be recognized in 
the spectrum. Water can be recognized too, but it is related with issues of the experimental 
setup. 
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Figure 3.3.6: Example of an IR spectrum obtained in a TG-DSC-FTIR test for 2-chloro-6-
nitrobenzaldehyde. 
 
 
Furthermore the TG-DSC-FTIR technique yields a profile of the product formation along the 
test. By a proper calibration, quantitative data can be obtained. Calibration was obtained for 
carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and hydrogen chloride by the gas pulse method described in 
§3.1.2.1. 
 
Figure 3.3.7 reports the profile of carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide signal as a function of 
the cell temperature in the case of 2-nitobenzaldehyde. Data are corrected for the lag time of 
the transfer line. The figure reports the TG graph registered in the test. It can be observed that 
both the gases are released when the lid of the cell opens. They are both formed in the 
decomposition, even if it is not possible to know from this test if they originated since the first 
stage or only in the second. 
A secondary carbon dioxide release peak is detected between 310 and 370°C. 
 
The calibration data allow to quantify the integral quantity released, that correspond to an 
average of 192mmol of CO2 and 27mmol of CO per mol of initial sample. This quantity is 
likely to be an underestimation of the potentially releasable gases, due to the evaporative 
phenomena that may occur after lid opening. 
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Figure 3.3.7: Release curve for carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide in TG-DSC-FTIR tests 
on 2-nitrobenzaldehyde. The weight loss curve from TG is reported too. Both CO2 and CO 
signals were rescaled by an arbitrary factor to improve visualization. 
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Figure 3.3.8: Release curve for carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and hydrogen chloride in 
TG-DSC-FTIR tests on 2-chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde. The weight loss curve from TG and 
the heat fluxes from DSC are reported too. All the substance release signals were rescaled by 
an arbitrary factor to improve visualization. 
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The behaviour of chlorinate isomers in TG-DSC-FTIR tests is quite similar to what previously 
described. Figure 3.3.8 summarizes the curves obtained for 2-chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and hydrogen chloride are all released in the main 
decomposition step. 
Important releases of hydrogen chloride from the char are detected at temperatures higher 
than 300°C. A temperature cycle test was also performed (Figure 3.3.9): temperature is risen 
till 300°C as in a regular test than the sample is cooled down and the transfer line purged. A 
new test with the regular temperature profile shows hydrogen chloride release at temperature 
higher than 300°C with non appreciable release of other compounds, as e.g. carbon dioxide. 
 
The use of calibration data yield the released quantities of the three substances: 600mmol of 
CO2, 54mmol of CO and 474 mmol of HCl per mol of initial sample. Also in this case, this 
quantity is likely to be an underestimation of the potentially releasable gases, because of the 
evaporative phenomena that may occur after lid opening. 
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Figure 3.3.9: Release curve for carbon dioxide and hydrogen chloride during a cyclic TG-
DSC-FTIR tests on 2-chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde. The temperature profile is reported too. 
Both CO2 and HCl signals were rescaled by an arbitrary factor to improve visualization. 
 
 
 
3.3.5 – DSC-GC combined tests  
 
The off-line combination of the DSC and GC techniques allows to monitor both the thermal 
effects of reaction and the reagent conversion. The final goal of the test is to identify the 
overall heat of decomposition without limitations by evaporative effects. 
 
The DSC runs were performed in a Mettler DSC-25. Tests were carried out using a purge gas 
flow (300 ml/min at 25°C) of pure nitrogen. Aluminium closed test cells were used (160µl). 
Typical sample mass is of 3-4 mg; this leaves some free volume in the test cell to prevent cell 
opening from pressure build-up, at least in the earlier phases of the decomposition. At pre-
identified temperatures test runs were stopped and the cell was quenched. Weight loss was 
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checked to verify any appreciable weight loss due to gas/vapour release from the cell. Cells 
were opened and an acetone solution of the content was prepared and injected in the gas 
chromatograph. 
In order to obtain quantitative data, a calibration is needed among the concentration of the 
solution and the output signal of the GC. This was obtained injecting solutions having known 
concentration. Figure 3.3.10 shows an example of calibration line for 3-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
The calibration correlation is linear in the range of interest. 
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Figure 3.3.10: Calibration curve of 3-nitrobenzaldehyde for GC tests. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.11 plots the results for the thermal effect with the conversion of 3-
nitrobenzaldehyde. Although data scattering is appreciable, due to the random errors 
introduced by the experimental technique used, a linear correlation can be identified among 
the points. The slope of the interpolation line (1057 J/g) is a good evaluation of the heat of 
decomposition for the 3-nitrobenzaldehyde, within the experimental errors of the technique. 
At values of conversion higher than 70% the cell opens, yielding higher apparent conversions, 
due to material loss. The interpolation line does not show zero conversion for zero thermal 
effect. This bias was interpreted as a systematic error introduced by the experimental setup. 
 
Once a correlation is known among total thermal effects and conversion, an apparent kinetic 
model can be proposed for DSC data. Figure 3.3.12 reports an Arrenius plot for the 3-
nitrobenzaldehyde. A 0-order apparent kinetic model is assumed: 
RT
E
eA
dt
d −−=χ          (3.3.1) 
 
The regression of the Arrenius plot yield an activation energy of 557 kJ/mol. This is a rather 
high value, but it is consistent with a relatively high onset temperature as 242°C and a quick 
decomposition. 
Table 3.3.4 summarize the thermal and kinetic data identified by DSC-GC tests. 
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Figure 3.3.11: Heat release as function of conversion of the initial material in DSC-GC 
of 3-nitrobenzaldehyde for GC tests. 
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Figure 3.3.12: Arrenius plot for DSC test on 3-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
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A similar procedure was followed for the 4-nitrobenzaldehyde. Figure 3.3.13 plots the results 
from the DSC-CG tests. The general comments on the figure are the same earlier presented 
for 3-nitrobenzaldehyde. However here the data bias at low conversions appears higher. In 
this case the presence of  initial reactions with small thermal effects may not completely 
excluded, as suggested by the low conversion data presented in the figure. The heat of 
decomposition obtained by the regression of the line is 1386 J/g. 
 
Also in this case a kinetic model was evaluated from DSC data. The Arrenius plot is reported 
in Figure 3.3.14. The activation energy for an first order apparent kinetic results 562 J/kmol. 
Again the values is quite high. Table 3.3.4 summarize the thermal and kinetic data identified 
by DSC-GC tests. 
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Figure 3.3.13: Heat release as function of conversion of the initial material in DSC-GC 
of 4-nitrobenzaldehyde for GC tests. 
 
 
 
 3-Nitrobenzaldehyde 4-Nitrobenzaldehyde 
Heat of decomposition (J/g) 1057 1386 
Activation energy (kJ/mol) 557 562 
Pre-exponential factor (s-1) 7.80 · 10 54 2.00 · 10 55 
 
Table 3.3.4: Summary the thermal and kinetic data identified by DSC-GC tests 
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Figure 3.3.14: Arrenius plot for DSC test on 4-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
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3.4 – Results from experimental studies: DTA 
 
3.4.0 – Overview 
 
The current section presents the results obtained within the DTA experimental protocol 
(Figure 3.1.2) for the group of materials identified in §3.2. 
The application of this protocol provides useful data for the design of the adiabatic 
calorimetry tests (§3.5). 
 
 
3.4.1 – DTA tests 
 
The DTA tests were performed by the Radex oven. The DTA tests overcome some of the 
limits of DSC tests. In fact, the test cell is able to withstand pressures up to 100bar. Tests 
aimed at the following objectives: 
i. Study of the decomposition behaviour 
ii. Study of the gaseous product release as a function of the temperature 
iii. Study of the formation of non-volatile residue (char) 
 
The principal limit of the DTA technique, as it was applied in present study, concerns the non 
availability of data on heat fluxes. 
Typical sample sizes used in these study were of about 250mg. The sample size was chosen at 
the lower side of the possible range to avoid excessive pressure build-up. The cell material is 
stainless steel. The sample in the cell is not stirred, but lays in the bottom surrounding the cell 
temperature thermocouple. Cells are sealed in air. 
The temperature profile of the oven  is a constant slope ramp of 1°C/min till the maximum 
temperature of 380°C. Test runs on the same material showed good reproducibility. 
 
Figure 3.4.1 shows an example of typical result of the test for a 2-nitrobenzaldehyde sample. 
The red line reports the pressure increase with respect to oven temperature or time (that is the 
same because of the constant heating rate). The initial drift of the line upward is partially due 
to expansion of the gasses trapped in the cell. In data elaboration pressure data were corrected 
subtracting the contribution by assuming the perfect gas model. The same gas model allows 
defining the quantity (moles) of gas present in the cell. This can be corrected by the number 
of moles initially present in the vapour space to yield the moles released during the tests. 
Summing up: 
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where ε is the release ratio, nr(t) is the number of moles released at time t, n0 the sample molar 
quantity, P(t) and T(t) the cell pressure and temperature at time t, V the cell volume, R the 
perfect gas constant and t0 a reference time. 
 
The blue line of Figure 3.4.1 shows the temperature difference of the sample cell (reactor) and 
the oven. The oven is heating the reactor, so in normal conditions there is a constant 
temperature difference that is the driving force of the heat exchange. When exothermic 
phenomena occur in the sample, the temperature difference decreases due to heat generation. 
The temperature difference data were elaborated subtracting a polynomial baseline obtained 
interpolating  the sections of the curve where no decomposition occurs. The heat transfer 
among the oven and the rector is not fully reproducible and blank runs are not suitable to 
obtain reliable baselines. 
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The parameter obtained by the subtraction of the baseline (named ∆) can be plotted as a 
function of the reactor temperature. The resulting curve is qualitatively comparable with DSC 
curves in terms of number and temperatures of the peaks. Of course the effects of peak 
drifting because of different temperature profiles in the test should be considered, as earlier 
discussed with respect to Figure 3.3.4. 
In the plots of ∆ as function of the temperature of the reactor, a peculiar graphic effect may 
appear: peaks “bend” with segments of the curve that are back-moving on the reactor 
temperature axis. This is a consequence of the plotted parameter ∆ being a temperature 
difference. The effect is graphically explained in Figure 3.4.2. 
 
Figure 3.4.3 reports the profiles of ∆ and ε as a function of the temperature of the reactor for 
2-nitrobenzhaldehyde. The figure reports the DSC results for the same material. It can be 
observed that the two partially overlapped stages of decomposition, identified by DSC runs, 
are detected also by DTA. As expected for the slower temperature rise in DTA (1°C/min vs. 
10°C/min of DSC tests) the peaks are shifted at lower temperatures. The first exothermic 
effects related to decomposition (i.e. onset) can be identified at about 195°C. A secondary 
peak, not present in DSC tests, is detected for temperatures higher than 320°C. This can be 
interpreted as a further decomposition of the materials generated by the two main 
decomposition stages. The volatilization of the materials after lid opening is probably the 
cause of the absence of this peak in DSC runs. 
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Figure 3.4.1 Example of typical output from DTA tests on 2-nitrobenzhaldehyde. 
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Figure 3.4.2 Graphical example of “peak bending” in “∆ – Treactor” plots. From low right, 
moving clockwise: temperature-time plot showing Treactor and Toven profiles; ∆-time plot;  ∆ – 
Treactor plot, showing a back-moving segment. 
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Figure 3.4.3 Results from the DTA test on 2-nitrobenzaldehyde. A heat flux curve from 
DSC tests is reported in the graph; scales on y-axis of DTA and DSC were altered to allow 
qualitative comparison. 
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With respect to the quantity of gases in the vapour space of the cell, it has been evaluated by 
equation (3.4.1). At temperatures below onset temperature no appreciable drift from the 
horizontal baseline is appreciated: thus evaporative phenomena, if present, are below the 
detection limit. The release of gases appears to be slightly delayed compared to the onset. The 
release is significant during the two main decomposition steps. Above 310°C, that is the upper 
limit of the second decomposition peak, the rate of gas release decreases, but does not appear 
to stop completely. This is interpreted as a gas release from the slow decomposition of the 
primary residue.  However no clear correspondence is found among the variation in gas 
release rate and the peak above 320°C. 
 
Figure 3.4.4 shows the results a of DTA test on 3-nitrobenzaldehyde. Also in this case the 
behaviour detected with DSC is confirmed. A single decomposition stage is identified with an 
onset temperature of 218°C. Above 275°C further exothermic effects are identified (two low 
peaks can be identified, one starting at 275°C and the other at 320°C). This may correspond to 
the low peak observed in DSC runs above the main decomposition peak. 
The release of gases shows a sharp step at thermal onset temperature. The release ratio (ε) of 
this step is about 0.13, meaning  that 13 mol of gases are released for 100 mol of 3-
nitrobenzaldeide in this phase. Above the temperatures of the main decomposition, the gas 
release continues, as previously discussed for 2-nitrobenzaldheyde. However, in this case, a 
change of release rate is experienced for the temperatures corresponding to the decomposition 
of the primary residue. As a matter of fact, the majority of the released gas is produced in this 
phase. 
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Figure 3.4.4 Results from the DTA test on 3-nitrobenzaldehyde. A heat flux curve from 
DSC tests is reported in the graph; scales on y-axis of DTA and DSC were altered for allow 
qualitative comparison. (Note: the values of ∆ for temperatures above 250°C are influenced 
by the choice of the baseline, that is admittedly difficult because of the change of heat transfer 
coefficients of the system due to char formation) 
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Figure 3.4.5 Results from the DTA test on 4-nitrobenzaldehyde. A heat flux curve from 
DSC tests is reported in the graph; scales on y-axis of DTA and DSC were altered for allow 
qualitative comparison.  
 
 
 
With respect to 4-nitrobenzaldehyde (Figure 3.4.5), the results of the DTA tests shows a 
behaviour qualitatively similar to 3-nitrobenzaldehyde. Thus similar considerations on the 
decomposition apply in this case. The decomposition takes place in one stage (onset at about 
237°C) and a sharp step in gas release is experienced during the phenomenon (ε ≈ 0.2). The 
main fraction of released gas is formed at higher temperatures, when the decomposition of the 
primary residue occurs. The change in the steep of the gas release ratio and of the value of ∆ 
above 330°C suggests that the phenomenon slows down above that temperature, probably due 
to the formation of a more stable solid char.  
 
Figure 3.4.6 reports some results from DTA tests on 2-chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde. The 
decomposition takes place in a single stage (onset 185°C). The decomposition peak is quite 
broad, similarly to what happened in DSC tests. Gas are mainly released during the 
decomposition, but no sharp step is identified for the emission. Gases release from the 
primary residue is low, in particular at temperatures above 300°C. No appreciable thermal 
effects are detected in this range. It is worth noticing that in this stages the pressure in the cell 
is between 16 and 18 bar. 
At least for the main decomposition stage, the behaviour of 2-chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde 
shows interesting similarities with 2-nitrobenzaldhyde: broad peaks, large difference between 
the onset temperature of DTA and DSC, gas release spread uniformly over the decomposition 
temperature range. 
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Figure 3.4.6 Results from the DTA test on 2-chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde. A heat flux curve 
from DSC tests is reported in the graph; scales on y-axis of DTA and DSC were altered for 
allow qualitative comparison.  
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Figure 3.4.7 Results from the DTA test on 2-chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde. A heat flux curve 
from DSC tests is reported in the graph; scales on y-axis of DTA and DSC were altered for 
allow qualitative comparison.  
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The results of the a DTA test on 2-chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde are presented on Figure 3.4.7. 
The decomposition shows a narrow peak having an onset temperature of about 252°C. The 
rate of energy release and thus of reactor temperature increase is very high in the peak. Also 
the gas release is intense in this phase (0.26 mol of gas are released per mole of sample), as 
the sharp step in Figure 3.4.7 shows. 
At temperatures above the main decomposition step, the gas release continues. The thermal 
effects corresponding to that release are anyway modest, though a low broad peak can be 
identified. 
The overall behaviour is qualitatively similar to 3- and 4- nitrobenzaldehyde. 
 
 
The 4-chloro-3-nitobenzaldehyde shows, also at DTA a peculiar behaviour if compared with 
the other materials (Figure 3.4.8). A low and broad peak (the scale of ∆ was enlarged in 
Figure 3.4.8 compared to other figures in order to better show the trend) shows the onset at 
138°C, a temperature well below that of DSC tests. The gas release at the temperatures of this 
first peak is very modest (release ratio around 0.07). This is confirmed by TG-DSC tests, 
where the lid was nit opening during first decomposition stage (see §3.3.1). A large quantity 
of gases is released, instead, at temperatures above 250°C. Exothermic phenomena are 
identified above 270°C by 2 partially overlapped peaks. These may correspond to the two 
peaks above 280°C in the DSC. The gas release slope decrease at temperatures above these 
peaks. 
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Figure 3.4.8 Results from the DTA test on 4-chloro-3-nitrobenzaldehyde. A heat flux curve 
from DSC tests is reported in the graph; scales on y-axis of DTA and DSC were altered for 
allow qualitative comparison.  
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Table 3.4.1 summarises the main quantitative results of the DTA tests. The fraction of the 
residue was determined weighting the test cell after cooling. The reference temperature is the 
maximum temperature reached by the sample in the test. 
The release ratio ε was calculated by equation (3.4.1) in the final conditions of the test, 
considering as reference condition the onset. 
 
Table 3.4.2 introduces a comparison among the values of residue fraction in DTA tests and 
the outcome from TG tests at the same reference temperature. It is apparent from the table that 
TG data result systematically lower than DTA tests performed in a closed cell. This proves 
one more time the significance of material evaporation in TG and DSC tests on the materials 
studied. 
 
 
 
Onset temp. 
(°C) Residue at [T]
ε at maximum 
temperature 
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde 195 61% [368°C] 0.70 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde 218 67% [356°C] 0.53 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde 237 63% [355°C] 0.75 
2-Chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde 185 73% [349°C] 0.86 
2-Chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde 252 67% [363°C] 0.70 
4-Chloro-3-nitrobenzaldehyde 139 88% [367°C] 0.80 
 
Table 3.4.1 Summary of the quantitative experimental results of DTA tests. 
 
 
 
Reference 
temperature 
Residue 
DTA at [T] 
Residue 
DSC at [T] 
 (°C)   
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde 368 61% 35% 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde 356 67% 52% 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde 355 63% 49% 
2-Chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde 349 73% 52% 
2-Chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde 363 67% 49% 
4-Chloro-3-nitrobenzaldehyde 367 88% 51% 
 
Table 3.4.2 Comparison of residue fractions at the same reference temperature in DTA and 
TG tests. 
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3.5 – Results from experimental studies: Adiabatic Calorimetry 
 
3.5.0 – Overview 
 
Current section presents the results obtained within the Adiabatic Calorimetry experimental 
protocols (Figure 3.1.3) for some of the materials identified in §3.2. 
The application of these protocols allows the simulation of the behaviour of a adiabatic 
decomposition of the materials of interest. This is a particularly interesting accident condition 
for the assessment of the inherent safety of materials that may undergo decomposition. 
In the following the results of the Adiabatic Calorimetry tests are presented and discussed. In 
the first part (§3.5.1) the thermal results of the tests are of concern. The second part (§3.5.2) 
deals with the identification of the products of decomposition formed in the tests. 
 
 
3.5.1 – Thermal results in Adiabatic Calorimetry tests 
 
The adiabatic calorimetric tests were performed in the Phi-tec II calorimeter. The 
experimental setup will allow testing: 
i. The onset temperature of the materials in adiabatic conditions 
ii. The temperature increase for adiabatic decomposition and, thus, the heat of 
decomposition 
iii. The pressure increase for adiabatic decomposition and, thus, the gas release 
iv. The formation of a non-volatile residue (char) during the adiabatic decomposition 
Moreover the integration with off-line analytic techniques yields: 
v. The identification of the decomposition products present in the gas phase of the test 
cell 
vi. The identification of the decomposition products present in the condensable and solid 
fraction in the test cell 
 
High pressure test cells were used (maximum pressure 140 bar, volume 10ml) since the 
pressure compensation system of the equipment is not able to compensate the pressure 
increase rate experienced in the DTA tests. Moreover the limits of the equipment as maximum 
operative temperature (400°C) force to use small samples (0.5÷1g), so to limit temperature 
increases acting on the phi-factor. The cell is flushed by nitrogen to yield an inert 
environment. The sample in the test cell is stirred by a magnetic bar coupling during the test. 
 
Different temperature profiles can be used in the test to reach the conditions where the 
adiabatic decomposition occurs. The “Heat-Wait-Search” mode is a temperature program 
particularly suitable for the identification of the onset temperature. In this operational mode, 
temperature of the test cell is increased in steps of fixed pace (“heat”). After a time gap, to 
allow the system to reach thermal equilibrium (“wait”), adiabatic condition is maintained for a 
fixed amount of time by a system of guard heaters that compensate dispersions. During the 
adiabatic phase, possible temperature variations related  to exothermic reactions are 
monitored (“search”). If an exothermic behaviour is detected, adiabatic conditions will be 
maintained; else a new step “heat” step will start. 
 
Figure 3.5.1 shows the results of an  Heat-Wait-Search test on 3-nirobenzaldehyde. In the 
figure, after sample heating up to 190°C, some steps are required to reach the onset 
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temperature. The temperature increase after onset results very steep, showing a nearly 
explosive behaviour. After the run-away the cell is cooled down and the gas present in the 
vapour space can be sampled for analysis. The figure reports also the curve of the absolute 
pressure in the test cell. A steep increase in the pressure, due to gas release, is recorded during 
the run-away. After the cooling the pressure decrease due to of gas sampling can be observed. 
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Figure 3.5.1: Temperature and pressure profiles of 3-nitrobenzaldehyde in an Adiabatic 
Calorimetry test using  Heat-Wait-Search mode. 
 
The main goal of Heat-Wait-Search tests is to identify the onset temperature. The 
identification of this temperature required some test runs, since small differences in the 
experimental setup may affect the onset for a few °C. However it was possible to identify a 
run-away onset temperature for all the chemical systems studied. 
The typical sample size in the tests was between 0.6 and 1 grams. This yields a phi-factor 
between 8 and 13 for the cells used. It is worth recalling that the phi-factor is defied as: 
samplesample
cellcell
pCm
pCm
ˆ
ˆ
1+=φ         (3.5.1) 
where m is the mass and Cp the specific heat. In the current study the specific heat of the 
analysed material was considered constant in the test and equal to the initial value of the 
liquid phase. Since no data were available in the literature for the substances of interest, this 
was predicted by structure-propriety correlations [Perry, 1998]. Values of 2.15 J/(g K) and 
1.94 J/(g K) were respectively adopted for non-chlorinated and chlorinated isomers. 
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Table 3.5.1 reports the onset temperatures identified for the materials studied. The same table 
shows the onset temperatures identified in DTA tests, for the sake of comparison. The 2-
nitrobenzaldeyde is identified also in this case as the less stable among the 3 isomers. The 
data show a good agreement with DTA data, provided that in adiabatic conditions it was 
expected that onset temperatures were lower. 
 
 
Onset 
temperature
AC 
Onset 
temperature 
DTA 
 (°C) (°C) 
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde 190 195 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde 200 218 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde 210 237 
2-Chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde 183 185 
 
Table 3.5.1 Onset temperatures from Adiabatic Calorimetry (AC) and DTA tests. 
 
 
Adiabatic calorimetry test allow the estimation of an adiabatic temperature rise, that can be 
related to the heat of decomposition by the equation: ( )onsetfinalsampleiondecomposit TTpCH −=∆ ˆφ       (3.5.2) 
where Tfinal is the final temperature reached in the runaway. 
The experimental setup used in the tests has safety limits on the maximum temperature that 
can be reached (around 400°C). Since the process is intensely exothermic (see. §3.3.5) high 
phi-factors (Φ) are used (i.e. small sample mass) in the tests. For instance, in the case of 3-
nitrobenzaldehyde if an ideal test with Φ =1 is performed and the final temperature of the test 
is 400°C, the maximum heat of reaction that can be measured is: ( ) gJTTpCH onsetfinalsampleiondecomposit /430)200400(15.21ˆ =−⋅⋅=−=∆ φ  (3.5.3) 
that is too low compared to the predicted values from DSC tests (see §3.3.5). 
 
By converse, the sample weight and, consequently, the phi-factor influence the final 
temperature that is reached by the adiabatic test. This, in turn, influences the decomposition, 
since higher temperatures activate further decomposition stages of the residue. Thus, by a 
changing of the sample mass, the reaction will stop at different maximum temperatures, 
depending on the decomposition stages activated. This is particularly interesting for the 
analysis of the decomposition residues at different stages. 
 
Several tests were performed on the materials of concern in the study, using different sample 
mass (0.4÷0.9 g) and high phi factors (9÷18.5). Tests were performed in “closed can” mode. 
In this experimental setup, the test cell is heated at a given temperature few degrees above the 
onset by a defined ramp. Then the guard heaters start to compensate heat losses in order to 
achieve adiabatic conditions. In that phase the runaway will occur. A cool down follow the 
end of runaway. 
 
This test mode is preferred to the heat-wait-search for the determination of the heat of 
decomposition, since the sample is not left at high temperature for a long time before of the 
runaway, preventing the alteration of the material and the start of slow non-detectable 
decomposition reactions. 
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Figure 3.5.2 shows an example of the whole cycle of a “closed can” test on 3-
nitrobenzaldehyde.  
 
Table 3.5.2 reports an overview of the principal results obtained by Adiabatic Calorimetry 
tests in “closed can” mode. For each material, the average data is reported among different 
tests resulting in the same final temperature range. The final pressure is the maximum 
pressure reached in the test and is reported in order to better define the final test conditions. 
The heat of decomposition is calculated by equation 3.5.2. The factor ε is the molar ratio of 
gas produced per unit of sample. It is calculated similarly to DTA tests by equation (3.4.1) 
from final temperature and pressure data, assuming an ideal gas behaviour. The weight of 
final residue is obtained by cell weighting after the cooling down and gas discharge. 
The table clearly shows as the heat of decomposition is influenced by the maximum 
temperatures reached in the test. This is pretty evident in the case of 3-nitrobenzadehyde, that 
had a more extensive coverage of final temperatures. The reaction involving the compounds 
in the primary residue at high temperatures (see DSC and DTA tests for diagrams of reactions 
steps with temperature, §3.3.2 and §3.4.1) yield higher release of gas and reduce the 
percentage of residue at the end of the test. 
 
Table 3.5.3 compares the results from Adiabatic Calorimetry tests with the DTA tests at 
comparable final temperatures. It can be observed as the results for the residue fraction and 
the gas release ratio are generally in line among the two kind of test at comparable final 
temperatures. 
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Figure 3.5.2: Temperature and pressure profiles of 3-nitrobenzaldehyde in an Adiabatic 
Calorimetry test with Closed Can mode. 
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Table 3.5.4 compares the heat of decomposition obtained by Adiabatic Calorimetry tests and 
the DSC-GC tests. The DSC-GC data refer to the main step of decomposition of the product, 
in particular to a conversion of the final product < 80%. The results have a very good match 
for 3-nitrobanzaldehyde. For 4-nitrobenzaldehyde it was not possible in AC tests to reproduce 
a comparable final temperature within the experimental survey (DSC and DTA tests show that 
secondary reactions are active at the final temperature of 290°C, see Figure 3.4.5). 
 
 
 
 
Final 
temp. 
range 
Final 
pressure
Heat of 
decomposition 
ε at final 
conditions Residue
 (°C) (bar) (J/g)   
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde Up to 390 18.8 4510 0.70 54 % 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde Up to 260 4.4 1085 0.15 96 % 
 Up to 300 6.8 1846 0.25 89 % 
 Up to 400 38.0 3616 1.10 42 % 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde Up to 290 9.8 2448 0.52 44 % 
 Up to 390 43.5 3509 1.33 37 % 
2-Chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde Up to 245 6.0 1876 0.37 74 % 
 
Table 3.5.2: Selected quantitative results from Adiabatic Calorimetry (AC) tests. 
 
 
 AC DTA AC DTA 
 Residue at [T] ε at [T] 
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde 54 % [390°C] 61% [368°C] 0.70 [390°C] 0.70 [368°C]
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde 89 % [300°C] 42 % [400°C] 67% [356°C] 
0.25 [300°C] 
1.10 [400°C] 0.53 [356°C]
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde 44 % [290°C] 37 % [390°C] 63% [355°C] 
0.52 [290°C] 
1.33 [390°C] 0.75 [355°C]
2-Chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde 74 % [245°C] 73% [349°C] 0.37 [245°C] 0.86 [349°C]
 
Table 3.5.3: Comparison of results from Adiabatic Calorimetry (AC) and DTA tests. 
 
 
 AC DSC 
 Heat of decomposition up to [T] (J/g) 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde 1085 [260°C] 1057 [241°C] 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde 2448 [290°C] 1386 [240°C] 
 
Table 3.5.4: Comparison of results from Adiabatic Calorimetry (AC) and DSC-GC tests. 
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3.5.2 – Identification of the decomposition products in Adiabatic Calorimetry tests 
 
Following the Adiabatic Calorimetry protocol, the contents of the cell after the decomposition 
test were analysed in order to identify the substances present. Two main fractions were 
recovered from test cells and analysed: 
• The gas fraction: this fraction was sampled at the and of the test, after cool down, as 
described in §3.1.2.3. The gas was expanded in the gas cell and analysed by FTIR. 
Usually a single sampling was possible because of the small size of the AC test cell. 
• The condensable fraction: this fraction was recovered from the test cell by a solvent 
(acetone, HPLC grade) and analysed by GC-MS analyser. 
 
The FTIR analysis of the gas fraction yield an absorbance spectrum. The IR-opaque 
substances present in the gas cell can be identified by the analyses of the bands in that 
spectrum. The wavenumbers used for the identification of the compounds of interest in 
current analysis are reported in Table 3.5.5. Water is not considered, since traces are always 
present in the spectrum due to the experimental setup. 
 
Compound Wavenumber (cm-1) 
CO2 669 
HCN 713 
CH4 729 
NH3 800-1200 
C2H4 949 
N2O 1225-1335 
CH4 1306 
NO2 1560-1650 
NO 1830-1930 
CO 2010-2220 
N2O 2140-2270 
CO2 2250-2400 
N2O 2420-2500 
N2O 2520-2605 
CH4 2850-3190 
HCN 3225-3385 
NH3 3334 
N2O 3420-3510 
CO2 3525-3765 
 
Table 3.5.5: Wavenumbers used in the interpretation of FTIR spectra. 
 
 
Figure 3.5.3 provides an example of infrared spectrum for the gases collected from a 
Adiabatic Calorimetry test on 3-nirobenzadehyde. It can be seen as the different compounds 
can be identified according to the wavenumbers. The spectra have good reproducibility. 
Figure 3.5.3, in particular, refers to a test in witch the final temperature belong to the class “up 
to 400°C” of Table 3.5.2. For the purpose of comparison, Figure 3.5.4 shows a spectrum from 
a test in the class “up to 300°C”. The differences among the products in gas phase of severe 
and milder conditions are plain. The analysis of these results suggest that, for
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Figure 3.5.3: FTIR spectrum of the gas phase in an AC test in severe conditions on 3-
nitrobanzaldehyde. 
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Figure 3.5.4: FTIR spectrum of the gas phase in an AC test in mild conditions on 3-
nitrobanzaldehyde. 
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3-nitrobenzaldehyde, only carbon oxides are released to gas phase in detectable quantities in 
the main decomposition (probably along with nitrogen, that is however non-detectable by 
FTIR). The other compounds of Figure 3.5.3 should be formed at higher temperatures and 
pressure from primary residue decomposition or gas phase reactions. 
 
Table 3.5.6 reports a summary of the FTIR analysis, classified according with the groups of 
tests similarly to Table 3.5.2. It can be observed as, in all the cases, the AC tests reaching 
more severe conditions yield a higher number of gaseous compounds. The reason of this 
behaviour should be the same earlier argued for 3-nitrobenzaldehyde: successive reactions 
occur at higher temperatures. 
In all the cases methane and nitrogen oxides are formed in the most severe conditions. In 
several cases also hydrogen cyanide is detected. For the chlorinated isomers, at least at the 
temperatures of the test considered no hydrogen chloride is detected. Probably chlorine is 
bound in residue as was earlier suggested by TG-DSC-FTIR tests (see §3.3.4).  
 
The FTIR spectra can be analysed in order to obtain quantitative information as described in 
§3.1.2.1. Although this require calibration on a reference. Reference calibration data were 
obtained for carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, methane and ethene, as by the gas 
concentration method (see §3.1.2.1). 
Table 3.5.6 reports average release ratios of the substances for which the calibration was 
available. It is apparent from the table as the release of the gases increases with the increase of 
the final temperature. Moreover the molar ratio identified for single compounds, if compared 
with the ε factors of Table 3.5.2, clearly shows that the quantified gases do not represent the 
major fraction of the actual gas phase. At least for the tests in milder conditions, where carbon 
oxides are the only substances identified at FTIR, the more likely candidate for the missing 
fraction is nitrogen, since it can not be identified in FTIR analysis and its molar mass can 
justify the weight loss of the residue. 
 
 
 
Final 
temp. 
(°C) 
Final 
pressure
(bar) C
O
2 
C
O
 
C
H
4 
C
2H
4 
H
C
N
 
N
2O
 
N
O
 
N
O
2 
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde Up to 280 8.3 ? ?       
 Up to 390 18.8 ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde Up to 260 4.4 ? ?       
 Up to 300 6.8 ? ?       
 Up to 400 38.0 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde Up to 250 4.9 ? ?       
 Up to 290 9.8 ? ?    ? ? ? 
 Up to 390 43.5 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
2-Chloro- 
6-nitrobenzaldehyde Up to 245 6.0 ? ?       
 
Table 3.5.6: Selected quantitative results from FTIR analysis on gas phases sampled from 
Adiabatic Calorimetry (AC) tests. 
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 Final temp. 
Final 
pressure CO2 CO CH4 C2H4 
Ratio 
CO/ 
CO2 
Ratio 
CH4/ 
CO2 
 (°C) (bar) (mmol/mol) 
2-Nitrobenzaldehyde Up to 280 8.3 0.033 0.008   0.33  
 Up to 390 18.8 135 27 2.43 0.18 0.20 0.001 
3-Nitrobenzaldehyde Up to 260 4.4 15.7 0.2   0.014  
 Up to 300 6.8 48.8 1.5   0.031  
 Up to 400 38.0 184 124 75.6 - 0.673 0.411 
4-Nitrobenzaldehyde Up to 250 4.9 43.0 2.0   0.046  
 Up to 290 9.8 122 10.5   0.086  
 Up to 390 43.5 197 108 69.4 - 0.546 0.352 
2-Chloro- 
6-nitrobenzaldehyde Up to 245 6.0 153 14   0.065  
 
Table 3.5.6: Selected quantitative results from FTIR analysis on gas phases sampled from 
Adiabatic Calorimetry (AC) tests. 
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Figure 3.5.5: example of chromatogram from GC-MS analysis of condensable fraction in an 
AC test in severe conditions on 3-nitrobanzaldehyde. Some of the identified compounds are 
reported in the figure. 
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The condensable fraction recovered by acetone from the test cells was analysed by GC-MS 
(§3.1.2.5). Figure 3.3.5 reports and example of chromatogram that is obtained from the 
analysis: the total ion current is reported as function of the retention time in the 
chromatographic column. The single compounds release were identified from the mass 
spectra, using the internal database of the software for reference spectra. In the following 
tables, when the identification yields various options for the compounds, all the plausible 
possibilities are reported.  
 
Tables from 3.5.7 to 3.5.10 report the results of GC-MS analysis on the samples collected 
from the AC tests on 3-nitrobenzaldehyde. It can be observed as, also in this case, the profile 
changes a lot among the tests that reached different final temperatures. 
At milder conditions, the presence of compound containing nitrogen is dominant, in particular 
for the nitro group. The 3-nitrobenzaldehyde is identified among the compounds, meaning the 
conversion is not complete. Few aromatic and poly-aromatic hydrocarbons and no 
heterocyclic aromatics are found, suggesting that the primary residue it is far away from being 
a stable char.  
In more severe conditions (tests up to 400°C) a wider variety of aromatic and poly-aromatic 
hydrocarbons is formed. On the other side less compounds containing nitro- groups are found. 
This suggests that they tend to react forming e.g. heterocyclic compounds or being expulsed 
to gas phase compounds (molecular nitrogen, nitrogen oxides, hydrogen cyanide). Substances 
containing cyano- group are detected in the severe condition tests. This matches well with the 
identification of hydrogen cyanide in FTIR spectra for the gas phase. 
 
 
 
Class of compounds 
AC test 
up to 
300°C 
AC test 
up to 
400°C 
Aromatic and poly-cyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 1 14 
Oxygenated aromatic compounds without N 3 6 
Aromatic compounds with nitrogen   
? nitro- group 8 5 
? azo- group 1 1 
? cyano- group --- 2 
? amide --- 1 
? imide 1 --- 
? poly-functional compounds 3 3 
? heterocyclic-aromatic compounds --- 3 
 
Table 3.5.7: summary of the classes of compounds identified by GC-MS analysis in 
samples from AC tests on 3-nitrobenzaldehyde. The values refer to the number of compounds 
(or of group of compounds impossible to differentiate by GC-MS analysis). 
 §3.5 - 11
 
 
 
 
 MM AC test 
up to 
300°C 
AC test 
up to 
400°C 
Naphthalene 128  ? 
Biphenyl / Acenaphthene 154 ? ? 
Acenaphthylene / biphenylene 152  ? 
Fluorene 166  ? 
Methyl-biphenyl 168  ? 
Anthracene / phenanthrene 178  ? 
Pyrene / fluoranthene 202  ? 
Phenyl naphthalene / dihydropyrene 204  ? 
Benzo[a]anthracene / Benzo[c]phenanthrene / Naphthacene / 
Triphenylene / Chrysene /…. 228  ? 
Terphenyl 230  ? 
Benzo[j]fluoranthene / Benzo[b]fluoranthene / Benzo[e]pyrene / 
Benzo[k]fluoranthene / Perylene / Benzo[a]pyrene 252  ? 
Binaphthalene / 4,5-dihydrobenzo[a]pyrene / phenylanthracene 254  ? 
Benzo[b]triphenylene / benzo[b]chrysene / 
dibenzo[a,h]anthracene / dibenzo[a,j]anthracene / 
benzo[a]naphthacene 
278  ? 
Quarterphenyl 306  ? 
 
Table 3.5.8: aromatic and poly-aromatic hydrocarbons identified by GC-MS analysis in 
samples from AC tests on 3-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
 
 
 
 
MM 
AC test 
up to 
300°C 
AC test 
up to 
400°C 
Phenol 94  ? 
Benzaldehyde 106 ?  
Benzoic acid 122 ? ? 
Hydroxybenzaldehyde 122 ?  
Dibenzofuran 168  ? 
Diphenyl ether 170  ? 
Hydroxybiphenyl 170  ? 
Fluoren-9-one 180  ? 
 
Table 3.5.9: oxygenated aromatic compounds without nitrogen identified by GC-MS 
analysis in samples from AC tests on 3-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
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MM 
AC test 
up to 
300°C 
AC test 
up to 
400°C 
Nitro- group    
Nitrobenzene 123 ? ? 
m-nitrophenol 139 ? ? 
m-nitrobenzaldehyde 151 ?  
m-nitrobenzoic acid 167 ? ? 
m-nitrobiphenyl/ nitro-acenaphthene 199 ? ? 
2-nitro-9-fluorenone 225 ?  
m-nitrobenzophenone 227 ? ? 
Dinitrobiphenyl 244 ?  
 Azo- group    
2-Phenylbenzoxazole 195  ? 
Azobenzene 182 ?  
Cyano- group    
Benzonitrile 103  ? 
Isocyanonaphthalene / naphthalene carbonitrile  153  ? 
Amide    
N-phenylbenzamide 197  ? 
Imide    
Phthalimide 147 ?  
Poly-functional compounds    
m-nitrobenzamide 166 ? ? 
Amino benzonitrile 118  ? 
Nitro benzonitrile 148  ? 
N-(4-nitrophenyl)methylene-benzamine 226 ?  
Diphenylcarbadiazone 238 ?  
Heterocyclic-aromatic compounds    
Phenylpyridine 155  ? 
Phenyl benzonitrile / phenantridine / acridine / 
Benzoquinoline 179  ? 
Dibenzo(B,DEF)carbazole 241  ? 
 
Table 3.5.10: aromatic compounds with nitrogen identified by GC-MS analysis in samples 
from AC tests on 3-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
 
 
 
For sake of comparison with 3-nitrobenzaldehyde, the results of the analysis of the 
condensable fraction of AD tests on 2-nitrobenzaldehyde is reported in the Tables from 3.5.11 
to 2.5.14. 
The same considerations as for 3-nitrobenzaldehyde may be repeated on the formation of 
poly-cyclic and hetero aromatic compounds. Also in this case the cyano group is identified 
only at severe test conditions, as well as the number of nitro compounds reduces in these 
conditions. 
In this case, however, amino- groups were identified in the condensable fraction, no matter 
the severity of the test. These groups may derive from the reduction of the nitro group. 
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Class of compounds 
AC test 
up to 
280°C 
AC test 
up to 
390°C 
Aromatic and poly-cyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 2 23 
Oxygenated aromatic compounds without N 5 7 
Aromatic compounds with nitrogen   
?  nitro- group 3 2 
?  amino- group 2 2 
?  azo- group 1 1 
?  cyano- group --- 8 
?  poly-functional compounds 6 4 
?  heterocyclic-aromatic compounds --- 12 
 
Table 3.5.11: summary of the classes of compounds identified by GC-MS analysis in 
samples from AC tests on 2-nitrobenzaldehyde. The values refer to the number of compounds 
(or of group of compounds impossible to differentiate by GC-MS analysis). 
 
 
 
 MM 
AC test 
up to 
280°C 
AC test 
up to 
390°C 
Naphthalene 128 ?  ? 
Methylnaphthalene (2) 142  ? 
Acenaphthylene / biphenylene 152  ? 
Ethenylnaphthalene / 1,4-diidro-1,4-ethenonaphthalene / biphenyl / 
acenaphthene 154  ? 
Fluorene 166  ? 
Methylbiphenyl / diphenylmethane (2) / ethenylnaphthalene 168  ? 
Anthracene / phenanthrene 178 ?  ? 
Fluoranthene / pyrene 202  ? 
Phenylnaphthalene / ethenylanthracene / 1-(phenylmethylen)-1H-
indene / 1,4-diidro-1,4-ethenoanthracene / dihydropyrene / 
dihydrofluoranthene 
204  ? 
Benzo[a]anthracene / naphthacene / benzo[c]phenanthrene / 
triphenylene / chrysene 228  ? 
Terphenyl / dihydronaphthacene / dihydrochrysene 230  ? 
Benzo[j]fluoranthene / benzo[e]acephenanthrylene / 
benzo[k]fluoranthene / perylene / benzo[e]pyrene 252  ? 
Dihydrobenzo[a]pyrene / dihydrobenzo[e]pyrene / binaphthalene 254  ? 
Quaterphenyl 306  ? 
 
Table 3.5.12: aromatic and poly-cyclic aromatic hydrocarbons identified by GC-MS analysis 
in samples from AC tests on 2-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
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 MM 
AC test 
up to 
280°C 
AC test 
up to 
390°C 
 nitro- group    
nitrobenzene 123 ?  ?  
2-nitrobenzaldehyde 151 ?   
2-nitrobiphenyl 199 ?  ?  
3-nitrobiphenyl 199 ?   
amino- group    
Aniline 93 ?  ?  
Biphenylamine 169 ?  ?  
azo- group    
Azobenzene 182 ?  ?  
cyano- group    
Benzonitrile 103  ?  
Methylbenzonitrile / benzenacetonitrile  117  ?  
Methylen-benzenacetonitrile / 3-phenyl-2-propen-nitrile / isoquinoline 129  ?  
Naphthalencarbonitrile (2) 153  ?  
Phenylbenzonitrile / phenanthridine / acridine (3) / benzo[h]quinoline / 
benzo[f]quinoline 179  ?  
poly-functional compounds    
Aminobenzonitrile /  1H-benzoimidazole / 1H-pyrrole 2,3-[b]pyridine / 
1H-indazole 118  ?  
Phenylbenzoxazole 195 ?   
N-phenylbenzamide 197 ?   
N-(aminophenyl)-benzamide / amino-N-phenylbenzamide 212 ?   
N-phenylphthalimmide 223 ?  ?  
N-(o-nitrobenzyliden)aniline 226 ?  ?  
6H,12H-indazole 2,1-A indazol-6,12-dione 236 ?  ?  
heterocyclic-aromatic compounds    
Isoquinoline / methylen-benzenacetonitrile / 3-phenyl-2-propen-nitrile 129  ?  
1H-benzimidazole / 1H-pyrrol 2,3-B pyridine / 1H-indazole / 
aminobenzonitrile 118  ?  
Phenylpyridine 155  ?  
4-azofluorene 167  ?  
Phenanthridine / acridine / benzo[h]quinoline  (3) / benzo[f]quinoline / 
phenylbenzonitrile 179  ?  
Phenazine / 2-(2- pyridinyl)benzonitrile / o-phenanthroline / 1,7- 
phenanthroline 180  ?  
4-azapyrene / indeno(1,2,3-IJ) isoquinoline / acenaphtho(1,2-B)pyridine 203  ?  
dibenzo(B,DEF)carbazole 241  ?  
9-phenyl-9H-carbazole / methylbenzo[c]acridine / methylbenzo[a]acridine 243  ?  
 
Table 3.5.13: aromatic compounds with nitrogen identified by GC-MS analysis in samples 
from AC tests on 2-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
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 MM 
AC test 
up to 
280°C 
AC test 
up to 
390°C 
Phenol 94 ?  ?  
2H-1-benzopyran-2-one 146 ?   
Dibenzofuran 168 ?  ?  
Hydroxybiphenyl 170  ?  
9H-xanten-9-one 196 ?  ?  
4-hydroxy-9-fluorenone 196 ?  ?  
benzoic acid phenyl ester 198  ?  
9,10- anthracendione 208  ?  
 
Table 3.5.14: oxygenated aromatic compounds without nitrogen identified by GC-MS 
analysis in samples from AC tests on 2-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
 
 
 PM 
AC test 
up to 
245°C 
Aromatic hydrocarbons  1 
Anthracene / phenanthrene 178 ? 
Aromatic compounds with Cl, without N, O  6 
Dichlorobenzene (2) 146 ? 
Trichlorobenzene 180 ? 
Tetrachlorobenzene (2) 214 ? 
Dichlorobiphenyl (2) 222 ? 
Trichlorobiphenyl (3) 256 ? 
Tetrachlorobiphenyl (4) 290 ? 
Aromatic compounds with O and Cl, without N  7 
Chlorophenol 128 ? 
Chlorohydroxybenzaldehyde 156 ? 
Chlorobenzoic acid 156 ? 
Dichloro benzaldehyde 174 ? 
Dichlorobenzoic acid 190 ? 
Dichlorobenzophenone 250 ? 
Trichlorobenzophenone 284 ? 
Aromatic compound with N   
Nitro- group  5 
Chloronitrobenzene 157 ? 
2-chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde 186 ? 
Dichloronitrobenzene 191 ? 
4-chloro-1-chloromethyil-2-nitrobenzene 205 ? 
Dichloronitroaniline 206 ? 
Amino- group  6 
Dichloroaniline 161 ? 
Dichlorobenzamide 189 ? 
Dichoronitroaniline 206 ? 
Tetrachloroaniline 229 ? 
N-phenyl-dichloroaniline 237 ? 
4, 4’-dichlorobenzaniline 265 ? 
Cyano- group  1 
Dichlorobenzonitrile 171 ? 
Azo- group  1 
Tetrachloroazobenzene 318 ? 
 
Table 3.5.15: compounds identified by GC-MS analysis in samples from AC tests on 2-
chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde. 
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# of 
chlorine 
atoms 
MM # of compounds 
0 178 1 
1 128, 139 (2), 156, 157, 180, 185, 233 8 
2 
146 (2), 161, 171, 174, 189, 190, 191, 
196, 206, 222, 237, 247, 250 (2), 262, 
263, 265, 267 (2), 279, 290, 291, 310, 
316, 319, 336 
27 
3 
180 (2), 195 (2), 242, 256 (4), 271 
(3), 272 (2), 283, 284, 285, 290, 296 
(2), 297 (2), 298, 299, 304, 308, 313, 
323, 324 (2), 325, 338, 344, 373, 400, 
414, 444, 445 
38 
4 
214 (2), 229, 288, 290 (4), 305 (2), 
318, 331 (3), 333, 348 (2), 433 (2), 
434, 479 
21 
5 365, 467, 468 (2) 4 
 
Table 3.5.16: partition of chlorine atoms in the compounds identified by GC-MS analysis in 
samples from AC tests of the group “final temperature up to 245°C” on 2-chloro-6-
nitrobenzaldehyde. 
 
 
Finally a set of GC-MS results for a specific group of AC tests on the 2-chloro-3-
nitrobenzaldehyde is reported in Table 3.5.15. In this case it is of particular interest to analyse 
the fate of chlorine. Table 3.5.16 summarizes the number of compounds identified as a 
function of the number of chlorine atoms present in the molecule. 
The results show that poly-chlorinated compounds of medium-high molecular mass are 
formed in the decomposition. This fact, together with the absence of hydrogen chloride in gas 
phase at FTIR analysis, suggests that chlorine, at least in the first main stage of 
decomposition, remains principally in the residue. It is worth noticing that among the 
chlorinated products, well-known hazardous compounds (e.g. chlorophenol, polychloro-
benzene, polychloro-biphenyl) are formed. 
As regard compounds containing nitrogen, the 2-chloro-3-nitrobenzaldehyde shows a 
behaviour similar to the tests in milder conditions on the non chlorinated samples above 
discussed. As in other tests at similar final temperature, few species of non-substituted 
hydrocarbons were detected. Similarly to 2-nitrobenzaldehyde, also in this case compounds 
with amino groups were identified. 
 
A brief review of the results presented above shows that a variety of compounds are formed in 
the decomposition of the materials studied. Though some of them were mentioned in the some 
of the corresponding Material Safety Data Sheets, a large number was unspecified. 
Nevertheless many of them are well known to be hazardous compounds. 
The analysis of the hazard of these materials through the procedure identified in §2.2 will be 
the subject of a specific example in §4.5. 
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3.6 – Summary and Conclusions 
 
An experimental survey aimed at the characterization of a group of thermally unstable 
materials was presented in this section. The study principally concerned the thermal effects 
and the chemical compound release occurring during the degradation of the initial material. 
Experimental protocols were defined for the tests. This allowed performing the tests on 
different materials by a coherent methodological basis. 
 
The group of materials studied included different isomers of non-chlorinated and chlorinated 
nitrobenzaldehyde. The main outcomes are summarized in the following: 
 
• 2-nitrobenzaldehyde: this compound shows an onset temperature of 190°C in AC 
tests. The first decomposition stage involves two thermal steps. In this phase gases are 
released (about 0.65 mol/mol of initial material); CO2 and CO are the principal gaeous 
compounds identified by FTIR analysis. The residue contains various species with 
functional groups containing oxygen and nitrogen (nitro-, amino-, hydroxyl-, etc.). 
The primary residue undergoes further degradation reactions that, though not 
increasing the released quantity of gases, greatly affects the nature of the gases 
(nitrogen oxides, CH4, HCN are formed). In the residue several poly-aromatic and 
hetero-cyclic hydrocarbons and cyano- groups were identified. The heat release for the 
whole decomposition up to 390°C, calculated by AC data, is of 4510 J/g of the initial 
material. 
• 3-nitrobenzaldehyde: this compound shows an onset temperature of 200°C in AC 
tests. The first decomposition stage takes place in a single thermal step. Gas is quickly 
released in this phase (0.13 mol/mol of initial material); CO2 and CO are the main 
gaseous compounds identified by FTIR analysis. The residue contains several species 
with functional groups containing oxygen and nitrogen (nitro-, carbonyl-, etc.). The 
heat release in this phase is estimated around 1085 J/g of the initial material. The 
primary residue undergoes further degradation reactions that may further release gases 
(0.53 mol/mol of initial material total at 356°C, 1.1 mol/mol above 400°C). The nature 
of the gas phase (nitrogen oxides, CH4, HCN) and of the residue (poly-aromatic and 
hetero-cyclic hydrocarbons, cyano-, hydroxyl- groups are identified) changes in the 
more severe conditions. The heat release in this phase appears significant. The heat 
release for the whole decomposition up to 400°C is of 3616 J/g of initial material, 
calculated by AC data. 
• 4-nitrobenzaldehyde: this compound shows a behaviour qualitatively similar to 3-
nitrobenzaldehyde. The onset temperature is of 210°C in AC tests. The first 
decomposition stage takes place in a single thermal step. Gas is quickly released in 
this phase (0.2 mol/mol of initial material); CO2 and CO are the principal compounds 
identified by FTIR analysis. The heat release is estimated around 1386 J/g of the initial 
material. The primary residue undergoes further degradation reactions that may release 
further gaseous compounds (0.75 mol/mol of initial material at 355°C, 1.3 mol/mol at 
390°C). The nature of the gases changes in these further stages: nitrogen oxides are 
detected at 290°C, CH4 and HCN appear in the mixture at 390°C. The heat release for 
the whole decomposition process up to 390°C, calculated by AC data, is of 3509 J/g of 
the initial material 
• 2-chloro-6-nitrobenzaldehyde: this compound shows an onset temperature of 183°C 
in AC tests. The first decomposition stage involves a single thermal step. All along 
this stage gases are released (about 0.8 mol/mol of initial material); CO2 and CO are 
the main compounds identified by FTIR analysis in AC tests concerning the early 
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phases of this decomposition. In TG-DSC-FTIR tests also HCl is detected. The residue 
contains several species having functional groups containing oxygen and nitrogen 
(nitro-, amino-, hydroxyl-, carbonyl-, etc.). Chlorine is fixed in the residue, where 
ploy-chlorinated compounds are formed. The heat release up to the temperature of 
245°C, calculated by AC data, is  1876 J/g of initial material. The primary residue 
does not show significant thermal degradation effects above 300°C, though a minor 
increase in the released quantity of gas is detected above that temperature. 
• 2-chloro-5-nitrobenzaldehyde: this compound shows a narrow decomposition peak 
above 252°C in DTA tests. The result is confirmed in DSC tests. Together with the 
thermal peak, gas is quickly released (about 0.26 mol/mol of initial material). The 
residue undergoes further decomposition at higher temperatures, releasing heat and 
significant quantities of gases. The whole gas released up to the temperature of 363°C 
in DTA test is about 0.7 mol/mol of initial material. The qualitative behaviour of the 
decomposition is similar to 3- and 4-nitrobenzaldehyde. The material was not tested 
by AC. 
• 4-chloro-3-nitrobenzaldehyde: this compound shows a decomposition peak 
characterized by a steep increase in temperature. The onset of the peak varies among 
139 and 203°C in DTA and DSC tests. However, a heat release of 839 J/g of initial 
material was estimated from DSC runs. The heat of decomposition was almost 
constant, no matter the onset of the stage. The heat release is related to a very modest 
release of gases (about 0.07 mol/mol of initial material). The residue undergoes further 
decomposition at higher temperatures (above 250°C) releasing heat and significant 
quantities of gases. The whole gas released up to the temperature of 367°C in DTA 
test is about 0.8 mol/mol of initial material. The material was not tested by AC. 
The described results of the experimental survey were used as input data in case-studies of 
Section 4. In fact, some applications of the inherent safety assessment tools described in 
Section 2 require data on the decomposition behaviour of processed materials (e.g. thermal 
effects, formation of secondary substances). For instance, §4.5.1 demonstrates the application 
of the procedure defined for hazard assessment of materials (§2.2) to nitrobenzaldehyde. In 
the case-study, the information on the substances that may be released in the decomposition of 
nitrobenzaldehyde are used to identify the hazard footprint of the material. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 4: Case Studies 
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4.0 - Introduction 
 
In the current section the assessment methods presented in sections 1 and 2 are applied to 
several cases studies. Some of the case-studies were defined in collaboration with industries, 
that provided the necessary data on alternative processes, procedures and facilities. 
 
The development and analysis of the case studies aims at two main goals: 
 
• Demonstration: the cases studies presented in the following extensively report 
several applications of the proposed methodologies, demonstrating the use of the 
developed procedures. Moreover, the case studies analyze a wide range of design 
problems, encompassing two different dimensions: type of facility and stage in the 
design activities (Table 4.0.1). The applicability of the tools at any of these case 
studies demonstrates the flexibility and the simple use of the developed portfolio of 
approaches. 
 
• Validation: in the analysis of the cases studies constant attention is paid at the ability 
of the final and intermediate results to match the expected impact profiles. The 
expected profiles are identified “a priori” from expert judgment and process 
experience, that was possible to collect for the analyzed processes. On the reverse, 
whenever the application of the method identified a given aspect as significant, a 
check was made in order to verify the plausibility of the result. 
When possible (e.g. inherent safety assessment), a comparison with existing methods 
was made. However, as discussed in sections 1 and 2, literature approaches show 
several limits in the applicability for design support, preventing the results to be 
compared. 
 
Table 4.0.1 lists the cases studies described in the current section with respect to the type of 
facility and the stage of the design activities. Table 4.0.2 matches the cases-studies with the 
assessment methods that were applied. 
 
  Type of facility 
  Chemical processing Storages Waste disposal 
Material 
selection 
Nitrobenzaldehyde and 
other materials (§4.5)   
Cyclohexanone production 
(§4.3)  
Disposal electronic boards 
(§4.1) Process 
design Hydrogen production 
(§4.4)  
Disposal used solvent 
(§4.2) 
 Hydrogen storage (§4.4)  
Storage and mixing of a 
reactant (§4.6) 
Storage and mixing of a 
reactant (§4.6)  
Plant 
design 
Finishing of an oligomer 
(§4.6)   
Acrylic acid plant layout 
(§4.7) 
Acrylic acid plant layout 
(§4.7)  
St
ag
e 
of
 th
e 
de
sig
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
Layout 
design Gas & oil separation layout 
(§4.7) 
Fuel storage section layout 
(§4.7)  
 
Table 4.0.1: List of the cases studies described in Section 4 with respect to the type of 
facility and the stage of design activities considered. 
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  Assessment method 
 
Case study 
Su
st
ai
na
bi
lit
y 
(§
1.
2)
 
In
he
re
nt
 sa
fe
ty
 o
f m
at
er
ia
ls
 (§
2.
2)
 
In
he
re
nt
 sa
fe
ty
 o
f p
ro
ce
ss
 (§
2.
3)
 
In
he
re
nt
 sa
fe
ty
 o
f l
ay
ou
t (
§2
.4
) 
(§4.1) Disposal electronic boards ?    
(§4.2) Disposal used solvent ?    
(§4.3) Cyclohexanone production  ?  ?  
(§4.4) Hydrogen production  ?  ?  
(§4.4) Hydrogen storage    ? ? 
(§4.5) Nitrobenzaldehyde and other materials   ?   
(§4.6) Storage and mixing of a reactant  ?  ?  
(§4.6) Finishing of an oligomer  ?  ?  
(§4.7) Acrylic acid plant layout     ? 
(§4.7) Gas & oil separation section layout     ? 
(§4.7) Fuel storage section layout     ? 
 
Table 4.0.2: Proposed assessment methods used in the case studies of Section 4. 
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4.1 – Electronic Waste 
 
4.1.1 Case study description 
 
The following case study concerns the analysis of available alternative processes for the 
disposal of waste printed wiring boards (PWB). Printed wiring boards are part of many 
widely used electronic devices (e.g. computers, mobile phones, TV sets and toys). The annual 
world production of PWB was estimated to be of 265 Mm2 in the year 2000 and is constantly 
increasing. Due to the rapid obsolescence of the electronic devices and to the presence of 
hazardous components in PWB [Cui & Forssberg, 2003; Jang & Townsend, 2003; Menad et 
al., 1998], the management of electronic waste is becoming an important problem, as 
recognized also by sector regulations [Directive 2002/95/EC; Directive 2002/96/EC]. On the 
other hand, the recovery of valuable materials present in PWB (gold, silver, tantalum, etc.) is 
economically attractive. Waste PWB usually contain three material fractions: a plastic 
fraction (epoxy cross-linked resin), a metallic fraction (copper, lead, etc.) and an inert fraction 
(usually glass fibers). Brominated organic compounds are frequently employed to improve the 
flame resistance of the plastic fraction in the boards. In some disposal processes, the thermal 
degradation of this plastic fraction is likely to result in the formation of hazardous high-
molecular-weight organobrominated compounds, such as bromophenols, bromodioxins and 
furans [Barontini & Cozzani, 2006; Barontini et al., 2005; Drohmann & Tange, 2002; Sakai 
et al., 2001]. 
Electronic scrap is usually disassembled to different waste streams for the disposal. The 
operations of grinding and mechanical separation produce a waste stream which mainly 
contains the material of the support board (average composition of the stream: 35%w plastic, 
50% of inert and 15% metal). Present study compares four different process alternatives for 
the disposal of this waste stream from printed boards scrap: A) pyrolysis-gasification; B) 
dedicated incineration without energy recovery; C) incineration in a non-dedicated facility 
with energy recovery; and D) landfilling. The landfill disposal option was introduced to test 
the capability of the developed procedure to assess such a solution. 
The potentiality of 400 kg/h of ground PWB waste was assumed as a common reference 
basis. The impacts deriving from the waste transport and from the previous treatments of the 
waste stream were not considered in the present analysis, because they are common to all the 
cases. 
The alternative disposal processes assumed for the analysis were defined from the literature 
data available for existing or pilot plants [Boerrigter, 2001; Vehlow et al., 2002]. The level of 
detail of the alternative definition reflects the typical situation of early stages of process 
design. The features of each disposal alternative are briefly reported in the following. 
 
 
A) Pyrolysis-gasification plant 
 
The considered process (Figure 4.1.1-A) consists in a thermal degradation of the plastic 
fraction of the waste in non oxidative conditions (pyrolysis) at about 550°C. The volatiles 
formed are fed to a catalytic reforming to yield syn-gas. This gas stream is quenched with an 
alkaline solution to remove hydrogen bromide and bromine (if present). The exhaust bromide 
solution, after filtration and neutralization, is not of environmental concern and may be 
disposed or used in other activities (e.g. as biocide, in drilling addictives, for de-icing). The 
purified syn-gas, after scrubbing and activated carbon absorption, is suitable for combustion. 
The gas is thus used in part to heat the pyrolysis oven (around 20%) and in part to generate 
electricity by a gas engine. Energy recovery is actually one of the main advantages of this 
process. The pyrolysis residue (char) is available to be fed to a secondary copper smelter, in 
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order to separate the inorganic part and to recycle copper. However in the present study 
landfilling was considered for this stream as a conservative working hypothesis. 
 
 
B) Dedicated incineration facility 
 
This process alternative (Figure 4.1.1-B) aims at waste volume reduction by a thermal 
oxidative destruction of the waste plastic fraction. Due to the high content of flame retardants, 
combustion must be assisted by a pilot flame, fired by natural gas. The flue gases are 
scrubbed as in the previous process, but it is worth to notice that oxidative conditions enhance 
the formation of bromodioxins [Barontini & Cozzani, 2006; Barontini et al., 2005; Sakai et 
al., 2001]. In order to limit this reaction, a quench must be applied and energy recovery from 
flue gases is not feasible. Also in this case the solid residual was considered to be disposed by 
landfilling. 
 
 
C) Non dedicated incineration facility 
 
As in the previous alternative, this process (Figure 4.1.1-C) aims to volume reduction of the 
waste: in this case combustion is carried out in a waste-to-energy plant, in which the 
electronic scrap (about 3%w) is fed with other wastes that provide the necessary conditions 
for combustion. A combustion efficiency is introduced to account for the possibility of 
incomplete combustion. The plant has a proper flue gas treatment to control dioxins emission 
via activated carbon adsorption. Energy recovery is in place and the quantity of electric 
energy generated allocable to the contribution of the PWB waste stream was calculated. Also 
in this case the combustion residue is landfilled. 
 
D) Landfill 
 
A landfill for the disposal of hazardous waste was considered. Proper devices were supposed 
to be present in order to avoid waste dispersion in the surrounding environment. Thus, 
leaching and gas releases are prevented or, if present, are drained and properly disposed, at 
least in a short term perspective. However occupation of land for a very long time (virtually 
infinite) occurs, and is accounted for by a land use environmental indicator. 
 
 
4.1.2 Results from sustainability assessment 
 
4.1.2.1 – Calculation of Level 1indicators 
 
The input data required for the application of the proposed methodology to this case study 
were derived from the available literature on existing or pilot plants [Boerrigter, 2001; 
Vehlow et al., 2002]. This allowed specifying the process diagram and the main process 
streams. Flow rates and compositions were calculated by material and energy balances. The 
fugitive emissions were assessed by average emission factors for the expected leak points 
within the process diagram (e.g. seals, joints, valves, etc.) [Allen & Shonnard, 2002]. The 
emission of micro-pollutant from the utilities (e.g. power generation, furnaces, etc.) were 
evaluated by emission factors from available databases [EPA, WPa]. The main material and 
energy flows across the system boundaries are reported in Table 4.1.2. The main sources of 
emissions are the off-gases from combustion in the pyrolysis oven and in the syn-gas fired 
engine for power generation. 
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Figure 4.1.1:  Diagrams of the alternative processes analysed for the disposal of waste from 
electronic scrap: boundary definition and main flows. A) Pyrolysis-gasification plant, B) 
Dedicated incineration facility, C) Incineration in a non-dedicated facility, D) Landfill. 
 
 
Air emissions Stack Fugitive  Total Unit 
     CO2 2.10·106   2.10·106 kg/y 
     NOx 7.35·103   7.35·103 kg/y 
     CO 4.82·103 1.88·103  6.70·103 kg/y 
     HBr 1.85·103 3.52·102  2.20·103 kg/y 
     Br2 1.82·103   1.82·103 kg/y 
     Volatile organic mix 1.02·103 6.16·102  1.64·103 kg/y 
     Dioxins and furans 7.08·10-8   7.08·10-8 kg/y 
Waste To disposal     
     Char 2.24·106   2.24·106 kg/y 
Resources Consumed Produced    
     Electric power 3.50·101 1.80·102  1.45·102 kW 
 
Table 4.1.2: Material and energetic flows relevant to pyrolysis-gasification alternative of 
disposal of waste from electronic scrap. 
 
 
 
The more important pieces of equipment were preliminary sized, allowing the estimation of 
the plant capital cost [Matche; WP; Perry & Green, 1997] necessary for economic 
evaluations and of the hold-ups required for inherent safety analysis. Material, energy and 
operative costs were evaluated multiplying the calculated flow rates by average unitary costs 
from various sources [IChemE, 2002; Perry & Green, 1997]. The specific equivalent number 
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of employees necessary for process activities was estimated by expert judgment based on 
similar activities. The estimation of the number of employees is necessary for the assessment 
of both occupational and economic indices. 
 
The level 1 indicators may be directly obtained from the input data by the application of 
specific rules for each category of impact. In the following these rules are detailed and a 
calculation example of the procedure is provided for the “pyrolysis-gasification” alternative 
for electronic scrap waste disposal (alternative process A in Figure 4.1.1). Since the general 
procedure is common to all the applications, the detailed assessment of the indicators for the 
other process alternatives is not reported here for sake of brevity. 
 
All the environmental indicators considered in this case study are assessed following the 
principle of potential impact benchmarking [Allen & Shonnard, 2002; Chen et al., 2002; 
Pennington et al., 2000]. Thus they are expressed as a quantity of an equivalent reference 
material by an equivalence factor named potential impact factor (see 1.2.3). The values of the 
potential impact factors applied in the assessment of option A are shown in Table 4.1.3. 
For some impact categories consolidated values from the literature (e.g. Allen & Shonnard, 
[2002]) are suitable for the discussed method. For toxic and carcinogenic air emissions and 
for solid waste disposal specific approaches described in 1.2.3 were followed to define the 
impact factor. The data on toxicity and carcinogenicity of the substances of concern are 
collected from suitable databases [CDC,WP; EPA, WPc]. 
 
For example, the nitrogen dioxide is reported to be a greenhouse, acidifying and toxic 
compound. The global warming and acidification potential for this compound is evaluated by 
the standard approach described by Pennington et al., [2000]. In particular the values 
tabulated by Allen & Shonnard, [2002] were used in current case study (Table 4.1.3). For as
 
 
 GWP RAP SFP TAP CAP WDP 
CO2 1.0·100      
NO2 4.0·101 7.0·10-1  3.0·102   
CO    2.4·101   
HBr  4.0·10-1  7.4·103   
Br2  4.0·10-1  3.8·103   
Volatile organic mix   8.7·10-1 1.6·102   
Dioxins and furans    1.2·105 1.3·106  
Hazardous waste      9.0·100 
Reference 
[Allen & 
Shonnard, 
2002] 
[Allen & 
Shonnard, 
2002] 
[Allen & 
Shonnard, 
2002] 
C.f 
[CDC,WP]
C.f. 
[EPA, 
WPc] 
C.f. 
[Saling et 
al., 2002] 
 
Table 4.1.3: Example of potential impact factors applied in Level 1 impact indicators 
assessment of pyrolysis-gasification alternative for disposal of waste from electronic scrap. 
GWP: global warming potential, RAP: rain acidification potential, SFP: smog formation 
potential, TAP: acute toxicity in air potential, CAP: carcinogenicity in air potential, WDP: 
solid waste disposal hazard potential, C.f. : calculated from data in the reference. 
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 concerns the air toxicity potential, data on LC50 to be used in Equation (1.2.2) for rats are 
derived from NIOSH database [CDC, WP] for both nitrogen dioxide ( 88ppm/4h ) and the 
benchmark reference toluene ( 49g/m3 /4h ). The straightforward application of Equation 
(1.2.2) leads to the value reported in Table 4.1.3: 
300
]/[49
1
]/[17.0
1
3
3
2
==
mg
mg
TAPNO        (4.1.1) 
 
The solid waste disposals are assessed within the category of landfilled wastes, since landfill 
is assumed to be the worst disposal option. As a working hypothesis, the ratio of the average 
disposal cost of the waste of concern to that of municipal waste is used as potential impact 
factor. The disposal cost is in general representative of the hazard due to the different 
standards necessary for landfilling a type of waste [Saling et al., 2002]. 
The land use indicator is related to the occupation of land. In particular, in the present case 
study, the impact is assessed for process alternative D, where the landfill facility occupies a 
significant land area for a long time span (virtually infinite). In that case, the occupied area 
per unit of disposed waste is evaluated by data of similar facilities. 
 
The impact category of resource consumption is related to the material and energy flows 
entering the process. In particular, in current case study, the use of fossil fuels and of 
electrical power is of concern. Fuel consumption is assessed with respect to the energy 
released corrected by a penalty factor that is related to the emission of toxic combustion 
products. The electrical power is straightforward evaluated as an energy consumption rate. 
 
 
Capital cost 1.11·106 € 
Annual income 1.44·106 €/y 
Annual costs 7.23·105 €/y 
Net Present Value 3.43·106 € 
 
Table 4.1.4: Example of economic data used the assessment of pyrolysis-gasification 
alternative for disposal of waste from electronic scrap. 
 
 
The flow data presented in Table 4.1.2 are combined with the pertinent potential impact 
factors (Table 4.1.3) by Equation (1.2.1) according to the rules defined in §1.2.3. The 
calculation yields the Level 1 environmental indicators for the various impact categories. The 
values obtained are reported in Table 4.1.4. For example, the global warming indicator for 
process option A is calculated as in the following: 
=+= ANONOAACOCOAAGW xx mPIFmPIFI ,,,,, 22
 ykg eqCO /1039.21035.7401010.20.1 2
636 ⋅=⋅⋅+⋅⋅=    (4.1.2) 
 
The input data on operative (raw material, sales, labor, etc.) and capital costs allow 
calculating parameters relevant to the assessment of the economic impact. Some of the 
intermediate values are reported in Table 4.1.4. The Net Present Value (NPVi) over the plant 
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life (n) is calculated from estimated annual cash flows (Ct,i) and discount rate (r) by equation 
(4.2.3): 
∑
= +=
n
t
t
it
i r
C
NPV
0
,
)1(
         (4.2.3) 
 
The net present value is multiplied by -1 to yield the net potential economic impact index 
(NPEI), that is the economic indicator used in the assessment framework. The change of sign 
is introduced since impact indices must have a higher value in the worst case. 
 
The data on process scheme, operative conditions, material flow rates and inventories are the 
input for the assessment of the inherent safety index. In current case study the Mond Fire, 
Explosion and Toxicity Index [ICI Mond, 1985; Tyler, 1985] is used as inherent safety index. 
In particular the Overall Risk Factor of the Mond index approach is calculated for the 
principal units of the process by the procedure described in the Mond Guide [ICI Mond, 
1985]. Table 4.1.5 reports an example of intermediate results in the application of the Mond 
procedure to the gas reformer in process alternative A (pyrolysis-gasification plant). The 
higher index value among the units is assumed as hazard index for the process alternative. 
 
 
 Value 
Material factor 21 
Hazard factors  
Special material hazards 30 
General process hazards 50 
Special process hazards 265 
Layout hazards 50 
Overall risk factor 428 
 
Table 4.1.5: Example of intermediate values in the assessment of Mond Index for the gas 
reformer in the pyrolysis-gasification alternative for disposal of waste from electronic scrap. 
 
 
The occupational index is calculated multiplying the previously evaluated number of 
employees by -1. As in the case of NPEI, the change of sign is necessary since impact indices 
must have a higher value in the worst case. 
 
The resulting values of the considered set of Level 1 indicators for all the options are reported 
in Table 4.1.6. The table clearly shows that the first result obtained by the application of the 
proposed procedure was to point out the major differences among the impact of the different 
alternatives considered for the disposal of the PWB waste stream. The data in Table 2 
evidence that, as expected, relevant differences are present among the values of the 
environmental impact indicator for landfilling with respect to those of the other processes. 
The main impact of landfilling is in land-use, while all the other processes result in impacts 
related to emission of greenhouse-gases and of airborne micropollutants. Among the thermal 
disposal processes, dedicated incineration is that showing the worst performances with respect 
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to global warming and natural gas consumption (since the process is not autothermal), 
although it has the best performances with respect to the emission of acidifying and toxic 
compounds. 
The inherent safety index also shows relevant differences among the processes. Landfilling is 
the process showing the worst performance, due to the possibility of accidental combustion of 
wastes, while the pyrolysis-gasification alternative is also penalized due to the formation and 
the treatment of a flammable gas in the process. 
 
 
 Impact indicator Pyrolysis – gasification
Dedicated 
incineration
Non-
dedicated 
incineration
Landfill Unit 
Norm. 
Factor 
(unit/km2) 
Level 1        
Global warming 2.39·106 2.47·106 2.32·106 0.00 kg/y 1.16·106 
Rain Acidification 6.75·103 3.00·103 3.61·103 0.00 kg/y 4.83·103 
Smog Formation 1.43·103 1.53·101 1.53·101 0.00 kg/y 5.63·103 
Air toxicity 2.57·107 2.13·107 3.06·107 0.00 kg/y 3.79·105 
Air carcinogenicity 9.20·10-2 1.29 3.32·101 0.00 kg/y 2.06·101 
Solid waste disposal 2.02·107 1.89·107 1.95·107 0.00 kg/y 2.32·105 
Land use 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.17·10-3 km2/y 2.34·10-5 
Natural Gas 0.00 1.50 0.00 0.00 TJ/y 4.02·101 
Environment 
Electric Power -1.16·106 0.00 -1.94·106 0.00 kWh/y 1.10·106 
Economy NPEI -3.43·106 -3.00·106 -3.78·106 -5.04·106 Euro05 2.83·106 
Occupational index -1.50·101 -1.50·101 -1.50·101 -9.00 People 7.92·101 
Society 
Inherent Safety 4.28·102 1.90·101 1.90·101 1.43·104 Score 1.06·103 
 
Table 4.1.6: Values of Level 1 impact indicators calculated for disposal of waste from 
electronic scrap. 
 
 
4.1.2.2 – Normalization and aggregation 
 
Table 4.1.6 also reports the normalization factors used in the procedure. The normalization 
factors assumed were calculated from the reference background data available for a site in the 
North of Italy. Table 4.1.7 reports the corresponding normalized values of the indicators, as 
obtained by Equation 1.2.7. 
The normalized values of the environmental indicators allow the comparative assessment of 
the main impacts of the alternative processes based on external references. As shown in the 
table, two main criticalities are present: i) waste stream disposal for all the alternative 
processes; and ii) emission of hazardous airborne toxic compounds from the thermal 
processes. In the case of landfilling, waste stream disposal concerns the entire waste stream, 
while in the thermal processes the impact is related to the disposal of the residual solid 
fraction obtained from the thermal treatment. The criticality of these aspects is clearly related 
to the characteristics of the waste streams. As a matter of fact, the thermally degradable 
fraction is only a part of the overall waste stream (about 30% by weight [Barontini & 
Cozzani, 2006]). On the other hand, the potential formation of highly hazardous compounds 
in the thermal processing of PWB was demonstrated in several previous studies [Barontini & 
Cozzani, 2006; Barontini et al., 2005; Sakai et al., 2001]. The identification of critical 
elements at this level of the analysis is a key issue for driving improvements in further steps 
of the design process (e.g. research for technologies/operative conditions for reducing toxic 
compound emissions). 
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Impact index Pyrolysis – gasification 
Dedicated 
incineration 
Non-
dedicated 
incineration 
Landfill Weight Factor 
Level 1 (normalized)      
Global warming 2.05 2.12 1.99 0.00 0.051 
Rain Acidification 1.40 0.62 0.75 0.00 0.066 
Smog Formation 0.25 0.003 0.003 0.00 0.049 
Air toxicity 67.95 56.21 80.75 0.00 0.095 
Air carcinogenicity 0.004 0.06 1.61 0.00 0.168 
Solid waste disposal 87.09 81.35 83.86 0.00 0.030 
Land use 0.00 0.00 0.00 135.30 0.081 
Natural Gas 0.00 0.037 0.00 0.00 0.044 
Environment 
Electric Power -1.05 0.00 -1.76 0.00 0.064 
Economy NPEI -1.21 -1.06 -1.34 -1.78  
Occupational index -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.11 0.200 
Society 
Inherent Safety 0.40 0.018 0.018 13.42 0.800 
 
Table 4.1.7: Normalized values of Level 1 indicators for disposal of waste from electronic 
scrap. 
 
 
Impact index Pyrolysis – gasification 
Dedicated 
incineration 
Non-
dedicated 
incineration 
Landfill Weight Factor 
Level 2       
Environment 9.18 7.92 10.47 10.90 0.300 
Economy -1.21 -1.06 -1.34 -1.78 0.300 
Society 0.29 -0.02 -0.02 10.71 0.400 
Level 3       
Overall Index 2.51 2.05 2.73 7.02  
Overall Index (normalized) 0.36 0.29 0.39 1.00  
 
Table 4.1.8: Normalized values of Level 1 indicators and values of Level 2 and 3 indices 
calculated for case-study 1 (waste PWB disposal). 
 
 
The weight factors used in the first step of aggregation are also reported in the Table 4.1.7. 
Table 4.1.8 reports the values calculated for Level 2 (aggregated) and Level 3 (overall) 
indices and the other weight factors used. 
As discussed in §1.2.5, the choice of weight factors is based on decisions concerning the local 
sustainability policy. In the present case-study, weight factors were chosen on the basis of the 
relative importance given in the Italian national policy to the reduction of emissions, 
economic growth and societal problems, provided the historical data and the compliance to 
international agreements (e.g. Kyoto Protocol, Goteborg Protocol, etc.). However, it must be 
remarked that the general approach developed in the present study may be applied as well 
using alternative weight factors, although selected on the basis of the criteria discussed. 
 
The fingerprint of the impacts of the different process alternatives on the three main aspects of 
sustainability (environmental, economic, societal) are reported in Figure 4.1.2. The figure 
evidences that landfilling is the alternative that shows the highest environmental and societal 
impact, although is the more advantageous with respect to the economic aspects. Pyrolysis-
 §4.1 - 9
gasification also shows a relevant societal impact, having a wider impact fingerprint with 
respect to the other thermal processes. A more detailed comparison among the Level 2 indices 
is reported in Table 4.1.8. The table confirms that the societal index is that showing the wider 
differences (up to three orders of magnitude) among the proposed alternatives. More limited 
variations (less than a factor 2) are present in the values of the environmental and economic 
indices. The table also reports the value of the overall sustainability index for the proposed 
alternatives. As shown in the table, the overall index calculated by the weight factors reported 
in the table is mainly influenced by the differences in the inherent safety and environmental 
impact of the different processes. Thus, landfilling results, as expected, the less sustainable 
process, having an overall impact more than three times higher with respect to the other 
processes. Lower differences (less than a factor 1.5) are present among the other alternatives. 
Thermal methods are found to have almost equivalent overall impacts, although non-
dedicated incineration is penalized as well by safety and environmental impact factors, and 
dedicated incineration emerges as the more sustainable process. The analysis of the results 
obtained for the indices at the different levels of the hierarchy is the basis of the decision 
making process among the alternatives. The defined performance indices allow outlining the 
impact fingerprint of the alternative options both in terms of difference between alternatives 
and as impact significance respect to the external reference. 
 
Environment
Society Economy
10.0
1.0
0.1
-0.1
-1.0
Pyrolysis-gasification
Dedicated incineration
Non-dedicated incineration
Landfill
 
 
Figure 4.1.2: Radar diagram representing the impact footprint of the disposal processes 
analysed in the present study. 
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4.1.2.3 – Sensitivity analysis 
 
The results obtained for the overall index are obviously influenced by the weight factors used 
in the procedure. As remarked in §1.2.6, uncertainties may be present in the value attributed 
to these parameters. A sensitivity analysis was performed to assess the influence of these 
uncertainties on the results of the method. A Monte Carlo method was used to calculate the 
resulting distribution of the aggregated indices (the overall index and the Level 2 indices) and 
the contribution of the different weight factors to the variance of the results. A beta 
distribution of probability is arbitrary associated to each weight factor (α=β=4 and a 20% 
maximum variation of the values in Table 4.1.7 and 4.1.8 are assumed). 
 
Table 4.1.9 shows the contribution to the variance of the overall index in the current case 
study. Only two weight factors showed a relevant contribution to variance. Moreover, these 
are the same for all the processes involving thermal treatments, confirming that the critical 
impacts of these processes are the same (environmental aspects and, mainly, air toxicity). 
The probability distribution of the difference between overall sustainability indexes for 
selected couples of process alternatives was calculated by Monte Carlo runs. The analysis of 
the cumulative distributions allows identifying the likelihood of changes in the impact ranking 
of the alternatives. Figure 4.1.3 shows the cumulative probability of the values calculated for 
the difference between the overall sustainability impact indices for the different processes. As 
shown in the figure, a change of sign of the difference (that implies a change in the impact 
ranking among the alternatives) is extremely unlikely to take place. Thus, the analysis 
evidenced that a limited uncertainty in the selection of the weight factors seems not critical for 
the identification of the process alternative that has the lowest impact on sustainability. It may 
be concluded that the use of the overall sustainability index provided in Table 4.1.8 and of the 
impact fingerprint provided in Figure 4.1.2 allow at least a preliminary screening of the 
expected impact on sustainability of the different process alternatives. Moreover, the case-
study evidenced that the preliminary data available during early process design are sufficient 
to carry out a sustainability assessment by the developed procedure. 
 
 
Pyrolysis – gasification Dedicated incineration Non-dedicated incineration Landfill 
Environment 6.2·10-1 Environment 6.5E-01 Environment 6.3·10-1 Inherent Safety 4.4·10-1 
Air toxicity 3.1·10-1 Air toxicity 2.8E-01 Air toxicity 3.2·10-1 Economy 3.2·10-1 
Waste disposal 5.0·10-2 Waste disposal 5.7E-02 Waste disposal 3.4·10-2 Land use 2.4·10-1 
Economy 1.5·10-2 Economy 9.2E-03 Economy 8.1·10-3 Environment 3.3·10-5 
Inherent Safety 2.8·10-3 Inherent Safety 4.3E-04 Air carcinog. 5.1·10-4 Global warming 1.8·10-5 
Global warming 1.3·10-4 Global warming 1.7E-04 Inherent Safety 2.3·10-4 Air toxicity 1.6·10-5 
Rain acidification 2.1·10-5 Air carcinog. 1.5E-05 Global warming 9.4·10-5 Ozone depletion 1.1·10-5 
Electrical Power 1.2·10-5 Electrical Power 6.9E-06 Electrical Power 3.3·10-5 Air carcinog. 1.0·10-5 
Air carcinog. 9.7·10-6 Natural gas 6.1E-06 Natural gas 6.5·10-6 Rain acidificatio. 4.0·10-6 
Natural gas 6.0·10-6 Ozone depletion 4.2E-06 Ozone depletion 3.4·10-6 Natural gas 3.1·10-6 
Ozone depletion 2.9·10-6 Land use 2.1E-06 Land use 1.7·10-6 Electrical Power 1.5·10-6 
Land use 2.0·10-6 Rain acidificatio. 1.1E-06 Rain acidificatio. 6.0·10-7 Smog formation 1.4·10-6 
Smog formation 1.1·10-6 Smog formation 1.2E-07 Smog formation 6.8·10-9 Waste disposal 1.8·10-8 
 
Table 4.1.9: Contribution to the variance of the overall indexes calculated for the weighing 
factors. A beta distribution of each weight assumed with α = β = 4 and a maximum range of 
±20% of initial values were assumed. 
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Figure 4.1.3: Distribution of cumulative probabilities for the difference between the overall 
sustainability indexes for selected couples of alternative options. a) Non-dedicated 
incineration - Pyrolysis–gasification; b) Pyrolysis–gasification - Dedicated incineration; c) 
Landfill - Non-dedicated incineration 
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4.2 – Solvent Recovery 
 
4.2.1 – Case study description 
 
This case-study concerns the analysis of the disposal alternatives for waste liquid organic 
solvents. Organic solvents are commonly used in many industrial activities and in year 2002 
the world demand of solvents was around 17.5 Gg. Several industrial activities result in the 
production of waste streams of exhaust solvents. These waste solvents may have a wide range 
of possible compositions, depending on the specific industrial activity and on the specific 
process operation that results in the production of the waste. In the present case study, a 
model composition is assumed for a solvent waste from a paint production plant. The disposal 
of a stream of medium-low boiling solvent contaminated by 1%w of chromate salt (i.e. 
strontium chromate) is considered. Disposal of this waste is a critical issue due to the many 
threats present: liquid phase, volatile components, toxicological relevance of some chemicals 
used as solvents or pigments, formation of unstable compounds (e.g. peroxides). 
The design of disposal alternatives for waste must take into account that both energy recovery 
and the recovery of solvent for reuse may be economically attractive. However, process safety 
may play an important role in the selection among alternatives, since the waste stream is a 
flammable liquid in which peroxides or other unstable substances may be present [Cozzani et 
al., 1999]. Moreover, the chromium (VI) of the stream is toxic and carcinogen. 
Three process alternatives derived from industrial practice were assessed for the treatment of 
this waste stream: A) incineration in a dedicated facility with energy recovery; B) solvent 
recovery for reuse; and C) landfilling. The disposal of a 1000 kg/h stream was considered. 
Also in this case, the level of information is comparable to typical early stages of process 
design. 
 
 
A) Dedicated incineration 
 
This process aims at elimination of the waste stream by combustion in controlled and safe 
conditions. The process (Figure 4.2.1-A) is designed in order to assure the typical emission 
values of an hazardous waste incinerator, equipped with a proper flue-gas treatment 
(scrubbing, filtering, etc.). The main fraction of chromium is found in the combustion ashes 
and, after proper treatment, is delivered to an hazardous waste landfill. Due to solvent 
flammability, the combustion is supposed to be almost complete. Provided that the waste is 
halogen-free, no formation of halogenated dioxins is considered. The process greatly reduces 
the volume of the waste and destroys all the flammable and thermally unstable components. 
Besides, the energy recovery on the flue gas generates electric power that is accounted in the 
assessment. 
 
 
B) Solvent recovery 
 
This process consists in the distillation of the waste stream to recover a commercial solvent 
mixture. The process is attractive both from an environmental (reuse) and from an economic 
(valuable product) point of view. A batch distillation process is considered (Figure 4.2.1-B). 
The distillation residue in the evaporation vessel contains almost all the chromium salt and is 
disposed off by landfilling. In the present analysis it is conservatively estimated that around 
5% of the waste solvent is present in the residual. 
Safety is the major problem concerning this process alternative: thermally unstable 
compounds may be present (e.g. peroxides), that may lead to explosive decomposition when 
 §4.2 - 2 
heated. In order to limit this hazard, samples of each batch of processed solvent must be 
thermally tested [Cozzani et al., 1999]. Safety limits should also be introduced for the 
maximum process temperatures. 
The process requires heat for the distillation and nitrogen for equipment blanketing. The heat 
is generated in a proper device by natural gas combustion, and the emissions of this utility are 
included in the assessment. The nitrogen is separated from air off-site. However, the electrical 
power consumption required for nitrogen production is considered in present analysis. 
 
 
C) Landfill 
 
A landfill for the disposal of barrels of the hazardous waste was considered. Proper devices 
were supposed to be present in order to avoid waste dispersion in the surrounding 
environment. Thus, emissions are prevented or, if present, are drained or captured and 
properly disposed, at least in a short term perspective. However occupation of land for a very 
long time (virtually infinite) occurs, and is accounted for by a land use environmental 
indicator. 
It is worth to notice that on the very long term there are two main possible release events: 
release of volatile organic compounds and release of chromium salts. The first one is expected 
to occur at a very slow time rates: thus no significant effects derive from it. The second, even 
if at slow rate can be hazardous. Nevertheless, it has to be considered that, in a long term 
perspective, this release is common to all the disposal options under analysis, since most of 
the chromium salt is landfilled in any case. Although the elimination of chromium from paints 
is the inherent approach to this problem, this issues was not considered in the current 
assessment, since it falls out of the scopes of the present study (i.e. comparison of disposal 
options for an already existing stream). 
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Figure 4.2.1: Alternative processes analysed for the disposal of waste solvents: boundary 
definition and main flows. A) Dedicated incinerator, B) Solvent recovery, C) Landfill. 
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4.2.2 – Results from sustainability assessment 
 
The assessment procedure described in §1.2 and demonstrated in detail for the case-study of 
electronic waste disposal (§4.1), applies similarly also to this one. Hence, for sake of brevity, 
only the final results of the indices will be presented and discussed. 
 
Tables 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 summarize the results obtained from the analysis of the waste solvent 
disposal options. As shown in the tables, quite different results were obtained for the impact 
indices of the different processes. This is shown by Figure 4.2.2, that reports the impact 
fingerprint of the process alternatives. As evident from the figure, the three alternatives have 
the main impact in different sectors: combustion and landfilling have a main impact on 
environment, solvent recovery on societal aspects (due to the higher safety problems 
associated with the process). 
 
Also in this case landfilling resulted the process having a higher impact on sustainability. 
Moreover, the results obtained for the overall index evidence again the importance of 
introducing inherent safety and economic factors in the assessment. As a matter of fact, the 
overall impact on sustainability may be high for processes as solvent recovery, that have a 
low environmental impact with respect to combustion, but that seem to “shift” the impact to 
other compartments (in the specific case, to societal aspects). 
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Figure 4.2.2: Radar diagram representing the impact footprint of the disposal processes 
analysed in the present study. 
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 Impact indicator Dedicated incineration 
Solvent 
recovery Landfill Unit 
Norm. Factor 
(unit/km2) 
Level 1       
Global warming 2.02·107 3.53·105 0.00 kg/y 1.16·106 
Rain Acidification 1.43·104 9.20·101 0.00 kg/y 4.83·103 
Smog Formation 2.06·103 4.26·103 0.00 kg/y 5.63·103 
Air toxicity 6.18·106 5.02·104 0.00 kg/y 3.79·105 
Air carcinogenicity 3.26·105 1.36·105 0.00 kg/y 2.10·103 
Solid waste 
disposal 6.10·10
5 4.18·106 0.00 kg/y 2.32·105 
Land use 0.00 0.00 1.32·10-2 km2/y 2.34·10-5 
Natural Gas 0.00 5.41 0.00 TJ/y 4.02·101 
Electric Power -2.43·107 2.19·104 0.00 kWh/y 1.10·106 
Environment 
Solvent 0.00 -7.52·106 0.00 kg/y 3.66·105 
Economy NPEI -1.64·107 -2.44·107 -8.40·106 Euro05 2.83·106 
Occupational index -1.50·101 -1.50·101 -9.00 People 7.92·101 
Society 
Inherent Safety 8.01·102 2.49·104 1.67·104 Score 1.06·103 
 
Table 4.2.1: Values of Level 1 impact indicators calculated for case-study on waste solvent 
disposal. 
 
 
Impact index Dedicated incineration 
Solvent 
recovery Landfill 
Weight 
Factor 
Level 1 (normalized)     
Global warming 17.33 0.30 0.00 0.051 
Rain Acidification 2.96 0.02 0.00 0.066 
Smog Formation 0.37 0.76 0.00 0.049 
Air toxicity 16.32 0.13 0.00 0.095 
Air carcinogenicity 154.89 64.82 0.00 0.168 
Solid waste disposal 2.63 18.02 0.00 0.030 
Land use 0.00 0.00 563.77 0.081 
Natural Gas 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.044 
Electric Power -22.04 0.02 0.00 0.064 
Environment 
Solvent 0.00 -20.52 0.00 0.031 
Economy NPEI -5.80 -8.61 -2.97  
Occupational index -0.19 -0.19 -0.11 0.2 
Society 
Inherent Safety 0.75 23.43 15.74 0.8 
Level 2      
Environment 27.36 10.87 45.42 0.3 
Economy -5.80 -8.61 -2.97 0.3 
Society 0.56 18.71 12.57 0.4 
Level 3      
Overall Index 6.69 8.16 17.76  
Overall Index (normalized) 0.38 0.46 1.00  
 
Table 4.2.2: Normalized values of Level 1 indicators and values of Level 2 and 3 indices 
calculated for the case-study. 
 
 §4.2 - 5
 
The results obtained for the overall index are obviously influenced by the weight factors used 
in the procedure. A sensitivity analysis was performed by the Monte Carlo approach 
described in §1.2.6. A beta distribution of probability is arbitrary associated to each weight 
factor (α=β=4 and a 20% maximum variation of the values in Table 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 are 
assumed). 
In particular it was possible to calculate the distribution of the differences of overall indices. 
As discussed in §1.2.6, the options were ranked according to the value of the overall index in 
Table 4.2.2: i) Landfill; ii) Solvent recovery; iii) Dedicated incineration. Then the cumulative 
distribution is calculated by random runs for the differences of consecutive ranks: a) 
(Landfill-Solvent recovery) and b) (Solvent recovery-Dedicated incineration). The result is 
shown in Figure 4.2.3. As shown in the figure, a change of sign of the difference (that implies 
a change in the impact ranking among the alternatives) is extremely unlikely to take place 
(e.g. it is lower than 6%, under the assumed hypothesis, for the difference “b)”). 
 
Thus, the sensitivity analysis evidenced that the final values of the impact factors are not 
critically affected by limited uncertainties in the values selected for the weight factors. 
Therefore, as shown in Figure 4.2.2 and in Table 4.2.2, the application of the developed 
methodology allows the preliminary assessment of the main expected impacts of process 
alternatives, based on a limited set of preliminary data available in early process design. 
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Figure 4.2.3: Distribution of cumulative probabilities for the difference between the overall 
sustainability indexes for selected couples of alternative options. a) Landfill-Solvent recovery; 
b) Solvent recovery-Dedicated incineration. 
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4.3 – Cyclohexanone 
 
This chapter reports a case study concerning the comparison of alternative options for the 
industrial production of cyclohexanone, in the early stages of process design. Both 
sustainability (§4.3.2) and inherent safety assessment methods (§4.3.3) are applied in the 
following. 
 
 
4.3.1 – Case study description 
 
Cyclohexanone is an important intermediate in chemical industry. It is principally used as 
feedstock in the production of nylon 6,6 (via cyclohexanone-oxime) and of adipic acid (via 
oxidation by nitric acid). Other application include use as solvent and as feedstock for fine 
chemicals (pharmaceutics and agrochemicals). The world production was 3 billions of kg in 
1990, about 97% was converted to ε-caprolactam or adipic acid [Kirk-Othmer, 1992]. 
 
In the  following five alternative processes are compared for the production of cyclohexanone. 
They are based on alternative chemical routes and represent the evolution, over the time, of 
the production technologies. The information required for the definition of the alternative 
process schemes was obtained from the scientific literature, patents, informal contacts with 
producers and engineering experience. Common boundaries were chosen for the options: the 
analysis extends from the same initial raw material (i.e. benzene) to the final product 
cyclohexanone. The boundaries include the allocable fraction of the utilities (e.g. boilers, 
wastewater treatment) that are necessary for the process. Storage of the raw materials, 
products and intermediates is not considered. A production potential of cyclohexanone in the 
final step of 98Gg/year was assumed as reference basis for all the cases. 
 
 
4.3.1.1 – Process A: synthesis via oxidation of cyclohexane 
 
The first industrial application of this process date back to the 40s. The process is notorious 
for the Flixborough accident [Lees, 1996], where a vapour cloud explosion took place 
following the loss of containment in the reactor of an oxidation plant. The whole process 
(Figure 4.3.1) can be divided in two main steps [Ullmann,1987; Kirk-Othmer, 1992; Crouch, 
1960]: 
i) synthesis of cyclohexane (hydrogenation of benzene) 
ii) synthesis of cyclohexanone (oxidation of cyclohexane) 
 
The first step follows the reaction: 
126266 3 HCHHC →+         (4.3.1) 
 
The reaction is exothermic and temperature must be kept below 300°C (thermodynamic 
equilibrium favourites benzene at higher temperatures). Pressure is usually between 20 and 30 
MPa. Methylcyclopentane may be formed as side-product, but catalytic systems based on 
nickel, palladium and platinum on alumina are selective toward the desired product. The 
reactor is operated in vapour phase with inter-cooled stages. Benzene conversion is almost 
complete. The hydrogen in the reactor output (hydrogen is fed to the reactor in stoichiometric 
excess) is separated from the condensable fraction and recycled back to the reactor feed. A 
fraction of the cyclohexane is recycled to the reactor as thermal inert. 
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The second step of the process is based on cyclohexane oxidation. The reaction system can be 
divided in two stages: 
 
OOHHCOHC 1162126 →+         (4.3.2) 
 
OHOHCOOHHC 2106116 +→  
22126116 17
6
17
6
17
16 COOHOHCOOHHC ++→      (4.3.3) 
tssideproducOOHHC →116  
 
In the first stage, the cyclohexane is oxidized by air, yielding cyclohexyl-hydroperoxide. The 
peroxide may undergo decomposition to the desired products (cyclohexanone and 
cyclohexanol) as well as to other undesired side-products. The decomposition of the 
hydroperoxide should be avoided in the oxidation reactor, since the oxidation of the 
decomposition products is easier than oxidation of cyclohexane, resulting in the formation of 
a large number of side-products. Thus, the two stages of reaction (cyclohexane oxidation and 
hydroperoxide decomposition) are segregated in different units, in order to enhance the yield 
in the desired products. 
In the oxidation reactors (1.5÷4.0 MPa, 175÷220 °C, residence times 2÷10 minutes), the 
conversion of cyclohexanone is maintained low (2÷5%). The principal side-products of 
oxidation are minor fractions of low and high-boiling acids and aliphatic alcohols. Due to the 
low conversion, separation and recycle of the unreacted cyclohexane is fundamental for the 
process. The operative and capital costs of the plant are consequently affected by the large 
recycle. The amount of air fed to the reactor is dosed and diluted with inert gas so to limit the 
unreacted oxygen in the gaseous mixture leaving the reactor (below 0,2%vol). This enhances 
selectivity to cyclohexyl hydroperoxide and improves safety. The cyclohexane in the exhaust 
gas stream is condensed and recycled back to the reactor. The liquid output of the reactor is 
sent to a column in order to separate the bulk of unreacted cyclohexane that, after decanting to 
remove water and soluble low-boiling acids, is recycled to the reactor. The bottoms of the 
column are sent to the decomposition reactor.  
The decomposition of the hydroperoxide is carried on in a dedicated reactor, in alkaline 
environment, free of oxygen. A water solution of sodium hydroxide is used for the 
decomposition. The aqueous fraction of the reactor output is separated in a decanter. This 
aqueous stream removes the sodium salts of the high-boiling acids presents in the side-
reaction products and need to be treated in order to be disposed. In the analysed process 
scheme, the steam is neutralized by mixing with a waste acid steams from other processes, 
and the organic fraction is removed by electro-oxidation. The resulting salt solution is a 
marketable product (e.g. de-icing applications). The oily-phase from the decanter is distilled 
and the fraction of cyclohexane sill present is separated and recycled back to the oxidation 
reactor. Cyclohexanone is vacuum distilled from the bottoms of the former column. A further 
distillation step removes high boiling products from cyclohexanol. Cyclohexanol is processed 
in a dehydrogenation section. Here it is vaporized and converted to cyclohexanone by 
catalytic de-hydrogenation in gas phase (250÷450°C, 0.1÷0.15 MPa). The reaction is 
endothermic and reaches yields of about 80%. The stream leaving the reactor is cooled, 
hydrogen is separated and the condensate is vacuum distilled to separate cyclohexanone. 
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Figure 4.3.1: Simplified PFD for process scheme A (synthesis via oxidation of cyclohexane) 
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4.3.1.2 – Process B: synthesis via hydration of cyclohexene 
 
This option is an innovative process, first proposed in the 90s by Asahi. The whole process 
can be divided in three main steps: 
i. synthesis of cyclohexene (hydrogenation of benzene) 
ii. synthesis of cyclohexanol (hydration of cyclohexene) 
iii. synthesis of cyclohexanone (de-hydrogenation of cyclohexanol) 
 
The first step (hydrogenation of benzene) is based on the following reaction: 
106266 2 HCHHC →+         (4.3.4) 
The reaction is occurs in liquid phase (40atm, 140°C, slurry of Ru-Ti-Zn catalyst). The heat of 
reaction is removed by external exchangers. Non reacted hydrogen is recycled. Conversion is 
not complete (about 50%) and selectivity is limited (35% yield), the main byproducts being 
cyclohexane (about 0.5% of methyl-cyclopentane is also produced). The liquid mixture 
leaving the reactor is filtered, in order to remove the catalyst. 
The mixture is sent to a two step hydration process where it occurs the overall reaction: 
OHHCOHHC 1162106 ↔+         (4.3.5) 
 
In the first reactor (80°C, 0.1÷0.15 MPa) the double bond is attacked by sulphuric acid (60% 
water solution). In a second reactor (110°C) water is added and the cyclohexyl-hydrogen 
sulphate is decomposed. The overall conversion of cyclohexene is about 55% and the 
selectivity toward cyclohexanol is about 95% (cyclohexanone is the main side-product). The 
mixture is sent to a separation section (distillation columns and decanters). The following 
streams are obtained in this section: cyclohexanol (to be fed to the dehydrogenation section), 
sulphuric acid and water (to be recycled back to the corresponding phases of hydration 
reactors), a mixture of benzene, cyclohexane and cyclohexene (to be sent to the de-
hydrogenation section) and streams of other impurities (e.g. phenol). As a matter of fact, 
benzene, cyclohexane and cyclohexene give low-boiling azeotropes that make separation 
practically unfeasible. The principal advantage of the described process is to produce 
cyclohexanol avoiding the separation of that mixture. On the other side, the dehydrogenation 
of that mixture back to benzene is required to make the recycle feasible. The dehydrogenation 
to benzene is endothermic and requires a multiple stage reactor (average temperature 370°C). 
The dehydrogenation of cyclohexanol is similar to the process step described above in option 
A (vapour phase reaction and vacuum distillation). 
 
 
4.3.1.3 – Process C: synthesis via hydrogenation of phenol (pressurized liquid phase) 
 
The hydrogenation of phenol was actually one of the first industrial processes for 
cyclohexanone production. The hydrogenation of phenol is currently the process option more 
common for cyclohexanone production (the vapour phase hydrogenation, process E, is 
actually the option more frequently applied nowadays). The whole process can be divided in 
three main steps: 
i. synthesis of cumene (alkylation of benzene) 
ii. synthesis of phenol (oxidation of cumene) 
iii. synthesis of cyclohexanone (hydrogenation of phenol) 
In current analysis three alternative options are compared for the last step (hydrogenation of 
phenol), while the former two are the same for option C, D and E. 
In the following the common steps and the pressurized liquid phase hydrogenation (option C) 
is presented. 
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 Figure 4.3.2: Simplified PFD for process scheme B (synthesis via hydration of cyclohexene) 
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Cumene is produced by alkylation of benzene with propene [Ulman, 1996; Kirk-Othmer, 
1992]: 
1296366 HCHCHC ↔+         (4.3.6) 
The reaction is exothermic and is operated in gas phase and excess of benzene (250°C, 1.5 
MPa, supported polyphosphoric acids as catalyst). Average conversion of propene is about 
94%. The stream leaving the reactor is condensed and separated by various distillation stages. 
Streams of benzene and propylene are recovered and recycled back to the reactor. A stream of 
cumene at desired grade is obtained. Side-products (dipropylbenzene isomers, methylpentene, 
etc.) are separated. 
 
Phenol is obtained by oxidation of cumene with air. It is a two-stage process: in the first step 
cumene is oxidized to cumyl-hydroperoxide in liquid phase and, in the second step, the 
hydroperoxide is decomposed to phenol and acetone. The oxidation steps yields phenyl-
dimethylcarbinol, acetophenon and dicumyl-hydroperoxide as side-products (selectivity 
toward cumyl-hydroperoxide is about 89.5%). The operation is performed in a series of 
reactors operating at 0.6÷0.65 MPa and 105÷115°C, where the temperature is controlled by 
external coils. The air feed is dosed in order to prevent the formation of explosive mixtures in 
the top of the reactor. The product stream contains about 32% of cyclohexanone. This stream 
is concentrated in a vacuum column and the major part of cumene is separated and recycled 
back to the reactors. The concentrated solution of cyclohexyl-hydroperoxide is sent to the 
decomposition reactor (0.1÷0.15 MPa, 115°C, catalyzed by sulphuric acid in water solution). 
The reaction is exothermic and the heat of reaction is removed by evaporation and 
condensation of acetone. The output stream of the reaction is washed and decanted, to remove 
sulphuric acid. The oily-phase is separated in a train of distillation columns to yield pure 
phenol (99.96% in weight). In particular the separation of some compounds, like α-
methylstyrene, requires an extractive distillation with ethylene glycol. Acetone is also purified 
from water in a dedicated column. 
 
Phenol is hydrogenated, in current option, in liquid phase, in a slurry pressurized reactor 
(1MPa,  135°C, slurry of supported palladium catalyst) [Joris et al., 1956]. Heat of reaction is 
removed by external heat exchangers. Conversion is about 95%. The yield to cyclohexanone 
is about 90%. The excess of hydrogen collected in the top of the reactor is recycled back to 
the feed. The liquid output of the reactor is filtered to separate the slurry catalyst and vacuum 
distilled to separate cyclohexanone at desired grade. The side-product with high-boiling point 
are separated from the bottoms of the column by flash of the recycle stream of unreacted 
phenol to the reactor. 
 
 
4.3.1.4 – Process D: synthesis via hydrogenation of phenol (liquid phase with product 
stripping) 
 
As mentioned above the steps of cumene and phenol synthesis of this process option are 
similar to option D. 
The hydrogenation of phenol is in liquid phase (0.1÷0.2 MPa, 100÷150°C, slurry palladium 
catalyst), but in current option products are continuously stripped from the liquid by a gas 
flow (unreacted hydrogen plus inert gas) [Phielix, 1959]. This eliminates the problem of solid 
st separation. The separation of high-boiling side-products that may accumulate into the 
reactor is performed by a filtration and flash circuit, that treats only minor amounts of the 
material. The reaction products are recovered from the gaseous stream by cooling, quenching 
 §4.3 - 7
 
 
Figure 4.3.3: Simplified PFD for process scheme C (synthesis via hydrogenation of phenol - 
pressurized liquid phase) 
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Figure 4.3.4: Simplified PFD for process scheme D (synthesis via hydrogenation of phenol - 
liquid phase with product stripping) 
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Figure 4.3.5: Simplified PFD for process scheme E (synthesis via hydrogenation of phenol - 
vapour phase) 
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and washing with the very same cooled condensate. The condensate is vacuum distilled in 
order to recycle unreacted phenol and separate pure cyclohexanone at acceptable grade (traces 
of cyclohexanol are present). 
 
 
4.3.1.5 – Process E: synthesis via hydrogenation of phenol (vapour phase) 
 
As mentioned above the steps of cumene and phenol synthesis of this process option are 
similar to option D. In current process, the step of  hydrogenation is in gas phase (0.1÷0.2 
MPa, 145°C, palladium catalyst) [Ullman, 1987; Dodgson et al., 1989]. This requires 
vaporization of the feed mixture and condensation of the product stream. The non condensed 
gas is recycled back to the reactor. The condensate is vacuum distilled to remove 
cyclohexanol (the selectivity to cyclohexanol is about 4% in the reactor), which can be sold at 
the market. Cyclohexanone is distilled in a second vacuum column. The bottoms of the 
column are flashed to remove high-boiling compounds and are recycled to the reactor. 
 
 
 
4.3.2 – Sustainability assessment 
 
The assessment method proposed in §1.2 was applied to the described process options. The 
required input data about the processes were obtained integrating the information in the 
literature with material and energy balances and basic engineering rules. The fugitive 
emissions were assessed by average emission factors for the expected leak points in the 
process diagram (e.g. seals, joints, valves, etc.) [Allen & Shonnard, 2002]. The emission of 
micro-pollutant from the utilities (e.g. power generation, wastewater treatment, etc.) were 
evaluated by emission factors from available databases [EPA, WPa, WPf]. Economic 
parameters (e.g. material, energy and operative costs, capital costs) were evaluated by average 
costs from various sources [IChemE, 2002; Matche; WP; Perry & Green, 1997]. The more 
important pieces of equipment were preliminary sized. 
 
Table 4.3.1 lists the impact categories considered in the analysis. It can be observed that the 
assessed environmental impacts include several aspects: air emissions, water emission, 
resource use. Emissions to air are expected to derive from: i) emissions from stack at boiler 
section; ii) fugitive losses from the possible leak points of the plant (valves, flanges, etc.) and 
from the waste water treatment section. 
Table 4.3.1 reports the non-normalized values of the indices calculated for the single options. 
The analysis of the environmental indicators reveals that the impacts regarding single impact 
categories have generally comparable values among the options. However, option A 
(cyclohexane oxidation) shows higher impacts on smog formation and electrical power 
consumption than the other options. This is mainly due to the wastewater treatment section, 
where fugitive emissions are significant and an electro-oxidation process is operated. 
 
The proposed method allow the analysis of the contribute of single sections of the plant on the 
overall impact performance. Table 4.3.2 reports an example for the carcinogenicity indicator. 
It can be observed as the majority of the impact can be related to emissions of micro-
pollutants from energy production. As a matter of facts traces of organic compounds and 
metals are continuously emitted by natural gas fired boilers [EPA, WPa]. Some of these 
compounds are potentially toxic and carcinogen. The analysis identifies a minor contribution 
on carcinogenicity related to fugitive emissions. This contribution mainly depend on the 
sections that handle large quantities of benzene. 
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A similar scheme in partition of sources can be identified in the analysis of the contribution to 
the emissions for the toxic and smog-promoting compounds. 
 
With regard to the economic impact, the impact indicator (NPEI, i.e. NPV multiplied by -1) 
largely varies among the alternatives. Process A is not economically profitable with the 
assumed cost values. On the other side process B appears to be the more economically 
profitable. The indicator shows limited changes among the 3 options based on phenol 
hydrogenation, since the main part of the process is actually similar. Table 4.3.3 shows the 
evaluated capital costs: process B is the one requiring lower investments, since the total 
 
 
 Unit (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) Norm. Factor 
Environmental impact        
Emissions to air        
Global worming kgeq/y 2.58E+08 1.76E+08 1.85E+08 1.82E+08 1.97E+08 1.16E+06
ARP kgeq/y 8.60E+04 5.48E+04 6.14E+04 5.84E+04 6.23E+04 4.83E+03
MIR kgeq/y 1.11E+06 2.85E+04 9.43E+04 9.27E+04 9.61E+04 5.63E+03
Air Toxicity kgeq/y 2.99E+07 2.11E+07 2.42E+07 2.29E+07 2.44E+07 3.77E+05
Air Carcinogenicity kgeq/y 1.61E+04 2.17E+04 1.69E+04 1.66E+04 1.77E+04 1.01E+02
Emissions to water        
Organic load kgeq/y 2.48E+03 1.33E+00 - - - 1.79E+02
Water toxicity kgeq/y 2.17E+04 1.65E+03 - - - 2.80E+02
Water Carcinogenicity kgeq/y 0.00E+00 1.10E+00 - - - 1.09E+03
Eco-toxicity kgeq/y 0.00E+00 3.33E-01 - - - 3.41E+04
Resources        
Raw materials kgeq/y 3.81E+08 2.65E+08 2.68E+08 2.64E+08 2.59E+08 3.51E+05
Electrical  power kWh/y 1.21E+08 2.91E+07 1.82E+07 1.59E+07 1.63E+07 1.10E+06
Economic impact        
NPEI € 1.69E+07 -1.28E+08 -3.74E+07 -4.38E+07 -4.99E+07 3.40E+07
Societal impact        
Inherent safety km2/y 1.71E-03 2.90E-04 1.87E-03 1.87E-03 1.87E-03 6.00E-06
Occupation People 3.40E+01 2.40E+01 5.40E+01 5.40E+01 4.90E+01 7.92E+01
 
Table 4.3.1: Non normalized values of the level 1 indicators and normalization factors used 
in the assessment. 
 
 
C.S.  Fugitive Energy production Total 
A) Benzene hydrogenation 1010 200 1210
 Cyclohexane oxidation  11360 11360
 Alkaline wastewater treatment  3570 3570
 Total 1010 15130 16140
B) Cyclohexene process 6440 13360 19800
 Wastewater treatment 1900 1900
 Total 8340 13360 21700
E) Cumene production 2830 5340 8170
 Phenol production 1150 7770 8920
 Phenol hydrogenation  610 610
 Total 3970 13720 17700
 
Table 4.3.2: Non normalized values of the level 1 indicator for carcinogenicity: analysis of 
single contributions. 
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 process has a size comparable with single sections of the other alternatives. This element is 
one of the keys toward higher NPV for this option. Another element is a favourable annual 
savings/costs ratio (Table 4.3.4). This performance is due to the lower total annual costs, since 
the production potential is the same of other processes (annual savings are dominated by sells 
of cyclohexanone) and the composition of costs (Table 4.3.4) is similar among the processes. 
The same table outlines the role of raw materials on the pattern of operative costs: they show 
a contribution spanning from 64% to 70% of the overall costs, as expected in a production 
process of commodities. 
 
With regard to the societal impacts, inherent safety will be more extensively discussed in a 
dedicated section (§4.3.3). The occupation index relies on the evaluation of the number of 
employees necessary to operate the plant. The value results affected by the complexity of the 
plant and somehow reflects the pattern of the capital investments. 
 
Table 4.3.5 reports the normalized values of the environmental indicators. It can be observed 
that a few impact categories show significant emission to air. In particular emissions of 
greenhouse gases and potentially carcinogen compounds are one order of magnitude higher 
than the others impacts for all options. This reflects the fact that, in such a type of processes, 
an important issue for environmental impacts is energy production. In fact, the greenhouse  
 
 
  Capital cost NPV 
A) Cyclohexane oxidation (w. p.) 46’820’000 -16’898’000 
B) Cyclohexene process (w. p.) 29’337’000 128’251’000 
C) Phenol hydrogenation process (w. p.) 57’325’000 37’409’000 
D) Phenol hydrogenation process (w. p.) 53’025’000 43’839’000 
E) Phenol hydrogenation process (w. p.) 47’225’000 49’898’000 
 
Figure 4.3.3: Capital costs and net present values (NPV) for the options considered. 
 
 
  
Savings /  
Total costs 
Raw material 
costs /  
Total costs 
Combustible 
cost /  
Total costs 
Electrical 
power / 
 Total costs 
A) Whole process 1.02 0.64 0.124 0.021 
B) Whole process 1.42 0.70 0.099 0.018 
C) Cumene production 1.02 0.86 0.038 0.002 
 Phenol production 1.09 0.85 0.033 0.005 
 Hydrogenation 1.05 0.90 0.001 0.001 
 Whole process 1.12 0.69 0.057 0.007 
D) Cumene production 1.02 0.86 0.038 0.002 
 Phenol production 1.09 0.85 0.033 0.005 
 Hydrogenation 0.94 0.85 0.002 0.000 
 Whole process 1.02 0.66 0.056 0.006 
E) Cumene production 1.02 0.86 0.038 0.002 
 Phenol production 1.09 0.85 0.033 0.005 
 Hydrogenation 1.06 0.90 0.008 0.000 
 Whole process 1.13 0.69 0.063 0.006 
 
Figure 4.3.4: Selected ratios for annual costs and savings for the options considered. 
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 gases, principally carbon dioxide, are emitted due to the combustion of natural gas in the 
boilers and the carcinogens are related to micro-pollutants released in the same conditions 
(see Table 4.3.2.and related comments). The use of resources is the other significant category 
of impact for the processes. Again this was expected, since material consumption depends on 
both the flows of feedstock materials (benzene, propene, etc.) and of fuel for energy 
production (natural gas). The former is inevitably significant for a material transformation 
process as the current one, where benzene is converted into the desired product (the use of 
propene in processes C, D and E is partially compensated by the sold by-product acetone). 
The latter is related to the air emissions. 
Some of the process schemes require disposal of water streams. However the impact potential 
is not particularly critical, provided the compliance to law limits. On the other side, the 
wastewater treatment is a significant source of fugitive emissions to air and of resource 
consumption (e.g. electrical power in electro-oxidation). 
 
The normalized economic indicator have a potential impact that is a couple of orders of 
magnitude lower than the other indices. This is expected, since in commodities production 
processes the margins are modest compared to the investments, yielding low NPVs. 
 
Inherent safety is identified as the dominant issue in this kind of processes. This is a 
consequence of both the actually high value of the index and the relatively low value of other 
impact categories. The high value of the index is due to the amount of flammable and toxic 
materials processed and to the large number of units in the process – that reflects complexity. 
 The occupational index is at least two orders of magnitude lower than the inherent safety 
index. This reflects the high automation level typical of chemical industry. 
 
 
 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) Weight factors 
Environmental impact      
Emissions to air    
Global worming 2.21E+02 1.51E+02 1.59E+02 1.56E+02 1.69E+02 0.051 
ARP 1.78E+01 1.13E+01 1.27E+01 1.21E+01 1.29E+01 0.066 
MIR 1.98E+02 5.06E+00 1.67E+01 1.65E+01 1.71E+01 0.049 
Air Toxicity 7.93E+01 5.59E+01 6.43E+01 6.07E+01 6.48E+01 0.095 
Air Carcinogenicity 1.59E+02 2.14E+02 1.67E+02 1.65E+02 1.75E+02 0.168 
Emissions to water       
Organic load 1.38E+01 7.43E-03 - - - 0.020 
Water toxicity 7.75E+01 5.91E+00 - - - 0.095 
Water Carcinogenicity - 1.00E-03 - - - 0.168 
Eco-toxicity - 9.76E-06 - - - 0.033 
Resources     
Raw materials 1.08E+03 7.53E+02 7.62E+02 7.51E+02 7.38E+02 0.044 
Electrical  power 1.10E+02 2.64E+01 1.65E+01 1.44E+01 1.47E+01 0.064 
Economic impact       
NPEI 4.97E-01 -3.77E+00 -1.10E+00 -1.29E+00 -1.47E+00 - 
Societal impact       
Inherent safety 2.86E+02 4.83E+01 3.12E+02 3.12E+02 3.12E+02 0.5 
Occupation -4.29E-01 -3.03E-01 -6.82E-01 -6.82E-01 -6.19E-01 0.5 
 
Table 4.3.5: Normalized values of the level 1 indicators and weighting factors used in the 
assessment. 
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The weight factors listed in Table 4.3.5 are assumed for the aggregation of the level 1 indices. 
Table 4.5.6 reports the aggregated values, also represented in figure 4.3.6. 
Figure 4.3.7 reports another representation of the environmental impact index. The histogram 
shows the contribution of the single steps of the process to the final values. It can be observed 
that the feedstock benzene (i.e. material resource use) accounts for about one quarter of the 
environmental impact. The contribution obviously depends on the overall yield of the process. 
The wastewater treatment for process A gives a significant contribution to the environmental 
impact. However option A results to have the higher environmental impact independently of 
the wastewater treatment score and, thus, of the technology considered for the aqueous stream 
disposal. 
It is worth noticing that in alternatives from C to E cumene production impact appears to be 
larger than phenol. However this effect is partially do to the accounting of the material flows: 
in cumene production the consumption of propene raises the impact value, while in phenol 
production the by-production of acetone (accounted as a material consumption multiplied by -
1) lowers the value. Hydrogenation of phenol plays a minor role on the environmental impact 
of these alternatives, since it is actually a small section compared to the whole process. 
 
Environmental and societal indices result to be the dominating ones also at level 2 (Table 
4.3.5). This confirms the aforementioned comments on economic index. Option B clearly 
results the preferable one from societal and economic point of views. As regard 
environmental impact the performance is slightly worse than for the options based on phenol 
hydrogenation. It is worth noticing that environmental indices are quite close among the 
options, while the societal and economic performance show larger variations. As a 
consequence, option B results preferable from the point of view of the integrated impact on 
sustainability. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.6: Level 2 indices for the options considered in the case study. The profile of 
option C and D practically collapses on E in this representation. 
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The Monte-Carlo method proposed for sensitivity analysis (§1.2.6) was applied in order to 
explore the effects of the chosen weight factors. The analysis confirms all the observations 
drawn in the discussion above even for moderate variations of the value of the weight factors. 
For example Figure 4.3.8 reports the cumulative probability of the difference of the overall 
index for option B and D. It refers to variations in all the weight factors of 20% of their value. 
The graph shows that no change in the sign of the difference is possible, confirming the 
identified rank of preference for the options. 
Further examples of the application of the sensitivity analysis are discussed in detail for other 
cases studies (§4.1, §4.2, §4.4). 
 
 
 A B C D E Weight factors 
Level 2       
Environmental index 1.19E+02 8.55E+01 7.85E+01 7.71E+01 7.94E+01 0.3 
Economic index 4.97E-01 -3.77E+00 -1.10E+00 -1.29E+00 -1.47E+00 0.5 
Societal index 1.43E+02 2.40E+01 1.56E+02 1.56E+02 1.55E+02 0.2 
       
Level 3       
Overall impact index 6.45E+01 2.86E+01 5.42E+01 5.36E+01 5.42E+01  
Normalized 0.82 0.36 0.69 0.68 0.69  
 
Table 4.3.6: Values of the level 2 and 3 indices and weighting factors used in the 
aggregation. 
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Figure 4.3.7: Environmental impact index, contribution of the single steps of the process. 
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Figure 4.3.8: Example of result from sensitivity analysis: difference of the values of overall 
impact index for options D and B. 
 
 
 
4.3.3 – Inherent safety assessment 
 
The developed method for inherently assessment (§2.3) was applied to the alternative options 
for cyclohexanone production. The input data required for the application actually match the 
information collected for sustainability assessment. 
The process is divided in single units, as reported in Table 4.3.7. The failure modes were 
identified and event trees associated to each units. This allow the calculation of the damage 
distances by proper consequence models. Table 4.3.7 reports an example of LOC events, 
accidental scenarios, damage distances and credit factors for the section of phenol 
hydrogenation in option C. The table shows that important differences (up to some orders of 
magnitude) may be present both in the damage distances and in the credit factors for different 
LOCs concerning the same piece of equipment. As expected, scenarios involving toxic 
dispersions are those resulting in higher damage distances. On the other hand, higher credit 
factors are obtained for units that are more likely to cause loss of containment (e.g. heat 
exchangers, compressors and pumps etc.). 
 
Tables from 4.3.8 to 4.3.12 shows the results obtained in the calculation of the equipment 
potential and of the inherent hazard indexes. The potential hazard index only gives 
information on the equipment that may potentially trigger the most severe scenario, while the 
inherent hazard index also includes information concerning the credibility of the possible 
scenarios. Thus, the inherent hazard index yields a more realistic description of the credible  
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 Unit Eq. Class LOC Scenario cfi,k   (1/a) di,j,k  (m) 
R01 Single slurry reactor EQ1.2 R1 JF 1x10-4 7.6 
    VE 1x10-4 12 
    FF 1x10-4 7.4 
    TD 1x10-4 58 
    PF 1x10-4 14 
   R2 TD 5x10-6 66 
    PF 5x10-6 14 
   R3 JF 5x10-6 23 
    VE 5x10-6 19 
    PF 5x10-6 13 
C01 Vacuum distillation column EQ1.2 R3 VE 1x10-5 30 
    TD 1x10-5 61 
    PF 1x10-5 17 
    EX 1x10-4 36 
D01 Flash drum EQ1.2 R3 JF 1x10-7 20 
    VE 1x10-7 9.6 
    FF 1x10-7 6.4 
    TD 1x10-7 16 
F01 Filter EQ3.1 R4 TD 6x10-4 8 
    PF 6x10-4 15 
   R5 TD 1x10-5 61 
    PF 1x10-5 17 
E01 Hydrogen cooler EQ2.1 R1 JF 1x10-3 8.2 
    VE 1x10-3 13 
    FF 1x10-3 7.5 
   R3 JF 1x10-5 22 
    VE 1x10-5 14 
E02 Condenser EQ2.1 R3 TD 2x10-5 16 
    PF 2x10-5 17 
    EX 1x10-3 6.3 
E03 Reboiler EQ2.1 R3 VE 2x10-5 14 
    TD 2x10-5 8.2 
    PF 2x10-5 16 
    EX 1x10-3 7.7 
E04 Evaporator EQ2.1 R1 PF 1x10-3 8.5 
   R3 TD 5x10-5 17 
    PF 5x10-5 8.5 
E05 Condenser EQ2.1 R1 PF 1x10-3 7.7 
   R2 TD 1x10-5 6.2 
    PF 1x10-5 7.7 
   R3 JF 1x10-5 20 
    VE 1x10-5 9.6 
    FF 1x10-5 19 
    TD 1x10-5 16 
    PF 1x10-5 7.7 
G01 Phenol feed pump EQ5.1 R4 PF 5x10-4 8.1 
   R5 PF 1x10-4 13 
G02 Cyclohexanone pump EQ5.1 R5 TD 1x10-4 16 
    PF 1x10-4 17 
P01 Hydrogen compressor EQ5.2 R4 JF 1x10-3 13 
    VE 1x10-3 18 
    FF 1x10-3 10 
   R5 JF 1x10-4 22 
    VE 1x10-4 14 
 
Table 4.3.7: Example of damage distances and credit factors: phenol hydrogenation section 
of option C. 
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  UHI UPI 
Unit Number of units 
Synthesis 
of cyclohexane 
Synthesis of 
cyclohexanone 
Synthesis 
of cyclohexane 
Synthesis of 
cyclohexanone 
R01 – Reactor 1 1.6E+01  1.6E+04  
R02 - Reactor 6  1.1E+01  1.2E+06 
R03 - Reactor 1  2.3E+00  3.1E+05 
R04 - Reactor 2  1.6E-01  3.2E+03 
C01 – Distillation column 1  2.9E+00  4.8E+05 
C02 - Distillation column 1  1.6E+00  3.1E+05 
C03 - Distillation column 1  3.1E-01  5.0E+04 
C04 - Distillation column 1  6.3E-03  8.9E+02 
C05 - Distillation column 1  3.8E-03  4.3E+02 
C07 - Distillation column 1  8.7E-03  3.2E+03 
D01 – Flash drum 1 4.7E-01  3.7E+04  
D02 - Flash drum 1  5.4E+00  6.1E+05 
D03 - Flash drum 1  9.0E-01  1.5E+05 
D06 - Flash drum 1  4.3E-03  8.1E+02 
D04 - Decanter 2  1.6E-01  2.5E+04 
D05 - Decanter 1  2.7E-02  2.5E+02 
E01 – Heat exchanger 1 2.7E-01  8.6E+02  
E02 – Vaporizer 1 2.1E+02  2.1E+05  
E03 - Heat exchanger 1 2.2E+01  4.7E+04  
E04 - Condenser 1 5.6E+00  8.5E+03  
E06 - Heat exchanger 5  1.0E+01  7.6E+04 
E07 - Condenser 4  4.1E+00  3.1E+04 
E08 - Condenser 8  9.7E+00  1.1E+05 
E09 - Reboiler 1  1.7E+01  1.8E+05 
E10 - Heat exchanger 1  2.5E+01  4.1E+05 
E12 - Heat exchanger 1  7.7E+00  7.6E+03 
E13 - Condenser 2  9.9E-01  7.6E+04 
E14 - Reboiler 1  2.6E+00  2.2E+05 
E15 - Condenser 1  1.1E+00  1.1E+05 
E16 - Reboiler 1  6.2E-01  4.1E+04 
E17 - Condenser 1  2.7E-01  1.3E+04 
E18 - Reboiler 1  1.5E-02  3.0E+02 
E19 - Condenser 1  1.0E-02  1.7E+02 
E20 - Reboiler 1  1.1E-02  9.2E+01 
E21 – Vaporiser 1  1.8E-01  2.1E+03 
E22 - Heat exchanger 1  3.2E-02  3.2E+03 
E23 - Condenser 1  1.1E-01  3.3E+03 
E24 - Condenser 1  2.0E-02  6.1E+02 
E25 - Reboiler 1  1.6E-02  3.0E+02 
P01 - Compressor 1 1.3E+00  1.2E+03  
P02 - Compressor 1 4.8E-01  8.6E+02  
G01 - Pump 1 1.1E+00  2.2E+03  
G03 - Pump 1  3.2E-01  5.3E+02 
G04 - Pump 1  1.2E+00  2.2E+03 
G05 - Pump 1  1.6E-02  3.1E+01 
G06 - Pump 1  2.0E-02  4.1E+01 
G08 - Pump 1  1.6E-01  3.1E+02 
G09 - Pump 1  6.5E-02  1.3E+02 
Total  2.6E+02 2.9E+02 3.2E+05 1.2E+07 
Overall process  HI 5.5E+02 PI 1.2E+07 
 
Table 4.3.8: Unit and overall KPIs for option A. 
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Unit Number of units UHI UPI 
R01 – Reactor 2 8.1E+00 2.4E+05 
R02 - Reactor 1 8.0E-01 1.3E+05 
R03 - Reactor 1 6.2E-01 1.2E+05 
R04 - Reactor 1 4.3E-02 4.2E+03 
R05 - Reactor 1 4.4E-02 4.3E+03 
R06 - Reactor 6 1.2E-01 1.1E+04 
D03 - flash drum 3 2.9E-01 5.7E+04 
D04  - flash drum 1 1.9E+00 3.4E+05 
D05  - flash drum 1 1.2E-03 2.5E+02 
C01 - Distillation column 1 8.3E-04 1.3E+02 
C02 - Distillation column 1 0.0E+00 6.4E+04 
C03- Distillation column 1 0.0E+00 4.0E+04 
C04- Distillation column 1 3.2E-01 3.2E+03 
C05- Distillation column 1 1.1E-01 1.1E+03 
C06- Distillation column 1 5.4E-01 9.1E+04 
C07- Distillation column 1 3.3E-01 3.2E+03 
D01 – Decanter 1 3.8E-01 6.9E+04 
D02 - Decanter 1 2.3E-01 3.8E+04 
E01 - Condenser  1 1.5E+00 1.4E+03 
E02 – Heat exchanger  1 4.4E+01 1.4E+05 
E04 - Condenser 3 5.7E-01 5.7E+04 
E05 - Condenser 2 1.1E-01 6.2E+02 
E07 - Condenser 1 5.2E-01 4.3E+04 
E08- Reboiler 1 1.0E+00 5.8E+04 
E09- Condenser 1 2.8E-01 2.3E+04 
E10- Reboiler 1 6.2E-01 4.4E+04 
E11- Condenser 1 6.6E-02 3.2E+02 
E12- Reboiler 1 8.9E-02 2.9E+02 
E13- Condenser 1 5.0E-02 2.1E+02 
E14- Reboiler 1 8.7E-02 2.3E+02 
E15 - Heat exchanger 1 7.1E+00 1.4E+05 
E16- Condenser 1 2.5E-01 1.1E+04 
E17- Condenser 1 1.2E+00 9.0E+04 
E18- Reboiler 1 8.9E-01 4.5E+04 
E19 – Vaporizer  1 3.7E-02 7.2E+01 
E20 - Heat exchanger 1 6.1E-01 1.2E+04 
E21 - Heat exchanger 1 2.1E-01 4.2E+03 
E22- Condenser 1 1.3E-01 4.3E+03 
E23- Condenser 1 7.2E-02 3.3E+02 
E24- Reboiler  1 1.3E-01 3.1E+02 
E25 - Heat exchanger 1 3.1E-01 3.2E+03 
G01 - Pump 1 4.4E+00 8.4E+03 
G02 - Pump 1 8.2E-03 8.2E+01 
G03 - Pump 1 2.1E-02 2.1E+02 
G04 - Pump 1 2.3E-02 2.3E+02 
G05 - Pump 1 2.1E-02 2.1E+02 
G06 - Pump 1 5.3E-03 5.3E+01 
P01 - Compressor 1 1.7E+00 3.2E+03 
P02 – Compressor 1 1.6E+00 3.2E+03 
F01 – Filter 1 1.2E-01 1.9E+02 
  HI PI 
Total  9.2E+01 2.4E+06 
 
Table 4.3.9: Unit and overall KPIs for option B. 
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Unit UHI UPI 
R01 – Reactor 6.6E+00 1.9E+04 
C01 – Distillation column 9.1E+00 4.3E+05 
C02 - Distillation column 3.6E+00 3.6E+05 
C03 - Distillation column 5.0E+00 3.5E+05 
C04 - Distillation column 8.5E-01 1.7E+05 
C05 - Distillation column 5.3E-01 8.7E+04 
E02 – Condenser 2.9E+01 1.9E+05 
E03 – Reboiler 9.0E+01 4.2E+05 
E04 - Condenser 2.9E+01 3.4E+05 
E05 - Reboiler 2.7E+01 1.7E+05 
E06 - Condenser 9.4E-01 9.4E+04 
E07 - Reboiler 3.6E-01 3.2E+04 
E08 - Condenser 2.0E+01 2.1E+05 
E09 - Reboiler 4.5E+01 3.7E+05 
E10 - Condenser 6.1E-02 6.1E+03 
E11 - Reboiler 3.1E-01 2.4E+04 
E01a – Heat exchanger 6.2E+01 2.6E+05 
E01b - Vaporizer 6.1E+01 2.7E+05 
E01c - Heat exchanger 1.9E+01 1.5E+05 
P01 – Compressor 9.1E-03 9.1E+01 
G01 – Pump 6.4E-02 1.1E+02 
G02 – Pump 1.2E+02 2.4E+05 
Total 5.3E+02 4.2E+06 
 
Table 4.3.10: Unit and overall KPIs for synthesis of cumene in options C, D and E. 
 
 
 accidental events that may be associated to plant operation. In particular, this index points out 
the importance of the safety performance of small pieces of equipment (e.g. heat exchangers, 
pumps, compressors, etc.) on the inherent safety of the plant, since these components may 
have per se relatively small damage distances but are more vulnerable to undergo loss of 
containment events. As shown in the tables, these units have inherent hazard indexes that are 
often comparable or higher than those of major process units (e.g. columns or reactors), that 
have potentially more severe scenarios but higher safety scores and thus lower credit factors. 
 
The analysis of the results in the Tables allows the addressing of some important features of 
the different alternatives for cyclohexanone production. The unit potential hazard indexes 
show that, as expected, LOCs in reactors and distillation columns may cause high damage 
areas due to the quantities of toxic material that may be released. Units directly connected to 
that critical units may similarly show high damage distances since a significant part of  the 
inventory of the principal unit may be released from LOCs in the minor units. 
The analysis of the unit inherent safety index outline the role of the credit factor. For instance, 
high values of UHI are obtained for units, like heat exchangers and pumps, operated at 
medium and high pressure (e.g. benzene alkylation section of processes C, D, E). In fact, 
relatively large damage distances are calculated for these units due to the potential of 
pressurized equipment to release large amounts of materials – especially liquids – even 
through small leaks. Though this characteristic is common with all the units in the same 
process section, higher credibility is given to the small leaks occurring for these types of 
equipment compared to LOCs from reactors and columns. 
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If the overall indexes are considered (Table 4.3.13), the ranking among the alternatives given 
by potential indexes (PI) results as a direct consequence of the number of units that may 
trigger long distance scenarios. Process A is the more penalized. It can be observed as the 
oxidation reactors play a major role in the value of PI for options A, C, D and E. On the other 
side option B appears to have quite low PI, due to reduced number of units and the moderate 
values of single UPIs. When credit factors are considered, the hazard related to small leaks 
from pressurized units is magnified and the pressurized sections of the plant gain larger 
weight over the other ones. Options A and C, D, E invert their relative rank, because of the 
number of units with critical values of UHIs. The difference among performance of the 
options C, D and E is minor, since the section of concern (phenol hydrogenation) contains few 
units and operated at low pressures. 
 
 
Unit Number of units UHI UPI 
R02 - Reactor 6 5.1E+00 9.5E+05 
R03 - Reactor 1 6.3E-01 6.1E+04 
D02 - Decanter 1 3.6E-01 6.7E+04 
D01 – Distillation column 3 3.1E-01 3.1E+03 
C06 - Distillation column 1 1.6E-02 1.0E+03 
C07 - Distillation column 1 2.4E-01 7.2E+03 
C08 - Distillation column 1 1.7E-01 1.6E+03 
C09 - Distillation column 1 3.6E-01 3.3E+03 
C10 - Distillation column 1 1.9E-01 1.8E+03 
C11 - Distillation column 1 1.4E-01 1.3E+03 
E12 – Condenser 1 2.1E+01 2.0E+05 
E13 – Condenser 3 2.0E-01 8.4E+03 
E14 – Reboiler 3 3.9E-01 4.8E+02 
E15 – Condenser 1 1.2E-01 8.2E+03 
E16 – Heat exchanger 1 1.3E+00 1.1E+05 
E17 – Condenser 1 4.3E-02 3.5E+03 
E18 – Reboiler 1 1.1E-02 8.6E+02 
E19 – Condenser 1 2.1E-01 7.2E+03 
E20 – Reboiler 1 3.8E-01 3.8E+02 
E21 – Condenser 1 1.0E-01 9.8E+02 
E22 – Reboiler 1 8.8E-02 3.2E+02 
E23 – Condenser 1 6.8E-02 3.1E+02 
E24 – Reboiler 1 3.1E-01 4.7E+02 
E25 – Condenser 1 6.5E-02 3.5E+02 
E26 – Reboiler 1 2.2E-01 4.4E+02 
E27 – Condenser 1 5.1E-02 2.6E+02 
E28 – Reboiler 1 4.9E-01 1.1E+03 
P03 – Compressor 1 8.2E-01 8.2E+03 
G03 - Pump 1 1.2E-02 1.2E+02 
G04 - Pump 1 1.5E-02 1.5E+02 
G05 - Pump 1 7.5E-03 7.5E+01 
G06 - Pump 1 3.4E-03 3.4E+01 
G07 - Pump 1 5.9E-03 5.9E+01 
G08 - Pump 1 2.5E-03 2.5E+01 
G09 - Pump 1 3.8E-03 3.8E+01 
G10 - Pump 1 4.0E-03 4.0E+01 
Total  6.1E+01 6.2E+06 
 
Table 4.3.11: Unit and overall KPIs for synthesis of phenol in options C, D and E. 
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Option B is identified as the preferable process scheme by both inherent safety performance 
indicators, PI and HI. This is a direct consequence of the low UPI and UHI values of the 
single units. In particular, the use of few pressurized units with large liquid inventories results 
to be the key factor to achieve this performance, in comparison with other options. In fact, the 
hydrogenation section alone, that is the pressurized one, accounts for about two thirds of the 
HI and half of the PI. 
 
 
 
Phenol hydrogenation section of 
option C 
Phenol hydrogenation section of 
option D 
Phenol hydrogenation section of 
option E 
 UHI UPI  UHI UPI  UHI UPI 
R01A 
Slurry reactor 3.7x10-1 4.3x103 
R01A 
Slurry reactor 2.2x10-1 7.9x103
R01A 
Fixed bed reactor 2.6x10-2 2.5x103
R01B 
Slurry reactor 3.7x10-1 4.3x103 
R01B 
Slurry reactor 2.2x10-1 7.9x103
R01B 
Fixed bed reactor 2.6x10-2 2.5x103
R01C 
Slurry reactor 3.7x10-1 4.3x103 
R01C 
Slurry reactor 2.2x10-1 7.9x103
C01 
Vacuum distillation 
of cyclohexanone 2.2x10-1 2.1x103
C01 
Vacuum 
distillation column 1.7x10-1 3.7x103 
C01 
Quenching column 3.0x10-1 5.2x104
C02 
Vacuum distillation 
of cyclohexanol 2.8x10-2 2.7x102
D01 
Flash drum 4.2x10-5 4.2x102 
C02 
Quenching column 7.2x10-2 8.6 x103
D01 
Flash drum 5.2x10-5 5.2x102
F01 
Filter 1.8x10-1 3.7x103 
C03 
Vacuum 
distillation column 1.5x10-1 1.4x103
E01 
Feed evaporator 9.2x10-2 1.8x103
E01 
Hydrogen cooler 1.7x10-1 4.8x102 
D01 
Flash drum 8.6x10-4 8.5x101
E02 
Product condenser 1.2x10-1 4.6x103
E02 
Condenser of C01 4.5x10-2 2.9x102 
F01 
Filter 7.6x10-4 7.6x101
E03 
Condenser of C01 4.6x10-2 3.6 x102
E03 
Reboiler of C01 6.4x10-2 2.6x102 
E01 
Quencher C01 
cooler 2.5x10-1 4.2x103
E04 
Reboiler of C01 8.2x10-2 2.8 x102
E04 
Evaporator of D01 1.4x10-2 2.8x102 
E02 
Quencher C02 
cooler 2.3x10-1 2.4x103
E05 
Condenser of C02 1.4x10-3 1.4x102
E05 
Condenser of D01 6.4x10-2 4.2x102 
E03 
Condensate cooler 1.6x10-1 2.7x103
E06 
Reboiler of C02 1.4x10-3 1.4 x102
G01 
Phenol feed pump 4.9x10-2 1.6x102 
E04 
Condenser of C03 4.5x10-2 2.9x102
E07 
Evaporator of D01 6.1x10-2 2.1x102
G02 
Cyclohexanone 
pump 2.9x10-2 2.9x102 
E05 
Reboiler of C03 8.8x10-2 8.0x102
G01 
Cyclohexanone 
pump 3.1x10-2 3.1x102
G03 
Bottom pump 5.9x10-3 5.9x101 
E06 
Condenser of D01 1.5x10-3 7.6x101
G02 
Cyclohexanol pump 5.9x10-3 5.9x101
G04 
Recycle pump 3.8x10-2 8.5x101 
E07 
Recycle cooler 1.5x10-3 7.6x101
G03 
Recycle pump 5.9x10-3 5.9x101
P01 
Hydrogen 
compressor 3.9x10-1 4.8x102 
G01 
Cyclohexanone 
pump 2.9x10-2 2.9x102    
   
G02 
Recycle pump 8.8x10-3 8.8x101   
 HI PI  HI PI  HI PI 
 2.3x100 2.3x104  2.0x100 9.7x104  7.4x10-1 1.6x104
 
Table 4.3.12: Unit and overall KPIs for synthesis of cyclohexanone in options C, D and E. 
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HI       
 A B  C D E 
Synthesis 
cyclohexane 2.6E+02 9.2E+01 
Synthesis 
cumene 5.3E+02 5.3E+02 5.3E+02 
Synthesis 
cyclohexanone 2.9E+02  
Synthesis 
phenol 6.1E+01 6.1E+01 6.1E+01 
   
Synthesis 
cyclohexanone 2.3E+00 2.0E+00 7.5E-01 
Total 5.5E+02 9.2E+01  6.0E+02 6.0E+02 6.0E+02 
       
PI       
 A B  C D E 
Synthesis 
cyclohexane 3.2E+05 2.4E+06 
Synthesis 
cumene 4.2E+06 4.2E+06 4.2E+06 
Synthesis 
cyclohexanone 1.2E+07  
Synthesis 
phenol 6.2E+06 6.2E+06 6.2E+06 
   
Synthesis 
cyclohexanone 2.4E+04 9.7E+04 1.6E+04 
Total 1.2E+07 2.4E+06  1.0E+07 1.1E+07 1.0E+07 
 
Table 4.3.13: Summary of overall KPIs for the current case study. 
 
 
 
4.3.3.1 – Comparison with literature approaches 
 
The case study was also analysed using literature methodologies for inherent safety index 
assessment. In particular, the following methods were considered: 
• Prototype Index of Inherent Safety (PIIS) proposed by Edwards & Lawrence, [1993]; 
• Inherent Safety Index (ISI) proposed by Heikkilä et al., [1996, 1998, 1999]; 
• Potentials Danger for safety in Environmental Safety and Health (ESH) by Koller et 
al., [2000]. 
• Tools I and J of INSET Toolkit (INSET) [INSIDE, 2001]; 
• Safety Weighted Hazard Index (SWeHI) by Khan at al., [2001]; 
• Integrated Inherent Safety Index (I2SI) by Khan & Amyotte, [2004,2005]; 
• Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) [Dow, 1994]; 
• Dow Chemical Exposure Index (CEI) [Dow, 1993]. 
 
The comparison of the results obtained by the methods listed above required some further 
assumptions. In particular, some methods (e.g. ESH, INSET) yield a cluster of indexes for 
specific types of unit hazards. Thus, additional assumptions were necessary to obtain overall 
combined indexes: in accordance with the literature, the maximum expected values and an 
equal weight of the indexes were considered in normalization and aggregation [INSIDE, 
2001; Koller et al., 2001]. Whenever single indexes are expressed in terms of damage 
distance (Dow F&EI, Dow CEI) the use of the higher distance was preferred, in accordance 
with the approach suggested by the SWeHI method [Khan at al., 2001] and by the 
methodology developed in the present paper. Furthermore, several methods do not define 
clear and homogeneous procedures to calculate the material quantities to be considered in the 
unit assessment, requiring specific assumptions to limit potential biases in the results. 
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Figure 4.3.9: Inherent safety indexes calculated by different methods for the hydrogenation 
reactor present in options C, D and E. 
 
 
Figure 4.3.9 shows an example of comparison of the results obtained for the inherent safety 
assessment of a single unit. The phenol hydrogenation reactor of options C, D and E was 
selected, since the assessment of a reaction unit is considered in most of the literature 
methods. Moreover this reactor actually accomplish the same type operation in the three 
different operative conditions. Since the indexes calculated by the different methods have 
different scales, the index values reported in Figure 4.3.9 were normalized dividing them by 
the higher value obtained for each methodology. In the case of I2SI, that has a higher value 
for an inherently safer option, the inverse of the index was considered for normalization. 
A first remark that comes from the analysis of the figure is that there is no agreement in the 
results obtained by the different methods, both from a qualitative and a quantitative point of 
view. The differences are likely to arise both from the different level of detail required by the 
application of the method and by the different penalization factors considered. For instance, 
the reversed behaviour of INSET method compared to EHS is mainly due to the penalization 
parameters used in the former, that do not consider the high operating pressure of the units. 
As a consequence, the inventory of phenol, which is linked to the conversion, becomes 
determinant in the ranking by the INSET method, since it has a prevailing role among the 
toxic material hazard. 
Moreover, the results in Figure 4.3.9 show that the less information demanding indexes yield 
poor evaluation of single units. PIIS is not at all suitable for the analysis of a single reaction 
unit, being designed to address the process as a whole. On the other hand, the scoring of ISI, 
that can be applied to the sole reaction section, seems not sensitive to differences in unit 
operating conditions. Even the more detailed approaches are not able to take into account all 
the hazards evaluated by the UPI: the SWeHI is strongly influenced in the results by the data 
on inventory value and, on the other hand, the F&EI is quite unable to take into account the 
specific unit characteristics. Both these indexes base the assessment of the reactor only on the 
flammable proprieties of materials, respectively identifying as secondary issues or neglecting 
the toxic dispersions. On the other hand, the CEI index is limited to considered toxic effects, 
thus it only takes into account phenol releases, since this is the only substance that has 
available ERPG data. Finally, I2SI seems to have a behaviour similar to UHI, but it shall be 
recalled that the results of this index partially reflect the expertise of the analyst, being thus 
“tailored” on the specific cases. 
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Figure 4.3.10 extends the analysis to the whole plant section of phenol hydrogenation. This is 
actually the section that is different among options C, D and E. The figure shows the 
comparison of the overall inherent safety indexes calculated by different methods. The values 
of the overall indexes largely differ among the different methods. In quite all the overall 
indexes represented in Figure 4.3.10, the reactors play a dominating role in determining the 
index values, as evident from the comparison with Figure 4.3.9. In spite of the large 
differences shown by the different methods, most of them indicate that option E is preferable, 
in accordance with the results of PI and HI. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.10: Comparison of the overall inherent safety indexes calculated by 
different methods for the hydrogenation section of options C, D and E. 
 
 
The results reported above can be confirmed extending the application to the whole processes 
of the considered options. Thus some general conclusions can be drawn. No coherence exists 
among the available methods for the quantitative assessment of inherent safety. Several 
factors are responsible of the disagreement in the results, evidenced by Figures 4.3.9 and 
4.3.10. In particular, the detail of information required for the application of each method 
influences the results. Thus, procedures based on general data do not allow a detailed hazard 
identification. Moreover, subjective assumptions on material quantities resulted a significant 
issue for the reliability of some literature methods. Furthermore, not all the tools attribute the 
same importance to different potential hazard factors. These elements, if added to built-in 
assumption and to some degree of freedom left to the experience of the analyst, may well 
justify the differences in the results obtained. 
 
The Potential hazard index (PI) and the detailed methods proposed in the literature (e.g. EHS, 
SWeHI) are frequently in disagreement, even if consider the potential severity of the 
scenarios as the prevailing factor in the analysis. On the other hand, the inherent safety hazard 
index (HI) introduced in the present study adds further details to the results, accounting for 
the recorded safety scores of the different units, thus assessing the hazards coming from 
auxiliary equipment, as compressors, filters, and heat exchangers, that are often overlooked in 
conventional severity-based inherent safety assessment methods. 
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4.3.4 - Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, some of the developed assessment tools (§1.2 and §2.3) were applied to case 
studies concerning the design of a process for industrial production of the chemical 
intermediate cyclohexanone. Several design options were compared, considering three 
different chemical routes for the production as well as different technological solutions for the 
plant. The applied methodologies allowed the analysis of the options, identifying the impact 
profile expected from experience/expert judgement. The comparison with conventional 
inherent safety assessment methodologies from the literature evidences the ability of the 
proposed approach to override several problems that used to hinder the implementation of 
inherent safety in design. 
The principal outcomes identified in the analysis of the cyclohexanone case-study are: 
• The innovative route proposed for the production (process B, synthesis via 
cyclohexene hydration), is the preferable option form the point of view of impact on 
sustainability. This results from the combined effect of inherent safety and economic 
performance, since the process is simpler (lower capital and operative costs) and 
requires milder operative conditions. However some specific impacts pertaining to the 
environmental sphere (e.g. release of carcinogen compounds) are identified as critical 
for this option compared to the others. 
• The aggregate environmental impacts of the processes are mainly depending on the 
thermal energy requirements. In option A (synthesis via oxidation of cyclohexane) the 
wastewater treatment shows a significant contribution to the impact. On the other side, 
the economic index has a minor role on the performance of all the options, as expected 
in a process for production of commodities, that typically has low annual margins. 
• Inherent safety performance is principally influenced by the presence of two elements 
in the option: sections operated at medium/high pressures and units having large 
inventories of flammable and/or toxic liquid. The developed inherent safety approach 
allows to effectively capture this hazard profile, since it accounts by one hand the 
maximum expected consequences of an accident and, by the other, the role of minor 
but more credible releases. This is evident from the comparison with the literature 
approaches that lack these assessment features. 
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4.4 – Hydrogen 
 
4.4.0 – Overview 
 
The challenge for a widespread hydrogen utilization as an energy vector requires the adoption 
of proper strategies to manage the issues related to safety, environment and process 
efficiency. The identification of sustainable industrial processes for hydrogen production thus 
arises as a key element in this challenge. Thus, the introduction of sustainability drivers in 
process design is a key issue to orient the further development and the selection among 
industrial alternatives. 
On the other side, the increase in the number and in the potentialities of hydrogen production 
plants will require a strong increase of hydrogen storage capacities [Sarkar & Banerjee, 2005; 
Venter & Pucher, 1997; Zhou, 2005]. Moreover, it is expected that use of hydrogen as an 
energy carrier may cause a spread of hydrogen storage installations also in vulnerable 
contexts, such as residential and commercial areas. 
 
In the following, alternative processes proposed for industrial high purity hydrogen (99.5-
99.9%) production by steam reforming of natural gas are compared with regard to their 
sustainability and inherent safety performance (§4.4.1). Then the problem of storage is faced 
by an analysis of the inherent safety of alternative options for hydrogen storage (§4.4.4). 
The case studies in both the afforded themes represent a demonstration of the applicability of 
the methods described in sections 1 and 2. Moreover, the discussion of the results will allow 
to evidence how the approaches yield interesting and effective results, overcoming the 
limitations of former literature methods. 
 
 
4.4.1 – Production case-study description 
 
The present case-study focuses on the comparison of five different processes proposed for 
industrial high purity hydrogen (99.5-99.9%) production by steam reforming of natural gas. 
Even if in a long time period hydrogen industrial production needs to be based on the use of 
renewable resources, in a short time perspective the shift toward the widespread utilization of 
hydrogen requires to manage the transitory period of change by the optimization and 
improvement of current technologies for hydrogen production [Mueller-Langer et al., 2007; 
Häussinger et al., 2003; Fu & Wu, 2007; Adhikari et al., 2007]. This is confirmed by the 
active research in this field, that resulted in the development of several innovative processes 
based on steam reforming [Aasberg-Petersen et al., 2001; Reyes et al., 2003; Song & Guo, 
2006; Biesheuvel & Kramer, 2003]. 
 
The steam reforming process is presently the most common and well known method for large 
scale hydrogen production. The process is based on the catalytic conversion of a mixture of 
methane and steam to yield hydrogen and carbon monoxide, following the endothermic 
“conversion reaction”: 
2
24.1
1000700
24 3HCOOHCH
MPa
K
+⎯⎯⎯ →⎯+ −
−
      (4.4.1) 
Carbon monoxide is then converted to carbon dioxide following the slightly exothermic “shift 
reaction”: 
22
8.14.1
650
2 HCOOHCO
MPa
K
+⎯⎯⎯ →⎯+ −       (4.4.2) 
Finally hydrogen is purified by separation. 
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The key-issues to enhance the process yields are the reaction and separation design. 
Alternative processes, characterized by different levels of development, are nowadays 
available. In particular, high temperature membrane separation was proposed and several 
processes based on membrane separation are currently under development. In the following, 
five reference processes will be analyzed (Figure 4.4.1), namely: 
 
1. traditional with pressure swing adsorption (PSA) – reference process #1 
2. auto-thermal with pressure swing adsorption (PSA) – reference process #2 
3. internal membrane separator – reference process #3 
4. external membrane separator – reference process #4 
5. integrated reactor – reference process #5 
 
The processes mainly differ in the arrangement of the reaction and separation sections as well 
as in the adoption of different separation technologies (adsorption or membranes). Traditional 
and auto-thermal processes with PSA (#1 and #2) are those currently used in industrial 
hydrogen production [Häussinger et al., 2003; Ahmed & Krumpelt 2001; Seo et al., 2002; 
Hagh, 2003]. In these conventional process arrangements, hydrogen is separated by selective 
adsorption at mild temperature. In the internal membrane separation process (#3), a novel 
approach to the reaction section is introduced: the shift reactor is eliminated and hydrogen 
production only occurs in a single adiabatic reactor, where semi-permeable membranes allow 
the direct high-temperature separation of hydrogen, enhancing the conversion. The external 
high-temperature membrane separation (#4) was also proposed, although lower conversions 
are obtained by this process. The integrated reactor (#5) process presents a novel design for 
both heat transfer and hydrogen separation. In particular, the reaction heat is not provided by 
an external heat exchanger, but by hot gases in an integrated tubular exchanger. Hydrogen 
separation is obtained by a high-temperature internal membrane. 
A brief description of each process is reported in the following. 
 
 
i) Reference process scheme #1: Traditional with Pressure Swing Adsorption 
The most common and available technique for hydrogen production is presently the so called 
Traditional process with PSA [Häussinger et al., 2003; Ahmed & Krumpelt 2001; Seo et al., 
2002], in which hydrogen purification is realized in zeolite bed batteries. The process may be 
divided in three sections. In the first section, the hydrodesulphurization of natural gas occurs 
by hydrogen addition. A pre-heater of natural gas and a H2S adsorber on zinc oxides are 
present in this section. In the second section, the purified natural gas is mixed with hot steam 
and fed to the catalytic bed in the reforming side of the reactor. A further not purified stream 
of natural gas is burned into the furnace side, together with the off gas (a flammable mixture 
containing 42% of hydrogen) from the purification section. The combustion is carried out 
with atmospheric air and provides the heat for the endothermic reforming reaction. The 
reacted stream is then cooled in a spray quencher with water and fed to another catalytic 
reactor, in which a further hydrogen production is realized via shift reaction. In the last 
section, hydrogen is purified and a thermal recovery is performed cooling the hydrogen 
stream and producing hot steam. The water obtained in the conversion and shift reaction is 
removed from the hydrogen stream via condensation and recycled to the reaction section. 
Hydrogen is purified in the PSA unit and sent to the storage. The exhausted beds of PSA are 
regenerated by hydrogen washing. Hence, even if a high purity hydrogen is obtained, almost 
the 25% of the final product is consumed in this operation. The purged gas from the 
regeneration, which is called off gas, is fed to the furnace side of the reactor. The PFD shown 
in figure 4.4.2 was used as the reference schemes for the assessment carried out in the present 
study. 
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Figure 4.4.1: Block diagram of the five reference processes for hydrogen production by 
natural gas steam reforming considered in the present study 
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Figure 4.4.2: Reference process flow diagram (PFD) defined for the traditional process with 
PSA (#1). R1: hydrodesulphurization reactor; R2: H2S adsorption; R3: reforming reactor and 
furnace; D5-D6-D7-D8: adsorption beds; E1, E2, E3: heat recovery system; E4: air cooler; 
D9-D10: pressure buffers. 
 
 
ii)  Reference process scheme #2: Auto-thermal with Pressure Swing Adsorption 
The second process considered in the present study for hydrogen production is the auto-
thermal process with PSA [Häussinger et al., 2003; Ahmed & Krumpelt 2001; Seo et al., 
2002; Hagh, 2003], which is as well widely adopted in the current industrial practice, 
although being more complex than the traditional PSA process. The main difference with 
respect to the traditional PSA is in the reaction section. All the natural gas fed to the reactor is 
purified, since hydrogen is produced in two parallel streams, by endothermic catalytic 
reforming and by exothermic partial oxidation with pure oxygen (instead of air). The 
exothermic partial oxidation reaction provides the energy contribution necessary for the 
conversion reaction.  
In this scheme, pure oxygen is used instead of air and larger quantities of natural gas are 
processed, since less heat is produced in the furnace, where only a partial oxidation is carried 
out. Moreover, the off-gas from the regeneration of the adsorbers can not be recycled to the 
furnace, thus increasing the natural gas consumption. On the other hand, the off-gas may be 
used for hot steam generation, in particular if thermal energy users are present (e.g. as in 
integrated eco-parks). 
 
iii) Reference process scheme #3: Internal membrane separator 
The third process considered is indicated as internal membrane separation process and is 
characterized by a novel approach to the reaction section [Gallucci et al., 2004; Lattner & 
Harold, 2004]. The shift reactor is eliminated and hydrogen production only occurs in a 
single adiabatic reactor. All the reforming reactions (i.e. conversion, water gas shifting and 
partial oxidation) are integrated in the reactor and the separation is carried out via semi-
permeable membranes in the reactor. The continuous removal of hydrogen from the reaction 
zone influences the equilibrium, enhancing reactant conversion. In the process analyzed, the 
generation of hot gases, which provides the thermal energy required for the reforming 
reaction, is coupled to mechanical energy production with a gas turbine. Hot steam is fed to 
the permeate side of the reactor in order to easily sweep the hydrogen through the membrane.  
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Figure 4.4.3: Reference process flow diagram (PFD) defined for the integrated membrane 
separation process (#3). R1: hydrodesulphurization reactor; R2: H2S adsorption; R3: 
membrane reforming reactor; T1: gas turbine group; C1: compressor; C2: process air 
compressor; E1-6: heat recovery system, E7: steam condenser with refrigeration cycle; E8; air 
cooler; D1: flash drum. 
 
 
The condensation of this steam requires a refrigeration cycle, that is the main disadvantage of 
this scheme, due to the related power consumption. The condensed demineralized water may 
be recycled to the process without external integration, while in the first two schemes a water 
make-up was required. A final compression and cooling unit is needed to provide a hydrogen 
output at the same operating conditions of the previous processes. The mechanical energy for 
this compression is provided by the gas turbine. Figure 4.4.3 reports the reference scheme 
assumed in the present study for the sustainability assessment of the process. 
 
iv) Reference process scheme #4: External membrane separator 
An alternative type of membrane separation process was considered in the comparison. 
Although many elements are similar to internal membrane separation process, this process 
presents an external membrane apparatus to remove hydrogen from the reforming gases, after 
the cooling for thermal recovery [Simpson & Lutz, 2007]. Thus, operating conditions in the 
separation section are less severe. In particular, temperatures are lower, so the membrane is 
exposed to a less severe environment and the selectivity is higher. However a compression is 
required before of the membrane separator to increase the partial pressure of hydrogen. On the 
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other hand, hydrogen is not continuously removed from the reaction side as in the internal 
membrane separation process, so the conversion is lower. Moreover, also in this process the 
non permeated gas, containing a high percentage of unreacted methane, is fed to a gas turbine 
in order to exploit the heating value of the stream, and to provide the reaction heat to the 
process. 
 
v) Reference process scheme #5: Integrated reactor 
Also the last process considered is similar to the internal membrane separation process, but 
the reactor presents an alternative design [Iaquaniello & Mangiapane, 2006]. In particular, 
the reaction heat is not provided by an external heat exchanger, but by an integrated tubular 
exchanger. The heat is provided by a hot stream obtained from methane combustion, thus 
composed only of exhaust burned gases. A further equipment integration is thus realized in 
this scheme. The reactor is compact and efficient, carrying out reaction, separation and heat 
transfer. Moreover, there is no need to feed compressed air to the reactor as in the previous 
processes. Thus, the air compression section (C3 in figure 4.4.3) is not present. The critical 
point of the scheme concerns the membrane in the reactor, that is characterized by severe 
operative conditions, in particular during process start-up, when temperature gradients 
between the two sides of the membrane are higher. Heat recovery is possible from many 
streams of the process, leading to the production of excess steam suitable for external uses. 
 
 
4.4.2 – Sustainability assessment of the production case study 
 
In the following the case study is assessed according to the procedure described in §1.2. The 
application of the procedure will require the definition of an index pro inherent safety 
assessment. The more derailed discussion on inherent safety assessment trough the method 
described in §2.3 will be the topic of §4.4.3. 
 
4.4.2.1 - Definition of reference basis, boundary limits and data collection 
 
The starting point of the analysis was the definition of reference process schemes at a 
sufficient level of detail, and the collection of the quantitative data necessary for the analysis. 
For each reference process considered in the analysis, a simplified block diagram is presented 
in figure 4.4.1. It must be remarked that the process schemes defined in the following have the 
only purpose to show the results of the sustainability assessment performed and to provide  
 
 
Process Thermal/reaction use rate (ψ) 
Reactor conversion 
(χ) 
Separation 
efficiency (ζ) 
Overall reaction 
yield (η) 
Traditional PSA 0.56 0.95 0.75 2.6 
Auto-thermal PSA - 0.90 0.75 1.6 
Internal membrane 1.22 0.85 0.90 2.1 
External membrane 0.86 0.80 0.95 2.2 
Integrated reactor 10.57 0.90 0.90 3.2 
ψ = (natural gas for thermal use) / (natural gas fed to the reactor) 
χ = (converted methane [mol] ) / (methane feed to the reactor [mol] ) 
ζ = (hydrogen entering the separation device) / (hydrogen production potential) 
η = (hydrogen production potential [mol] ) / (methane feed to the reactor [mol] ) 
 
Table 4.4.1: Selected key parameters calculated for the alternative process options. 
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data useful for the identification of critical issues in the main alternative routes for hydrogen 
production. Obviously other processes or different arrangements may be proposed or are 
actually used for hydrogen production. 
 
On the basis of the average size of several existing plants, a hydrogen production potential of 
7100 t/y was considered. A reference process flow diagram (PFD) was defined for each 
reference process. The reference PFD was derived from those of existing plants for available 
industrial scale processes, or was based on data available in the technical literature for 
processes that are still under development. Figures 4.4.2 and 4.4.3, reporting the PFDs of the 
traditional with PSA (#1) and of the internal membrane separator (#3) processes, show the 
typical level of detail of the reference process schemes required for the application of the 
assessment procedure. 
The boundaries of the analysis should include all the stages of the process as well as the 
utilities, even if outside process or design battery limits. However, in the analysis of the 
required utilities (e.g. oxygen feedstock, refrigeration cycle), only the impacts directly 
allocable to the process of interest were considered. Therefore the environmental impacts 
related to oxygen production were considered for auto-thermal process with PSA (#2). 
Similarly, a portion of the overall impacts of auto-thermal with PSA (#2) and integrated 
reactor (#5) processes should be allocated to a co-product (a medium pressure steam stream) 
obtained in these processes. The storage and the distribution of hydrogen was not considered 
in the present analysis. 
 
Besides the full definition of material and energy flows, the analysis of each reference process 
scheme requires data on equipment and operating conditions. For each alternative these were 
gathered from literature data [Ahmed & Krumpelt 2001; Gallucci et al., 2004; Hagh, 2003; 
Häussinger et al., 2003; Iaquaniello & Mangiapane, 2006; Lattner & Harold, 2004; Seo et 
al., 2002; Simpson & Lutz, 2007] and from design calculations. Material and energy flow 
balances yield flow rates and compositions of the main streams. Table 4.4.1 summarizes 
selected key parameters calculated for the alternative options. The fugitive emissions were 
assessed by average emission factors for the expected leak points within the process diagram 
(e.g. seals, joints, valves, etc.) [Allen & Shonnard, 2002]. The emission of micro-pollutant 
(primarily NOx and CO) from the utilities (e.g. gas turbines, furnaces, etc.) were evaluated by 
emission factors from available databases [EPA, WPa, WPe]. The main pieces of equipment 
were preliminary sized, allowing the estimation of the unit inventories required for inherent 
safety analysis.  
Economic data were also retrieved or assessed. Material, energy and operative costs were 
evaluated multiplying the calculated flow rates by average unitary costs [IChemE, 2002; ICIS, 
WP]. The specific equivalent number of employees necessary for process activities was the 
result of an expert judgment based on similar activities. 
 
The adoption of a site specific approach in the normalization procedure required to select a 
reference site for the analysis (see §1.3 for details about). This was arbitrarily chosen in the 
outskirts of an industrial city in northern Italy. The resulting normalization factors are 
reported in the last column of table 4.4.2. Nevertheless, in the discussion of the results the 
influence of the site on the results of the analysis will be examined. 
 
 
4.4.2.2 - Results from sustainability assessment and discussion 
 
Table 4.4.2 shows the non normalized values of the Level 1 indicators calculated for the five 
reference schemes defined. The upper part of table 4.4.3 reports the normalized values of the 
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indices for each impact category. The values were obtained from the indicators and 
normalization factors in table 4.4.2 applying Equation (1.2.7). The table also reports the 
values calculated for Level 2 (aggregated) and Level 3 (overall) indices. All of them were 
obtained introducing in Equation (1.2.9) the proper values of indices and weight factors from 
table 4.4.3. 
 
 
 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 Unit Normalz. Factor 
Environment        
Global Warming 8.81 · 10 7 6.43 · 10 7 1.85 · 10 8 1.51 · 10 8 6.44 · 10 7 kgeq/y 1.16 · 10 6 
Rain Acidification 5.23 · 10 4 7.83 · 10 2 9.78 · 10 4 7.15 · 10 4 -2.28 · 10 4 kgeq/y 4.83 · 10 3 
Air Toxicity 2.32 · 10 7 3.47 · 10 5 4.21 · 10 7 3.08 · 10 7 -1.45 · 10 7 kgeq/y 3.79 · 10 5 
Solid waste disposal 1.55 · 10 4 2.46 · 10 4 3.35 · 10 4 2.76 · 10 4 9.08 · 10 4 kgeq/y 2.32 · 10 5 
Natural gas 4.06 · 10 7 3.18 · 10 7 7.39 · 10 7 6.07 · 10 7 2.73 · 10 7 kgeq/y 1.19 · 10 5 
Electric power 0.00 1.76 · 10 7 3.74 · 10 5 3.25 · 10 6 3.74 · 10 5 kWh/y 1.10 · 10 6 
Economy        
Economic impact index -7.14 · 10 6 -8.99 · 10 6 4.25 · 10 6 -1.52 · 10 5 -1.42 · 10 7 €/y 2.83 · 10 6 
Society        
Occupational index -2.10 · 10 1 -2.10 · 10 1 -1.50 · 10 1 -1.50 · 10 1 -1.80 · 10 1 people 7.92 · 10 1 
Inherent Safety 4.38 · 10 -6 3.73 · 10 -6 5.61 · 10 -6 1.06 · 10 -5 4.86 · 10 -6 km2/y 6.00 · 10 -6 
 
Table 4.4.2: Non normalized values of Level 1 impact indicators calculated for the five 
reference processes assessed. 
 
 
 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 Weight factor 
Level 1       
Global Warming 7.57 · 10 1 5.52 · 10 1 1.59 · 10 2 1.30 · 10 2 5.53 · 10 1 0.051 
Rain Acidification 1.08 · 10 1 1.62 · 10 -1 2.02 · 10 1 1.48 · 10 1 -4.72 · 10 0 0.066 
Air Toxicity 6.12 · 10 1 9.17 · 10 -1 1.11 · 10 2 8.13 · 10 1 -3.84 · 10 1 0.095 
Solid waste disposal 6.69 · 10 -2 1.06 · 10 -1 1.45 · 10 -1 1.19 · 10 -1 3.91 · 10 -1 0.030 
Natural gas 3.42 · 10 2 2.67 · 10 2 6.22 · 10 2 5.11 · 10 2 2.29 · 10 2 0.044 
Electric power 0.00 · 10 0 1.60 · 10 1 3.39 · 10 -1 2.95 · 10 0 3.39 · 10 -1 0.064 
Economic impact index -2.52 · 10 0 -3.18 · 10 0 1.50 · 10 0 -5.36 · 10 -2 -5.02 · 10 0  
Occupational index -2.65 · 10 -1 -2.65 · 10 -1 -1.89 · 10 -1 -1.89 · 10 -1 -2.27 · 10 -1 0.200 
Inherent Safety 7.30 · 10 -1 6.22 · 10 -1 9.35 · 10 -1 1.77 · 10 0 8.10 · 10 -1 0.800 
Level 2       
Environmental impact 2.54 · 10 1 1.57 · 10 1 4.74 · 10 1 3.80 · 10 1 9.03 · 10 0 0.300 
Economic impact -2.52 · 10 0 -3.18 · 10 0 1.50 · 10 0 -5.36 · 10 -2 -5.02 · 10 0 0.300 
Societal impact 5.31 · 10 -1 4.45 · 10 -1 7.10 · 10 -1 1.38 · 10 0 6.03 · 10 -1 0.400 
Level 3       
Overall index 7.09 · 10 0 3.94 · 10 0 1.50 · 10 1 1.19 · 10 1 1.44 · 10 0  
Normalized 0.47 0.26 1.00 0.80 0.10  
 
Table 4.4.3: Normalized values of Level 1 indicators and values of Level 2 and 3 indices 
calculated for the five reference processes assessed. 
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It is evident from table 4.4.2 that the alternative processes differ significantly in the amount of 
raw material (i.e. natural gas) required for the fixed annual production of hydrogen. This is a 
straightforward consequence of both the different overall yield of the processes and the 
different requirement of methane for thermal use (table 4.4.1). Though the co-production of 
medium-pressure steam has to be considered in some schemes. In particular, in auto-thermal 
with PSA (#2) and integrated reactor (#5) processes a large fraction of the raw material 
consumption (respectively 26% and 86% of the actual natural gas feed) and of the consequent 
emissions were allocated to the steam production and, thus, not accounted for the 
environmental impact in table 4.4.2. 
The emission of greenhouse gases (mainly due to CO2 emission from combustion) and the 
solid waste disposal (i.e. the exhausted H2S adsorbent) follow the same pattern of natural gas 
consumption. 
The emission of toxic and acidifying compounds is mainly related to the emission of nitrogen 
oxides (NOx). Also NOx and CO formation may be roughly correlated to the amount of 
natural gas consumed for thermal uses, although emission factors slightly differ among 
technologies [EPA, WPa, WPe]. However, for reference processes #2 and #5 the allocation of 
emissions to steam production gives an important contribution in reducing the values of the 
impact index due to micro-pollutant emissions. Furthermore, the allocation leads to negative 
values of the toxicity and acidification indices for the integrated reactor process (#5), since 
the NOx formation is lower in the assessed process than in the average industrial boilers which 
were considered in the allocation procedure as the source of the emissions avoided. 
Electric power consumption is mainly due to the drive engines of the compressors that are 
required in some schemes. In reference process #2, the electric power required for the 
production of the pure oxygen yields an index that is at least an order of magnitude higher 
than in the other reference schemes. 
The economic impact index shows a wide range of values among the alternatives. Negative 
cash flows (and thus positive index values) were calculated for the internal membrane 
separation process (#3) on the basis of the prices considered for hydrogen and raw materials. 
External membrane separation process (#4) is found economically profitable, but is at least 
one order of magnitude less convenient than other alternatives. Both the processes are 
affected by the large costs of natural gas, correlated to the low hydrogen yield and the high 
thermal energy requirement (table 4.4.1), with no profitable steam co-production. On the 
other hand, reference processes #2 and #5 benefit of the selling of the co-product medium 
pressure steam that partially compensates the natural gas purchase. 
The analysis of the inherent safety index evidences that a higher level of hazard is present in 
the reference processes which require compressors or heat exchangers treating an hydrogen 
rich stream. A high hazard index results for the compression, due both to the high 
flammability of the processed stream and to the significant credit of compressor failure 
scenarios. Similarly, heat exchangers treating hydrogen streams play a significant role in the 
overall plant hazard, due to their operating conditions. In process #4, the compressor used 
before of the membrane separator, that has no corresponding unit in the other membrane 
alternatives, is mainly responsible of the lower inherent safety performance of the reference 
process. 
 
The normalized values of the environmental indicators, reported in table 4.4.3, allow the 
comparative analysis of the main impacts of the alternative process schemes and the analysis 
of their importance with respect to the external references. As shown in the table, in all the 
processes the critical impact results the consumption of natural gas as raw material. This was 
expected, due to the non renewable nature of this feedstock. Global warming and toxicity 
impact indexes also have significant values, about one order of magnitude higher than the 
normalized values of the others indices. Again, this is related to natural gas consumption. In 
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reference scheme #2 it is worth noting that the impact of electrical power requirement 
contributes to balance the lower natural gas request. 
With respect to societal impacts, non-critical values are obtained for both the inherent safety 
and occupational normalized indexes. In the case of the occupational index, this result may be 
expected, due to the high automation of chemical plants. On the other hand, the quite low 
value of the normalized inherent safety is due to the boundaries chosen for the analysis of the 
reference schemes, that excluded the storage and distribution facilities. Thus, only limited 
quantities of gas-phase hazardous substances are present in the reference process schemes 
assessed. 
 
Level 2 key performance indicators (KPIs) are reported in the impact fingerprint plot shown 
in figure 4.4.4. The diagram evidences that environmental impacts prevail on all the other 
issues in all the reference schemes considered. On the other hand, in general societal aspects 
do not result critical. Process scheme #4 is an exception, due to the higher value of the 
inherent safety index caused by the aforementioned presence of two compressors in the 
process, that are both likely to give releases of hydrogen-rich streams. 
A more detailed comparison of the Level 2 KPIs is possible in table 4.4.3. The table confirms 
that the environmental impact is dominant, while the economic impact is lower of about an 
order of magnitude. The table also evidences the poor sustainability performance of reference 
process schemes #3 and #4.  This is a consequence of both the low overall yield and the high 
use of methane for energy production, with no compensation by heat recovery as co-product 
medium pressure steam (table 4.4.1). This is due to the low conversion in the adiabatic reactor 
assumed in the reference process scheme. Even if the membrane allows higher hydrogen 
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Figure 4.4.4: Radar plot reporting the impact fingerprint of the alternative processes 
analyzed in the present study. 
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 recoveries than, for instance, a traditional process with PSA, the overall yield remains lower 
(table 4.4.1). A lower yield requires a larger consumption of natural gas in the reactor and 
larger requirement for thermal energy to preheat the reactor feed and to produce process 
steam. The higher consumption of natural gas consequently affects emissions, raw material 
costs, gas desulphurization and scale of possible releases of flammable materials. 
 
On the other hand, the sustainability performance of reference processes #2 (auto-thermal 
with PSA) and #5 (integrated reactor), that is promising from the point of view of 
sustainability, is strongly influenced by the assumptions concerning co-product allocation (the 
medium pressure steam stream). Thus, the valorization of this product stream is critical for the 
sustainability performance of the process. Non considering the allocation to the co-product 
stream (i.e. steam is not exploited by other facilities/users) would yield important 
modifications in the final results. For instance, the environmental index of process #5 would 
increase of about 15 times. 
 
The value of the overall sustainability performance indicator shown in table 4.4.3 confirms 
the conclusions drawn on the basis of Level 2 KPIs. The comparison of the index values 
evidences that in the present assessment, the reference scheme considered for the integrated 
reactor process (#5) results that having the best expected sustainability performances, mainly 
due to the high reaction yield and the sharing of impacts with a co-product stream. The 
internal membrane separation and integrated heat transfer has similar expected performances, 
although the valorization of the steam co-production is crucial. Membrane technologies 
present clear advantages like high selectivity and possibility of shifting the reforming 
reactions by product removal. However they have to be properly integrated with the reaction 
in order to result in high product recovery, high process yield, and efficient use of the thermal 
energy. The fully integrated reactor of process scheme #5 seems to be effective in this sense. 
Other promising options may concern the use of multi-stage configurations, that should 
improve the low conversion performances of the single stage adiabatic reactor considered for 
reference schemes #3 and #4 [Feng & Ji, 2007]. However, if such processes require 
compression stages, the compression units may result critical from the point of view of 
inherent safety, as earlier identified in option #4. 
A final note on reference process #2 (auto-thermal with PSA) should be added. This process 
results profitable and more sustainable compared to the traditional PSA. However the results, 
also in this case, can be affected by assumption on the allocation of the co-product medium 
pressure steam. Moreover this option requires the availability of a industrial oxygen 
production plant for the feedstock. 
 
 
The results obtained for the overall and Level 2 KPIs are obviously influenced by the weight 
factors used in the procedure. As remarked above, uncertainties may be present in the values 
attributed to these parameters. A sensitivity analysis was performed in order to identify the 
influence of the weight factors on the results. The uncertainty of the weight factors was 
described by an arbitrary probability distribution of values (a Beta distribution with α=β=4 
and a 50% maximum variation of the values reported in table 4.4.3 were assumed in current 
study). A Monte Carlo method was applied to calculate the resulting probability distribution 
of the aggregated KPIs (the overall index and the Level 2 indices) and the contribution of the 
different weight factors to the variance of the results. As shown in table 4.4.4, only two 
weight factors showed a relevant contribution to the variance of the overall index: those 
attributed to natural gas consumption and to environmental impact (see table 4.4.4). In 
reference scheme #2, also the contribution of weight factor attributed to electric power 
consumption was significant. These results confirm that natural gas consumption, which in 
 §4.4. - 12 
turn greatly influences the environmental performance, is the key element for the comparison 
of the overall sustainability performance of the alternative processes considered. 
The ranking among the expected sustainability performance of the alternative processes 
analyzed, as expressed by the overall sustainability index, is only slightly affected by the 
uncertainty in the weight factors. Figure 4.4.5 reports the cumulative probability of the values 
of the differences among the overall sustainability indexes of different couples of processes, 
calculated by Monte Carlo runs. As shown in the figure, a change of sign of the difference 
among the overall sustainability index has a negligible probability within the range of 
uncertainty assumed for the weight factors. Hence, although the absolute values of the results 
are obviously influenced by the values of the weight factors selected, the sensitivity analysis 
evidenced that the ranking obtained in the former analysis is sufficiently robust. A limited 
uncertainty in the selection of the weight factors thus seems not critical for the identification 
of the process alternative that has the lowest impact on sustainability. Similar conclusions 
may be drawn for the normalization factors, that are expected to change if the site considered 
in the analysis is changed. Thus, even if the reported values are site specific, the general 
trends evidenced in the results reported are expected to have a sufficiently general validity, at 
least if sites in industrialized districts are considered. 
 
 
 
4.4.3 – Inherent safety assessment of the production case study 
 
The same five process options described in §4.4.1 were assessed for inherent safety by the 
approach defined in §2.2.3. The application of the procedure yields the values reported in 
table 4.4.2 that were briefly commented in the discussion of results for sustainability. In the 
following a few further details on the application of the procedure are reported. However, the 
attention is focused on only 2 options, for sake of brevity: option #1 (traditional with PSA) 
and #5 (integrated reactor). 
 
The indices obtained from the assessment of the two options considered are reported in Table 
4.4.6, that shows the equipment potential and inherent hazard indexes calculated for the 
alternative processes considered in the analysis. The table also reports the overall indexes 
calculated for the two alternatives. 
 
 
 
 # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 
Global Warming 1.3 % 1.5 % 2.0 % 2.0 % 2.1 % 
Rain Acidification < 0.1 % < 0.1 % < 0.1 % < 0.1 % < 0.1 % 
Air Toxicity 2.9 % < 0.1 % 3.4 % 2.7 % 3.2 % 
Solid waste disposal < 0.1 % < 0.1 % < 0.1 % < 0.1 % < 0.1 % 
Natural gas 19.8 % 24.9 % 23.4 % 23.2 % 26.4 % 
Electric power < 0.1 % 0.2 % < 0.1 % < 0.1 % < 0.1 % 
Inherent Safety < 0.1 % 0.1 % < 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.2 % 
Environmental impact 74.4 % 69.2 % 71.0 % 71.7 % 53.5 % 
Societal impact 1.5 % 4.2 % < 0.1 % 0.2 % 14.5 % 
 
Table 4.4.5: Contribution (%) of the weight factors to the variance of the overall index. 
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Figure 4.4.5: Distribution of cumulative probabilities for the difference between the overall 
sustainability indices of selected couples of alternative processes. 
 
 
#1 – traditional with PSA #5 - integrated reactor 
 
UHIk 
(m2/y) 
UPIk 
(m2)  
UHIk 
(m2/y) 
UPIk 
(m2) 
R1 hydrodesulfuration 3.1x10-2 4.6x103 R1 hydrodesulfuration 2.3x10-2 2.5x103 
R2 H2S adsorption 3.1x10-2 4.6x103 R2 H2S adsorption 2.2x10-2 2.5x103 
R3 reforming reactor 1.7x10-1 9.6x103 R3 membrane reactor 1.0x10-2 2.0x103 
R4 water-shift  reactor 3.7x10-2 6.0x103 C2 hydrogen compressor 1.8 x100 7.5x102 
D3 
spray quencher / water 
mixer 3.2x10-2 4.9x103 D1 water separator 1.0x10-2 1.9x103 
D4 water separator 5.3x10-2 8.4x103 E1 methane heater 3.4x10-1 4.3x103 
D5-8 PSA beds battery 1.4x10-2 7.0x102 E2 hydrogen cooling 3.9x10-1 7.5x102 
D9 hydrogen buffer 3.6x10-3 4.9x103 E3 syn-gas cooler 9.6x10-2 1.9x103 
D10 off-gas buffer 2.0x10-3 3.8x103 E6 syn-gas cooler 9.4x10-2 7.5x102 
E1 methane heater 4.7x10-1 7.0x103 C1 turbogas 5.0x10-2 2.8x103 
E2 syn-gas cooler 4.0x10-1 6.2x103     
E3 syn-gas cooler 4.4x10-1 7.1x103     
E4 syn-gas cooler 1.6x10-1 6.2x103     
 HI PI  HI PI 
 1.9x100 7.4x104  2.8x100 2.0x104 
 
Table 4.4.6: Values of unit and overall inherent safety key performance indicators for the 
alternative processes considered in the analysis. 
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The reforming reactor is outlined as the most potentially dangerous unit. On the other hand, 
the adoption of the membrane technology in option #5 proved to be effective in limiting the 
maximum possible consequences of release scenarios. Due to the unconventional nature of 
this piece of equipment, a FMEA was performed, indicating that the unit is extremely unlikely 
to cause LOC events resulting in high damage areas. Focusing on UHIs, the heat exchangers 
generally resulted among the more inherently hazardous units, having severe scenarios 
associated to rather high credit factors. However, the hydrogen compressor of option #5 is the 
unit that has the higher value for UHI, despite of the low UPI value, due to the effect of credit 
factors. 
 
If the overall indexes are considered, option #1 results the worst with respect to the potential 
hazard index. If credit factors are considered, the high equipment inherent hazard index of the 
compressor in option #5 causes the overall inherent hazard index (PI) to be higher. Thus, the 
application of the method yields two important pieces of information for the further 
development and/or the selection among alternatives: on one hand, the potential hazards of 
alternative #1 are higher; on the other, a safety critical unit is present in alternative #5. 
 
 
 
4.4.3.1 – Comparison of the results with inherent safety assessment methods from the 
literature 
 
The case studies were also analysed using literature methodologies for inherent safety 
assessment. In particular, the following methods were considered: 
 
• Prototype Index of Inherent Safety (PIIS) proposed by Edwards & Lawrence, [1993]; 
• Inherent Safety Index (ISI) proposed by Heikkilä et al., [1996, 1998, 1999]; 
• Potentials Danger for safety in Environmental Safety and Health (ESH) by Koller et 
al., [2000]. 
• Tools I and J of INSET Toolkit (INSET) [INSIDE, 2001]; 
• Safety Weighted Hazard Index (SWeHI) by Khan at al., [2001]; 
• Integrated Inherent Safety Index (I2SI) by Khan & Amyotte, [2004,2005]; 
• Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) [Dow, 1994]; 
• Dow Chemical Exposure Index (CEI) [Dow, 1993]. 
The comparison of the results obtained by the methods listed above required some further 
assumptions. In particular, some methods (e.g. ESH, INSET) yield unaggregated indexes for 
specific types of unit hazards. Thus, additional assumptions were necessary to obtain overall 
aggregated indexes: in accordance with the literature, the maximum expected values and an 
equal weight of the indexes were considered in normalization and aggregation [INSIDE, 
2001; Koller et al., 2001]. Whenever unaggregated indexes are expressed in terms of damage 
distance (Dow F&EI, Dow CEI) the use of the higher distance was preferred, in accordance 
with the approach suggested by the SWeHI method [Khan at al., 2001] and by the 
methodology developed in the present paper. Furthermore, several methods do not define 
clear and homogeneous procedures to calculate the material quantities to be considered in the 
unit assessment, requiring specific assumptions to limit potential biases in results. Since the 
indexes calculated by the different methods have different scales, the index values reported in 
Figure 4.4.6 were normalized dividing them by the higher value obtained for each 
methodology. In the case of I2SI, that has a higher value for an inherently safer option, the 
inverse of the index was considered for normalization. 
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Figure 4.4.6: Comparison of the overall inherent safety indexes calculated by different 
methods (see text) for two of the processes considered for hydrogen production: A: #1 - 
traditional with PSA, B: #2 - integrated reactor. (*) Aggregation was obtained by the 
assumptions discussed in the text. 
 
 
Figure 4.4.6 shows the comparison of the overall inherent safety indexes calculated by 
different methods for all the case studies considered. The results evidence that also the values 
of the overall indexes largely differ among the different methods. The differences are likely to 
arise both from the different level of detail required by the application of the method (see 
Table 2.1.1) and by the different penalization factors considered in the methods.  
 
The application of PIIS, that requires to consider reforming and shift reaction as two 
independent steps, results in the penalization of option #1. The application of the more 
detailed indexes (EHS, INSET, SWeHI and F&EI) is influenced by the absence of explicit 
rules for the definition of material quantities to be considered in the analysis, since all the 
process are based on gas phase streams and the unit inventories are generally low. However, 
almost all the approaches identify as more hazardous the process alternatives having the 
higher material inventories. The values of the PI index obtained by the proposed approach 
show a similar behaviour with respect to most of the other indexes. However, the analysis of 
each single unit allows the identification of important differences related to the ability of the 
proposed method to take into account specific features and release modes of the units. 
Moreover, credit factors derived from equipment safety scores are not considered by the 
majority of the other tools. 
 
The results reported above allow some general conclusions to be drawn. No coherence exists 
among the available methods for the quantitative assessment of inherent safety. Several 
factors are responsible of the disagreement in the results, evidenced in Figure 4.4.6. In 
particular, the detail of information required for the application of each method influences the 
results: thus procedures based on general data do not allow a detailed hazard identification. 
Moreover, subjective assumptions on material quantities resulted a significant issue for the 
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reliability of some literature methods. Furthermore, not all the tools attribute the same 
importance to different potential hazard factors. These elements, if added to built-in 
assumption and to some degree of freedom left to the experience of the analyst, may well 
justify the differences in the results obtained. 
 
As expected, the results obtained for the overall potential hazard index (PI) are in line with 
those obtained using the more detailed methods proposed in the literature (e.g. EHS, SWeHI), 
since in the methodologies considered the potential severity of the scenarios as the prevailing 
factor in the analysis. On the other hand, the inherent safety hazard index (HI) introduced in 
the present study, adds further details to the results, accounting for the recorded safety scores 
of the different equipment items, thus taking into account the hazards coming from auxiliary 
equipment, as compressors, filters, and heat exchangers, that are often overlooked in 
conventional severity-based inherent safety assessment methods. 
 
 
 
4.4.4 – Storage case-study description 
 
Hydrogen storage represents a well-known and widely investigated technological problem. 
Due to the physical and chemical properties of this substance, conventional storage processes 
have to manage critical operating conditions: high pressures are required by pressurized 
storages (tens of MPa), while liquefied storage needs lower temperatures than other cryogenic 
processes (a few tens of Kelvin) [Conte et al., 2004; Zhou, 2005; Takeichi et al., 2003; 
Domashenko et al., 2002. Mitlitsky et al., 2001]. Moreover the flammability limits are wider 
and the ignition energy is much lower than that of other flammable substances [Cadwallader 
et al., 1999]. Thus, several innovative technologies were proposed for hydrogen storage. 
Examples are the adsorption on metals or the storage as a complex hydride [Conte et al., 
2004; Zhou, 2005; Takeichi et al., 2003; Hagstrom et al., 1995]. 
 
Since different technologies are suitable for different potentialities of storage, three different 
“sizes” were explored in the study, namely “small”, “medium” and “large” scale applications. 
These were defined on the basis of the analysis of technical literature [Conte et al., 2004; 
Zhou, 2005; Takeichi et al., 2003; Domashenko et al., 2002. Mitlitsky et al., 2001; Hagstrom 
et al., 1995] and of available commercial datasheets. 
• “Small scale” storages are needed in innovative automotive applications. A 5 kg 
storage was considered, supplying gaseous hydrogen at a fuel cell engine operating at 
low pressure (e.g. 0.3 MPa). 
• “Medium scale” storages will be required in hydrogen refuelling stations. In several 
preliminary and demonstrative plants the storage unit contains about 500kg of 
hydrogen. In these applications, hydrogen is supplied to the user at 35 MPa. Thus, a 
compression unit is also required. 
• “Large scale” applications are used in current industrial application, including 
hydrogen production and supply in oil refineries. On the basis of literature data, a bulk 
storage of 27t of hydrogen was considered in the analysis. In order to have a correct 
overview of the hazards related to the alternative technologies, the storage facilities 
were considered coupled with the necessary “upstream” operations (e.g. the 
liquefaction unit for liquefied storage). 
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Four alternative storage techniques were considered in the case-studies: 
i) storage of hydrogen gas under pressure; 
ii) storage of liquefied hydrogen; 
iii) storage as a metal hydride; 
iv) storage as a complex hydride. 
 
These were indicated in the literature as the more effective and competitive technologies for 
the future development of hydrogen storage processes [Browning et al., 1997; Aiello et al., 
1999; Mahmut & Kaplan, 2001]. The present stage of development of these four technologies 
is quite different [Conte et al., 2004; Zhou, 2005; Takeichi et al., 2003; Browning et al., 
1997; Aiello et al., 1999; Mahmut & Kaplan, 2001]. In particular, technologies based on 
compressed gas and liquefied cryogenic storage are currently used worldwide for large scale 
applications, such as refineries or chemical plants [Browning et al., 1997; Aiello et al., 1999]. 
On the other hand, technologies based on metal and complex hydrides are still under 
development but are indicated as possible safer alternatives [Browning et al., 1997; Mahmut 
& Kaplan, 2001]. 
 
Table 4.4.7 reports the main features and the stage of technology development for the 
different scale hydrogen storage processes considered. In the case of storage based on metal 
or complex hydrides, some data in the table were estimated on the basis of the characteristics 
of the available pilot applications. 
 
Scheme Features Small scale Medium scale Large scale 
Technology Commercial Commercial - 
Pressure (MPa) 40 25 - 
Temperature (K) 300 300 - 
H2 mass stored per unit (kg) 2.5 35.7 - 
Compressed 
 
Number of units 2 2 tube trailers 
(7 units each) 
- 
Technology Research Commercial Commercial
Pressure (MPa) 0.6 0.6 1.7 
Temperature (K) 20/25 20/25 20/25 
H2 mass stored per unit (kg) 5 500 13500 
Cryogenic 
 
Number of units 1 1 2 
Technology Commercial Research - 
Pressure (MPa) 1.1 1.1 - 
Temperature (K) 300 300 - 
H2 mass stored per unit (kg) 1 105 - 
Metal 
Hydride 
 
Number of units 5 5 - 
Technology - Research Research 
Pressure (MPa) - 0.1 0.1 
Temperature (K) - 300 300 
H2 mass stored per unit (kg) - 500 13500 
Complex 
Hydride 
 
Number of units - 1 2 
 
Table 4.4.7: Stage of development and main features of different scale hydrogen storage 
systems. 
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Reference schemes were defined for the storage technologies considered in the present study. 
Figures 4.4.7 to 4.4.9 report the reference schemes defined for the different technologies and 
the different scales considered in the assessment on the basis of literature data and of available 
information on existing hydrogen storage plants. The symbols used to identify the units in the 
figures are explained in table 4.4.10. 
 
“Small scale” storages are devoted to automotive applications. The PFDs for the proposed 
technologies are reported in figure 4.4.7. A 5 kg storage on board was considered for all the 
alternative technologies, supplying gaseous hydrogen at a fuel cell engine on the vehicle. The 
fuel cell operating pressure was supposed to be 0.3 MPa, which is a typical operating 
condition for these equipment items. In the case of the gaseous storage (figure 4.4.7-(a)), the 
high pressure hydrogen is delivered from the cylinders D1 and D2 by pressure gradient. In the 
case of the liquefied storage at 25 K (figure 4.4.7-(b)), an electric vaporizer E1 provides low 
pressure gaseous hydrogen. Finally, in the case of the metal hydrides storage, a battery of 5 
reactors (D1-D5) is used, each containing up to 1kg hydrogen via adsorption on a specific 
metal support (figure 4.4.7-(c)). An organic oil is used as a thermal vector, both to provide 
and subtract heat from the bulk storage unit in the different operating conditions. In the 
loading phase, the adsorption heat is removed and the oil is cooled in the E2 heat exchanger. 
In the discharging phase, the oil heated in E1 heat exchanger, provides the desorption heat to 
the storage unit. The released hydrogen is stored in a pressurized buffer D6. 
 
“Medium scale” storages are mainly developed in the perspective of application to hydrogen 
refuelling stations. In most applications, the storage unit is supposed to contain about 500 kg 
of hydrogen, stored using different alternative technologies. In the case of the gaseous storage 
technology, the bulk storage was considered at on operating pressure of 25 MPa (figure 4.4.8- 
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Figure 4.4.7: Small scale hydrogen storage processes: reference schemes considered in the 
analysis. (a) Compressed, (b) cryogenic and (c) metal hydrides storage technologies. 
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(a)) with 2 commercial tube trailers (D1 and D2). Each trailer was considered as composed of 
6 pressurized cylinders, each containing about 40kg of hydrogen. Since for the refuelling of 
the next generation hydrogen vehicles high pressures will be required, a compressor (K1) 
coupled with a buffer storage unit (D3-D13) is needed, providing gaseous hydrogen at 35 
MPa. 
In the case of the cryogenic storage (figure 4.4.8-(b)), hydrogen is stored at 20-25 K at 
moderate pressure (0.6 MPa). An external finned tubes heat exchanger (E1) is needed to 
provide gaseous hydrogen. Also in this case, the coupled compression (K1) - high pressure 
buffer (D2-D12) units are needed. 
The medium scale reference scheme for metal hydrides storage technology (figure 4.4.8-(c)) 
was based on the same principle of the small scale scheme. Each unit was supposed to store 
up to 100 kg hydrogen by adsorption on metal hydrides. In the discharge phase, hydrogen is 
released at low pressure (about 1.1 MPa) and compressed as in previous cases. 
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Figure 4.4.8:  Medium scale hydrogen storage processes: reference schemes considered in the 
analysis. (a) Compressed, (b) cryogenic, (c) metal hydrides and (d) complex hydrides storage 
technologies. 
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The medium scale reference scheme for hydrogen storage on complex hydrides (figure 4.4.8-
(d)) consists in three main sections: i) a bulk storage unit for the hydride, at atmospheric 
pressure and ambient temperature; ii) a reaction section, in which the gaseous hydrogen is 
produced; and iii) a compression and buffer storage unit. The hydride is dispersed in a mineral 
oil in order to prevent the contact with moisture, which may cause unwanted hydrogen 
release. In the reaction section, the slurry is mixed with water and gaseous hydrogen is 
released via hydrolysis. Gaseous hydrogen is then compressed (K1) and sent to the high 
pressure buffer (D4-D14). Two semi-batch reactors are supposed to work alternatively, in 
order to allow continuous supply of hydrogen to the compression unit. 
 
In “large scale” reference schemes, also auxiliary sections were considered in order to obtain 
a correct representation of the expected safety performance of the process. Thus, a  
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Figure 4.4.9:  Large scale hydrogen storage processes: reference schemes considered in the 
analysis. (a) Liquefied and (b) complex hydrides storage technologies. 
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 liquefaction section was considered together with cryogenic storage, and a hydroxide 
regeneration section was associated to the complex hydrides storage. 
In large scale cryogenic storage reference scheme (figure 4.4.9-(a)), a double tank bulk 
storage unit (D3 and D4) was considered, containing 27 t of liquid hydrogen at 1.7 MPa and 
20-25 K. The liquefaction process is characterized by the coupling of two cycles, respectively 
for nitrogen and hydrogen liquefaction. In each cycle, the gas is compressed (compressors K1 
and K2 respectively), then cooled (heat exchangers E1-E4) and finally expanded and 
liquefied. The liquid is separated from the vapour in a buffer flash chamber (respectively D1 
and D2), and the vapour is recycled to the compressor. 
Also in the case of the complex hydrides reference scheme (figure 4.4.9-(b)), two large tanks 
(D3 and D4) were considered for the bulk storage, containing 90t of hydride slurry, equivalent 
to 27 t of hydrogen. A LiH slurry with mineral oil was considered as a support for hydrogen 
storage. The hydrogen release section is the same illustrated for the medium scale storage. In 
the regeneration section, carbon based material (e.g. biomass) is mixed with the exhaust 
hydroxide supplied from the exhaust storage (D1 and D2 tanks). In a decomposition reactor 
(R1), the reduction of the hydroxide was considered. The gases formed are extracted and 
compressed (K1). Hydrogen is separated via membrane separation (S1) and coupled in the 
mixer R2 with the liquid lithium coming from R1 to give the regenerated hydride, which is 
separated (B1) and mixed with the mineral oil (R3). The heat necessary is provided by the 
combustion of auxiliary fuel and waste carbon monoxide gas coming from S1 in burner B2. 
 
 
 
4.4.5 – Inherent safety assessment of the storage case-study 
 
4.4.5.1 – Small scale 
 
Table 4.4.8 reports the damage distances, the escalation distances and the credit factors 
assessed for the “small scale” reference schemes. 
The unit potential index was directly obtained from the data in table Table 4.4.8 selecting the 
maximum damage distance for each unit, while the unit hazard index was calculated applying 
equations(2.3.3) and (2.3.4) to the same data. The results obtained are reported in table 4.4.10. 
As shown in the table, in all the alternative schemes considered the hydrogen bulk storage is 
the unit that shows the higher value of the unit potential index, UPI. On the other hand, the 
introduction of credit factors in the analysis penalizes the presence of equipment items that 
may origin more easily LOC events. Thus, as shown in table 4.4.10, in the case of metal 
hydrides the higher values of the unit hazard index, UHI, were obtained for the shell&tube 
heat exchangers. 
Table 4.4.9 shows the values calculated for the overall potential and hazard indexes, PI and 
HI. The table evidences that the highest potential hazard index PI was obtained for the 
compressed gas storage, while the introduction of credit factors results in a penalization of the 
cryogenic technology, that results associated to the highest value of the hazard index, HI. 
Figure 4.4.11-(a) reports a comparison among the normalized values of the potential and 
hazard indexes calculated for the alternative technologies. The radar plot allows an effective 
comparison among the expected safety performance of the alternative technologies. As shown 
in the plot, metal hydride technology shows the best expected safety performances. 
Compressed storage is the technology associated to the higher potential hazards. On the other 
hand, if credit factors are considered, liquefied storage is penalized, while compressed storage 
and metal hydrides are expected to have similar performances. This result is caused by the 
high credit factors associated to LOC events from auxiliary units, in particular heat 
exchangers, present in the metal hydrides scheme. These factors increase the overall hazard 
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index associated to the technology, that results comparable to that of compressed storage, 
even if the UPI and UHI values of the bulk storage are much lower for metal hydrides than for 
compressed storage, as shown in figure 4.4.11-(a). 
It must be remarked that the values of the credit factors used in the present study are derived 
from available literature data based on the analysis of standard equipment performances. 
Thus, in particular in the case of technologies still under development, as metal hydrides, the 
actual values of these factors in a future industrial application may be different, since specific 
equipment with improved safety performances may be used. Nevertheless, the results 
obtained evidence that in the perspective of an industrial implementation of this technology, 
the reliability of the auxiliary equipment will be an important issue to be addressed. 
 
 
Scheme Unit LOC Scenario cfi,k di,j,k (m) 
Compressed D1-D2: Bulk storage tanks R1 JF 1x10-5 40.1 
   VE 1x10-5 18.2 
   FF 1x10-5 18.3 
  R2 JF 5x10-7 <5.0 
  R3 FB 5x10-7 21.0 
   VE 5x10-7 41.0 
   FF 5x10-7 7.5 
Cryogenic D1: Bulk storage tank R1 JF 1x10-4 24.4 
   VE 1x10-4 29.4 
   FF 1x10-4 22.4 
  R2 JF 5x10-6 <5.0 
   FF 5x10-6 <5.0 
  R3 FB 5x10-6 20.1 
   VE 5x10-6 23.4 
 E1: electric vaporizer - - -  
Metal hydrides D1-D5: Bulk storage tanks R1 JF 1x10-3 5.9 
   FF 1x10-3 5.6 
  R2 JF 5x10-5 <5.0 
   FF 5x10-5 <5.0 
  R3 FB 5x10-5 6.5 
   VE 5x10-5 18.6 
 D6: gas dispenser R1 JF 1x10-5 7.6 
   FF 1x10-5 <5.0 
  R2 JF 5x10-7 <5.0 
  R3 FB 5x10-7 12.4 
   VE 5x10-7 9.2 
   FF 5x10-7 <5.0 
 D7: Oil buffer tank R1 PF 1x10-5 5.9 
   FF 1x10-5 6.1 
  R2 FF 5x10-7 5.8 
  R3 FF 5x10-7 5.9 
 E1: heat exchanger R4 PF 1x10-3 7.3 
   JF 1x10-3 8.5 
  R5 PF 1x10-4 6.5 
 E2: heat exchanger R4 PF 1x10-3 7.1 
   JF 1x10-3 8.1 
  R5 PF 5x10-4 5.9 
 
Table 4.4.8: Small scale hydrogen storage schemes: calculated damage distances (di,j,k) and 
credit factors (cfi,k) for each scenario (i) of each LOC (j) considered for each 
process unit (k). For LOC and scenario definition, see table §2.3. 
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4.4.5.2 – Medium scale 
 
The values calculated for the unit potential and hazard indexes of “medium scale” reference 
schemes are shown in table 4.4.10. The results evidence that, as in the previous case, the 
hydrogen bulk storage is the unit associated to the higher values of the potential index in all 
reference schemes, with the exception of that based on metal hydrides. In this case, the buffer 
tanks containing pressurized hydrogen show higher potential indexes than the bulk storage, 
due to the higher expected safety performance of bulk storage based on metal hydrides. 
If the unit hazard indexes are compared, the hydrogen compressor always results the more 
hazardous unit. The credit factors related to this equipment item are particularly high, even if 
the damage distances are rather low with respect to those obtained for the bulk storage units. 
Thus, the compression units result the more critical with respect to inherent safety. Again, this 
is due to the importance given to the credit of LOC events in the unit hazard index (credit 
factors). 
Table 4.4.9 reports the values of the overall indexes. The table evidences that the overall 
potential hazard index PI results higher for commercial technologies (compressed and 
liquefied storages) than for the innovative ones based on metal and complex hydrides. This is 
mostly due to the contribution of the bulk storage unit, and is caused by the more severe 
operating conditions of this unit, that may result in worst consequences of the possible LOC 
events. From the point of view of inherent safety principles, these outcomes were expected, 
since the innovative technologies are examples of application of the principles underlying the 
“substitution” and “moderation” guidewords. On the other hand, the higher values of the 
overall inherent hazard index HI were obtained for metal hydride and liquefied storage 
systems, while the HI value for compressed storage resulted lower and comparable to that 
obtained for the chemical hydride system. A key issue that influences the values of the overall 
hazard index is the plant complexity, in terms of auxiliary equipments and secondary units. 
The innovative technologies, such as hydride storages, need heat transfer utilities, while the 
process diagram of commercial compressed storage technologies is much simpler and a more 
limited number of units is present. The contribution of auxiliary equipment to the overall 
KPIs may be important, in particular if high credit factors are associated to LOC events from 
these units. As a matter of fact, the introduction of credit factors in the analysis penalizes 
more complex designs, or the use of equipment items that more easily may origin LOC 
events. In particular, high values of the credit factor associated to the LOC events considered 
were obtained for the shell&tube unit present in the metal hydride reference scheme and for 
the multilayer coated vessel considered for cryogenic storage. 
The radar plot reporting the normalized values of the more significant hazard and potential 
indexes is shown in figure 4.4.11-(b). The figure evidences that chemical and metal hydrides 
are expected to have better safety performances than the more conventional technologies for 
hydrogen storage. Again, the similar values of the hazard indexes obtained for the compressed 
storage and of metal and complex hydrides technologies evidence the problem of the 
reliability of auxiliary equipment as a key factor in the development of alternative 
technologies for hydrogen storage. 
 
In medium scale installations, escalation events may give an important contribution to the 
overall hazard. Figure 4.4.12 reports the values calculated for the domino potential and hazard 
indexes. 
As shown in figure 4.4.12, cryogenic liquefied storage has very high values of both potential 
and hazard indexes, mainly due to the contribution of the hydrogen bulk storage. On the other 
hand, compressed storage has associated the higher potential index for domino effect, 
although credit factors are low, as shown in figure 4.4.12-(b). Besides, alternative 
technologies present also in this case lower potential indexes (figure 4.4.12-(a)) but, at the 
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same time, the hazard indexes result influenced by the compression unit. As a matter of fact, 
the maximum domino unit hazard index, UHD, is connected to this piece of equipment in all 
the assessed technologies. 
 
4.4.5.3 – Comparison with other literature methods at medium scale 
 
Similarly to §4.4.3.1, the proposed method can be compared with the literature. For sake of 
brevity, an example concerning only two options for the medium scale storage is reported in 
the following (compressed and cryogenic storage). The literature methods considered and the 
assumptions in the analysis are the same as §4.4.3.1. 
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Figure 4.4.10: Comparison of the overall inherent safety indexes calculated by 
different methods for the medium scale storage: A, pressurized gas storage; B: liquid storage. 
(*) Aggregation was obtained by the assumptions discussed in the text. 
 
 
Small scale Medium scale Large scale Scheme 
PI HI PI HI PI HI 
Compressed 1.3 × 103 1.7 × 10-2 9.8 × 103 3.1 × 10-1   
Cryogenic 6.0 × 102 1.3 × 10-1 9.4 × 103 5.0 × 10-1 1.7 × 106 1.4 × 102 
Metal hydride 2.4 × 102 3.5 × 10-2 3.2 × 103 4.9 × 10-1   
Complex hydride   4.6 × 103 3.3 × 10-1 1.8 × 104 6.8 × 100 
 
Table 4.4.9: Overall inherent safety KPIs calculated for the for the four reference process 
schemes considered 
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Figure 4.4.10 shows the comparison of the overall inherent safety indexes calculated by 
different methods for all the options considered. A first remark that comes from the analysis 
of the figure is that there is no agreement in the results obtained by the different methods, 
both from a qualitative and a quantitative point of view. Again, the differences are likely to 
arise both from the different level of detail required by the application of the method and by 
the different penalization factors considered in the methods. 
 
 
Small scale Scheme 
Unit Description UPI UHI 
Compressed D1-D2 Bulk storage tanks 1.3 × 103 1.7× 10-2 
D1 Bulk storage tank 6.0 × 102 1.3× 10-1 Cryogenic 
E1 Electric vaporizer - - 
D1-D5 Bulk storage tanks 1.8 × 102 3.0 × 10-3 
D6 Gas dispenser 5.5 × 101 1.0 × 10-4 
D7 Oil buffer tank 1.1 × 100 2.0 × 10-5 
E1 Heat exchanger 3.7 × 100 1.8 × 10-2 
Metal Hydride 
E2 Heat exchanger 3.4 × 100 1.4 × 10-2 
Medium scale Scheme 
Unit Description UPI UHI 
D1-D2 (A-G) Bulk storage tanks 7.3 × 103 1.8 × 10-2 
D3-D13 Buffer storage tanks 1.4 × 103 1.9 × 10-2 Compressed 
K1 Compressor 1.1 × 103 2.7 × 10-1 
D1 Bulk storage tank 6.8 × 103 2.0 × 10-1 
D2-D12 Buffer storage tanks 1.4 × 103 1.9 × 10-2 
E1 Vaporizer 9.4 × 101 1.5 × 10-2 
Cryogenic 
K1 Compressor 1.1 × 103 2.7 × 10-1 
D1-D5 Bulk storage tanks 6.9 × 102 1.7 × 10-1 
D7 Oil buffer tank 1.1 × 101 1.8 × 10-3 
D6-D16 Buffer storage tanks 1.4 × 103 1.9 × 10-2 
E1 Heat exchanger 5.5 × 100 1.8 × 10-2 
E2 Heat exchanger 6.5 × 100 1.4 × 10-2 
Metal Hydride 
K1 Compressor 1.1 × 103 2.7 × 10-1 
D1 Bulk storage tank 1.5 × 103 3.5 × 10-2 
D2 Water storage tank - - 
D3 (A-B) Collector tank unit 5.5 × 101 5.0 × 10-5 
D4-D14 Buffer storage tanks 1.4 × 103 1.9 × 10-2 
R1-R2 Hydrolysis reactors 5.3 × 102 4.0 × 10-3 
Complex Hydride 
K1 Compressor 1.1 × 103 2.7 × 10-1 
 
Table 4.4.10 (Part1):  Values of the unit KPIs calculated for the alternative storage 
technologies considered (small and medium scale) 
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Large scale Scheme 
Unit Description UPI UHI 
D1 N2 Buffer storage tank - - 
D2 Buffer storage tank 1.6 × 104 2.9 × 10-2 
D3-D4 Bulk storage tanks 1.1 × 106 1.2 × 101 
K1 N2 Compressor - - 
K2 Compressor 5.9 × 105 1.3 × 102 
E1 Heat exchanger - - 
E2 Heat exchanger 7.8 × 102 1.1 × 100 
E3 Heat exchanger 6.8 × 102 8.8 × 10-3 
Cryogenic 
E4 Heat exchanger 7.3 × 102 5.6 × 10-2 
D1-D2 Hydroxide storage tank - - 
D3-D4 Bulk storage tanks 3.6 × 103 7.3 × 10-2 
D5 Buffer storage tank 3.5 × 102 2.7 × 10-4 
R1 
Reactor for 
regeneration 3.1 × 103 1.8 × 10-2 
R2 
Reactor for hydride 
production 1.7 × 103 2.1 × 10-2 
R3 Mixer 1.7 × 103 1.4 × 10-2 
E1 Lithium cooler - - 
K1 Compressor 4.2 × 103 6.4 × 100 
B1 Rotating furnace 1.0 × 103 8.2 × 10-2 
B2 Furnace - - 
Complex Hydride 
S1 Membrane separator 2.0 × 103 2.1 × 10-1 
 
Table 4.4.10 (Part2):  Values of the unit KPIs calculated for the alternative storage 
technologies considered (large scale) 
 
 
The analysis with literature tools has to face the particular features of the process considered. 
Only a partial application of PIIS and ISI was possible, since no reactions are present in the 
case study. However, both methods penalize the option “cryogenic storage” due to the low 
temperatures. The other methods identify the storage as the critical unit, but the ranking varies 
among them. The results from EHS, SWeHI and F&EI, consider alternative cryogenic storage 
more inherently safe, due to the low hazard factors used for liquids, in agreement with the 
results obtained for the PI index, that takes into account the lower severity of cryogenic 
scenarios with respect to those deriving from the release of compressed hydrogen. The INSET 
method, that does not consider temperature and pressure differences, is not effective in the 
assessment. I2SI and HI agree in attributing a higher hazard score to cryogenic storage, since 
both these methods account for the lower safety performance expected from equipment 
handling liquid hydrogen. Nevertheless, it is worth to recall that this aspect is introduced in 
I2SI by an arbitrary scoring derivate by expertise. 
 
The general conclusions that can be drawn from this example match the ones previously 
obtained: no coherence exists among the available methods, the detail of information required 
for the application of each method influences the results; subjective assumptions on material 
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quantities are a significant issue for the reliability of the results; built-in assumption make 
assessment hard for non conventional units. 
 
4.4.5.4 – Large Scale 
 
Table 4.4.10 reports the values calculated for the two large scale hydrogen storage reference 
schemes considered in the present study. Table 4.4.10 evidences that in both processes the 
hydrogen bulk storage unit does not result the more critical item. Nevertheless, both the unit 
potential and unit hazard indexes are much lower for the chemical hydride bulk storage, as 
evidenced also in the radar plot reported in figure 4.4.11-(c). This is due to the inherently 
safer storage of hydrogen as stable hydride in solid phase in this technology. Thus, the results 
obtained for the bulk storage indexes are a concrete example of the effectiveness of the 
application of the “substitution” and “moderation” inherent safety guidewords for hazard 
reduction. 
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Figure 4.4.11:  Normalized values of: overall potential hazard and inherent hazard 
indexes; unit potential hazard and inherent hazard indexes for the bulk storage unit; maximum 
unit potential hazard and inherent hazard indexes. (a) Small scale, (b) medium scale, and (c) 
large scale. 
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Also in this case, the most critical unit resulted the compression system for both alternatives. 
This unit is needed in the conventional process for hydrogen liquefaction and in complex 
hydrides storage for hydrogen gas delivery. As shown in table 4.4.10, in both alternatives the 
compression unit gives the more important contribution to both the potential and the hazard 
indexes. 
The overall potential and hazard indexes reported in table 4.4.9 evidence that the expected 
safety performance of the complex hydrides large scale storage including the regeneration 
section results higher than that of conventional cryogenic liquid storage including a 
liquefaction section. As shown in table 4.4.9 and in figure 4.4.11-(c), both potential and 
inherent hazard indexes, PI and HI, evaluated for the cryogenic storage result about two 
orders of magnitude higher than in the alternative technology. Similar results were obtained 
for the escalation hazard, as shown in figure 4.4.13. The PD index evaluated for the cryogenic 
alternative is strongly influenced by the bulk storage unit while the HD index, that takes into 
account the credit factors, is penalized also in this case by the hydrogen compression unit. 
Similarly, the escalation hazard KPIs evaluated for the complex hydrides technology result  
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Figure 4.4.12: Medium scale hydrogen storage processes: overall, bulk storage and 
maximum unit values of domino potential (a) and inherent hazard (b) indexes. 
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Figure 4.4.13: Large scale hydrogen storage processes: overall, bulk storage and 
maximum unit values of domino potential (a) and inherent hazard (b) indexes. 
 
 
about two order of magnitude lower than those of the liquefied storage process. Is it worth to 
notice that in the case of escalation hazards, the contribution of the membrane separation unit 
(labelled as S1 in figure 4.4.9-(b)) to the overall index is much lower than in the case of 
hazards to humans, since the toxic dispersion of carbon monoxide is not taken into 
consideration as in the case of potential and inherent hazard indexes.  
 
 
 
4.4.6 – Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the methods developed and presented in §1.2 and §2.3 were demonstrated by 
the application to case studies concerning industrial production and storage hydrogen. Several 
process options were compared, proving the applicability of the proposed methods in the 
various situations. The methodologies succeeded in evidencing the critical issues and the 
expected sustainability impact and inherent safety profile of alternative processes. Moreover it 
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was possible to provide suggestions for improvement in the discussion of results. For inherent 
safety assessment comparison with literature methods was performed, evidencing that the 
proposed methodology, not only matches the expected results, but overrides several problems 
present in conventional approaches. All these elements prove the value of the developed 
methods. 
 
In the analysis of the specific case studies, some key conclusions can be drawn: 
 
• In the analysis of innovative technologies for hydrogen storage, evidenced as the 
potential hazard is always lower for the innovative technologies proposed (metal and 
chemical hydrides). This is mainly a consequence of the application of principles 
underlying the inherent safety “substitution” guideword, since in these alternative 
technologies hydrogen is stored as a less hazardous hydride. Moreover, metal hydrides 
and complex hydrides storage systems present less severe operative conditions than 
those of conventional technologies (inherent safety guideword “moderation”). 
Nevertheless, if the credit factors of LOC events are considered, based on standard 
equipment reliability data, the innovative technologies, and in particular metal 
hydrides storage, show lower safety performances than conventional storage 
processes. This is due to the more complex storage process (opposed to the guideword 
“simplification”), requiring a higher number of auxiliary units, and to the credit of 
LOC events in standard units as compressors or shell&tube heat exchangers. Thus, the 
results obtained evidence that in the perspective of an industrial implementation of 
these technologies, the reliability of the auxiliary equipment will be an important issue 
to be addressed. 
 
• The comparative analysis of reference schemes for hydrogen production by steam 
reforming of natural gas evidenced that the integrated reactor process (#5) is expected 
to have the lowest impact on sustainability. The results were confirmed also for 
moderate variations of the reference parameters used in the analysis, as shown by a 
Monte Carlo approach.  The autothermal process (#2) resulted the second best 
alternative with respect to sustainability, showing impacts slightly lower than the 
traditional PSA (#1) process. However it must be considered that the indexes 
calculated for both the auto-thermal process (#2) and the integrated reactor process 
(#5) receive a positive contribution from the allocation of part of the impacts to a co-
product stream. Thus, the valorization of this by-product stream is an essential 
requirement to reduce the impact on sustainability of these processes. Among the other 
reference schemes, the internal membrane separation (#3) and the external membrane 
separation processes (#4) evidenced the lowest expected performances, due to the 
need to overcome limits in membrane separation efficiency. As expected, the 
consumption of raw materials, and in particular of natural gas, impacting on economic 
and environmental aspects, was identified as the most critical element influencing the 
sustainability performance of the different processes. Thus, the focus in proposing and 
developing innovative processes for hydrogen production from natural gas should be 
not only on the improvement of the reaction section, but also on the optimization of 
the overall separation efficiency and energy consumption. 
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4.5 - Inherent Safety of Materials 
 
In the present chapter a few examples of application of the method described in §2.2 for 
inherent safety of materials are provided. The examples consist in typical results of 
comparison of hazard profiles of primary and secondary substances for thermally instable 
materials. 
 
4.5.1 – Case study on Nitrobenzaldehyde 
 
The present case study analyses some of the outcomes of the experimental survey on the 
isomers of nitrobenzaldehyde described in Section 3.  
In the following the substances identified for 3-nitrobenzalheyde by Adiabatic Calorimetry 
tests are analysed. In particular the identification was possible for tests performed with 
different quantities of sample: tests where the final temperature reached 300°C (referred as 
“mild conditions” in the following) and tests where the final temperature reached 400°C and a 
large increase in pressure was detected (referred to as “severe conditions” in the following) 
(see §3.5.2). Tables from 3.5.8 to 3.5.10 list the compounds of interest. 
 
Data on the proprieties of the identified substances were collected from available databases 
(see §2.2 for a list); in a few cases estimation was needed, resorting to structure-propriety 
relationships [EPA, WPd]. The application of the scoring procedure on this data resulted in 
the hazard matrix reported in Table 4.5.1 for “mild conditions”. 
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Figure 4.5.1: Hazard profile of 3-nitrobenzalehyde (black) compared to that of its 
decomposition products (grey) as obtained by tests in mild (top) and severe (down) 
conditions. 
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3-Nitrobenzaldeide 1 2 0 0 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 12 0 0 12 
Benzaldehyde 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 3 1 1 0 6 1 1 8 
Nitrobenzene 2 1 3 1 2 2 1 3 1 3 6 9 9 3 27 
Benzoic acid 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 0 2 0 2 
Biphenyl 0 3 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 0 6 4 2 12 
Acenaphtene 0 3 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 0 6 4 2 12 
1-Ethenyl Naphthalene 0 3 0 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 0 6 0 0 6 
2-Hydroxybenzaldehyde 1 2 0 0 2 2 1 3 1 1 0 6 0 0 6 
3-Hydroxybenzaldehyde 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 6 0 0 6 
4-Hydroxybenzaldehyde 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 6 0 0 6 
Phthalimide 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
3-Nitrophenol 1 3 0 0 2 1 1 3 1 2 2 12 0 0 14 
Azobenzene 1 3 0 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 3 12 0 4 19 
3-Nitrobenzoic acid 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 0 2 0 2 
2-nitro biphenyl 1 2 0 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 8 0 4 12 
3-Nitro biphenyl 0 2 0 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 8 0 4 12 
4-Nitro biphenyl 0 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 8 4 4 16 
5-Nitro acenaphthene 0 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 0 8 4 4 16 
3-Nitrobenzamide 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 3 1 2 0 0 2 0 2 
3-Nitrobenzophenone 0 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 8 0 0 8 
2-Nitro-9-fluorenone 0 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 8 0 0 8 
3-Nitro-9-fluorenone 0 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 8 0 0 8 
N-(4-Nitrophenyl) 
methylenebenzamine 0 3 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 12 0 0 12 
2,4'-Dinitrobiphenyl 0 2 0 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 8 0 2 10 
2,2'-Dinitrobiphenyl 0 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 8 0 0 8 
4,4'-Dinitrobiphenyl 0 2 0 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 8 0 2 10 
3,4'-Dinitrobiphenyl 0 2 0 0 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 8 0 0 8 
CO2 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Carbon monoxide 2 0 1 0 3 2 3 2 1 1 15 0 1 0 16 
 
Table 4.5.1: Hazard matrix and hazard indices for 3-nitrobenzaldehyde, “mild condition” 
test. 
 
 
The scores can be reported on a radar graph. A band or envelope of the different substances 
can be drawn on the graph, featuring the extremes of the hazard profile of the decomposition 
mixture. The envelope of the scores for the different proprieties of the substances formed is 
presented in the radial graph of Figure 4.5.1. As it is clear from the graph, substances 
characterized by different impact vectors compared to the original one are formed: in 
particular more dangerous substances are formed as, for instance, several nitro substituted 
aromatics and polycyclic aromatics as well as dangerous gases like nitrogen oxides and 
hydrogen cyanide. 
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This is more evident when comparing specific impact indexes (Figure 4.5.2). Substances 
characterized by a high toxicity, both for humans and ecosystem, and carcinogens are formed 
in detectable quantities in the degradation. It can be generally observed that as the more 
severe condition are reached (higher reaction temperatures and pressures) cyclization 
reactions are promoted, yielding to the formation of polycyclic compounds that frequently are 
carcinogen compounds. In these severe conditions, higher quantities of hazardous compounds, 
as nitrogen oxides and hydrogen cyanide, can be identified in the gas phase. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5.2: Hazard profile of 3-nitrobenzalehyde compared to that of its decomposition 
products as obtained by tests in mild (A) and severe (B) conditions. Some hazard indexes for 
3-nitrbenzaldeyde are not visible in the histogram since their values are practically zero. 
 
 
4.5.2 – Other cases-studies 
 
The same procedure was applied to other cases studies, where it was possible to obtain from 
the literature data on qualitative and quantitative analysis of the product formed in accidental 
conditions. A few are reported in the following for sake of demonstration of typical results 
and conclusions. 
 
4.5.2.1 – Tetrabromobisphenol A 
 
Tetrabromobisphenol A (TBBA) is a material mainly used as flame retardant in the 
production of plastics. Quantitative and qualitative data for the thermal decomposition of 
tetrabromobisphenol A are reported by Barontini et al., [2004a, 2004b]. 
Table 4.5.2 reports the hazard vector for the primary material, TBBA. 
 
For each of the products identified, the hazard matrix and the hazard profile were calculated. 
Figure 4.5.3 and Table 4.5.3 reports the results obtained. As shown in the figure, the hazard 
profile of TBBA is that of an ecotoxic substance. The high molecular weight limit the acute 
toxicity hazard, while no evidence of chronic toxicity or carcinogenicity is reported. On the 
other hand, the identified decomposition products show more hazardous impact profiles: a 
first category of products, the brominated phenols, are again characterized by an ecotoxicity 
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impact, although the lower molecular weight is responsible of the higher hazard scores 
detected. On the other hand, lower molecular weight products showing a high acute toxicity 
hazard are also formed, as hydrogen bromide and carbon monoxide. Thus, the impact profile 
of the decomposition products suggests that two different accidental scenarios should be 
assessed in the safety analysis of runaway or fire scenarios involving TBBA or materials 
containing TBBA as a flame retardant: the formation of a toxic cloud containing acutely toxic 
compounds, and the dispersion of an aerosol of ecotoxic decomposition products. 
 
 
4.5.2.2 – Tert-butylperoxybenzoate 
 
Data on the decomposition of tert-butylperoxybenzoate (TBPB) are reported in CCPS, 
[1995]. These data can be elaborated by the proposed methodology (§2.2), yielding the 
impact profile represented in Figure 4.5.4. In this case, the primary material show prevalent 
hazard for environment and, in minor terms, for chronic and carcinogen effects on humans. 
The mixture of decomposition products (grey band in the graphs) shows that more volatile 
products characterized by acute and chronic toxicity can be released. Since quantitative 
information are available on the composition of the mixture of secondary product [CCPS,  
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Table 4.5.2: Example of hazard vector evaluated for tetrabromobisphenol A (TBBA) . 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5.3: Hazard profile of TBBA compared to that of its decomposition products 
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 1995], this profile can be reported on the graph (dark grey line). Thought the presence of a 
modest acute hazards are confirmed, the comparison  with the primary material shows a 
reduction of eco-toxicity and a stable level of chronic and carcinogen hazards. This example 
clearly shows the importance of having quantitative information on the possible mixtures 
formed in decomposition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Iacute Ienv Ichronic Icanc 
TBBA 0 9 0 0 
2,4,6-tribromophenol 0 12 0 0 
2,4-dibromophenol 0 12 0 0 
2,6-dibromo-4-
methylphenol 0 12 0 0 
2,6-dibromophenol 0 12 0 0 
2-bromophenol 0 6 0 0 
4-bromophenol 0 12 0 0 
bisphenol A 0 12 6 0 
dibenzifuran 0 8 0 0 
phenol 6 12 2 0 
biphenyl 0 8 0 0 
CO 15 0 0 0 
HBr 6 0 0 0 
 
Table 4.5.3: Decomposition products and hazard indices for tetrabromobisphenol A 
(TBBA) . 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5.4: Hazard profile representation referred to the TBPB decomposition: black refers 
to TBPB and grey to its decomposition products. The grey line in the radial graph is the 
average hazard profile of the secondary products. 
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4.5.3 – Conclusions 
 
The procedure developed to define the hazard profile of decomposition products (§2.2) was applied 
to some case studies. The input data for the selected set of hazard parameters were easily 
obtained from the available databases, allowing the application in all the cases studied. When 
necessary, predictive estimations were effective in the integration of scant data. The changes 
in the hazard profile of a chemical system due to the undesired decomposition of a substance 
were identified. The results proved that the developed method may be applied as a rapid and 
effective screening tool to represent the inherent hazard related to a substance present in a 
chemical system due to the possible decomposition products that may be formed. This allows 
a complete identification of the accidental scenarios that should be assessed following the 
emission in the environment of decomposition products formed in the loss of control of a 
chemical process. 
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4.6 – Upgrade of process sections in fine chemistry plant 
 
In this section a couple of case studies about the implementation of alternative process and 
plant options in sections of an existing plant are discussed. The cases studies, featuring real 
industrial cases, were developed in collaboration with Ciba Speciality Chemicals. Some 
information, like the name of the substances involved, are not fully reported in the following 
for reasons of data confidentiality. 
 
The case studies demonstrate the application of the sustainability and inherent safety 
assessment methods in the analysis of a section of a plant. Two problems are analysed: the 
storage and mixing of an hazardous reactant (§4.6.1) and the finishing of an oligomer 
(§4.6.5). 
 
 
4.6.1 – Case study #1: Storage and mixing of an hazardous reactant: case study description 
 
This case study deals with a specific section of a plant producing fine chemicals. The section 
prepares a reactant (B) used in the synthesis of the final product, by mixing it with a solvent 
(A). Two alternative options were identified for this plant section (the first one was in place at 
the moment of the analysis). The options differ in the physical state of the feedstock B: 
• Option 1: the raw-material B is in solid state, as a powder at room temperature. 
• Option 2: the raw-material B is in liquid state, since it is kept at temperature higher 
than its melting point. 
The boundaries of the analysis include the preparation and mixing section of the plant as well 
as the storage of the material, since it changes according to the state of the material B. On the 
other hand, the production and transport of the different forms of B are beyond the goals of 
current analysis, since it is oriented to the assessment of the facility in the site. 
 
4.6.1.1 - Option 1: raw-material B in solid state (powder) 
 
In this option the raw-material B is a powder. The boundaries of option include the storage of 
the raw material in a dedicated warehouse, the transport of the material from the warehouse to 
the mixer and the mixing section of the plant (Figure 4.6.1). 
The powder of B is supplied and stored in closed hoppers (GFK). The storage facility is a 
“open” warehouse in the raw-material storage section of the plant, that provides protection 
from rainfall, allowing natural ventilation. The GFKs can be of 3 different weights (600, 700 
and 800 kg). The GFKs can be stacked and usually are stored in piles of two. The GFKs are 
handled both for truck unloading and for feed to the production by forklift truck. 
In the mixing procedure, solvent A is fed to a mixing tank (R420-R1) from the storage tank 
(excluded from the boundaries of the analysis, since it is equal for both the options) and 
cooled to 10°C by chilled water in the mixer tank jacket. The desired quantity of solvent A is 
transferred from R420R1 to R445, in order to yield a solution of the required concentration. 
The content of tank R445 is kept to 10°C by chilled water in the jacket. The GFKs containing 
material B are lifted by a semi-automatic facility and connected to the feeding nozzle of the 
mixing tank (R445). The mixing tank (R445) is maintained to pressure lower than 
atmospheric, in order to prevent any release of powder when it is discharged. The discharge is 
by gravity and is promoted by the vibrating devices on the GFK. The disconnection of the 
empty GFK follow the inverse procedure than the feeding. Each time, the charging nozzle is 
washed by solvent A, in order to remove traces of B adhering the walls. Usually two GFKs 
are fed to the mixer in each batch. The discharged quantity is checked by a tank weight.  
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The mixing is done in R445 by an agitator. The mixture is then sent to the reactors (out of 
system boundaries) in the desired quantities. Tank R445 is then washed by the solvent A (the 
washing mixture is used in the reactor section as well) and flushed by nitrogen. 
 
4.6.1.2 - Option 2: raw-material B in liquid state (melted) 
 
In this option material B is stored and fed to the mixing as a liquid. Since the melting point of 
B is above room temperature (around 145°C), specific plant design is aimed to prevent the 
solidification of the material. The boundaries of option, similarly to the previous case, include 
the storage of the raw material, the transfer of the liquid to the mixer and the mixing section 
of the plant where the desired solution of A and B is obtained (Figure 4.6.2). 
In this option the raw-material B is supplied to the plant in horizontal cylindrical tanks 
(isotanks) of the volume of 14.5 m3 and equipped with steam coils. The isotanks are 
connected to the plant by flanged hoses. The hoses, as well as the piping carrying material B 
have steam heating system, in order to prevent the solidification of the substance. 
When in use, the isotank is connected to the steam lines (1.2 MPa) in order to maintain the set 
point temperature (160°C). The hose of the isotank is connected to a closed loop transfer line, 
in order to keep the material moving. An injector feeds and meters the raw-material B from 
the transfer loop to the mixer (R2000). 
The loading and storage facility allows 4 isotanks in place at a time. It is located in the plant 
storage area and is protected by a metallic roof. The isotanks are supplied to the plant with 
blind flanges on the connection nozzles (transfer line of the material and nitrogen line for  
 
 
 
Figure 4.6.1: Diagram of the reactant preparation section for option 1 (material B in 
powder). The powder storage is not represented in this diagram. 
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 pressurization). When the tanks are connected, the absence of leaks is tested by compressed 
nitrogen. Before disconnection, the transfer line is drained. 
 
Solvent A is fed to a mixing tank (R2000) from the storage (excluded from the boundaries of 
the analysis, since it is equal for both options) by dedicated lines that do not enter the isotank 
storage facility, that is thus an area with no fire hazard (B is not flammable). 
The circulation of B in the loop transfer line is provided by a canned pump. The piping of the 
line is installed with proper slopes, so it can be easily drained: if a shut down occurs, the line 
inventory flows back to the isotank. The piping is traced. 
The mixer (R2000) is located in a building close to the storage of B. The solvent A is feed to 
the tank and cooled down by chilled water in an external shell-and-tube heat exchanger. The 
temperature around 10°C is required for process and safety (low partial pressure) issues. The 
weight of mixer (R2000) is a measured variable. The reagent B is metered (controlled flow 
and temperature) and injected by a nozzle that disperse it in fine droplets. Different 
compositions of mixture  are produced. 
 
 
4.6.2 – Case study #1: Collection of input data 
 
The initial step of the analysis is the collection of the necessary data to define the options. 
Several data were collected from the design sheets of the options, but the need for estimated 
data was not completely eliminated (e.g. fugitive emissions). 
The analysed process is a batch process. Four different composition of the final product (the 
mixture of A and B) are of interest in the production. Table 4.6.1 reports the summary of the 
production in a reference year, assumed for the calculation of the average annual production  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6.2: Diagram of the reactant preparation section with material B in liquid state 
(melted), option 2. 
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 B (t/y) A (t/y) Batch (y -1) GFK (y -1) Isotank (y -1) 
Mixture 1 1575,00 3270,75 1050 2100 83 
Mixture 2 201,60 657,72 168 336 11 
Mixture 3 453,00 1527,18 566 566 24 
Mixture 4 100,55 459,36 168 168 5 
 2330,15 5915,00 1952 3170 123 
 
Table 4.6.1: Number of batches and raw-material consumption in the production reference 
year. 
 
 Steam Use (kgsteam/y) 
Consumption CH4 
(Nm3CH4/y)a 
Cost 
(€/y)b 
1. Isotank warming up 161’900 12’900 3’730 
2. Isotank maintaining 64’500 5’140 1’490 
3. Loop line maintaining 373’500 29’800 8’600 
 599’900 47’800 13’800 
 
Table 4.6.2: Consumption of steam an natural gas for option 2. a) boiler efficiency 93%; b) 
natural gas cost 0.2885 €/Nm3. 
 
 
Unit Power (kW) 
Use 
(h/y) 
Consumption 
(kWh/y) 
Cost 
(€/y)b 
R420-P3 3,00 488 1’463 143 
R445-P1 7,50 976 7’319 717 
Y2049-P3 2,00 8000 16’000 1’568 
Y2049-P6 8,70 8000 69’333 6’795 
Stirrer R420-R1 4,00 8000 32’000 3’136 
Stirrer R445 4,00 8000 32’000 3’136 
Refrig. Cycle (Y2049)a 27,88 8000 223’000 21’900 
Total Option 1 - - 381’200 37’400 
R2000-P1 4,5 8000 36’000 3’528 
R2000-P2 12,0 3253 39’036 3’826 
R2000-P3 0,5 8000 4’000 392 
Y2049-P3 3,0 8000 24’000 2’352 
Y2049-P6 13,0 8000 104’000 10’192 
Stirrer R2000 7,5 3253 24’400 2’391 
Refrig. Cycle (Y2049)a 72,50 8000 580’000 56’840 
Total Option 2 - - 811’400 79’500 
 
Figure 4.6.3: Electrical power consumption and related costs. a) refrigeration cycle has COP 
of 2.08; b) electrical energy cost assumed 0.098 €/kWh 
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 potential used in the analysis. The consumption of solvent A is independent of the 
technological option adopted for the production. Table 4.6.1 reports the number of GFKs and 
of Isotanks needed to match that production. 
 
Medium pressure steam is used in option 2. In particular steam is used for: i) warming up of 
the isotank once docked in the storage facility (in order reach the use conditions); ii) 
maintaining the docked isotanks at the desired standby condition; iii) maintaining the 
circulation loop at the desired condition. The thermal dispersions and, consequently, the steam 
consumption were evaluated. The consumption of natural gas and the costs for steam 
production were calculated from the characteristics of the existent boiler house. The results 
obtained are summarized in Table 4.6.2. 
 
The principal users of electrical power, in both the options, are the refrigeration cycles, pumps 
and stirring drivers. The collected data are reported in Table 4.6.3. 
Nitrogen is used for inerting of the vessels in the plant. The batch operation results in a cyclic 
variation of the level in the vessels, that expels nitrogen and, consequently, requires nitrogen 
make-up. The results of the estimation of nitrogen consumption are reported in Table 4.6.4.  
 
 
 
 N2 (kmol/y) A (kmol/y) A (kg/y) B (kmol/y) B (kg/y) 
Option 1      
R445 376,7 0,964 102,3 2,43E-03 0,447 
R420-R1 203,2 0,725 77,0 0 0 
Total 579,9 1,689 179,3 2,43E-03 0,447 
Option 2      
R2000 376,7 0,964 102,3 2,43E-03 0,447 
 
Figure 4.6.4: Estimation of the emissions of A and B to air from inerting cycles. 
 
 
(€/y) Option 1 Option 2 
Material B 3’791’000 3’346’000 
Material A 4’732’000 4’732’000 
Electrical Power 37’400 79’500 
Steam - 13’800 
Maintenance 20’000 69’500 
Labour 215’000 86’000 
Total operative costs 8’795’400 8’326’800 
Total savings 9’375’500 9’375’500 
Initial capital investment 1’000’000 1’600’000 
NPV 1’413’800 2’645’500 
 
Table 4.6.5: Annual operative costs, initial capital investment and net present value of the 
two considered options 
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The compounds A and B are released in the same operations. The releases are calculated 
considering equilibrium of the liquid phase with the vapour phase released in cyclic 
variations, as suggested by [Allen & Shonnard, 2002]. This hypothesis is extremely 
conservative, since a demister and an alkaline scrubber are present on the venting line. The 
estimation of fugitive emissions from leaks (valves, flanges, pumps) are also estimated as 
proposed by Allen & Shonnard, [2002]. 
 
The calculation of the Net present Value of each option required collection of data on costs 
and discount rates. Table 4.6.5 summarizes the operative and capital costs considered. The 
reference year is 2005. In the calculation of the savings a value added of 10% is considered 
for the product mixture compared to the prices of single components. 
 
 
4.6.3 – Case study #1: Inherent safety assessment 
 
The inherent safety assessment of the options is performed by the procedure described in 
§2.3. The accidental scenarios considered in the assessment are: 
• DP1)  toxic dispersion, deriving from release of B and accidental stoichiometric 
reaction with water (HCl is released from the reaction). 
• DP2)  pool fire of the flammable compound A 
Tables 4.6.6 and 4.6.7 report a summary of the damage distances identified for the critical 
units considered in the assessment. Consequences were modelled by commercial software 
models. The release modes considered are: 
• R1)  continues release from a 10mm equivalent hole 
• R2)  continuous release of the hold-up in 10 minutes 
• R3) instantaneous catastrophic rupture. 
In the case of B in powder the release of HCl is supposed the result of reaction with water of 
superficial layer (thickness 10 cm) of a pile of released powder. 
 
Figure 4.6.6 and 4.6.7 report also the credit factors considered in the analysis, derived from 
the literature on credibility of equipment release [Uijt de Haag & Ale, 1999]. In the case of 
the toxic cloud dispersion (DP2) the credit factors (theoretically depending only on the 
equipment) are multiplied by 0.192, representing the credit (probability) of rainfall in the 
specific site. In  fact the accidental presence of water is required to derive from this condition. 
 
It can be observed that pool fire scenarios usually result in modest damage distances, 
compared to toxic dispersions deriving from reaction of B with rainfall water. 
Table 4.6.8 reports the hazard index calculated for the considered units. It can be observed 
that, even if maximum damage distances (and thus UPI, not reported in the table) are similar 
for different units, the credit factor influence the value of UHI. For instance, in option 2, 
R2000 and R2000-W1 have the same damage distance, but the release from a catastrophic 
failure of the condenser (R2000-W1) is much more credible. 
 
The HI of option 1 is dominated by the UHI of the toxic dispersion following the rupture of a 
GFK. This is a combination of a large expected damage distance and a high credit factor, due 
to the high number of handling operations. 
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Unit Top event Credit factor Release Damage distance (m) 
1 E-05 R1 43 
5 E-07 R2 45 R420-R1 DP2 
5 E-07 R3 42 
1 E-05 R1 183 
5 E-07 R2 2318 DP1 
5 E-07 R3 3680 
1 E-05 R1 39 
5 E-07 R2 40 
R445 
DP2 
5 E-07 R3 37 
GFK DP1 1 E-05 x # of handlings R3 1937 
 
Table 4.6.6: Damage distances and credit factors for Option 1. 
 
 
 
Unit Top event Credit factor Release Damage distance (m) 
1 E-05 R1 183 
5 E-07 R2 2319 DP1 
5 E-07 R3 3680 
1 E-05 R1 19 
5 E-07 R2 19 
R2000 
DP2 
5 E-07 R3 16 
1 E-03 R1 183 DP1 5 E-05 R3 3680 
1 E-03 R1 19 R2000-W1 DP2 5 E-05 R3 16 
 
Table 4.6.7: Damage distances and credit factors for Option 2. 
 
 
 
 UHI HI 
Option 1   
R420-R1 9,81E-03 
R445 1,87E+00 
GFK 2,27E+04 
2,27E+04 
Option 2   
R2000 1,87E+00 
R2000-W1 1,36E+02 
1,37E+02 
 
Table 4.6.8: Unit and overall hazard index for the two options considered. 
  §4.6 - 8 
4.6.4 – Case study #1: Sustainability assessment 
 
Table 4.6.9 reports the normalized environmental indicators calculated for the 2 options. 
The material use (raw materials processed and natural gas) results the higher impact present. 
This is expected, since the process is basically a material treatment. The higher request of 
energy by option 2 pays significant effects on the environmental impact profile. In fact, the 
impacts linked to the emissions of exhaust gases negatively affect the categories of global 
warming, acidification, smog formation, toxicity and carcinogenicity. On the other side, the 
contribution of fugitive emissions on the value of the environmental indicators was identified 
as negligible. 
Electrical power is another impact that shows a relatively high normalized indicator. As 
concerns this impact, the worse performance of Option 2 is linked to the higher requirement 
for chilled water. 
 
Table 4.6.10 reports the calculated values of the level 2 and level 3 indices. The 
environmental index penalizes option 2, mainly due to the emissions from energy production. 
On the other side, the economic index is favourable for option 2, since annual operative costs 
are lower, mainly due to the minor labour costs and the different unitary cost of the two 
commercial forms of B. However, societal impacts, due in particular to inherent safety, are 
the dominant indices (see §4.6.3). 
 
 
 
Impact category Option 1 Option 2 Normalization factor Weight factor 
Global warming 5,16E-04 8,12E-02 1,16E+06 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.051 
Acidification 1,42E-04 6,99E-03 4,83E+03 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.066 
Smog formation 2,00E-01 1,15E-01 5,63E+03 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.049 
Air toxicity 1,33E-03 3,61E-02 3,77E+05 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.095 
Carcinogenicity 0,00E+00 5,68E+00 9,91E-01 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.168 
Materials 6,00E+01 5,70E+01 4,80E+05 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.044 
Electrical power 7,94E-01 1,69E+00 3,51E+05 kWh/(y⋅km2) 0.064 
 
Table 4.6.9: Normalized environmental indicators, normalization factors and weight factors 
used in the assessment. 
 
 
 Option 1 Option 2 Weight factor 
Level 2    
Environmental index 2,70 3,59 0,300 
Economic index -1,15 -2,11 0,300 
Societal index 1,02E+04 6,17E+01 0,400 
Level 3    
Overall index 4,07E+03 2,51E+01  
 
Table 4.6.10: aggregated indices for the two compared options. 
  §4.6 - 9
The overall index follows the profile of the societal (inherent safety) aspect. The inherent 
safety index is recognized as important in the last aggregation step because of both: i) the 
significance compared to the background (i.e. normalization factor) and ii) the larger weight 
attributed to this impact aspect (i.e. the weight factor). Thus, in this case-study, the inherently 
safer option is also the more sustainable. 
 
 
 
4.6.5 – Case study #2: Finishing of an oligomer 
 
This case study deals with the final section of a specialty chemistry plant, where a product 
(named N), initially mixed with a solvent T, is treated in order to yield the commercial form. 
The pure oligomer N is a solid at room conditions. 
Two plant options were proposed for the upgrade of the finishing section of an existing 
production plant, from 400 t/year to 600 t/y. The upgrade is required as a consequence of 
increased production from upgrades and de-bottlenecking in the production section. The aim 
of the present analysis is to compare and find out the critical issues of the two plant options. 
 
• Option1 (LIST): Use of a new technology for product finishing, called LIST (twin 
shaft extruder – solvent devolatilization). This option will produce a the oligomer in 
chips, one of the possible commercial form. The process is operated in continuous. 
• Option 2 (Traditional): This is the traditional batch process, adopted in the original 
section of the plant. The option consists in an upgrade of the present production 
potentiality with the realization of a new production line parallel to the original one in 
order to match the desired production potential. It produces a dry product in powder, 
that needs to be compacted to reach an acceptable commercial form. The compacting 
is realized in a facility out of the production plant boundaries. 
 
4.6.5.1 - Option 1: LIST 
 
In this process N is directly separated from the organic solvent (T). The principal piece of 
equipment, called LIST, requires auxiliary units to operate in steady state and to obtain the 
desired form of product: a buffer for storage of the mixture to be processed (which is 
produced by a batch process), two buffers for the storage of the solvent T, a vacuum pump, a 
pre-concentration, a laminator/cooler of the extruded oligomer, a “breaker” of the flakes 
resulting from the extruded product, a vibro-screen to split the coarse product from fines and 
the devices filling the Bulk Bags. 
 
The mixture to be processed (about 35% of N) is stored in the buffer B640 (see figure 4.6.3). 
The solution is transferred to R641, where a continuous pre-concentration takes places 
(temperature 95°C, pressure 15 kPa). Pump G642 maintains the desired pressure in the 
system. The condenser R641-W1, operated with chilled water, allows to recover the solvent 
T. The solvent is stored in R641-B1, available for recycle back to production. 
The solution leaving R641 contains around 80% of N. The LIST, G642, processes the mixture 
at 140°C and 2 kPa. A concentration of T lower than 0.5% is expected in the exiting stream of 
N. 
 
The solvent T evaporated is condensed (G642-W1) and collected in R642-B1. The fused N 
leaves the extruder and it is cooled and laminated in G642-H1. The 2 mm thick layer 
produced in this operation is broken by G642-Z1, that produces the final chips. These are 
separated from fines by screening (G642-H2) and stored in bulk bags. 
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Figure 4.6.3: Plant scheme for option 1. 
 
 
 
4.6.5.2 - Option 2: traditional plant 
 
This option is the one currently in place in the plant. The upgrade can be realized building a 
similar production line. In the traditional process a the solvent T of the initial mixture is 
displaced by water and the drying step is realized on the water mixture. 
 
The mixture to be processed (about 35% of N) is stored in L2023. A batch of 3150 kg of 
solution is transferred in R123 by the pump L2023-P1. The vessel R123 is stirred and heathen 
up to 70°C by 0.2 MPa steam. Pressure is lowered to 14 kPa by vacuum pump V130. The 
evaporated solvent T is condensed (R123-W1, by cooling water, and R123-W2, by chilled 
water) and sent to B106, where it is stored. The product of concentration contains more than 
80% of oligomer N. 
The product is transferred by P123-P1 to the vessel F123-E1, partially filled by demineralised 
water at 100°C. The oligomer is dispersed in the water. Vapours of T and water are condensed 
in F124-W1 and the two phases separated in a decanter. The solvent T is sent to the storage 
buffer (F124-B2). The next phase of the process cools down the vessel F123-E1 and sends the 
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Figure 4.6.4: Plant scheme for option 2. 
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 mixture (N and water) to a filter (F124). The mother liquor is stored in F123-B1 and recycled 
for the next batch.  
The cake from the filter is transferred to a drying vessel (T125). This works at 7.5 kPa 
pressure and 65°C. The vacuum pump V130 removes the released vapours that are condensed 
(T125-W1) and sent to R123-B1. The drying ends when water content is lower than 0.5%. 
The product is packed in bulk bags for transfer to the external compaction treatment. 
 
 
4.6.6 – Case study #2: Collection of input data 
 
The data on the plant were collected on-site and from the analysis of the design 
documentation, similarly to §4.6.2. Also in this case some additional estimations were 
necessary to complete the required data. 
The production potential is the same 600 t/y of N in dry form. The finishing operations are 
realized in option 1 by a single treatment line and in option 2 by two equal parallel lines (in 
the following the combined effect of both is reported). The plant of option 1 is a continuous 
plant, and 8000 h/y of operation are considered. The plan of option 2 is batch and the design 
is such that vessels are slightly oversized; thus the number of batches required for the 
potentiality can be reached in 6000 h/y of operation on both the production lines. 
Table 4.6.11 summarizes the principal material flow entering and leaving the two options. 
The consumption of nitrogen for the cyclic operations in the batch vessels was evaluated 
similarly to previous case study (§4.6.2). This allows the evaluation of the quantity of T 
leaving the vessels. A large part of this T (about 95%) is recovered in the guard condensers on 
the vent lines. The condensed T is fed at the furnace for steam generation, while the gaseous 
stream is sent to incineration. Thus, no emission of T is expected from the inerting system. On 
the other hand, fugitive emissions may occur from leaks in flanges, valves and other 
equipment. These were evaluated by conventional emission factors [Allen & Shonnard, 
2002]. These result around 1.3 and 1.4 kg/y of T emitted for option 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
 
(t/y) Option 1 Option 2 
Input   
Feed mixture  1714 1714 
Water - 818 
NaOH - 136 
Output   
Recovered T 1113 1112 
Waste 1 957 
 
Figure 4.6.11: Process input and output in the considered options. 
 
 
 Option 1 Option 2 
Steam use (kg/y) 402’100 1’148’800 
Natural gas (Nm3/y) 30’490 87’710 
Cost (€/y) 9’147 26’310 
Electric power use (kWh/y) 415’500 343’700 
Cost (€/y) 44’000 36’400 
 
Figure 4.6.12: Process energy consumptions and related costs in the considered 
options. 
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The heat balances allowed to estimate the amount of steam required for heating. As a 
consequence the use of natural gas (energy from solvent recovered in guard condensers as co-
fuel was discounted) and the costs were accounted. The specifics on the use time and power 
consumption of the electrical motors allowed evaluation of the electrical power consumption. 
These data are reported in table 4.6.12. 
The principal economic parameters used for the calculation of the net present value are 
summarized in table 4.6.13. 
 
 
 (€/y) Option 1 Option 2 
Materials (€/y) 18’000’000 18’000’000 
Recovered T (€/y) -777’200 -776’400 
Electrical power (€/y) 44’000 36’400 
Steam (€/y) 9’100 26’300 
Nitrogen (€/y) 200 1’900 
Cooling water (€/y) 200 2’200 
Maintenance (€/y) 20’000 23’000 
Labour (€/y) 215’000 344’000 
Waste disposal (€/y) - 49’000 
Product compacting (€/y) - 282’000 
Total costs (€/y) 17’511’400 17’988’600 
Total savings (€/y) 21’000’000 21’000’000 
Initial invested capital (€) 18’00’000 600’000 
Net Present Value (€) 11’187.406 10'386’594 
 
Table 4.6.13: Annual costs, capital investments and net present value (NPV) for the two 
considered options. 
 
 
 
4.6.7 – Case study #2: Inherent safety assessment 
 
The procedure described in §2.3 is applied also in this case. The solvent T is a flammable 
liquid with moderate acute toxicity. The oligomer N can undergo dust explosion if a powder 
cloud is dispersed in air. The possible loss of containment were arranged in 5 release modes: 
• R1: continuous release from a 10mm equivalent hole 
• R2: continuous release of the hold-up in 10 minutes 
• R3: catastrophic rupture 
• R4: leak from pipe (10% of the nominal diameter) 
• R5: full bore rupture 
 
Table 4.6.14 and 4.6.15 report the damage distances ad the credit factors for the single units. 
The accidental scenarios considered are: 
• DP1: toxic dispersion 
• DP2: pool fire 
• DP3: vapour cloud explosion 
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• DP4: flash fire 
• DP5: internal explosion in vacuum equipment 
• DP6: dust explosion 
 
The critical unit for option 1 is the storage buffer B640, where the mixture of N and T to be 
processed is stored (Table 4.6.16). The other units have UHI at least one order of magnitude 
lower. The method identify an expected result: a continuous units have small inventories and 
are expected to result in smaller damage distances. This is an immediate consequence of the 
inherent safety principle of “minimization”. The sole UHI for B640 contributes to HI for 
about a half. 
In the batch plant the most critical unit is pump L2023-P1, used for displacing the mixture 
from the storage buffer (L2023) to the concentrator (R123). The higher damage distanced are 
actually expected from the buffer. However the rupture of the pump and the release of the 
material from the buffer is considered more credible than the collapse of the vessel. This unit 
alone is practically responsible of the value of HI for the plant. Other hazardous units are the 
pieces of equipment handling large quantities of solvent (L2023 and R123) and the drying 
vessel (T125). It is worth noticing that any of these units alone has an UHI similar to the most 
critical unit of option 1 and, thus, half of the HI for option 1. 
 
 
Unit Scenario Release Credit factor (y -1) 
Damage 
distance (m) 
R1 1 E-05 86 
R2 5 E-07 529 DP1 
R3 5 E-07 87 
R1 1 E-05 34 
R2 5 E-07 47 DP2 
R3 5 E-07 43 
R1 1 E-05 36 
R2 5 E-07 253 DP3 
R3 5 E-07 33 
B640 
DP4 R2 5 E-07 179 
B640-P1 DP2 R5 5 E-04 7 
DP2 R3 1 E-05 25 R641 DP5  1 E-04 10 
DP1 R3 1 E-05 20 
DP2 R3 1 E-05 14 
DP3 R3 1 E-05 19 R641-B1 
DP5  1 E-04 15 
R641-P1 - - - - 
R641-P2 DP2 R5 5 E-04 11 
R641-W1 DP2 R3 1 E-04 12 
G642 DP2 R3 1 E-05 8 
DP1 R3 1 E-05 20 
DP2 R3 1 E-05 14 
DP3 R3 1 E-05 19 G642-B1 
DP5  1 E-04 15 
DP1 R3 1 E-04 7 G642-W1 DP2 R3 1 E-04 12 
G642-P1 DP2 R5 5 E-04 11 
G642-H2 DP6  1 E-03 1 
 
Table 4.6.14: Damage distances and credit factors for Option 1. 
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Unit Scenario Release Credit factor (y -1) 
Damage 
distance (m) 
R1 1 E-05 81 
R2 5 E-07 509 DP1 
R3 5 E-07 71 
R1 1 E-05 35 
R2 5 E-07 34 DP2 
R3 5 E-07 41 
R1 1 E-05 35 
R2 5 E-07 230 DP3 
R3 5 E-07 29 
L2023 
DP4 R2 5 E-07 157 
DP1 R5 5 E-04 136 
R4 1 E-04 14 DP2 R5 5 E-04 19 L2023-P1 
DP3 R5 5 E-04 48 
DP1 R3 1 E-04 136 
DP2 R3 1 E-04 30 
DP3 R3 1 E-04 48 R123 
DP5  1 E-03 16 
R123-P1 DP2 R4 1 E-04 14 
R4 1 E-04 14 R123-P4 DP2 R5 5 E-04 8 
DP1 R3 1 E-04 10 R123-W1 DP2 R3 1 E-03 14 
R1 1 E-05 56 DP1 R2 5 E-07 96 
R1 1 E-05 24 
R2 5 E-07 24 DP2 
R3 5 E-07 22 
R1 1 E-05 26 
R2 5 E-07 44 
F124-B2 
DP3 
R3 5 E-07 5 
T125 DP6  1 E-03 14 
 
Table 4.6.15: Damage distances and credit factors for Option 2. 
 
 
 
4.6.8 – Case study #2: Sustainability assessment 
 
The data collected in §4.6.6 are the input for the impact indices in sustainability assessment 
(§1.2). 
Table 4.6.17 reports the normalized environmental indicators. Also in this case materials are 
identified as the most significant environmental category: this is a consequence of the process 
being the finishing of a final product, that has already caused impacts in the production stage. 
However the material index is practically identical among the alternatives. Similarly to case 
study #1, the impacts related to emissions from heat production (global warming, 
acidification, smog formation, air toxicity, carcinogenicity) are about one order of magnitude 
higher for option 2, which requires more steam in the operation (in particular in the drying 
section). Waste disposal is appreciable only for option 2, that produces a liquid waste form 
process water purge. Electrical power consumption is slightly higher for Option 1, because of 
the continuous operation of the vacuum pump and the refrigeration cycle. 
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Option 1 Option 2 
Unit UHI HI Unit UHI HI 
B640 2,19E-01 L2023 1,97E-01 
B640-P1 2,44E-02 L2023-P1 9,29E+00 
R641 1,72E-02 R123 2,12E-01 
R641-B1 2,71E-03 R123-P1 1,91E-02 
R641-P1 - R123-P4 4,98E-02 
R641-P2 6,40E-02 R123-W1 1,98E-02 
R641-W1 1,48E-02 F124-B2 3,57E-02 
G642 5,79E-04 T125 1,96E-01 
G642-B1 2,71E-03   
G642-W1 1,39E-02   
G642-P1 6,45E-02   
G642-H2 - 
4,24E-01 
  
1,06E+01 
 
Table 4.6.16: Unit and overall hazard indices for case study 2. 
 
 
Impact category Option 1 Option 2 Normalization factor Weight factor 
Global warming 5,45E-02 1,55E-01 1,16E+06 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.051 
Acidification 5,20E-03 1,43E-02 4,83E+03 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.066 
Smog formation 1,46E-03 2,86E-03 5,63E+03 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.049 
Air toxicity 2,62E-02 7,27E-02 3,77E+05 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.095 
Carcinogenicity 3,63E+00 1,04E+01 9,91E-01 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.168 
Materials 1,169E+02 1,17E+02 4,80E+05 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.044 
Electrical power 8,66E-01 7,16E-01 3,51E+05 kWh/(y⋅km2) 0.064 
Waste disposal - 3,65E+00 2,32E+05 kg/(y⋅km2) 0.030 
 
Table 4.6.17: Normalized environmental indicators, normalization and weight factors for the 
assessment of case study #2. 
 
 
 
The capital investment cost of option 1 is higher than option 2, due to the special and patented 
equipment required. However operative costs are lower for option 1, since a the requirement 
for utilities (steam, cooling, nitrogen, waste disposal, etc.) is lower (Table 4.6.13). This 
second effect prevail in the calculation of NPV, under the hypothesis assumed for the discount 
and tax rates. 
 
The societal index is a combination of inherent safety and occupational impacts (Table 
4.6.18). Inherent safety was discussed above (§4.6.7)  and identifies the continuous option 1 
to be largely preferable. The employees required (occupational index) for option 2 is larger, as 
it can be observed also in the analysis of operative costs. In this option also the allocation of 
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part of the workers of the compacting plant is accounted. However, when the societal index is 
calculated inherent safety is prevalent, as expected from an highly automatic plant handling 
moderately hazardous materials. 
 
The level 2 indices reported in table 4.6.19 evidence that, in this case, the impacts on the 3 
spheres o sustainability are of the same order of magnitude. All the indices are favourable to 
option 1: environmental and economic indices reflect the lower consumption of utilities of 
this option and societal index reflects the applicability of the inherent safety guideword 
minimization. 
The result of the aggregation to an overall index is, obviously, a clear preference of option 1. 
The index is negative since the more influent parameter for the calculation, the economic 
index, is negative. 
 
 
Impact category Option 1 Option 2 Normalization factor 
Weight 
factor 
Non normalized     
Occupational index 5 people 10.2 people 7,92E+01 peop./km2  
Inherent safety index 1,33 m2/y 33,3 m2/y 7,00E+00 m2/y km2  
Normalized     
Occupational index 6,30E-02 1,29E-01  0,20 
Inherent safety index 1,90E-01 4,75E+00  0,80 
Societal index 1,39E-01 3,78E+00   
 
Table 4.6.18: Societal indices, normalization and weight factors for case study #2. 
 
 
 Option 1 Option 2 Weight factor 
Level 2    
Environmental index 5,81 7,07 0,30 
Economic index -9,09 -8,43 0,30 
Societal index 0,14 3,78 0,40 
Level 3    
Overall index -0,926 1,103  
 
Table 4.6.19: Aggregated indices and weight factors for case study #2. 
 
 
 
4.6.7 – Conclusions 
 
In the case studies described above the methods developed for sustainability and inherent 
safety assessment are applied to alternative options for treatment of materials in speciality 
chemistry plants. This represent a rather particular kind of analysis, conceptually different 
than the process selection discussed in other cases studies. Nevertheless the methods were 
applicable and yielded valuable results. The results matched with the results expected from 
experience, thus, validating the proposed approach. 
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In particular the developed methods identified the following specific conclusions on the 
assessed options: 
• The analysed processes are treatment of materials and mixtures, no reactions occur: 
thus differences in the impacts among the alternatives are mainly related to the hazard, 
costs and energy requirements of the handling operations. 
• The use of highly hazardous materials, as material B in case study #1, makes inherent 
safety a dominant aspect for this kind of processes. This hazard is enhanced when 
manual operations (e.g. forklift truck handling) are performed, since this increases the 
credibility of release. 
• Processes operating in continuous result inherently safer, since the material inventories 
are lower (minimization). 
• The use of energy and utilities is the main element defining the marginal 
environmental performance in these kind of operations, since the prevalent impacts on 
many categories derives from the emission for the use of these utilities. The absolute 
value of the environmental index is, instead, dominated by the usage of materials 
processed, since impacts are accounted for their production in former lifecycle stages. 
• Economic indices are influenced by the annual operative costs; turnover periods for 
the capital investments are usually very short for these applications. 
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4.7 – Layout definition 
 
This chapter reports some case studiers demonstrating the analysis of layout plans as 
described in §2.4. The cases encompass different typologies of plant and different section of 
the facility (e.g. process and storage sections). This allows to test the applicability of the 
different methods to the various situations. 
Further case studies with application of the KPIs for domino hazard assessment (§2.4.2.2) are 
described in §4.4.4 for hydrogen storage. 
 
 
4.7.1 – Case study A: preliminary plant layout for production of acrylic acid 
 
This case study depicts an application of the developed I2SI for layout assessment (§2.4.3.2). 
It concerns the definition of the preferable layout plan for an acrylic acid production plant. 
The analysis will compare three different options for the overall plan, aiming to select the 
better layout by an inherently safe approach. 
 
The process for acrylic acid production was already studied in the literature on inherent safety 
[Khan & Amyotte, 2005; Palaniappan et al., 2002b]. However these analysis limited to 
chemical route and process selection, not assessing layout issues, since no suitable tools were 
available for the analysis (§2.4.1). The analysis in the literature lead to identify the one-step 
catalytic oxidation of propylene in the vapor phase as the inherently safer process for acrylic 
acid production. Further process details on this process are described by Palaniappan et al., 
[2002b]. Result in good agreement with the ones from Palaniappan and co-workers were 
obtained by the application of the I2SI from literature [Khan & Amyotte, 2005]. In the 
following the developed I2SI for layout assessment (§2.4.2) is applied to three possible layout 
options for a plant based on the one-step catalytic oxidation of propylene. 
 
The set of units considered in the analysis includes the process units, the units of the storage 
section for feedstock materials and products (propylene, acrylic acid, acetic acid, solvent for 
make-up), the tank-truck loading facility and the principal plant utilities (a detailed list can be 
found in Table 4.7.1). 
Figures 4.7.1 and 4.7.2 provide details of the general plot layout and the process area layout, 
respectively, of the three possible layout options are that have been proposed for comparison 
compared. 
Each option thus presents a different solution for the design of both the overall plot plan and 
the process area configuration: 
 
• Option 1 (base option) was designed in accordance with typical safety rules used in 
industrial practice for separation distances ([Mecklenburgh, 1985; Lees, 1996] and 
references cited therein). Because this option is taken as the base case, no passive 
protection devices were considered. The units of  the process area are arranged in a 
single block, in two parallel rows following the process flow order. The storage area 
can be sub-divided into two main blocks – the pressurized storage of liquefied 
propylene (comprised of several horizontal vessels) and the atmospheric tank farm for 
storage of the liquids (acrylic acid, acetic acids and solvent). 
 
• Option 2 presents an improved layout in the process area. The units are segregated in 
two blocks (reaction and product recovery block, and separation block). A wall, acting 
as both a fire resistant wall and a blast wall, is erected at the edge of the first block. All 
units have fire insulation in place. The layout of the loading and storage area has the 
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same plot plan as option 1; however, passive protection measures (bunds and fire 
insulation) are considered in this case. 
 
• Option 3 incorporates segregation of units, a modified spatial arrangement and passive 
protection devices, all aimed at enhancing layout safety. The units in the process area 
are arranged in two segregated blocks on a single row. The control room and 
laboratory are placed at a conveniently safe distance. Fire insulation is in place on all 
units. In addition, two firewalls to protect the quencher, and a bund to contain possible 
spills from the splitter, are in place. The layout of the tank farm is improved to limit 
escalation consequences. The distance of the loading facility from the propylene 
storage area is also increased. 
 
 
4.7.2 – Results from layout safety assessment of case study A 
 
For ease of discussion, the case study A is now analyzed before limiting the perspective to the 
process area layout and then expanding it to the overall plot plan. 
 
4.7.2.1 – Process area layout of case study A 
 
The results of the analysis of the three layout options are presented in Tables 7.4.1 through 
7.4.8. The process area is discussed first because it consists of closely linked processing units 
and displays several hazardous features that can trigger escalation events. The process area 
units considered for all options are listed in Table 7.4.1. Data on the relative distances of the 
units were organized for each layout in the form of a distance matrix; an example for option 3 
is given in Table 4.7.1. 
 
Relevant primary events were identified and the DHI was calculated. An example of the 
domino hazard scoring is reported in Table 4.7.2 for option 3. As explained in §2.4.2, the 
assessment of the DHI is required for evaluation of the Inherent Safety Index, or ISI. This 
further requires consideration of the extent of applicability of the inherent safety guidewords 
attenuation and limitation of effects; thus DHI must be calculated twice for each option (i.e. 
both with and without passive protection measures). Assessment of the damage distances for 
each option (again, a requirement for ISI computation) was accomplished in the present case 
study by means of the SWeHI methodology [Khan et al., 2001]. Values of the principal 
indices for the case study analysis are  reported in Tables from 4.7.3 to 4.7.5. 
 
# Unit 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
01 Compressor - 10.2 12.6 20.3 26.7 25.0 31.0 26.0 26.2 21.8 23.0 
02 Feed mixer 10.2 - 6.8 17.0 24.1 24.9 38.8 35.7 33.7 33.0 33.7 
03 Reactor 12.6 6.8 - 10.2 17.3 18.4 35.7 33.7 30.5 33.6 33.0 
04 Quencher 20.3 17.0 10.2 - 7.1 9.5 33.2 33.2 27.0 37.0 34.5 
05 Absorber 26.7 24.1 17.3 7.1 - 6.3 33.2 34.6 27.1 40.7 37.2 
06 Splitter 25.0 24.9 18.4 9.5 6.3 - 27.0 28.7 20.8 35.8 31.8 
07 Acid extractor 31.0 38.8 35.7 33.2 33.2 27.0 - 6.8 6.2 20.1 13.5 
08 Distillation I 26.0 35.7 33.7 33.2 34.6 28.7 6.8 - 9.2 13.3 6.7 
09 Solvent mixer 26.2 33.7 30.5 27.0 27.1 20.8 6.2 9.2 - 21.0 14.9 
10 Distillation II 21.8 33.0 33.6 37.0 40.7 35.8 20.1 13.3 21.0 - 6.6 
11 Distillation III 23.0 33.7 33.0 34.5 37.2 31.8 13.5 6.7 14.9 6.6 - 
 
Table 4.7.1:  Example of distances among unit geometric centres in process area of option 
3. 
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Figure 4.7.1 Layout plan of the three options in the case study. 
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Figure 4.7.2: Layout of the process area of the three options in the case study. 
 
 
Some general observations can be made concerning the DHS data such as those reported in 
Table 4.7.2. Units located in the same block are placed at close relative distances and domino 
effects within the block are extremely likely. However, some units have the potential to 
trigger escalation events at longer distances than others. When this distance is higher than (or 
at least comparable to) the block characteristic dimensions, placing these units in the same 
layout block implicitly means accepting a heightened escalation possibility. On the other 
hand, for units that trigger escalation only at short distances, the location within the block 
largely determines the possibility of initiating an escalation chain. In block layout design, 
therefore, the location of these latter units is of strategic importance in limiting the magnitude 
of accident consequences. 
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  Primary Unit 
 # 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 
# Secondary Unit            
01 Compressor -           
02 Feed mixer 1 - 10 10 1 1 1 1.1 1 1.4 1.6 
03 Reactor 1 10 - 10 1 1 1 1.3 1 1.3 1.7 
04 Quencher 1 10 10 - 10 2 1 1 1 0.8 1 
05 Absorber 1 10 10 10 - 5 1 1.2 1 1 1.5 
06 Splitter 1     -   1.4 1.1  
07 Acid extractor 1 1.3 1.6 1 0.3 1 - 10 7 10 10 
08 Distillation I 1     1  - 2.1 10  
09 Solvent mixer 1        -   
10 Distillation II 1        1.4 -  
11 Distillation III 1 1.6 1.7 1 1 1 2.5 10 1.8 10 - 
 DHI 10 33 33 32 13 12 7 25 18 36 16 
 
Table 4.7.2: Example of DHSi,k matrix for process area. Data refer to option 3, considering 
the effect of passive protection devices. Shaded areas correspond to negligible escalation 
effects (negative escalation test). Dashed lines group together units belonging to the same 
block. 
 
 
4.7.2.1.1 – Option 1 (base case) 
 
Table 4.7.3 depicts the I2SI values for option 1. Since this is the base case, these overall index 
values are mainly influenced by the HI values. Most of the units in the process area yield 
results for I2SI  that are significantly less than unity. On the other hand, the (air) compressor 
displays relatively safer performance. This is a consequence of the low damage potential (low 
DI and hence, low HI) and the modest requirement for hazard control devices in the layout 
definition (low HCI, yielding an ISPI above the average value). Concerning the other units, 
distillation II is identified as being somewhat safer than the average – again, because of a 
lower HI, but this time due to extensive application of control devices (this is the product 
refining column and monitoring is critical for quality control purposes). As expected, the 
reactor, because it requires a high level of safety devices, has the poorest inherent safety 
performance (lowest I2SI). 
 
The results of the cost indexing for option 1 are reported in Table 4.7.6. Again, no inherent 
safety measures are considered to be applied because this is the base case. Hence, the 
conventional and inherent safety cost indices are identical. It can be observed, however, that 
the cost indices for all units are below unity, meaning that the cost of safety devices is lower 
than the expected losses. That is mainly due to the possibility of domino effects which 
significantly increases the loss parameter values. 
 
 
4.7.2.1.2 - Option 2 
 
Focusing on option 2 (Table 4.7.4), the segregation of the two unit blocks in the process area 
is effective in reducing the escalation hazard of the units located close to the gap between the 
blocks. This leads to reduced values of DHI and increased values of ISI for the attenuation 
guideword as compared to the base case (option 1). Safety is further enhanced when passive 
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# Unit ISIa ISIs ISIl ISI PHCI ISPI DI HCI HI I2SI 
01 Compressor 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 11 0.45 7 43 0.17 2.71 
02 Feed mixer 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 31 0.16 29 56 0.53 0.31 
03 Reactor 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 42 0.12 47 92 0.52 0.23 
04 Quencher 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 26 0.19 25 51 0.48 0.40 
05 Absorber 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 31 0.16 30 57 0.53 0.30 
06 Splitter 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 21 0.24 21 51 0.41 0.58 
07 Acid extractor 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 21 0.24 30 47 0.65 0.37 
08 Distillation I 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 21 0.24 22 45 0.49 0.48 
09 Solvent mixer 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 21 0.24 20 42 0.47 0.51 
10 Distillation II 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 21 0.24 21 58 0.36 0.67 
11 Distillation III 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 21 0.24 27 45 0.59 0.40 
            
12 AA storage 1 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 24 0.21 36 56 0.64 0.32 
13 AA storage 2 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 24 0.21 36 56 0.64 0.32 
14 AA storage 3 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 24 0.21 36 56 0.64 0.32 
15 AcA storage 1 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 24 0.21 38 56 0.68 0.31 
16 AcA storage 2 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 24 0.21 38 56 0.68 0.31 
17 Sol storage 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 24 0.21 14 55 0.25 0.82 
18 P storage 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 36 0.14 40 73 0.55 0.25 
19 P tanker 1.0 1.0 1.4 5.0 36 0.14 27 73 0.37 0.38 
 
Table 4.7.3: Summary of all indices evaluated in the assessment for option 1 (case base). 
AA: acrylic acid, AcA: acetic acid, Sol: solvent, P: propylene. 
 
 
 
# Unit ISIa ISIs ISIl ISI PHCI ISPI DI HCI HI I2SI 
01 Compressor 1.0 1 1.4 5.0 11 0.45 7 43 0.17 2.71 
02 Feed mixer 1.0 -10 5.7 5.0 25 0.20 29 56 0.53 0.38 
03 Reactor 1.9 1 6.2 6.5 36 0.18 47 92 0.52 0.35 
04 Quencher 1.1 1 6.7 6.8 22 0.31 25 51 0.48 0.65 
05 Absorber 1.5 -10 7.1 5.0 23 0.22 30 57 0.53 0.41 
06 Splitter 3.0 -10 21.5 19.3 17 1.13 21 51 0.41 2.74 
07 Acid extractor 5.3 -10 32.6 31.5 17 1.85 30 47 0.65 2.86 
08 Distillation I 2.4 1 15.0 15.2 17 0.89 22 45 0.49 1.82 
09 Solvent mixer 2.2 1 28.9 29.0 17 1.71 20 42 0.47 3.64 
10 Distillation II 3.7 1 9.3 10.0 17 0.59 21 58 0.36 1.66 
11 Distillation III 2.0 1 32.3 32.3 17 1.90 27 45 0.59 3.23 
            
12 AA storage 1 1.0 -10 45.1 44.0 24 1.83 36 56 0.64 2.85 
13 AA storage 2 1.0 -10 34.1 32.6 24 1.36 36 56 0.64 2.11 
14 AA storage 3 1.0 -10 34.5 33.0 24 1.38 36 56 0.64 2.14 
15 AcA storage 1 1.0 -10 36.8 35.4 24 1.47 38 56 0.68 2.17 
16 AcA storage 2 1.0 -10 41.8 40.6 24 1.69 38 56 0.68 2.49 
17 Sol storage 1.0 -10 69.4 68.7 24 2.86 14 55 0.25 11.3 
18 P storage 1.0 1 1.4 5.0 36 0.14 40 73 0.55 0.25 
19 P tanker 1.0 1 1.4 5.0 36 0.14 27 73 0.37 0.38 
 
Table 4.7.4: Summary of all indices evaluated in the assessment for option 2. AA: acrylic 
acid, AcA: acetic acid, Sol: solvent, P: propylene. 
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 devices are considered, because the separation wall poses a physical barrier to escalation 
from one block to the other. The new position of the manned buildings (control room and 
laboratory) is verified as safer because these buildings are now located further from the units 
of the product separation block. As a consequence, the value of ISI for the limitation of effects 
guideword is significantly increased. On the other hand, ISI for the simplification guideword 
yields a negative contribution to all the units close to the wall, since the wall represents an 
obstacle. However, the absolute value of this contribution is judged to be quite small, because 
in the base option the same units were similarly obstructed by the absence of the gap between 
the blocks. The final result for I2SI is an increase above unity for all units belonging to the 
product separation block. This reflects the limited possibility of escalation from hazardous 
units (such as the reactor) in the other block. 
 
From a cost perspective (Table 4.7.6), segregation of the process layout into two blocks and 
the presence of passive measures reduce the requirement for further safety measures – thus 
lowering overall safety costs. The costs of applied devices and of additional land (i.e. 
increased space requirements) were considered in the evaluation of the inherent safety cost. 
The overall effect is one of reducing the  unit ISCI value from the base case (option 1). This 
decrease in ISCI is limited to a maximum factor of about 1.4 (reference unit 05, the absorber, 
in Table 4.7.6), meaning that the safety savings are usually an order of magnitude lower than 
the total costs. The units exhibiting better performance in this regard are those near the block 
spacing gap and thus protected by the wall – for example, the aforementioned absorber as 
well as the solvent mixer (unit 09 in Table 4.7.6). 
 
 
4.7.2.1.3 - Option 3 
 
In the process area of option 3, the unit arrangement increases segregation, effectively 
reducing the DHI values as compared to the base case. This yields high values of ISI for the 
attenuation guideword (Table 4.7.5). However, it also creates limitations on applicability of 
the simplification guideword, since the piping network for connection of the various units is 
made longer. The increased unit segregation makes the passive devices more effective, since 
the escalation vectors to be countered are mitigated by distance. This results in high values of 
ISI for the limitation of effects guideword. Some contribution to this index is also provided by 
the better building location (ISIlb) and the fire resistant wall that limits the possible affected 
areas (ISIla). Focusing on I2SI, values above unity are obtained for most of the units. In 
particular, the highest values are obtained for the splitter and acid extractor because the 
arrangement and the passive protection measures serve to limit escalation possibilities as 
compared to  the base case (option 1). On the other hand, the units with the poorest 
performance are the reactor and the quencher. This is due to the domino effect from 
explosions which is not countered by the fire resistant wall. 
 
In option 3 the values of ISCI for all units in the process area are lower than the 
corresponding CSCI  values (Table 4.7.6). These cost reductions are limited in extent for the 
same reasons discussed for option 2. In particular, safety costs are significantly decreased for 
the reactor (due to unit segregation and the firewall), solvent mixer (due to location), absorber 
(due to location), and splitter (due to location and bund). It can be observed that the ISCI 
values are comparable to the results for option 2; thus both options can be considered to be at 
the same approximate level of cost effectiveness. It should be remembered, however, that 
option 3 generally displays better performance from an inherent safety perspective. 
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#  ISIa ISIs ISIl ISI PHCI ISPI DI HCI HI I2SI 
01 Compressor 1.0 1 1.4 5.0 11 0.45 7 43 0.17 2.71 
02 Feed mixer 1.7 1 12.0 12.1 21 0.58 29 56 0.53 1.10 
03 Reactor 1.7 -10 12.0 6.9 38 0.18 47 92 0.52 0.35 
04 Quencher 1.6 -30 12.8 5.0 22 0.23 25 51 0.48 0.47 
05 Absorber 8.3 -30 38.3 25.1 27 0.93 30 57 0.53 1.75 
06 Splitter 12.2 -30 55.5 48.2 17 2.84 21 51 0.41 6.86 
07 Acid extractor 36.4 -30 75.2 78.0 17 4.59 30 47 0.65 7.10 
08 Distillation I 3.1 1 16.4 16.7 17 0.98 22 45 0.49 1.99 
09 Solvent mixer 5.8 -30 37.8 23.7 17 1.39 20 42 0.47 2.97 
10 Distillation II 2.8 -10 13.1 8.9 17 0.53 21 58 0.36 1.48 
11 Distillation III 2.7 1 27.0 27.1 17 1.59 27 45 0.59 2.71 
            
12 AA storage 1 1.0 -20 54.6 50.8 24 2.12 36 56 0.64 3.29 
13 AA storage 2 1.0 -20 54.6 50.8 24 2.12 36 56 0.64 3.29 
14 AA storage 3 1.0 -20 54.6 50.8 24 2.12 36 56 0.64 3.29 
15 AcA storage 1 1.0 -20 71.3 68.5 24 2.85 38 56 0.68 4.20 
16 AcA storage 2 1.0 -20 71.3 68.5 24 2.85 38 56 0.68 4.20 
17 Sol storage 1.9 -30 99.5 94.9 24 3.96 14 55 0.25 15.5 
18 P storage 1.1 1 1.5 5.0 36 0.14 40 73 0.55 0.25 
19 P tanker 42.9 1 42.7 60.5 36 1.68 27 73 0.37 4.54 
 
Table 4.7.5: Summary of all indices evaluated in the assessment for option 3. AA: acrylic 
acid, AcA: acetic acid, Sol: solvent, P: propylene. 
 
 
 Common to All Options (Base Case) 
 
Option 1 
 
Option 2 
 
Option 3 
# CLoss 
($) 
CConvSafety 
($) 
CSCI 
 
CInhSafety 
($) 
ISCI 
 
CInhSafety 
($) 
ISCI 
 
CInhSafety 
($) 
ISCI 
 
01 32680 23500 0.72 23500 0.72 20500 0.63 20500 0.63 
02 127868 44500 0.35 44500 0.35 44423 0.35 37434 0.29 
03 138266 63000 0.46 63000 0.46 54313 0.39 46120 0.33 
04 126140 25500 0.20 25500 0.20 24333 0.19 23985 0.19 
05 47699 32500 0.68 32500 0.68 22588 0.47 25851 0.54 
06 101186 21000 0.21 21000 0.21 17324 0.17 16706 0.17 
07 69381 21500 0.31 21500 0.31 18234 0.26 19738 0.28 
08 105368 20000 0.19 20000 0.19 17652 0.17 17743 0.17 
09 113504 24000 0.21 24000 0.21 17134 0.15 16695 0.15 
10 114921 22000 0.19 22000 0.19 19751 0.17 20259 0.18 
11 57392 18000 0.31 18000 0.31 15554 0.27 15698 0.27 
          
12 118432 33500 0.28 33500 0.28 30135 0.25 30135 0.25 
13 118432 33500 0.28 33500 0.28 30178 0.25 30135 0.25 
14 118432 33500 0.28 33500 0.28 30176 0.25 30135 0.25 
15 118432 33500 0.28 33500 0.28 30165 0.25 30028 0.25 
16 118432 33500 0.28 33500 0.28 30146 0.25 30028 0.25 
17 218434 33500 0.15 33500 0.15 30081 0.14 32354 0.15 
18 437977 287500 0.66 287500 0.66 275500 0.63 309028 0.71 
19 389648 69500 0.18 69500 0.18 69500 0.18 59664 0.15 
 
Table 4.7.6: Summary of cost indices evaluated in the assessment for the three options. For 
item number, refer to Table 4.7.3. CLoss, CConvSafety and CSCI are the same for all options 
(being based on the values of the base case). 
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The analysis of the Loss Saving Index (Table 4.7.7) reveals that options 2 and 3 are by far 
more cost effective in limiting the expected loss from accidental events. This is once again 
due to the integrated effect of passive and inherent measures. The presence of several negative 
values means that the cost of these measures is fully compensated for by the expected 
decrease in loss in the event of an accident. Analyzing the details for each unit generally 
results in the same outcomes already discussed for the I2SI results. This is due to the 
predominant effect of the values of DHI on both indices (LSI and I2SI). 
 
 
# Unit Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
01 Compressor 0.72 0.36 0.33 
02 Feed mixer 0.35 0.42 0.49 
03 Reactor 0.46 -0.19 -0.27 
04 Quench tower 0.20 -0.03 -0.07 
05 Absorber 0.68 0.16 -0.06 
06 Splitter 0.21 -0.32 -0.65 
07 Acid extractor 0.31 -0.24 -0.37 
08 Distillation I 0.19 -0.36 -0.41 
09 Solvent mixer 0.21 -0.60 -0.65 
10 Distillation II 0.19 -0.32 -0.30 
11 Distillation III 0.31 -0.30 -0.27 
     
12 AA storage 1 0.28 -0.46 -0.47 
13 AA storage 2 0.28 -0.44 -0.47 
14 AA storage 3 0.28 -0.44 -0.47 
15 AcA storage 1 0.28 -0.45 -0.50 
16 AcA storage 2 0.28 -0.46 -0.50 
17 Sol storage 0.15 -0.81 -0.82 
18 P storage 0.66 0.57 0.52 
19 P tanker 0.18 0.18 -0.47 
 
Table 4.7.7: Loss saving indices of the case study. AA: acrylic acid, AcA: acetic acid, Sol: 
solvent, P: propylene. 
 
 
 
4.7.2.2 – Overall plot plan of case study A 
 
Application of the proposed index methodology to the plot plan of the base case (option 1) 
reveals that the safety distances from the literature are effective in preventing escalation from 
storage to process area and vice-versa. This is also due to the choice, derived by safety 
experience and common to all proposed layouts, of locating the propylene storage at the 
furthest feasible distance from the process area. This enhances the evaluation of the whole 
layout, since no significant interactions are then possible between the process and storage 
areas (except fragment or missile projection – which, as previously discussed, is difficult to 
limit in practice). Another observation concerning the propylene storage is that this area has 
the same tank layout in all options and therefore does not require assessment of safety 
improvement possibilities. (This again highlights the fact that indices such as I2SI are 
intended to be used in a relative, not absolute, manner to effect risk reduction.) Thus, in the 
following discussion, only the effect on the other storage units from a single propylene vessel 
is considered. 
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As shown in Table 4.7.3, the I2SI values for the storage and loading area in option 1 are 
below unity. The Inherent Safety Index (ISI) has low values, as expected for the base case. 
The values of Damage Index (DI) illustrate that all units have significant damage distances 
and hence significant potential to trigger escalation. As expected, propylene storage appears 
as a critical safety issue. The storage of solvent, however, is a relatively low hazard unit with 
respect to escalation. 
 
In option 2 (Table 4.7.4), the spatial disposition of the units is the same as in option 1. Thus, 
the I2SI values principally reflect the effect of passive measures in escalation limitation. The 
combined protection of bunding and fire insulation increases the index values of the 
atmospheric storage units for flammable liquids well above unity. 
 
In option 3 (Table 4.7.5), the improved unit spatial disposition has no effect in preventing 
escalation among unprotected atmospheric storage units (low values of ISIa); however, if 
combined with passive protection, enhanced safety performance is obtained (high values of 
ISIl, mainly due to limitation of the effects of domino escalation). On the other hand, the 
increased segregation does prevent, from an inherent safety perspective, escalation triggered 
by the propylene tank trucks at the loading station. The I2SI values are well above unity for 
all units, with good performance of the solvent storage unit made possible by adopting both 
inherent and passive measures. 
 
Table 4.7.6 and 4.7.7 show the results of cost indexing for the storage and loading area. From 
Table 4.7.6, it can be observed that storage units usually have large costs of losses, mainly 
due to the large extent of damage propagation by domino effect. For storage, ISCI values are 
therefore lower than unity, suggesting that further protective measures should be applied. 
Option 2 shows only a minor decrease in ISCI values compared to those for CSCI for the 
storage area. This is a direct consequence of the similar values of costs for conventional safety 
and inherent safety. The same conclusions generally hold for option 3. Here, though, the 
inherent safety cost for propylene storage is higher than the conventional safety cost because 
of the high land cost for unit separation. 
 
Analysis of the Loss Saving Index results in Table 4.7.7 leads to the same conclusions as 
those drawn for the process area. The loading facility offers a clear example of the previously 
discussed effect of DHI performance on both LSI and I2SI. 
 
Table 4.7.8 reports the system I2SI for each of the three options. The better performance of 
the whole plant clearly belongs to option 3 due to the positive contribution of every unit. The 
contribution to the system index of the two identified plant areas (process area and storage 
area) is equally balanced in options 1 and 2, while a difference of one order of magnitude is 
shown by option 3. This is mainly due to the good performance achieved by coupling 
segregation and passive protection in facility layout. 
 
 
 Process Units 
Storage and 
Loading Units Whole Plant 
Option 1 
(Base Case) 1.8 · 10 -2 1.6 · 10 -2 2.9 · 10 -4 
Option 2 5.2 · 10 0 8.6 · 10 0 4.5 · 10 1 
Option 3 3.2 · 10 1 1.1 · 10 2 3.4 · 10 3 
 
Table 4.7.8: System I2SI values for process area, storage area and the whole plant. 
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4.7.3 – Case study B: preliminary layout of an oil separation section 
 
Case Study B shows an application of the KPIs for domino hazard assessment proposed in 
§2.4.2.2. The lay-out analyzed in this Case Study is a section of an off-shore separation train 
for oil extraction (Figure 4.7.3). Four main pieces of equipment were considered, as shown in 
Table 4.7.9. The Table also reports design details of the equipment and the primary scenarios 
considered in the analysis. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7.3: Layout analyzed in Case Study B. 
 
 
The safety distances required for the analysis were calculated for the release scenarios using 
the swift approaches described in Appendix 2.2. This allowed the definition of the domino 
chain potential indices for the units (Table 4.7.10). The UPD values rank the units for the 
potential of triggering domino effects, no matter the actual position in the layout. The index 
may be used for a preliminary screening aimed to support an inherently safer design of the 
process, preliminary to layout definition. In this case study, three units have an equivalent 
UPD, since the considered accidental scenarios are the same. Unit E01 was identified as the 
potentially more critical unit since the VCE scenario may result in huge damage distances. 
 
On the basis of the lay-out shown in Figure 4.7.3, the values of DCA, UDI and TDI were also 
calculated. The results are reported in Table 4.7.10. The domino chain actual hazard index, 
DCA, allows identifying the more hazardous domino escalation scenarios that may take place 
between each couple of units. As shown in Table 4.7.10, the DCA is never lower than 1.  
 
 
Id. Type Substance Inventory 
(t) 
Release 
Type 
LOC Primary 
scenario 
D01 Pressurized Vessel Propane 300 continuous Vessel Leak Jet Fire 
    continuous PSV Opening Jet Fire 
E01 Pressurized Vessel Propane 60 continuous Vessel Leak Jet Fire 
    continuous Vessel Leak VCE 
    continuous PSV Opening Jet Fire 
D02 Pressurized Vessel Propane 250 continuous Vessel Leak Jet Fire 
    continuous PSV Opening Jet Fire 
D03 Pressurized Vessel Propane 250 continuous Vessel Leak Jet Fire 
    continuous PSV Opening Jet Fire 
 
Table 4.7.9: List of equipment units and accidental scenarios considered in Case Study B. 
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 D01 E01 D02 D03 
UPD 2.83·104 2.06·106 2.83·104 2.83·104 
   DCA   
 Primary unit scenario 
Target unit Jet fire VCE Jet fire Jet fire Jet fire 
D01 - 2.03·101 1.75 2.00 1.08 
E01 1.75 - - 1.40·101 2.50 
D02 2.00 1.62·102 1.40·101 - 1.40·101 
D03 1.08 2.89·101 2.50 1.40·101 - 
DCF 8.6·101 1.7·101 7.1·101 7.1·101 
UDI 4.83·101 2.11·102 3.00·102 1.76·102 
TDI 5.10·101 1.83·102 3.22·102 1.79·102 
 
Table 7.4.10: Values of the Hazard Indices (UPD, DCA, DCF, UDI, TDI) for the equipment 
units considered in Case Study B. 
 
 
Thus, as expected, none of the units in the lay-out is inherently safe with respect to escalation 
triggered by other units. This result should have been expected, since the layout is rather 
congested and inherent safety is considered in the approach (thus, the effect of passive and 
active protections is not considered). 
 
The unit domino actual hazard index, UDI, identifies the more critical sources of domino 
effects, both for the capacity to damage target units and for the number of targets that may be 
damaged. Unit D02 appears to be particularly critical from this point of view, since the unit is 
very close to E01 and D03 and it has an inventory well above the critical one. On the other 
hand, unit D01, although having the same domino potential hazard, DPC, of D02, has a UDI 
value lower of about an order of magnitude due to the higher segregation. 
The limited separation distances in the lay-out and the severity of the jet fire scenarios, 
common to all the units, are responsible as well of the high values of TDI for all the units, 
with the exception of D01 due to the higher separation distances present for this unit. 
 
 
4.7.4 – Case study C: preliminary layout of a fuel storage section 
 
Also Case Study C demonstrates the application of the KPIs for domino hazard assessment 
proposed in §2.4.2.2. This Case Study concerns the layout of a fuel storage area (Figure 
4.7.4). This comprises an atmospheric tank farm for the storage of flammable liquids and 
several pressurized liquefied gas storage units. Table 4.7.11 summarizes the main features of 
the units of concern and of the primary scenarios considered. 
 
Similarly to Case Study B, inherent safety distances were evaluated for each scenario by the 
swift approach described in Appendix 2.2. Quantification of inherent safety distances allowed 
the assessment of the hazard indices. Figure 4.7.5 summarizes the final results obtained for 
the UPD, the UDI and the TDI indices of the units. The figure shows that the UPD of the 
pressurized vessels for liquefied gas storage (D1-6) may result in scenarios (i.e. VCE)  
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characterized by inherent safety distances well above those typical of the fire scenarios of 
atmospheric tanks T1-6. However, if the actual layout is considered the situation may change, 
since the location of the target units becomes important. The escalation is possible among the 
atmospheric tanks, even if the more segregated (T1 and T3 with respect to T5 and T6) are 
inherently safe from direct mutual domino effect. This is shown by the lower values of the 
UDI for these units (T1, T3, T5, T6) compared to the central ones (T2, T4). However UDI 
values for atmospheric tanks are lower than those for pressurized storages, since the 
escalation from the former to the latter is not considered credible for the fire scenarios defined 
in Table 4.7.11. 
 
 
Figure 4.7.4: Layout analyzed in Case Study C. 
 
 
Id. Type Diameter (m) 
Height/ 
length (m) Substance Release Type 
Primary 
scenario 
T1-5 Atmospheric 35 10 gasoline Continuous 
(50mm RD) 
Pool fire 
(PD 15m) 
     Instantaneous Pool fire 
(PD 60m) 
T6 Atmospheric 16.5 16.5 gasoline Continuous 
(50mm RD) 
Pool fire 
(PD 12m) 
     Instantaneous Pool fire 
(PD 40m) 
D1-6 Pressurized 4 40 LPG Continuous 
(10 min. release) 
Jet Fire 
     Continuous 
(10 min. release) 
VCE 
     Instantaneous Fireball 
     Instantaneous VCE 
 
Table 7.4.11: List of equipment units and accidental scenarios considered in case study 2. 
RD: release diameter; PD: pool diameter. 
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On the other hand any of the horizontal pressurized storage vessels may trigger escalation 
scenarios affecting the atmospheric storage tanks. The scoring of this effect is regulated by the 
relative distances of primary units and targets. As expected, units surrounded by a larger 
number of possible targets (e.g. D3-5) result in higher values of the indices. The TDI follow 
the same patterns of UDI, but the values are not, of course, identical since for a selected 
couple of units the mutual escalation vectors may be very different. The analysis of these 
results may provide useful information on the definition of add-on measures, e.g. in order to 
limit the possibility of escalation from pressurized to atmospheric storages or to install 
passive protections on the pressurized cylinders. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7.5: Hazard Indices (UPD, UDI, TDI) for the equipment units considered in Case 
Study C. The reported values were normalized by the highest value of each index among the 
units. 
 
 
 
4.7.5 – Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the methods developed and presented in §2.4 were demonstrated by the 
application to case studies of different nature, both for plant section (layout of the process 
section of a plant, layout of storage area, overall layout) and plant type (chemical industry, 
oil-upstream and fuel storage). The case studies proved the applicability of the proposed 
methods in the various situations. 
Moreover the methods permitted the identification of the critical units within a given layout 
and the assessment of the inherent safety performance of alternative options. Since in several 
cases the outcomes of the methods matched the results expected from the experience, this 
constitutes a validation of the applied methods. 
From the analysis of the specific case studies, some general conclusions can be drawn about 
the implementation of inherent safety in layout design: 
• The strategy of unit segregation is, as expected, effective in preventing domino chains, 
thus improving the inherent safety of the layout. Considering the whole plant, 
however, an integrated application of inherent and passive measures appears as the 
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desirable way to achieve the best layout safety performance. Furthermore, the 
identification by the inherent safety approach of the hazards in the system cast the 
basis for the design of more effective the add-on measures. 
• Grouping the units in blocks generally implies accepting the domino effects within a 
given block. This is a condition frequent in process area. The position of minor units 
should be carefully designed to limit initiation possibilities for chain effects. 
• The economic consequences of loss for domino effects are typically significant. 
Therefore, limiting domino possibility by improved layout design yields important 
savings in terms of the avoided costs of accidents. 
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4.8 – Conclusions 
 
In the current section the assessment methods presented in sections 1 and 2 were applied to 
several cases studies. The application successfully met both the goals initially proposed 
(§4.0): the demonstration of the applicability of the procedure and the validation of the 
methods. 
 
The case studies concern a large variety of design problems. They differ both in the type of 
design activity to be analysed (choice of materials, design of the process, of the plant, of the 
layout) and in the function of process/plant analyzed (chemical process, storage, waste 
disposal). For each case study a detailed demonstration of the application and of the 
interpretation of the results was provided. 
The application of the pertinent method was possible for each case with an amount of 
information comparable to that available in early design phases. This proves the applicability 
and the flexibility of proposed methods as a comprehensive portfolio of design support tools. 
The sensitivity analysis confirmed the ability of the method to yield unambiguous results, 
even if the values used in the analysis were affected by a modest degree of uncertainty in the 
weight factor used. 
 
With respect to the validation of the method, all the cases studies were successful in 
identifying the critical aspects expected from process experience or from engineering 
judgement. It is worth noticing that the developed methods are able to match the variety of 
cases expected from specific process experiences. Moreover the methods yield a quantitative 
picture of the impact profile, more easily interpretable than the qualitative outcomes from 
experience or arbitrary indices of other methods proposed in the literature. 
The comparison of the results with those obtained from other literature methods evidences the 
better performance of the developed approach. In particular in the case studies on inherent 
safety assessment of alternative processes, it was possible to show that the built-in and 
subjective assumptions embedded in literature methods negatively affected the ability to 
perform the analysis. Moreover, some aspect of the safety performance, as the hazard coming 
from minor and auxiliary units quite prone to loss of containment (e.g. pump, compressors, 
heat exchangers, etc.), are frequently overlooked by conventional inherent safety approaches. 
These units were accounted by the methodologies developed in the present study. 
 
In conclusion, the portfolio of developed methods is suitable to evidence the critical issues 
and the expected sustainability and inherent safety profile of alternative design options. It can 
be effectively used to support decision making and design improvement, also in the early 
stages of design activities. It overrides several problems and gaps present in conventional 
approaches for this kind of application.  
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Section 5 
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5.1 – Conclusions 
 
In the present study, quantitative assessment tools to support the implementation of 
sustainability and inherent safety in process and plant design activities were developed. These 
approaches are suitable for the analysis of the early phases of conceptual and basic design, 
when the project is still open to changes (due to the large number of degrees of freedom), that 
may as well encompass strategies to improve sustainability and inherent safety. The 
development of such tools gives a substantial contribution to fill the present gap in the 
availability of sound supports for safety and sustainability implementation in early design. 
The portfolio of the developed tools is devoted to encompass different phases of the design 
activities, all through the lifecycle of a project. 
The principal outcomes of the study are listed in the following: 
 
• Definition of design support tools for the analysis of the sustainability profile of 
process options. The methodology consists in the assessment of a comprehensive system 
of key performance indicators aimed at mapping the performance of a process scheme. 
The indicators are combined in aggregated indices to yield a sharp representation of the 
sustainability issues and of the critical elements of the analysed process. The proposed 
procedure results in a simple and flexible tool, which allows a straightforward application 
to practical situations. In particular, the definition of the methodology required the 
development of: 
- A system of representative leading key performance indicators (KPIs) which are able 
to capture the impacts on sustainability of industrial process schemes. The integrated 
system contains technological and economic KPIs as well as KPIs for inherent safety 
and environmental performance aspects. The indicators were either selected from 
widely accepted literature approaches, if suitable, or were developed within the present 
study. The KPIs are based on impact models (also complex), but are easy and swift in 
the practical application. Their full evaluation is possible also starting from the limited 
data available during early process design. 
- Rules for the normalization and aggregation of the KPIs. Innovative reference criteria 
were developed to compare and aggregate the impact indicators on the basis of the 
actual site-specific impact burden and the sustainability policy. On the one hand this 
links the assessment of the process to the general sustainability management of the site 
and, on the other hand, it allows a straightforward comparison and aggregation of 
aspects belonging to economic, societal and environmental spheres. 
 
• Definition of design support tools for the analysis of the inherent safety performance 
of process options. The methodology follows an innovative approach in the analysis of 
inherent safety, based on both the calculation of the expected consequences of potential 
accidents and on the evaluation of the hazard of the substances and related to equipment. 
The calculation of the consequences takes advantage of the progress in the availability of 
user-friendly commercial software that significantly reduced the time requirements for 
consequence analysis. In the framework of a comparative assessment of the inherent 
safety of process options, the methodology overrides several problems present in the 
previous methods proposed for quantitative inherent safety assessment. Introducing a 
direct relation among hazard factors and consequence analysis of potential scenarios, the 
proposed methodology avoids the use of arbitrary indexes and of subjective elements. The 
final result is expected to be a more realistic and sound representation of the inherent 
safety performance. The method is extremely flexible, allowing the assessment of the 
pertinent scenarios for each unit (e.g. FMEA can be used for non-standard units) and the 
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application of the more appropriate model for the analysis of specific consequences in the 
scenario. Thus, built-in assumptions and generalizations typical of other tools are avoided, 
yielding a more specific assessment of the expected accident severity. The methodology 
produces quantitative KPIs that are suitable for both the stand-alone analysis of inherent 
safety performance and the integration of inherent safety as a key element in the 
sustainability (societal sphere) of a process scheme. With respect to the latter option, the 
method is fully compatible with the developed sustainability assessment tool. 
 
• Definition of design support tools for the analysis of the inherent safety performance 
in layout definition. The specific features in the application of inherent safety principles 
in layout design were explored and defined. As a matter of fact, very limited efforts were 
devoted in the literature to this kind of application and no assessment tools were present. 
A consequence-based approach, built on the framework of the process assessment tool 
previously defined, was developed for the identification and ranking of the expected 
hazards related to escalation chains. In fact, the hazard of a domino effect was identified 
as a core feature in the inherent safety profile of layout. A set of KPIs was defined within 
the tool for the analysis and representation of unit specific parameters useful as a reference 
in layout design. In a second step, an integrated safety screening method was developed, 
which considers not only the domino hazard, but also the compliance to inherent safety 
principles, the residue requirement for risk control measures, and the safety economics. 
The proposed tool is based on the framework of an integrated method for process analysis 
described in the current literature, in order to produce a common approach for both 
process and layout assessment. However the application within the constraints and specific 
characteristics of layout design required a systematic update of the indexing system. 
 
• Definition of a screening procedure for the identification of hazardous scenarios 
related to the formations of undesired substances in chemical systems undergoing 
anomalous or “out of control” conditions. This procedure provides key information on 
the inherent safety of materials that is required for the application of further steps of 
inherent safety analysis of processes and plants. The procedure consists of two parts: the 
application of an array of experimental protocols for the assessment of the behaviour of 
the material in anomalous conditions and a hazard interpretation phase that analyses the 
experimental results defining the hazard profile of the material. The former part is based 
on the combination of calorimetric an analytic techniques that allow for the controlled 
reproduction of standardized accidental conditions on a safe laboratory scale. The latter 
part consists of a systematic procedure both for the collection of the hazard data of 
concern and for the representation and interpretation of the hazard profile. The hazard 
analysis is based on the physio-chemical and toxicological proprieties of the substances 
identified in the experimental survey. The results are presented through index scoring 
approaches developed “ad-hoc”. The current work produced a demonstration and testing 
of this procedure, by the development of an experimental activity aimed at the analysis of 
the thermal stability of chlorinated and non-chlorinated isomers of nitrobenzaldehyde. 
 
• Validation and demonstration of the developed methods by the application to cases 
studies. The proof of the effectiveness and value of the methods was obtained by the 
application to a large number of case studies concerning different kinds of design 
activities (choice of materials, design of the process, of the plant, of the layout) and 
different types of processes/plants (chemical industry, storage facilities, waste disposal). 
For all cases the methods were able to match the results expected “a priori” by the specific 
experience that was possible to collect about the single cases. This constitutes a validation, 
since the assessment procedure is able to identify critical elements that otherwise required 
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specific knowledge to be addressed. When applicable methods exist in the literature (e.g. 
inherent safety of processes), the comparison of the results for the cases studies showed 
positive matches with the outcomes of the proposed methods. Furthermore, it clearly 
demonstrated all the limits and deficiencies of the former, that were overcame by the new 
approach. In the cases studies, the application of the pertinent method was possible for 
each system analysed, requiring an input of information comparable to the early phases of 
design. This proves the applicability and the flexibility of the proposed tools. The 
sensitivity analysis confirmed the ability of the method to yield meaningful results even in 
the presence of limited degrees of uncertainty affecting input data and weight factors. 
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